Question One Hundred on Simony, Divided into Six Articles

Next we must consider simony. Concerning this, six questions are raised. First: what is simony? Second: whether it is lawful to receive money for the sacraments. Third: whether it is lawful to receive money for spiritual acts.

Article One.

Whether simony is the deliberate will to buy and sell something spiritual or something annexed to the spiritual. With regard to the first we proceed as follows. It seems that simony is not the deliberate will to buy and sell something spiritual or something annexed to the spiritual. For simony is a kind of heresy: for it is said in [Decretum] I, q. 1: “More tolerable is the impious heresy of Macedonius and those around him who attack the Holy Spirit, than that of the simonists. For the former, by deliberation, acknowledge the Holy Spirit as a creature and servant of God the Father and the Son: but the latter make that same Holy Spirit their own servant. For every lord, if he wishes, sells what he has: whether a slave, or any other thing among his possessions.” But unbelief does not consist in the will, but rather in the intellect, as does faith also, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore simony ought not to be defined through the will.

2. Moreover, to sin deliberately is to sin from malice, which is to sin against the Holy Spirit. If therefore simony is the deliberate will to sin, it follows that it is always a sin against the Holy Spirit.
3. Moreover, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregorius says in a certain homily: “The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you have.” Therefore it is not simony to wish to buy something spiritual.
4. Moreover, the name of simony is taken from Simon Magus, of whom we read in Acts 8 that he offered money to the Apostles to buy spiritual power — namely, that whoever he laid hands on would receive the Holy Spirit. But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell something spiritual.

Fourth: whether it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things. Fifth: whether only the gift of the hand [munus a manu] makes one simoniacal, or also the gift of the tongue [munus a lingua] and of service [munus ab obsequio]. Sixth: on the punishment of the simonist.

5. Moreover, there are many other voluntary exchanges besides buying and selling — such as barter and settlement. Therefore it seems that simony is defined insufficiently.
6. Moreover, everything annexed to the spiritual is itself spiritual. It is therefore superfluous to add: “or something annexed to the spiritual.”
7. Moreover, the Pope, according to some, cannot commit simony. Yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or something annexed to the spiritual.

On the contrary, Gregorius says in the Register: “No believer is ignorant that to buy or sell an altar, tithes, or the Holy Spirit is the heresy of simony.”

I respond that it must be said that, as was stated above, an act is evil in its kind when it falls upon undue matter. But a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling, for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be compensated by any earthly price: as is said of wisdom in Proverbs 3: “She is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired cannot be compared to her.” And therefore Petrus, condemning the wickedness of Simon at its very root, said: “May your money go with you to destruction, because you thought you could obtain the gift of God with money.” Second, because that alone can be the proper matter of sale of which the seller is the owner, as is clear from the authority cited above. But a prelate of the Church is not the owner of spiritual things but their steward, according to that text of 1 Corinthians 4: “Let a man regard us in this way: as servants of Christ and stewards of the mys-

teries of God.” Third, because sale is contrary to the origin of spiritual things, which come from the gratuitous will of God. Hence the Lord himself says in Matthew 10: “You received freely; give freely.”

Therefore, one who sells or buys a spiritual thing shows irreverence toward God and toward divine things. For this reason, such a person sins with the sin of irreligion.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that just as religion consists in a certain profession of faith, which a person sometimes nonetheless does not hold in his heart; so also the vices opposed to religion carry a certain profession of unbelief, even though unbelief is not always present in the mind. In this respect, then, simony is called a heresy according to outward profession: because in selling the gift of the Holy Spirit, a person in a certain way professes himself to be the owner of a spiritual gift — which is heretical.

It must be known, however, that Simon Magus, beyond wishing to purchase the grace of the Holy Spirit from the Apostles with money, also said that the world was not created by God but by a certain higher power: as Isidorus says in the Etymologiae. And according to this, Simonists are counted among other heretics, as is clear in Augustinus’s De Haeresibus.

To the second objection it must be said that, as was stated above, justice and all its parts, and consequently all the vices opposed to them, reside in the will as in their subject. Therefore simony is fittingly defined through the will. The word “deliberate” is added to designate choice, which pertains principally to virtue and vice. But not everyone who sins by choice sins the sin against the Holy Spirit: only one who chooses sin through contempt of those things that ordinarily restrain people from sinning, as was said above.

To the third objection it must be said that the kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when one gives what one has for God’s sake — taking the word “buying” broadly, in the sense in which it is used for merit. This, however, does not attain to the full notion of buying. Both because the sufferings of this present time are not worthy, nor are any of our gifts or works, in comparison to the fu-

Commentary of Cardinal Caietanus.

In the first article of Question One Hundred, in the response to the second objection, a difficulty arises concerning these words: “Justice and all its parts, and consequently all the vices opposed to them, reside in the will as in their subject.” For these words seem to go against the Author himself. Since it is clear that he is speaking of the parts of justice not only as integral and subjective parts, but also as potential parts: otherwise he would not be speaking to the point, since he is speaking of simony, which is a vice opposed to religion, which is one potential part of justice. And since the Author also places liberality as a potential part of justice, as is clear below in q. 117, art. 5, and places it subjectively in the concupiscible [faculty], both below in q. 134,

ture glory that will be revealed in us, as is said in Romans 8. And also because merit does not consist principally in an exterior gift, act, or suffering, but in an interior disposition.

To the fourth objection it must be said that Simon Magus wished to buy spiritual power in order to sell it afterward: for it is said in [Decretum] I, q. 3, that Simon Magus wished to buy the gift of the Holy Spirit, and sought to profit by multiplied money from the sale of signs that would be performed through him. And so those who sell spiritual things resemble Simon Magus in intention; whereas in act, it is those who wish to buy them. Those who sell, however, in act imitate Gehazi, the disciple of Elisha, of whom we read in 2 Kings 5 that he received money from the leper who had been cleansed. Hence sellers of spiritual things can be called not only simonists, but also Gehazites.

To the fifth objection it must be said that under the name of buying and selling every non-gratuitous contract is understood. Hence not even the exchange [permutatio] of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices can be carried out by the authority of the parties without the danger of simony, nor can a settlement [transactio], as the laws determine. A prelate, however, can by virtue of his office make such exchanges for a useful or necessary reason.

To the sixth objection it must be said that just as the soul lives by itself while the body lives through its union with the soul; so also some things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and other such things; while others are called spiritual because they adhere to such things. Hence it is said in [Decretum] I, q. 3, in the chapter Si quis obiecerit, that spiritual things do not advance without corporeal things: just as the soul does not live corporeally without the body.

To the seventh objection it must be said that the Pope can incur the vice of simony, like any other person: for a sin is the graver in any person the higher the rank he holds. For although the goods of the Church are his as principal steward, they are not his as owner and possessor. Therefore, if he were to receive money for some spiritual thing from the revenues of some church, he would not be free from the vice of simony. And similarly, he could also commit simony by receiving money from a layman, not from the goods of the Church.

art. 4, ad 1, as above, namely in Ia IIae, q. 60, art. 5: how then can these two things stand together, namely that all parts of justice reside in the will as in their subject, and yet some part of justice, namely liberality, resides in the concupiscible faculty as in its subject?

II. To this difficulty, which was also raised in the preceding Book, q. 60, art. 5, it is said that in this matter there is something clear and something ambiguous. For it is clear, first, that all virtues that are directed toward another must posit some disposition in the will, because the will, neither by its own nature nor by the nature of the one willing, is naturally inclined toward the good

of another, such that it does not require a habit perfecting it toward directing the good toward another. Just as, conversely, we said above that because the will is naturally inclined toward one’s own good according to the higher part of appetite, therefore the will in matters pertaining to ourselves does not require a virtue.

It is clear secondly that because certain virtues, such as liberality, regard operations directed toward another — for instance, the free giving of money to another — in such a way that the passions of cupidity must be restrained, it is therefore also necessary to posit some habitual perfection in the concupiscible faculty.

What is uncertain, however, is in which of these — namely the will or the concupiscible faculty — such a virtue is to be said to reside simply and absolutely as in its subject. This does not clearly appear without a discussion of the proper acts of such virtues. For this reason, the final definition is deferred until the place mentioned above. As for the present text, it can be glossed as referring to those parts of justice that are strictly and properly parts of justice, which Tullius [Cicero] enumerated — namely those that have the character of what is owed to another in such a way that without this owing, the moral integrity of conduct is not preserved. Liberality and the like, however, are not of this kind; they partake but little of the character of what is strictly owed, being not a matter of necessity but of a higher good, as appears above in question 80, where the parts of justice are treated.

III. In the reply to the seventh objection, note first that the Pope can commit the sin of simony, just as he can commit adultery and other vices, even though he incurs no canonical censure. And this is clear.

Note secondly that, since the money the Pope might receive is of two kinds — either money of the Church or secular money — whichever he receives as the price of a spiritual thing, he commits simony, because neither belongs to him absolutely. This is evident with respect to secular money. With respect to ecclesiastical money, it is declared in the text: because the Pope is not lord but the principal steward of ecclesiastical funds, and therefore the Church’s money is not his absolutely, so that he could dispose of it at will.

Article Two.

Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. On the second point we proceed thus. It seems that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. For baptism is the gateway to the sacraments, as is said in the Third Part. But it seems lawful, in certain cases, to give money for baptism — for instance, when a priest refuses to baptize a dying child without payment. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.

2. Furthermore, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated at Mass. But some priests receive prebends or money for singing Masses. Therefore it is even more permissible to buy or sell the other sacraments.
3. Furthermore, the sacrament of penance is a sacrament of necessity, consisting chiefly in absolution. But some [confessors] who absolve from excommunication exact money for doing so. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.
4. Furthermore, custom makes that not a sin which would otherwise be a sin: thus Augustinus says that having several wives, when

Note thirdly that, since the Pope’s power over the temporal goods of the Church is the power not of a lord but of a steward, as the text says, it follows that the fullness of papal power over the temporal goods of the Church does not exceed the limits of stewardly power — just as in natural things the fullness of the power to heat does not exceed the limits of the power to heat, and in political affairs the fullness of royal power does not exceed the limits of royal authority. Accordingly, the Pope cannot give away the Church’s goods at will; but he can, as one holding the apex of stewardly power, dispose of those same goods far more extensively than any other immediate prelate of a particular church.

