Distinction Sixteen, Question Four.

He [Alexander of Hales] cites James, the last chapter. Hence the whole Church is one commonwealth: whoever provides the necessities of Christian life is everywhere receiving in return what is necessary for himself. He proves the same point with examples from the blessed Alexius, Benedict, Dominic, and Francis, some of whom continued their lives in mendicancy and were holy and pleasing to the Lord, even though they were able-bodied. For the blessed Alexius, having spurned his patrimony and left his wife, went begging through the world; at his death the Lord wondrously revealed his holiness. Similarly, regarding Saint Benedict, Gregory says in the second book of the Dialogues, chapter one, that he lived for three years in a cave doing no work whatsoever, living on alms from a certain Roman monk. The cases of the others are well known. One might also adduce here the example of Christ, about whom various opinions are held among different authorities.

He also proves [his case] by the authority of the Church itself

which, after Christ, has no greater authority, and which has approved the mendicant orders, in which able-bodied men receive alms — not only those who preach, but also the rest who recite the canonical hours and serve others in various capacities.

Note that it is lawful for able-bodied persons to receive alms, because the Church has granted and approved this — what would otherwise be illicit. And it approved it because it was lawful. Likewise, in Acts 6 the apostles said: “It is not right for us to forsake the word of God and serve tables” — provided, of course, that they are able-bodied. By the same token, it is not right to forsake spiritual things and serve the table, that is, to engage in bodily labor to the neglect of spiritual duties.

Responses to the objections

By way of these considerations, responses are given to the objections set forth in the opposite direction at the beginning of the doubt. To the first objection, concerning the law forbidding able-bodied persons to beg: Alexander [of Hales] responds to this [objection] in part two, question 109, noting that this law was introduced against certain persons who, during a time of famine, usurped the alms of the poor by feigning idleness or incapacity for work. These were idle men who contributed nothing useful to the commonwealth — men who, though capable of working, occupied themselves with nothing profitable, seeking to abound through the alms of the poor, being prone to wrongdoing and plunder. Therefore, the rulers of the commonwealth justly barred such men from begging and punished them with the gravest penalties, namely perpetual serfdom if the man had been free. [See the Authentica: “If he had been a slave, through his subjection he acquires for his lord at the fortress declared.”] The case is otherwise with the religious poor, among whom there is no feigning of idleness, no love of sloth, and no danger of plunder.

Furthermore, Alexander says, this objection can easily be dismissed once one considers the respective purposes of the Gospel and the various aims of imperial law. For the aim of that law was to organize men usefully for the preservation, advancement, and stabilization of the commonwealth — whose preservation, advancement, and stabilization depends on the accumulation of wealth, the expansion of estates, and the cultivation of fields, which is accomplished by multiplying the powerful and rich and by reducing the needy and weak. By contrast, the aim of the Gospel is to order men toward the attainment and possession of the kingdom of God, which is better achieved through contempt of riches than through their accumulation and retention. This is why the Gospel pronounces blessed the poor in spirit — that is, the voluntarily poor. Hence, a gloss on imperial law makes no claim against it, since there is no contradiction between them on account of the different rationales behind the prohibitions and precepts; these operate differently.

From this it is clear that the indiscriminate censure of many who rebuke able-bodied mendicants is unfounded — at least with regard to those who have chosen poverty by renouncing all things and who live together in cities or forests, not in idle sloth but devote certain hours to prayers and devout exercises, and diligently labor in the remaining hours at simple tasks that do not distract from devotion. And when this [labor] does not suffice, they provide for their needs through begging for alms. Those who, out of love not for idleness or the accumulation of money but for Christ, desire to imitate the naked Christ in poverty, and devote themselves to purity of life, devout prayers, meditations, and spiritual exercises for the edification of the Church — such men are not to be torn apart by detractors, but are to be treated with every favor and charity as imitators of Christ and cultivators of evangelical poverty.

To the second [objection]

To the second [objection]: the major [premise] is conceded, the minor is denied — when the minor asserts that all able-bodied persons are bound to labor, speaking of manual and bodily labor. And as for that text of Genesis [“in the sweat of your face”]: Alexander notes in question 109, article 1, that the precept concerning labor ordered to the seeking of sustenance — like 1 Thessalonians 4: “work with your hands, as we commanded you, so that you walk honorably before those outside and lack nothing from anyone” — is not solely a precept of positive law, but also of natural law. For those things are of natural law to which men are inclined by their natural constitution. Thus, by the very disposition of the body, man is naturally ordered to manual work, on account of which the blessed Job says in chapter 5: “man is born to labor and the bird to flight.”