And by this the solution becomes clear to the question of merchants — namely whether those who have earned usury from various clerics, but at fixed rates, can come to an arrangement with the Lord Pope: for instance, if the usury amounts to fifteen thousand ducats, to give the Pope three or four thousand and retain the rest with a clear conscience. For it is evident that the merchant would not thereby be absolved in conscience. Both because the Pope is not lord but steward of ecclesiastical goods, and such a composition would not be an act of stewardship, which implies a discerning disposition; and also because even if the Pope were the lord, it is reasonably presumed that he would not be giving freely, but rather ransoming himself from annoyance by taking as much as he could get. The clearest sign of this is that in the composition he strives to recover as much as possible.

From the same foundation — namely that the Pope is not lord but steward — it also follows that he cannot by the fullness of his power give the Church’s goods at will to whomever he pleases, or to his relatives, etc.; but he is bound to dispense them faithfully as right reason dictates, in accordance with: “Now it is required of stewards that one be found faithful.” And again: “A faithful and wise servant, whom the lord has set over his household, to give them their measure of wheat in due season” — and not at will, as much as he wishes.

that it was the custom, was not a sin. But among some there is a custom that at the consecrations of bishops, the blessings of abbots, and the ordinations of clerics, something is given for the chrism, holy oil, and other such things. Therefore it seems that this is not unlawful.

5. Furthermore, it sometimes happens that someone maliciously impedes another from obtaining a bishopric or some other dignity. But it is lawful for anyone to redeem himself from such harassment. Therefore it seems lawful in such a case to give money for a bishopric or some other ecclesiastical dignity.
6. Furthermore, matrimony is a sacrament of a kind. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell the sacraments for money.

On the contrary, it is said in Causa I, question 1: “Whoever has ordained anyone for money, let him be excluded from the priesthood.”

I respond that it must be said that the sacraments of the new law are supremely spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, which cannot be valued in money and whose very nature is incompatible with not being given gra-

tuitously given. The sacraments, however, are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, who must be supported by the people, according to the Apostle’s word, 1 Corinthians 9: “Do you not know that those who serve in the temple eat of what belongs to the temple, and those who serve at the altar share in the offerings of the altar?” Therefore it must be said that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments is the crime of simony, which no custom can excuse, because custom cannot override natural or divine law. By “money” is understood everything whose value can be assessed in money, as the Philosopher says in Ethics IV. But to receive certain things for the sustenance of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the ordinance of the Church and approved customs, is neither simony nor a sin; for it is received not as the price of a transaction, but as a stipend of necessity. Hence on the text of 1 Timothy 5, “Let the elders who rule well,” etc., the Gloss of Augustinus says: “Let them receive the sustenance of necessity from the people, and the reward of stewardship from the Lord.”

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that in a case of necessity anyone can baptize. And since one must never act sinfully, it amounts to the same thing if a priest refuses to baptize without payment as if there were no one to baptize. Therefore the one who has charge of the child in such a case could lawfully baptize the child himself, or have him baptized by any other person. He could, however, lawfully purchase the water from the priest, since that is purely a bodily element.

If, however, it were an adult who desired baptism and death were imminent, and the priest would not baptize him without payment, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by another. But if he could not have recourse to another, he should in no way give a price for baptism, but should rather die without it; for what is lacking from the sacrament is supplied to him by the baptism of desire.

To the second objection it must be said that a priest does not receive money as the price of the consecration of the Eucharist or of the singing of a Mass — for this would be

Commentary of Cardinal Caietanus.

In the second article, in the reply to the first objection, a doubt arises whether in the case described in the text — where an adult at the point of death has no one willing to baptize him without money — there is room for the redemption of one’s own harassment. The reason for the doubt is this: if there is such room, it follows that one may lawfully give money to a greedy priest to baptize him, not by purchasing baptism but by redeeming himself from harassment. And consequently, he ought not to die without the baptism of water. The text says the opposite. But if there is no such room, it seems very remarkable why Abraham, not in such great necessity, was permitted to redeem himself from harassment by paying for a burial place; and why Jacob was permitted in this same way

simoniacal; rather it is received as a stipend of his sustenance, as has been said.

To the third objection it must be said that money is not exacted from one who is absolved as a price for absolution — for this would be simoniacal — but rather as a penalty for the preceding fault for which he was excommunicated.

To the fourth objection it must be said that, as has been said, custom cannot override the natural or divine law by which simony is forbidden. And therefore if certain things are exacted by custom as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling, it is manifest simony — especially if they are exacted from an unwilling party. But if they are received as a kind of stipend approved by custom, it is not simony — provided, however, that the intention of buying or selling is absent and the intention is referred solely to the observance of the custom, and especially when someone pays voluntarily. In all these matters, however, one must carefully guard against anything that has the appearance of simony or greed, according to the Apostle’s word, 1 Thessalonians 2: “Abstain from every form of evil.”

To the fifth objection it must be said that before someone has acquired a right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend through election, provision, or collation, it would be simoniacal to redeem with money the obstacles raised by adversaries; for in this way one would be using money to prepare a path toward obtaining a spiritual thing. But after a right has already been acquired by someone, it is lawful to remove unjust impediments by means of money.

To the sixth objection it must be said that some hold that it is lawful to give money for marriage because in it no grace is conferred. But this is not entirely true, as is said in the Third Part of this work. And therefore it must be said otherwise: that matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church but also an office of nature. And therefore to give money for matrimony insofar as it is an office of nature is lawful; but insofar as it is a sacrament of the Church, it is unlawful. And therefore the laws forbid that anything be exacted for the nuptial blessing.

to pay for his birthright; as the Author says in article 4, reply to the third objection of this question.

II. On this matter Petrus de Palude says, in his commentary on the Fourth Book, distinction 5, article 3, that here there is no room for the redemption of harassment. His reasoning rests on a distinction among those who harass. Some are those who can harm by deed but cannot benefit by right. From such persons it is lawful to redeem one’s harassment, as is evident when someone elected to a bishopric redeems himself from factual troublemakers who have no right to confer anything. Others, however, are those who can both harm by deed and benefit by right. From such persons it is not lawful to redeem oneself, as is evident in the example given regarding the one who confers the confirmation [of election]; for if

the confirmer were to harass the elect by refusing to confirm him, it would not be lawful for him to give money. And the reason for the difference is that in giving [money] the elect would be preparing a path for himself to acquire the episcopate, which is conferred by the confirmer. The same applies here: because the one who baptizes confers the character on the one being baptized.

Others, however, make a distinction and say that the case can arise in two ways. First, in the case of an adult being baptized for himself. In this case, they agree in saying that he ought rather to die than pay a greedy priest. Second, in the case of an adult acting on behalf of a dying infant — adding to the case the condition that the adult is entirely incapable of baptizing, for instance because he lacks the necessary members. In this case they say that it is lawful to give money to a priest so that he will baptize the infant, not by purchasing the sacrament, but by redeeming the child from harassment. The reason for the distinction is that an adult can be saved through baptism of desire [baptismus flaminis], whereas an infant is in extreme necessity with no other remedy available. This is the opinion of Panormitanus, in the chapter Cum in Ecclesia under the heading Rubra, on Simony; and of certain authors cited by Richardus in the twenty-fifth distinction of the Fourth [Book of the Sentences], article 3, question 1, reply to objection 8. Richardus himself, however, inclines to the opposite view.

III. Among these opinions, the one that seems more consonant with reason is that which holds that redemption from harassment applies here in the case of an infant at the point of death, but not in the case of an adult. The reason that moves me is this: the one to be baptized in this case suffers an injustice from one who is able but unwilling to baptize — for such a person is bound by the necessity of divine precept to baptize, in this situation, one who comes before him in danger of death without a baptizer, just as he would be obliged to feed a man dying of hunger if he encountered him. For it is universally and manifestly true that anyone may lawfully free himself from an injustice he is suffering by paying some price — since this is nothing other than making use of the wickedness of one who is ready, indeed actively committing, that wickedness, for one’s own necessary good — that is, to redeem oneself from harassment. Hence, because between an infant and an adult in this case there is this difference — that the infant suffers an injustice if not baptized, for it loses access to eternal life owed to it through the act of baptism; whereas the adult does not lose that access, since the way of baptism of desire lies open to him (although the greedy man, by refusing to baptize, inflicts an injustice as far as he is concerned on both) — therefore the one who has care of the infant, if he cannot himself baptize (for instance, because he is mute), may lawfully give money to the greedy priest so that he will baptize, not purchasing the sacrament, but removing the obstacle that prevents baptism, namely that avarice insofar as it impedes baptism. Nor is this contrary to the Author’s text, since he does not address this particular case.

And by this the reply to Petrus’s argument is also clear, if it be raised against this position. For the money is not given to the one causing harassment in order that he may confer a right, but in order that he may remove an unjust impediment and consequently confer the right freely, without being impeded. Nor is the case of the confirmer of an election analogous, for there is no necessity there as there is here; nor is the rectitude of the giver’s intention assured there as it is here, since no temporal benefit is being sought.

In articles two, three, and four together, a difficulty arises: whether it is lawful for priests, preachers, and ministers of divine worship to set a maintenance stipend under a formal agreement. The source of the difficulty is that all the laws proclaim the negative [i.e., that it is not lawful], condemning such agreements in these matters and imposing penalties if they are made. And in the text, article three, reply to the second objection, it is expressly said: “If agreements of this kind are entered into, or even with the intention of buying or selling, it would be simony.”

On the affirmative side, however, there stands the custom approved by the Church — namely, that priests who agree to serve a chapel for a year enter into a formal agreement for an annual sum of money. Nor are there lacking preachers who, by means of a formal agreement, wish the amount to be paid to them for Lent to be understood as covering their sustenance. The supporting reason may then be stated as follows: to want a maintenance stipend is not to want something temporal in exchange for something spiritual; therefore to want such a stipend by formal agreement is not to sell spiritual things; and therefore it is not unlawful. The first inference is evident because an agreement does not change the substance of acts — for the substance is the same whether a silver vessel is given as a gift

or sold. And therefore, if to want a maintenance stipend absolutely is not to want something temporal in exchange for something spiritual, then to want the same thing by formal agreement is likewise not to want something temporal in exchange for something spiritual — which would be selling. The second inference is evident because this would be unlawful only if it were unlawful, namely to want something temporal in exchange for something spiritual. Therefore, on this analysis of the wrongdoing, the resolution is that it is not unlawful.

II. A second difficulty arises: whether in matters of this kind pertaining to spiritual ministry it is lawful to sell one’s personal labor and hire out one’s services under a price agreement. The source of the difficulty on the affirmative side is that bodily labor, and similarly bodily services, belong to the category of temporal things, not spiritual things. But to sell or hire out temporal things is no sin.

This is confirmed. For if this were intrinsically unlawful, it would not be lawful in some spiritual matters and unlawful in others, but across the whole category of spiritual things it would either be lawful or unlawful throughout. But, as experience attests, it is clearly lawful in many spiritual matters: for a priest lawfully hires out his services in celebrating [Mass] three times a week and the like; and the labor he must expend in traveling to a village to celebrate he lawfully sets at a price; a doctor of theology also sells his services and labor, just as an advocate sells just legal counsel. In other spiritual matters, therefore, since they are not different from these, it will be lawful.

The negative side, however, is supported by two arguments. The first: since all ecclesiastical things that are called spiritual — such as the administration of sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, preaching, and divine worship — consist of two elements, namely a spiritual and a temporal (for the spiritual in them is grace, truth, and the like; while the temporal is the human action), then if it is lawful to sell or hire these out by reason of the human action, all ecclesiastical things would lawfully be saleable in an absolute sense; so that just as it is lawful to sell a chalice by reason of its material, so, proportionally, it would be lawful to sell all such spiritual things by reason of their human action. This is confirmed from the definition of simony, in which selling what is annexed to spiritual things is included. But it is clear that things simultaneous [with the spiritual] are more closely annexed to spiritual things than those to which spiritual things stand as antecedents. But human action in these matters is simultaneous with the spiritual. Therefore it is even less saleable than an ecclesiastical benefice, to which the spiritual stands as antecedent, and which is said to be altogether unsaleable.

The second argument is that, unless a distinction is made between a maintenance stipend and the sale of labor or the hiring out of services — as with an advocate or a doctor — then just as it is lawful for an advocate and a doctor, however wealthy, to sell their teaching and advocacy, so it will be lawful for wealthy priests and preachers to hire out their services, sell their labor, and consequently receive temporal goods from the people not for the sake of sustenance but under the title of wages. And consequently all the laws will collapse.

III. For the clarification of these matters, it must be understood that between a maintenance stipend and a stipend for hired services there is this difference: a stipend for hired services has the character of wages, in accordance with Matthew 20 — “Call the workers and pay them their wages” — whereas a maintenance stipend does not have the character of wages but of necessary or fitting support for ministers. From this it follows that one who gives something temporal, say money, to ministers of the Church for their sustenance is not giving money as the price of their services or labor, but solely to sustain them in food and clothing, so that having nourishment and covering they may devote themselves freely to ecclesiastical offices. But one who gives something temporal to those same ministers in return for their labor renders it as the price of labor and services, as the very name “hiring” indicates.

IV. From the fact that a maintenance stipend functions as something necessary without which the minister cannot, while preserving the respectability proper to his station, exercise divine offices, it follows that a maintenance stipend may be set by formal agreement, no less than the provision of other things needed for divine service — such as a chalice, sacred vestments, and the like. So that just as a priest who is to celebrate at someone’s request may stipulate by formal agreement that the one calling him shall pro-

vide a chalice, altar, sacred vestments, and the like without which he cannot celebrate; so too he may stipulate by formal agreement for his sustenance, without which he cannot devote himself to the ministry of the priesthood. And in this no simony intervenes.

Two things, however, must be noted here. First, that under the term “sustenance” there comes not only food and drink, but whatever is necessary for the food and clothing of himself and those in his care. For a priest ought not to have to beg for the support of his own family members, aged parents, or small grandchildren left in his care by the laws of nature, and the like.

Second, that a sustenance stipend can come about in two ways. The first is freely given, or by the authority of a superior. In this case it does not require that the one for whose sustenance it is given be in need — as is evident from the fact that, according to the laws, even the wealthiest bishop on visitation is owed a procuratio [i.e., hospitality expenses]. The other way is by formal agreement. In this case it can lawfully accrue only to a poor person who is actually in need of a sustenance stipend. For a priest who has sufficient means to live honestly according to his station, if he seeks a maintenance stipend by formal agreement, is shown to be lying when he agrees to such a stipend as necessary without which he cannot comfortably serve in the priesthood — since without that stipend he can do so comfortably. Hence it is shown that he is agreeing not to a sustenance stipend but to a stipend for his services — the lawfulness of which will be treated in the following difficulty. In this first difficulty, therefore, we speak only of a sustenance stipend.

In reply to the objections on the other side, it is said that placing ecclesiastical ministries under formal agreement can be understood in two ways. The first is simply and absolutely — as when one says, “I want such an amount of money for the ministry,” or “if I am to minister.” Such agreements are prohibited and called simoniacal in law and in the text. The second way is conditionally or with qualification — for example, “If I am to minister in spiritual matters, I want, for my maintenance stipend, such an amount: because otherwise I cannot comfortably devote myself to the ministry.” Such qualified agreements, made by ministers who are in need, are not simoniacal before God, who sees a right heart; nor are they simoniacal before the Church, to which it is or can be apparent both that the minister is in need and that the qualification expressly inserted in the agreement — namely, for necessary sustenance — is present. So much for the first difficulty.

V. To the second difficulty it is said that in ecclesiastical ministries it is lawful, speaking in absolute terms, to hire out one’s services by formal agreement. First, because this is the practice of the Church, as is evident from priests who are engaged to serve as monthly or annual chaplains — for an agreement intervenes that they are to be paid a certain amount each month. Second, because the same reasoning applies to an explicit agreement as to an implicit agreement. But an implicit agreement is found to be approved in law, as is evident from the title Extra, de Praebendis, chapter Significatum. Therefore it is also lawful to bargain explicitly about the price of services. Third, because the laws and the doctors approve the hiring out of services in matters of this kind. But it is clear that a hire can be confirmed by agreement and contract. Fourth, because the Apostle, speaking on this matter in 1 Corinthians 9, says: “Who ever serves as a soldier at his own expense?” For if no one is required to serve as a soldier at his own expense, one may bargain for a stipend for one’s services, just as a soldier in the armed forces does, following the Apostle’s reasoning. This is confirmed by the fact that the Lord, speaking of the work of the disciples in Luke 10, adds: “The laborer is worthy of his wages.” What could be plainer?

Therefore an agreement may lawfully be made concerning the wages of human work and labor in ecclesiastical offices. This opinion is further confirmed by the argument already given: namely, that a temporal thing may be placed under formal agreement. And although this is true in principle on the side of the thing itself, yet because in outward appearance it has the look of something evil — since in this way the door to simoniacal frauds is opened — the Church has therefore prohibited agreements of this kind.

VI. But this opinion does not seem reasonable. For the Church prohibits agreements because they are unlawful, and not the other way around — as is evident from the fact that the doctors, who agree with ecclesiastical law on this matter, appear to differ on [the reasons for] it.

It seems, therefore, that something different must be said, by setting out one proposition as a rule: namely, that a spiritual thing cannot

be the basis of a price or monetary valuation. The truth of this rule is manifested inductively. For a consecrated chalice cannot be sold at a higher price by reason of its consecration; and an estate that carries the right of patronage cannot be sold at a higher price by reason of that right of patronage; and things that are purely spiritual are altogether unsaleable, as is evident.

After this rule, a distinction must be drawn: certain things are a mixture of spiritual and temporal in which the principal object of interest is what is temporal; while in others the principal object of interest is what is spiritual.

In accordance with this distinction, it is said that those things in which the principal object is temporal may be placed under formal agreement, whereas those in which the principal object is spiritual may not be placed under formal agreement. The reason for both conclusions is one: that the accessory follows the principal — so that the accessory is not priced in either case, but accompanies the principal as something concurrent.

VII. From these two conclusions, an account must be given of all the objections and cases arising on both sides. From them it is clear, first, why cantors for the chapels of the Pope, lords, and churches — as also organists — may lawfully hire out their services by formal agreement. For the principal thing sought from them is human work, not anything spiritual (although human work is engaged for spiritual ends): what is sought in them is voice, artistic skill, and the like, which are sensible and temporal things.

It is clear, second, why advocates and doctors of any faculty may lawfully sell their services. For the principal thing sought from them is human assistance, whether toward justice or toward knowledge: just legal counsel renders temporal assistance that is monetarily assessable; and a doctor renders great temporal assistance to a student through explaining, applying, and the like.

It is clear, third, why it is not lawful to bargain for celebration of Mass, prayer, administration of the sacraments, the divine office or [office] of the dead, preaching, holy oil, chrism, the blessing of those being married. For in all these, the principal thing sought is spiritual; and whatever temporal element intervenes in them is not assessed except by reason of the spiritual.