But it should be known that precepts are twofold with respect to the deficiency they address: some address the deficiency of an individual person, whether spiritual — such as precepts concerning acts of virtue — or corporeal, as for example that of Genesis 2: “Of every tree of paradise you may eat.” Another kind is ordered to removing the deficiency of the species, such as Genesis 3: “Increase and multiply,” which commands the act of generation by which the human species is preserved. Between these two kinds of precept there is this difference: every individual is bound by a precept of the first kind of natural law; but a precept of the second kind, ordered to removing the deficiency of the species, does not bind each person individually, but rather the whole community of human beings is bound to ensure that some among them fulfill this duty.

Now the precept of manual labor is in a certain way contained under both of the aforementioned kinds: insofar as by labor one provides for the needs of others, it pertains to the second kind; insofar as one provides for one’s own needs, it pertains to the first kind, just as the precept of eating does. But a precept of either kind, ordered to removing a natural or bodily deficiency, does not oblige unless that deficiency requires it. Hence if there were someone who could live without food — as is reported of a certain hermit brother named Nicholas in Swabia — he would not be bound by the precept of eating. So too the precept of manual labor does not bind any individual, either insofar as it is ordered to removing the deficiency of others [through common provision] or insofar as it is ordered to removing one’s own personal deficiency, unless that deficiency requires it. And therefore, whoever has other means by which he can lawfully li-

ve is not bound to work with his hands. Therefore it is not simply necessary for able-bodied poor persons to labor with their hands, unless they cannot otherwise provide for their needs. And as for that saying to Adam, “in the sweat of your face”: it is said that those words of the Lord are rather a declaration of punishment than a precept imposing satisfaction for sin — whence he prefixes: “cursed is the ground on account of your work.” Similarly to the woman: “in pain you shall bring forth children.” It does not follow, therefore, that every man is bound to labor by necessity of precept. Otherwise it would follow that he is bound to agriculture, which the Lord specifically mentions there.

As for the saying of the Apostle [about working with one’s hands]: it is said that the Apostle commands manual labor for special reasons and for certain persons prone [to these vices] — for example, to prevent theft, to turn away the desire for others’ goods, to secure the necessities of life, to quiet anxious care, and to avoid idleness. But where these and similar reasons do not apply, the precept has no place.

To the third [objection]

To the third [objection]: the poor who beg — those of the kind spoken of in the responsive proposition — do not despoil other poor persons, because they do not receive what is not lawful for them to receive. For they have the right to ask for necessities, and they are not bound to labor bodily, as has been said.

As to the authority [of Jerome]

Jerome speaks of clerics who possess ecclesiastical goods that are owed to the poor — namely, those goods that remain beyond what is needed for an honest sustenance. If they divert these to other illicit uses, they despoil the poor and commit sacrilege. And he adds that manual labors are reckoned among the wealth of the able-bodied. This is true of those who are bound to work with their hands and are not prevented from doing so by superior goods. Alexander treats this matter at length there, in that proposition.

Second proposition

The second proposition: one who gives alms to a pious petitioner is not required to inquire too carefully into the character of the one begging. This proposition reflects the mind of Christ, according to [Chrysostom’s homily] on the Epistle to the Hebrews, and is found at Decretum D. 42, c. Quiescamus. It says: “If one asks for food, do not scrutinize him in these matters; for Abraham showed himself hospitable toward all. If he had been a scrutinizer of those who fled to him, he would never have received the angels as guests — for perhaps he would not have thought them angels and would have turned them away with the rest. But because he received all, he received the angels too. For God will not render you a reward on the basis of the life of those you receive, but on the basis of your will and your great honor and goodness and mercy.” And this is what the word “pious” adds: for he gives piously who, moved by charity and mercy, gives to support the poor — not to perpetuate begging. Enough has been said about this in Conclusion 6.

Second doubt

The second doubt concerns the saying of the blessed Augustinus, adduced in the proof of Conclusion 6, in which he censures donations made to actors and hunters alike. For the authority cited says: one who gives to a hunter loves in that man what makes him most wicked. The doubt, then, is whether one sins who gives something to hunters or actors. Alexander [of Hales] addresses this doubt in part four, question 109, article 1, by way of a distinction. For there are three kinds of hunting: oppressive hunting, arena hunting, and woodland hunting. Oppressive hunting is that by which the poor are oppressed — of which [it is written in] Genesis 10 [that] Nimrod was a mighty hun-