Nevertheless, because in matters that are accidental even the wise can be mistaken, as Aristotle says, it must be noted that it is one thing to speak of the celebration of Mass absolutely, and another to speak of the obligation to celebrate Mass in a given place, a certain number of times per week, at a particular hour, and so forth. These conditions are accidentally attached, and are temporal; and therefore they may be placed under formal agreement. So that, although a priest cannot hire out the act he performs in celebrating, preaching, administering sacraments, and the like — since, as has been said, it is assessed and given a price by reason of the spiritual, which is the principal object sought — he can nevertheless hire out or sell his obligation to keep and present his person in a given place, a certain number of times per week, at a certain time, and so on: because these things are temporal and constitute notable, accidental constraints on his personal freedom that are accidentally joined to the act of celebration and the like. This does not apply, however, to one who does not hire himself out but celebrates spontaneously whenever occasion arises: for there is nothing notably temporal that intervenes accidentally in one who celebrates in this way spontaneously, and therefore, if he were to make an agreement about a price, he would be entering into an agreement about something spiritual. Because, therefore, in these monthly or annual obligations to celebrate and the like, these temporal accidents intervene, they are said to hire out their services lawfully. This is not conceded for those who are not bound by these accidental conditions.

VIII. Hence, in reply to the objections on the other side, each is answered separately. To the first it is said that although both labor and human service in the administration of the sacraments are something temporal, yet because the basis of their valuation is what is spiritual, it is not lawful to sell them — as is evident in the case of holy oil and chrism; for each of these is something temporal, yet since it is not valued except by reason of the spiritual, it is not lawful to sell them.

To the second it is said that the reason for the difference is manifest: because in some things the principal object of assessment is

in some [cases] the thing valued is temporal, in others spiritual. And regarding the priest who hires himself out, this has already been addressed.

As for the labor one undergoes in traveling to a place of celebration or preaching, this is not to the point. For it is incidental, and can be placed under a price: as can the expenses incurred along the way. The labor that intervenes in the act of celebration and preaching itself, however, is an intrinsic part of celebration and preaching: since God dispenses spiritual things through such human acts.

A Doctor of Theology also differs from a preacher in this respect: the doctor is sought for the temporal benefit of learning in theology, as in the other sciences; but the preacher is sought only for spiritual benefit, as if the preacher were an instrument of the Holy Spirit for purging, illuminating, and perfecting human beings according to the grace of adoption. Hence no one may preach unless sent — according to that saying in Romans 10: How shall they preach unless they are sent? And therefore a preacher cannot contract for payment for his work and labor in preaching. Although for this there is also another reason from the same authority: namely, that whoever preaches does so by virtue of a delegated office, and therefore must be content with the stipends set by the one who delegated him — namely, the stipend of sustenance — and cannot hire himself out again to the people, having already hired himself out to the one who delegated him. It does not pertain to the vice of simony, however, if a preacher should prefer to preach in a place where he knows a larger alms has been set, rather than elsewhere: but it does pertain to a defect of charity, by which one attends more to temporal than to spiritual advancement.

Article Three.

Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual acts. With regard to the third we proceed as follows. It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual acts. For the exercise of prophecy is a spiritual act. But something was formerly given to prophets: as is clear from 1 Samuel 9 and 1 Kings 14. Therefore it seems lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual act.

2. Moreover, prayer, preaching, and the praise of divine utterances are most eminently spiritual acts. But money is given to saints and other holy men in order to obtain their prayerful intercession, according to that saying in Luke 16: Make friends for yourselves by means of the mammon of unrighteousness. To preachers who sow spiritual things, temporal support is owed, according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9. To those who celebrate divine praises in the ecclesiastical office and lead processions, something is also given, and sometimes annual revenues are assigned for this purpose. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual acts.
3. Moreover, knowledge is no less spiritual than [spiritual] power. But it is lawful to receive money for the use of knowledge: as it is lawful for an advocate to sell just legal counsel, a physician to sell medical advice, and a teacher to sell the office of teaching. Therefore, by the same reasoning, it seems lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of spiritual power — for instance, for a correction, or a dispensation, or something of that kind.

Regarding advocates, it has already been said that they are understood to be selling temporal assistance. And therefore, since they furnish great assistance by way of great counsel in great causes, they wish to be paid handsomely. And rightly so: for such rare assistance, acquired at the cost of so many sleepless nights, labors, and expenses, is worth that much.

IX. Through these considerations the reply to the arguments of the opposing opinion becomes clear, except for the authorities of the Apostle and the Lord. To the first of these it is said that both the Apostle and the Lord are speaking of the stipend of sustenance: as is clear from the Apostle’s conclusion, namely, that it is lawful to live from the Gospel. And that the Lord ordained this, the Apostle himself there testifies, explaining how those words of the Lord, The laborer is worthy of his wages, are to be understood in this context. Matthew also clarified this in chapter 10, saying that the Lord said: The laborer is worthy of his food. This meaning is also clear from the fact that the Lord, both in Matthew and in Luke, after commanding the Apostles to go without purse or bag, granted them the stipend of sustenance — namely, food and drink — at the hands of those who heard them.

X. Since temporal support may be sought or given in exchange for the provision of spiritual things under three headings — namely, as a price, as a stipend of sustenance, and as a stipend for hired labor — the first heading constitutes simony; the second was ordained by the Lord in both Testaments and can be stipulated by contract with the poor when necessity demands on account of the inhumanity of those being served in spiritual things; the third applies to those [acts] in which the principal thing sought is temporal, and incidentally in certain spiritual [acts], as is clear from what has been said.

4. Moreover, religious life is a state of spiritual perfection. But in some monasteries, something is required from those who are received. Therefore it is lawful to require something in exchange for spiritual [benefits].

But against this is what is said in [Decretum] I, q. 1: “Whatever is granted by the consolation of invisible grace must never be sold for gain or any kind of reward.” But all such spiritual things are granted through invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to sell them for gain or reward.

I reply that, just as the sacraments are called spiritual because they confer spiritual grace, so also certain other things are called spiritual because they proceed from spiritual grace and dispose toward it. These things are administered through the ministry of human beings, who must be sustained by the people to whom they administer spiritual things: according to that saying in 1 Corinthians 9: Who serves as a soldier at his own expense? Who tends a flock and does not eat of the flock’s milk? And therefore to sell what is spiritual in such acts, or to buy it, is simoniacal. But to receive or give something for the sustenance of those who minister spiritual things, in accordance with the ordinance of the Church and approved custom, is lawful — provided, however, that the intention of buying and selling is absent, and that it is not exacted from the unwilling through the withholding of spiritual things that are owed, for that would have a certain appearance of selling. When spiritual things have first been given freely,

the customary and established offerings, and any other revenues, may lawfully be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, with the authority of a superior intervening.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that, as Hieronymus says in his commentary on Micah, certain gifts were offered voluntarily to good prophets for their sustenance — not as if to purchase the use of prophecy — which use, however, false prophets turned to profit.

To the second it must be said that those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain their prayerful intercession do not give on the condition of intending to purchase prayers: rather, through gratuitous beneficence, they stir the hearts of the poor to pray for them freely and out of charity. To preachers also, temporal support is owed for the sustenance of preachers, not for purchasing the word of preaching. Hence the Gloss on 1 Timothy 5 — Elders who lead well, etc. — says: “It is of necessity to receive that by which one lives; it is of charity to provide it: yet the Gospel is not for sale, so that it should be preached in exchange for these things. For if they sell it thus, they sell a great thing at a cheap price.” Likewise, some temporal support is given to those who praise God in the celebration of the ecclesiastical office, whether for the living or the dead — not as a price, but as a stipend of sustenance. And on the same basis certain alms are received for leading processions in some funeral rites.

If, however, such things are done with a contract intervening, or even with the intention of buying or selling, it would be simoniacal. Hence a [church] ordinance would be illicit if it were decreed in some church that a procession would not be held at anyone’s funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid: because such a statute would foreclose the possibility of freely rendering the office of piety to some persons. An ordinance would be more licit, however, if it were decreed that to all who give a certain alms such an honor would be rendered: because by this the way of providing [a procession] for others would not be foreclosed. Furthermore, the first ordinance has the appearance of exaction, while the second has the appearance of gratuitous recompense.

To the third it must be said that the one to whom spiritual power is entrusted is bound by office to the use

Commentary of Cardinal Caietanus.

In the third article, toward the end, note that just as the text of the Decretum prohibiting anything to be given or received for admission to a monastery is glossed to mean that this applies when something is sought or given as a price for admission — which is the case when, by contract, something is exacted from someone the monastery does not need — but if the monastery is in need and openly stipulates that such an amount must be given for necessary sustenance, there is no simony: so also must the other laws on this matter be interpreted. Hence when the number of nuns that can be sustained without want has been fixed, such that if more were to be received,

of the power entrusted to him in the dispensation of spiritual things; and he also has fixed stipends from ecclesiastical revenues for his own sustenance. Therefore if he were to accept something for the use of spiritual power, it would not be understood as hiring out his labor — which he is bound to expend by the duty of the office he has accepted — but would be understood as selling the very use of spiritual grace. And for this reason, it is not lawful to accept anything for any dispensation whatsoever; nor for delegating one’s functions; nor for correcting one’s subjects, or for refraining from correcting them. It is lawful for them, however, to receive procurations when they visit their subjects — not as a price for correction, but as a due stipend.

One who possesses knowledge, however, does not thereby take on an office by which he is bound to render the use of that knowledge to others. And therefore he may lawfully receive payment for his teaching or counsel — not as selling truth or knowledge, but as hiring out his labor. If, however, he were bound to this by office, he would be understood to be selling truth itself: and hence he would sin gravely. As is evident in those who are appointed in certain churches to teach the clergy of the church and other poor [students], for which they receive a benefice from the church: from whom it is not lawful to receive anything — neither in order to teach, nor in order to observe or omit certain feast days.

To the fourth it must be said that for admission to a monastery it is not lawful to exact or receive anything as a price. It is lawful, however, if the monastery is poor and insufficient to support so many persons, to grant admission to the monastery freely, but to accept [payment] for the sustenance of the person who is to be received in the monastery, if the monastery’s means are insufficient for this. Similarly, it is also lawful if, on account of the devotion which someone shows toward the monastery by making generous alms, that person is more readily received in the monastery; just as it is likewise lawful to draw someone toward devotion to the monastery through temporal benefits, so that he may thereby be inclined to enter the monastery — though it is not lawful to give or receive anything by contract for admission to the monastery, as is held in [Decretum] I, q. 2, cap. Quam pio.

the monastery would be burdened, such that something of what is needed would thereby be lacking to the other sisters; it could lawfully be decreed that beyond such a number, no one is to be received unless she brings relief for the burden that would follow — for instance, a thousand gold pieces. For this is not exacting [payment] for admission, but for sustenance. Nor does it foreclose the way to others, since the very fixing of the number — which is done in accordance with the laws — closes the way: rather, it is opening the way of entry to those who have temporal means by which they can and are willing to relieve the monastery’s burden.

Article Four.

Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to the spiritual. With regard to the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to the spiritual. For all temporal things seem to be annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things are to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If therefore it is not lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things, it will be lawful to sell nothing temporal. But this is clearly false.

2. Moreover, nothing seems more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. But it is lawful to sell them for the ransom of captives, as Ambrosius says. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.
3. Moreover, the right of burial, the right of patronage, and the right of primogeniture seem to be annexed to spiritual things according to the ancients (since firstborn sons, before the [Mosaic] law, performed the office of priest); and likewise the right of receiving tithes. But Abraham bought from Ephron the double cave for burial, as is recorded in Genesis 22 [recte Gen. 23]. Jacob bought from Esau the right of primogeniture, as is recorded in Genesis 25. The right of patronage also passes with the sale of the property and is granted as a fief. Tithes have also been granted to certain soldiers and can be redeemed. Prelates sometimes retain for a time the fruits of prebends they confer, even though prebends are annexed to spiritual things. Therefore it is lawful to buy and sell things annexed to spiritual things.

But against this is what Pope Paschalis says, found in [Decretum] I, q. 3, cap. Si quis obiecerit: “Whoever among them has sold one without which the other does not come, has abandoned neither one [unexchanged].” Let no one therefore buy a church, a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical.

I respond that it must be said that something can be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. In one way, as dependent on spiritual things: just as holding ecclesiastical benefices is said to be annexed to spiritual things because it belongs only to one who holds clerical office. Hence things of this kind can in no way exist apart from spiritual things. And on this account they can in no way lawfully be sold: because, when they are sold, the spiritual things themselves are understood to be subjected to the sale.

But some things are annexed to spiritual things insofar as they are ordered toward spiritual things: such as the right of patronage, which is ordered toward presenting clerics for ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels, which are ordered toward the use of the sacraments. Hence things of this kind do not presuppose spiritual things, but rather precede them in order of time. And therefore

they can be sold in some manner, but not insofar as they are annexed to spiritual things.

To the first, therefore, it must be said that all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things as to an end. And therefore the temporal things themselves may indeed be sold: but the ordering of them toward spiritual things ought not to fall under a sale.

To the second it must be said that sacred vessels too are annexed to spiritual things as to an end. And therefore their consecration cannot be sold: nevertheless, for the necessity of the Church and the poor, the material of which they are made can be sold; provided that, after a prayer has been offered, they are first broken apart; because after their breaking they are understood not to be sacred vessels, but pure metal. Hence if from the same material similar vessels were to be remade, they would need to be consecrated again.

To the third it must be said that the double cave which Abraham bought for burial is not said to have been ground consecrated for burial. And therefore it was lawful for Abraham to buy that land for the purpose of burial, so as to establish a tomb there: just as it would also now be lawful to buy some common field to establish a cemetery or even a church there. Because, however, even among pagans places set apart for burial were considered sacred, if Ephron intended to receive a price for the right of burial, he sinned in selling: though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended to buy only common land. It is also lawful now to sell or buy land where a church once stood, in a case of necessity: just as was said concerning the material of sacred vessels. Or Abraham is excused because by this he redeems his own trouble. For although Ephron was offering him the burial place freely, Abraham perceived that he could not receive it freely without giving offense to him.

Now the right of primogeniture was owed to Jacob by divine election, according to that text of Malachi 1: “Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated.” And therefore Esau sinned in selling the birthright: but Jacob did not sin in buying it, because he is understood to have redeemed his own trouble.

Now the right of patronage cannot be sold by itself, nor given as a fief: but it passes with the estate that is sold or granted. But the spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to laymen; rather only the temporal things given under the name of tithes are granted, as was said above.

Concerning the conferral of benefices, it must be known that if a bishop, before he offers a bene-

fice to anyone, has for some reason ordered that something be deducted from the fruits of the benefice to be conferred and spent on pious purposes, this is not unlawful. But if from him to whom he offers the benefice

Commentary of Cardinal Caietanus.

In article four a doubt arises: whether ecclesiastical benefices may lawfully be sold by authority of the Pope. But because we have discussed this sufficiently in our first Quodlibet — in the matters grounded on this article, where it is said that the clerical right to which a benefice is annexed is spiritual — I therefore pass over it. See there, if you wish.

One doubt nonetheless remains. Because in exchanges of benefices where one is given in return for another, it is lawful, by the authority of superiors, for money to be given by the less wealthy party, so that the exchange may be brought to equality of temporal income: as is found in [Decretales] Extra, de Rerum Permutatione, cap. Ad quaestiones. From this there arises a twofold doubt. The first is: as the ratio of part to part is, such is the ratio of the whole to the whole. But for the part in which the temporal income of one exceeds [that of the other], it is lawful to demand money. Therefore, if one of those benefices has no income whatsoever, it will be lawful to give money for the entire prebend of the other. And thus it follows that a whole prebend, or the income of a benefice, could be sold, by the authority of a superior, by exchanging two benefices of which one has nothing temporal and the other has something. It is therefore false what is said in the text, that things of this kind annexed to spiritual things can in no way lawfully be sold.

The second [doubt] is that, although lesser prelates cannot [do this], the Pope nevertheless could, frauds being absent, for a reasonable cause, in exchanges of spiritual titles, grant to the entire income of one [benefice] that money should correspond in place of the income of the other, which has nothing. Since only temporal things, as such, would be appraised, by him who has the power to establish new law.

The first response is the safer one: insofar as for a title having income, something is owed by the very right of the incomes; and on this account, not everything ought to be matched by money as the principal correspondent. I do not, however, reject the second: on account of the fullness of Papal power, and the singular law which it can establish.

III. To the second doubt, however, which is directly against this response, it is said that there is a sophism there. For although whatever can be given to another can be given to the Pope,

require that something be rendered to him from the fruits of that benefice, it is the same as if he were exacting some other gift from him, and it is not free of the vice of simony.

not, however, in the same manner, nor for the same reason: just as whatever sight can do, the intellect can also do, but not in the same manner nor for the same reason. In the matter at hand, therefore, it can lawfully be given to one who exchanges [benefices], because he exchanges, or is treated as one exchanging, a stipend appointed for him. The Pope, however, does not stand as one exchanging or quasi-exchanging a stipend appointed for him: but rather stands as one selling the stipends appointed for the ministers of churches.

Together with these points, it nevertheless stands that the Pope, in another way — for instance, by way of union to his own table, or of a charitable subsidy — could, for a reasonable cause, apply to himself the revenues of a vacant church, and afterward alienate them, as need requires and the reasoning of ecclesiastical piety advises.

IV. In the same article, concerning the deeds of Jacob, a doubt arises, because Jacob appears inexcusable. First, because it is a mark of inhumanity to refuse food already prepared to a weary brother.

Secondly, because he induced Esau to sin by purchasing the birthright for himself. For Esau was not ready for this in the way a usurer stands ready for usury: but he was induced to it by Jacob saying: “Sell me the birthright,” Genesis 25.

Thirdly, because Esau was not harassing Jacob with respect to the right of primogeniture, but possessed it peaceably by natural right, as the firstborn. And on this account there was no room here for the redemption of harassment, which is adduced in the text: for it is lawful to give in order to redeem harassment — namely, in order to be given back one’s life, liberty, right, benefice, etc.

V. To this it is said that because God had revealed to Rebecca, as is clear from the same passage, that the elder would serve the younger; and it is reasonable that she had revealed all things to her beloved son Jacob: it follows that Jacob, certain of the right of primogeniture that it would be his by divine election, wished to redeem from Esau — as from one occupying his right — his own trouble, at that moment when he could conveniently make use of another’s iniquity for the acquisition of his right. Hence although Esau sinned (as not only the text says, but also the Apostle, in Hebrews 12, saying: “Lest anyone be a fornicator, or profane, as Esau, who for a single meal sold his birthright”), Jacob is nonetheless excused. And first, from inhumanity. Both because he seemed motivated not by necessity but by pleasure [i.e., Esau’s desire for the food]. And because it is the mark of a prudent man to withhold something of his own right when he hopes, through such withholding, to recover what is his.

Secondly, he is excused from inducing [another] to sin: no less than one who offers money to the occupier of his ecclesiastical benefice. For this is not to induce to sin: but to offer redemption, according to the truth, not only to one already disposed [to sin], but to one actually sinning by unjustly withholding [what is another’s]; even if according to the manner of speaking, and according to outward intention, it is otherwise. Hence when Jacob said “Sell me the birthright,” the meaning was: “Give me the birthright, which in truth is mine. Since you are unwilling to give it freely, I offer a price,” etc. For in this sense all redemptions of harassment are to be understood. Indeed in every redemption two things are found: one lawful, which the one redeeming seeks — namely, that his life, liberty, right, benefice, etc., be given back to him; the other iniquitous, which the one redeeming does not seek but suffers (even though he acts after the manner of one with power, because he offers the material of that iniquity to one ready for that iniquity, or a greater, or perhaps not a lesser one), namely the acceptance of the price. Not

For one who ransoms a brother or son from a robber does not intend that the robber should receive so much money as though he willed it; rather, the one suffering offers money so that the robber, who is ready to hold the man captive, may take it. And so in other cases. Jacob therefore did not lead Esau into sin — Esau was in reality a usurper of the birthright, and thus was a wrongdoer bound to renounce it, since he was obligated to obey the divine ordinance concerning the right of the firstborn. Rather, Esau himself took the occasion of sin from Jacob’s words.

Nor does it stand as an objection if one says that Esau believed the birthright to be his,

Article Five.

Whether it is lawful to give spiritual things in exchange for the gift of service or of speech. On the fifth article the procedure is as follows. It seems that it is lawful to give spiritual things in exchange for the gift of service or of speech. For Gregorius says in the Register: Those who serve the interests of the Church rejoice that my diocese rewards them. But to serve the interests of the Church pertains to the gift of service. It therefore seems lawful to bestow ecclesiastical benefices in exchange for service received.

2. Moreover, just as one’s intention seems carnal if a person gives someone an ecclesiastical benefice in return for service rendered, so too if one gives it out of regard for kinship. But this does not seem to be simoniacal, because there is no buying and selling involved. Therefore neither is the former.
3. Moreover, what is done solely at the request of someone appears to be done freely, and thus simony — which consists in buying and selling — does not seem to apply. But the gift of speech is understood to occur when someone confers an ecclesiastical benefice at another’s request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.
4. Moreover, hypocrites perform spiritual works in order to win human praise, which seems to belong to the gift of speech. Yet hypocrites are not called simoniacs. Therefore simony is not contracted through the gift of speech.

But against this, Pope Urbanus says: Whoever bestows or receives ecclesiastical things not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for personal gain, whether by gift of speech, of service, or of money, is a simoniac.

I respond that, as was said above, by the word “money” is understood everything whose value can be measured in money. Now it is clear that a man’s service is ordered to some utility that can be assessed in monetary terms — hence even ministers are hired for monetary wages. Therefore it is the same thing for a person to give a spiritual thing in exchange for some temporal service rendered or to be rendered as to give it for money, given or promised, by which that ser-

unaware of the divine ordinance that Jacob, as it is believed, knew. For even if Esau had known the divine ordinance, he would not on that account have withdrawn, but would have persisted in his usurpation — as is evident from the fact that, when he afterward learned of the paternal arrangement concerning the same matter, he said: “The days of mourning for my father will come, and I will kill Jacob” (Genesis 27). It was therefore lawful to ransom his [Jacob’s] oppression from one who was ignorant, all the more so because an ignorant person who believes he possesses what is actually another’s takes less occasion for sin than one who knows.

vice could be assessed. Similarly, when someone satisfies the requests of another made to obtain some temporal favor, this too is ordered to some utility that can be assessed in monetary terms. And therefore, just as simony is contracted by receiving money or any external thing — which pertains to the gift of the hand — so too it is contracted through the gift of speech or of service.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that if a cleric renders to some prelate an honorable service ordered toward spiritual ends — such as toward the benefit of the Church or the assistance of its ministers — by the very devotion of that service he renders himself worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice, just as he would by other good works. In this case, therefore, the gift of service is not to be understood as applying. And it is in this case that Gregorius speaks. If, however, the service is dishonorable or ordered toward carnal ends — for instance, because he served the prelate for the benefit of his own relatives or patrimony, or for something of that kind — it would be a gift of service and would be simoniacal.

To the second objection it must be said that if someone confers something spiritual on another on account of kinship or any carnal affection, the conferral is indeed illicit and carnal, but not simoniacal, because nothing is received in return; thus it does not pertain to the contract of buying and selling on which simony is founded. If, however, someone gives an ecclesiastical benefice to another with this stipulation or intention — that from it provision be made for his own relatives — that is manifest simony.

To the third objection it must be said that the gift of speech means either praise itself pertaining to human favor, which falls under a price, or requests by means of which human favor is obtained or its opposite avoided. And therefore if someone aims principally at this, he commits simony.

Now it seems that one aims principally at this when he heeds prayers offered on behalf of an unworthy person. Thus the very act is simoniacal. If, however, prayers are offered on behalf of a worthy person, the act itself is not simoniacal, because there is an underlying proper cause by reason of which that

person on whose behalf prayers are offered may receive something spiritual. Yet there can be simony in the intention if attention is paid not to the worthiness of the person but to human favor. If, however, someone prays for himself in order to obtain the care of souls, by that very presumption he renders himself unworthy, and thus the prayers are on behalf of an unworthy person. A person may nonetheless lawfully, if he is in

Commentary of Cardinal Caietanus.

In the fifth article, in the response to the third objection, a doubt arises: whether prayers for a benefice with cure of souls, made on behalf of the one requesting it, are prayers on behalf of an unworthy person. The source of the doubt is the divergence of opinions.

Although various writers have addressed this, as you may find in the Lord Iohannes de Turrecremata, on the Decreta, in question 1, chapter Ordinationes, article 3, the whole ambiguity reduces to this: whether in such a petition the vice of presumption intervenes. So that if presumption intervenes in the asking, the prayers are on behalf of an unworthy person; if presumption does not intervene in the asking, prayers on one’s own behalf, otherwise for a worthy person, are not prayers on behalf of an unworthy person. This is sufficiently suggested in the text when it says: “By that very presumption he renders himself unworthy.” Whether, however, the petition itself is simply or regularly presumptuous must be examined. And five summary points now present themselves.

First, that the petition for the simple cure of souls is regularly presumptuous — as, for instance, to seek a bishopric. I said “simple cure of souls” because, as is clear below, parish priests do not have the simple cure of souls; rather, bishops are those who hold the simple cure of souls over the whole diocese. I said “regularly” in order to except the petition for a bishopric in the case of necessity for the Church itself. This conclusion is sufficiently clear from the statements of the doctors, and it is Augustinus’s position in Book XIX of the City of God; and it is also clear below in the treatise on the states of life.

Second, that the petition for the simple cure of souls in a particular case is not presumptuous but holy — namely, when it is clearly evident that unless the worthy person himself seeks that bishopric, the Church will be poorly provided for. For then, if he can do so without scandal, an otherwise worthy person may lawfully petition in order to serve; and especially if he petitions indirectly. The reason is that this is a counsel of charity, not of presumption. This is clear from the fact that that Church would render great thanks to him if it knew that by his deliberate petition it had been snatched from the hand of an imminent wolf. And similarly the Bridegroom and Lord of the Church, Jesus Christ, would acknowledge him as a faithful steward of his affairs.

Article Six.

Whether it is appropriate that the punishment of the simoniac be deprivation of what he acquired through simony. On the sixth article the procedure is as follows. It seems that it is not appropriate that the punishment of the simoniac be deprivation of what he acquired through simony. For simony is committed when spiritual things are acquired through the intervention of some gift. But certain spiritual things, once obtained, cannot be lost — such as all sacramental characters, which are imprinted through some consecration. Therefore it is not appropriate that anyone be deprived of what he acquired simoniacally.

2. Moreover, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained a bishopric through simony commands a subject to receive orders from him, and it seems that the subject should obey so long as the bishop is tolerated by the Church. But no one should receive anything from one who

need, to petition for an ecclesiastical benefice without cure of souls on his own behalf.

To the fourth objection it must be said that the hypocrite does not give anything spiritual for the sake of praise, but only makes a show of it; and by his pretense he surreptitiously steals human praise rather than purchasing it. Hence he does not seem to pertain to the vice of simony.

no less than one man for whom this benefice had been held in trust. For it is clear that if that Church were mine, I would be obliged to render him great thanks. Would Christ perhaps be ungrateful, or so rigorous as to be unwilling that the dangers to his Churches be met with human prudence?

Third, that the petition for the cure — even the simple cure — of souls is not necessarily presumptuous. This is clear because in a particular case it is lawful. And because Isaiah, seeing himself purified, petitioned without presumption: “Here am I; send me.”

Fourth, that the petition for the cure of souls in a qualified sense, or secondarily — such as the petition for a parish, an archpriesthood, and the like — although it smacks somewhat of presumption within the limits of proper governance, yet where ecclesiastical governance is commonly corrupt (that is, where such benefices are not given except to those who petition for them), it lacks presumption, if it is done without prejudice to anyone, and the petitioner is otherwise worthy, and is moved by charity toward the Church. This is clear from the fact that in such corrupt systems of governance, poor provisions are frequently made. And therefore, in this limited cure of souls, worthiness and charity as the motive for petitioning suffice, without its being evident in the particular case that a bad provision is imminent.

Fifth, that when or where ecclesiastical governance of this kind is corrupt, a petition for such a benefice with cure of souls on one’s own behalf — made by an otherwise worthy person, proceeding from human feeling, although it smacks somewhat of presumption insofar as it seeks to have authority — yet since one truly desires and intends to be of benefit, and the danger of poor provision is ever present while such corruption endures, and worthy men are passed over: that presumption appears no greater than venial. And so the prayers are not for an unworthy person simply speaking, but only in a qualified sense.

Nor is it surprising if Augustinus, Gregorius, the Author [Aquinas], and others seem to have taught otherwise. For they taught what is to be done within the limits of the laws; we, however, [treat] what can be done — and sometimes must be done — amid the corruptions of laws. And again, they [taught] what is absolutely lawful; we, however, [treat] what is lawful in a case of necessity, whether simply or for the present among such persons.

does not have the power to confer. Therefore a bishop does not lose episcopal power if he acquired it simoniacally.

3. Moreover, no one ought to be punished for something that was done with the knowledge and consent of another, because punishment is owed to sin, which is voluntary, as is clear from what was said above. But it sometimes happens that someone simoniacally obtains something spiritual through the procurement of others, without his own knowledge or will. Therefore he ought not to be punished by deprivation of what was conferred on him.
4. Moreover, no one ought to profit from his own sin. But if one who obtained an ecclesiastical benefice through simony were to restore what he received, this would sometimes redo-

redound to the benefit of those who were simoniacal participants — for example, when the prelate and the entire chapter consented to the simony. Therefore it is not always the case that what is acquired through simony must be restored.

5. Moreover, sometimes a person is received into a monastery through simony and takes a solemn vow there by making profession. But no one ought to be released from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault committed. Therefore he ought not to lose the monastic state that he acquired simoniacally.
6. Moreover, external punishment in this world is not inflicted for an interior movement of the heart, the judgment of which belongs to God alone. But simony is committed by intention or will alone; hence it is also defined through the will, as was said above. Therefore a person ought not always to be deprived of what he acquired simoniacally.
7. Moreover, it is a far greater thing to be promoted to higher offices than to remain in what one has already received. But simonists are sometimes, by dispensation, promoted to higher offices. Therefore they ought not always to be deprived of what they have received.

On the contrary, it is said at C.1 q.1 c. Si quis episcopus [Decretum, C.1 q.1 c.1]: “Whoever is ordained shall gain nothing from an ordination or promotion accomplished through trafficking; but let him be a stranger to the dignity or office that he acquired by means of money.”

I reply that no one can lawfully retain what he has acquired against the will of the lord. For example, if a steward were to give something from his lord’s goods to someone against the will and ordinance of his lord, the one who received it could not lawfully retain it. Now the Lord, whose stewards and ministers the prelates of the churches are, ordained that spiritual things should be given freely — according to Matthew 10: Freely you have received, freely give. And therefore those who obtain any spiritual things through the mediation of a gift cannot lawfully retain them.

Moreover, simonists — both those who sell and those who buy spiritual things, as well as intermediaries — are punished by other penalties: namely, infamy and deposition if they are clergy; and excommunication if they are laity; as is found at C.1 q.1 c. Si quis episcopus.

To the first objection, therefore, it must be said that one who simoniacally receives a sacred order does indeed receive the character of the order, by reason of the efficacy of the sacrament; yet he does not receive the grace, nor the exercise of the order, because he received the character, as it were, by stealth, against the will of the principal Lord. And therefore he is suspended by the law itself — both with respect to himself, that is, so that he does not involve himself in the exercise of his order; and with respect to others, that is, so that no one joins him in the exercise of the order; whether his sin is

public or hidden. Nor can he recover the money he gave disgracefully, even though the other party unjustly retains it. — If, however, a person is simoniacal because he conferred an order simoniacally, or because he gave or received a benefice simoniacally, or because he was an intermediary in simony: if this is public, he is suspended by the law itself both with respect to himself and with respect to others; but if it is hidden, he is suspended by the law itself with respect to himself only, but not with respect to others.

To the second objection it must be said that no one ought to receive ordination from a bishop known to have been promoted simoniacally — neither on account of his command nor even on account of excommunication. And if one is so ordained, he does not receive the exercise of the order, even if he is unaware that the bishop is a simonist; but he requires a dispensation. — Although some say that if one cannot prove the bishop to be a simonist, he must obey by receiving the order, but ought not to exercise it without a dispensation. — But this is said without reason. For no one ought to obey anyone so as to join him in an unlawful act. Now one who is suspended by the law itself both with respect to himself and with respect to others confers an order unlawfully. Hence no one ought to join him by receiving from him, for whatever reason. If, however, the matter is not established, one ought not to presume the sin of another; and thus one ought to receive the order from him with a good conscience.

If, however, the bishop is simoniacal in some way other than through his own simoniacal promotion, one can receive an order from him if the matter is hidden — because he is not suspended with respect to others, but only with respect to himself, as was said.

To the third objection it must be said that a person’s being deprived of what he received is not only a punishment for sin, but is sometimes also an effect of unjust acquisition — for example, when someone buys a thing from one who cannot sell it. And therefore if someone knowingly and willingly receives an order or ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, he is not only deprived of what he received — that is, he lacks the exercise of the order and must resign the benefice together with the fruits received from it — but is further punished, because he is branded with infamy; and he is bound to restore not only the fruits actually received, but also those that could have been received by a diligent possessor (though this is to be understood of the fruits that remain after deducting the expenses incurred for their production, with the exception of those fruits that have already been expended for the benefit of the church). — If, however, his promotion is procured simoniacally by others without his will and knowledge, he indeed lacks the exercise of the order and is bound to resign the benefice he obtained, together with its existing fruits (though he is not

bound to restore consumed fruits, because he possessed them in good faith) — unless perhaps an enemy of his fraudulently gave money for his promotion, or unless he himself expressly objected. For in that case he is not bound to renounce — unless perhaps he subsequently consented to an agreement by paying what had been promised.

To the fourth objection it must be said that money, or property, or fruits received simoniacally must be restored to the church against whose rights they were given, notwithstanding that the prelate or some member of the chapter of that church was at fault — because their sin ought not to harm others. Yet this must be done in such a way that, insofar as possible, those who sinned derive no benefit from it. — But if both the prelate and the entire chapter are at fault, the goods must be distributed, by the authority of a superior, either to the poor or to another church.

To the fifth objection it must be said that if some persons have been received into a monastery simoniacally, they must renounce. And if the simony was committed with their knowledge after the General Council, they are expelled from their monastery without hope of restoration, and are to be placed in a stricter rule to perform perpetual penance, or in some house of the same order if no stricter order is found. — If, however, this occurred

Commentary of Cardinal Caietanus.

In the sixth article of question one hundred, a difficulty arises, chiefly in the reply to the fifth objection: namely, whether a mental simonist can in good conscience retain whatever he acquired simoniacally. The reason for the difficulty is this: on the affirmative side stands the Author himself in the text, in the reply to the sixth objection, saying that one is not bound to renounce a benefice acquired with a simoniacal intention. And there is the legal text at Extra, de Simonia, c. Mandato [X 5.3.32], from which the Author drew this reply.

On the negative side, however, there is a rational argument. For the general rule is that when both the giving and the receiving of a temporal thing are unjust, what is so acquired cannot be retained with a good conscience, as is clear above at q. 32, art. 7. Now it is established that in an acquisition proceeding from a simoniacal intention on both sides, both the giving and the receiving are iniquitous: because the one party unlawfully gives the benefice, money, or service out of a simoniacal intention, without any agreement; and the other iniquitously receives what he receives with a similar simoniacal intention. Therefore nothing so acquired can be retained with a good conscience.

This is confirmed. For it seems altogether remarkable that, where mental simony exists on both sides between two parties — for example, because a bishop grants a cleric a benefice principally on account of the hope of receiving money, and the cleric is also ready to give money to the bishop principally on account of the benefice, and without any agreement the consummated effect follows on both sides — it is remarkable, I say, that in this and similar cases the bishop is bound not to retain the money he received because he received it simoniacally, and yet the cleric can retain the benefice; since the cleric could more readily have donated the money, as the true owner of the money, than the bishop the benefice, since the bishop is only a steward of benefices.

This is further confirmed. For just as a mental usurer is bound to restitution if he knows that the gift offered to him by a borrower is given not freely but as if in payment of interest, without any agreement; no less is a mental simonist

before the Council, they must be assigned to other houses of the same order. And if this cannot be done, they must be received by dispensation in those same monasteries, lest they wander in the world — though their former places are to be changed and lower ones assigned.

If, however, they were received simoniacally without their knowledge — whether before or after the Council — once they have renounced, they can be received anew in different places, as has been said.

To the sixth objection it must be said that before God the will alone makes one a simonist; but with regard to external ecclesiastical punishment, one is not punished as a simonist so as to be bound to renounce, but must do penance for the evil intention.

To the seventh objection it must be said that only the Pope can dispense with one who has knowingly accepted a benefice [simoniacally]. In other cases, he [the Pope] can also dispense — yet only after the person has first renounced what he acquired simoniacally. He then receives a dispensation either small, that he may have lay communion; or great, that after penance he may remain in his order in another church; or greater, that he may remain in the same church but in minor orders; or greatest, that he may even exercise the major orders in the same church, though he may not assume a prelacy.

who, knowing that a benefice or money is being given to him simoniacally — even without any agreement — is bound to restore, or not to retain, what was so received.

II. In response to this difficulty, some, making a distinction, say that a mental simonist is not bound to restore what he has acquired, whether temporal or spiritual, in the case of simony quia prohibita [prohibited simony, i.e., simony by reason of positive law alone], in accordance with the said c. Mandato; but in the case of simony quia simoniaca [intrinsically simoniacal, i.e., by reason of divine or natural law], he is bound even in the forum of conscience to restore what was acquired through mental simony. Their reasoning is that this text speaks only of simony arising from positive law, and therefore ought not to be extended to simony arising from divine law. — Some, however, criticize this response, because the text speaks without distinction.

It seems to me that this response does not hold. For that text speaks of simony also prohibited by divine law — namely, that which is committed for the religious state. For it is established that it is prohibited by divine law for the spiritual state of religious life to be sold, since it is an unsaleable spiritual state instituted by Christ: If you wish to be perfect, go, sell, etc. [Matthew 19:21].

III. Others say that being bound to restitution arises in two ways: namely, by reason of ecclesiastical penalty, or by reason of natural law. They add that all simonists by agreement are bound by both titles to restitution: namely, by reason of natural law, because both the giving and the receiving were unjust; and by reason of ecclesiastical penalty, because the Church has so decreed. Mental simonists, however, are not bound by reason of ecclesiastical penalty — and this alone is what that text says — but they are indeed bound by reason of natural law to resign and make restitution, both of spiritual and of temporal things, because one who receives anything simoniacally receives it unjustly. And this the text passed over in silence because it spoke in terms of ecclesiastical forum.

But this response, though subtle, seems to deviate from the truth. For that text also speaks of the forum of conscience

[The decretal] speaks of the forum of conscience and expressly states that before God penitence alone suffices. For if it suffices to satisfy the Creator by penitence alone in mental simony, then in order to satisfy God one is not bound in the forum of conscience to anything else — such as resignation, restitution, and the like. Mental simonists are therefore bound, by natural and divine law, to nothing beyond penitence.

IV. Since it is not necessary to be wiser than is fitting, and since that decretal says both things — namely, that before God penitence alone suffices, and absolutely that they are not bound to the resignation of spiritual or temporal things acquired in such a way, not by any pact but with preceding mutual disposition of soul — it must therefore be stated absolutely that mental simonists, that is, those without any agreement, are not bound even in the forum of conscience to make restitution of things acquired through mental and simoniacal disposition, whether those things be spiritual or temporal; penitence alone suffices for them. Hence all simonists by hand, tongue, or service — not acting from a pact but from a principal hope or disposition, giving or receiving such things on account of spiritual goods — sin mortally with the sin of simony and are in a state of eternal damnation so long as they persevere in such evil intent; yet they are not bound to resign or restore what was received in this manner. And this appears to be the common practice.

To the objections urged on the other side, however, from which the truth will become clearer, the following must be said. To the first, which is very difficult, it is replied that a giving or receiving can be illicit in two ways. In one way, according to the very form of the exterior act signified by both the giving and the receiving — as when the act of giving or receiving is in its exterior form a sale, a purchase, and the like. In another way, from the interior disposition alone — for instance, because the exterior act, in its external manner and form, has the character of a gratuitous donation, yet from the interior disposition alone it has the character of a sale. The rule, “when a giving and receiving is illicit, what is thus acquired cannot be retained,” is to be understood of giving and receiving that is illicit in the first way, and not in the second; because in the first way the giving and receiving is illicit per se, whereas in the second way it is illicit per accidens, since the illicitness comes not from the external manner and form but from the bad intention joined to it. And so it is in the present case. For when only mental simony intervenes on both sides, the giving and receiving is illicit not according to its exterior form, but from the evil interior intention joined to it; because the one who gives, gives in the manner of a gift and not in the manner of a sale, even though inwardly he harbors this iniquity; and likewise the one who receives, receives in the manner of a gift, even though inwardly he purchases it from an iniquitous will.

To the second objection it is replied that one false thing is presupposed, namely, that a bishop is bound to restitution of the money he received through mental simony. For it is clear from the text of that decretal that mental simonists on both sides are bound neither to spiritual nor to temporal things acquired in this manner.

To the third objection — which is treated at length by Panormitanus [Nicolaus de Tudeschis] in the said chapter Mandato, recounting so many reasons for the distinction between a usurer and a mental simonist — setting aside everything that seems to be said less satisfactorily, as you may see for yourself: it is briefly replied that the reason why a mental usurer is bound to restitution of what was given him by the borrower not with the intention of donating, whereas a mental simonist is not bound to restitution of what was donated to him by the mental simonist with an intention of buying or selling, is this: what is given to a usurer is given willingly but involuntarily (for usury is paid involuntarily, by way of redeeming oneself from harassment — it is a mixed voluntary and involuntary act, as is clear from Ethics III); whereas what is given to a mental simonist is given voluntarily, since it is given with the intent of buying or selling, for it is plain that both buying and selling are voluntary contracts without any admixture of the involuntary, as you have from Ethics V. The entire basis for the distinction is therefore the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary: in the former case the giving is involuntary and must therefore be restored; in the latter it is voluntary and is therefore not subject to restitution.

V. In the response to the seventh [objection] in the same final article of question one hundred, note that the text appears defective: the word ordinatus [“ordained”] appears to be missing. For it ought to read —

“One who is ordained or provided with a benefice, etc.”: for it is agreed among all authorities, and is stated in the Decretals, de Simonia, cap. Si quis [X.5.3.1], that when someone has been knowingly ordained through simony, the Pope alone can dispense with him.

Note secondly, that the Pope can dispense in matters of penalties with any simonist — this is not in doubt; but whether he dispenses ipso facto [by that very act] with those who commit simony with him is a question disputed among the doctors. Some say that the Pope is understood to dispense in such a case because the knowledge of a prince [scientia principis] purges, just as he is understood to dispense with an irregular person by knowingly conferring on him an order or a benefice, because he intends his act to be efficacious. Among those of this opinion is Petrus de Palude, in the Fourth [Book of Sentences], dist. xxv, qu. iv, art. 1. Others hold the opposite view, because even if the Pope could dispense, he is not understood to dispense merely by communicating in a crime. Among those of this opinion is Panormitanus [Nicolaus de Tudeschis], in cap. I de Simonia.

It seems to me, however, that this second opinion rests on reason and truth, for two reasons. First, because, since in such a case there intervenes no dispensation or explicit relaxation of the law, the only grounds on which a dispensation could be said to intervene here would be the presumption that the Pope intends by his very act to dispense. But it is false that any such presumed dispensation intervenes here. Therefore no dispensation intervenes here at all. — The minor premise is proved as follows. For a presumption that the prince is dispensing to arise, it is required that sound reason counsel it; for although a prince can dispense from his will alone, yet if his will is not expressed, it ought not to be presumed that he dispenses unless sound reason counsels such a presumption. But sound reason does not counsel this — rather the opposite. For such a dispensation would be to the greatest harm of the Church: for from it would follow that sacrilegious men would be the legitimate pastors and holders of churches; and everywhere iniquitous men, secure [in their belief] that possession is licit, would buy benefices from the Pope; and thus the Church would be filled with unworthy prelates and parish priests. What could be more harmful than this? — Nor is it an obstacle [to this argument] that we already presuppose the Pope to be iniquitous. For a prince is not to be presumed worse than his own acts demonstrate. A Pope who sells spiritual things and wills that those who buy them possess and enjoy them licitly would be far worse than one who merely sells them: for the latter involves one evil, the former a double one.

Second, because if the person of the Pope knew that he to whom he confers an order or benefice was excommunicated, and without any other absolution confers on him the order or benefice, he does not for that reason absolve him from excommunication: as you have from cap. Si Summus, de Sent. Excomm., in the Clementines [Clem. 5.10.2], where the text states that from the Pope’s knowingly communicating in any manner with an excommunicated person, he is not understood to absolve him unless he expressly declares this to be his will. And the Gloss there, on the words in any manner, says that this also applies to participation in divine worship. For if the Pope, by knowingly conferring an order or benefice on an excommunicated person, does not absolve him ipso facto but leaves the recipient subject to the disposition of law; by the same reasoning, he does not relax the disposition of the common law by the fact that he confers a benefice on someone who, in receiving it, is by law excommunicated and rendered incapable, etc. — And this is confirmed: because dispensations of this kind, since they deviate enormously from the law and the good of the Church, are of the strictest legal construction and are least to be presumed.

VI. To the arguments of the other opinion it is replied that, although the knowledge of a prince qua prince — which is public knowledge — sometimes excuses (and not always, as is clear from the chapter cited), yet the knowledge of a prince qua private person does not appear to excuse, unless it appears otherwise from some other source. Hence if the Pope knowingly assigns the benefice of an excommunicated person, and he knows this only as a private person, I am not certain that it is to be presumed he is dispensing with the recipient — as is clear from the chapter adduced on the matter of absolution, which is not so odious as dispensation. But even if it were presumed that he dispenses, it does not follow by analogy in the case at hand. For in our present case the Pope would sin mortally in dispensing with an unworthy man to be a pastor; whereas in dispensing with an irregular person, he need not sin. Hence it is clear that the cases are not analogous, nor is there the same reason for presuming a dispensation in the one case as in the other.

To the argument that a prince intends his action to be efficacious: it is replied that this is true on his part, as agent. But from this it does not follow that he removes impediments that exist on the part of the recipient — impediments that are known to him only as a private person, or as a party to the act. For a prince is a voluntary agent, and does not always act to the full extent of his power, but only to the extent he wills. In the present case, moreover, there is neither appearance nor presumption that he wills to relax the common law with respect to the recipient. Perhaps he is ignorant and believes everything to be valid. Or, even if he has knowledge, since no suspension of the law with respect to that person has been sought from him, he leaves the recipient subject to the disposition of law — leaving the one who buys and receives a benefice to care for himself. Or he simply gives no thought to the matter at all, being occupied with other things, or having grown accustomed to acting badly.

Those who commit simony with the Pope are therefore bound, both in the forum of conscience and in the judicial forum, to resign and to restore whatever they have received; they are excommunicated and incur all the penalties of law — unless the Pope expressly declares his will to suspend the law in this regard, or grants them a dispensation after the fact.

VII. In this opinion, however, I do not stand so firmly on fixed footing that I do not waver. For to the second argument it can be said that the new law in the Clementines is an exception from the common law, and was enacted precisely because the common law held the opposite. For this reason it must not be extended, but understood only in its own specific case.

To the first argument, however, it can be said that from so iniquitous a will one ought to presume consistently — that is, that the Pope wills that which follows from his own perverse transaction. Now it is plain that a seller wills to transfer the thing sold to the buyer. A simoniacal Pope therefore intends that whoever purchases from him should truly have the benefice he sells, lest he appear to be a fraudulent vendor.

How much weight these arguments carry, let others judge. I myself confess that if, according to the laws, such knowledge of a prince purges in such a way as to excuse from the penalties of law in the judicial forum (which I leave for the jurists to determine), then one who has purchased a benefice from the Pope in this manner is not bound to renounce it in the forum of conscience: for the penalties of law would be understood to be simply suspended.