a hunter before the Lord, that is, a violent oppressor [of others], as is explained at Decretum D. 6 c. Non est peccatum. Arena-hunting is when someone fights against a toothed beast in the arena and hires out his labor for this purpose. This too is illicit, like the first type. One who practices it for pay sins mortally and becomes infamous [cf. C.3 q.7 c. Infamis]. Forest-hunting is that which is carried out in the woods and mountain thickets. This is licit, though it becomes illicit by reason of time, as during Lent, or by reason of person, since it is not licit for a cleric — at least that type involving dogs and clamor. To set out snares or nets without din or clamor is not illicit for a cleric. Regarding entertainers [histriones], a distinction is drawn. There are entertainers who, by some instrument or bodily gesture, intend to move men to vain laughter and evil, inept merriment. One who gives to them for this reason makes an offering to a demon, as the authority states, and sins. But there are others who are skilled in playing musical instruments — small bells or the zither — for the consolation of weak human nature, just as David played the zither before King Saul when he was troubled by an evil spirit and found relief. To give to such performers is not a sin, just as it is not [a sin] to play the zither for this purpose.

Third Doubt: Whether almsgiving is more satisfactory than the other two parts of satisfaction, namely fasting and prayer.

It must be noted that satisfaction is ordered to several ends: to the appeasement of divine offense, to the remission of punishment, to the uprooting of the root of sins, to the restoration of what is unjustly possessed, and to other [ends]. The principal end to which satisfaction is ordered, however, is the appeasing of divine offense so that sin may not overcome [us] — as is clear from the strict definition of satisfaction in q. 2 of this distinction. On this account, that act or voluntary suffering is more perfect and more satisfactory by which divine offense is more fully appeased. And since nothing appeases God more than an act elicited from charity, the act elicited from greater charity is simply more satisfactory. Therefore the parts of satisfaction stand in relation to one another as exceeding and exceeded. As regards other ends, however — such as remission of punishment — fasting is preferred, since it is more afflictive of the body. As regards the avoidance of the cause of sins [since the principal root of sin is pride, which prayer is ordered to address], prayer itself takes precedence over the others. As regards the restoration of unjust possessions, almsgiving is more efficacious, since through it the debt of required restitution is discharged and disgraceful gains are compensated, as is excessive solicitude. And so whichever part of satisfaction extends to more of the aforementioned ends is more perfect than the others. And since almsgiving proceeds from charity first [and especially], which is specifically joined to love of God; since also it avails not only from the act of the giver of alms but also from the recipient, who by precept is bound by the law of gratitude to repay spiritual [goods] — it surpasses prayer and fasting. Also because through almsgiving avarice is uprooted, the root of sin, as it is written: “Those who wish to become rich fall into the snares of the devil” [1 Timothy 6:9], and it follows: “The root of all evils is the love of money” [1 Timothy 6:10], and Ecclesiasticus [10:9–10]: “Nothing is more wicked than a miser, nothing more iniquitous than to love money; for such a one has set his own soul for sale, since in his lifetime he has cast away what is within him.” All these things are not found thus in any one of the other parts of satisfaction, namely in prayer or fasting. And therefore in many passages of sacred scripture almsgiving is commended and satisfaction for sins is attributed to almsgiving.

For this reason, with respect to prayer, the doctors prefer almsgiving to the other parts of satisfaction. And it was said pointedly that almsgiving binds the recipient by the law of gratitude — because the giver of alms is not obliged to bind the recipient by legal debt to repay spiritual goods, whether by contract or by agreement, since in that case he would commit simony by giving temporal things in exchange for spiritual ones. For almsgiving ought to be a free gift, not a loan [cf. 1 Corinthians 13]. [That said,] almsgiving can intend to move a poor recipient to a pious and charitable disposition by which he may be moved to pray — as [Master] Petrus [de Palude] says in the Parisian distinction 15, article [on almsgiving]. For almsgiving is given principally with a view to God, who counts what is given to any one of his poor ones as given to himself, who knows how to reward all things. The recompense is to be expected from him, not from the poor man. And on this basis the response to the doubt is to be varied according to the variation in comparing almsgiving to its diverse effects.

Fourth Doubt: Whether spiritual alms are more excellent than corporal ones.

Briefly, by the authority of Thomas [Aquinas], Summa Theologiae II–II, q. 32, a. 3: Comparing spiritual almsgiving to corporal almsgiving simply, other things being equal — for example, when there is equal need and equal destitution on both sides — spiritual almsgiving is superior to corporal. First, because what is given, namely a spiritual good, is nobler than a corporal gift, as teaching is better than gold. Second, because the soul to which it is given is nobler than the body. Third, because the fruit of spiritual almsgiving is greater than that of corporal. For the fruit of spiritual almsgiving is amendment from sins or the perfection of virtue, which are nobler than any corporal gifts. But in the case where other things are not equal, it is otherwise — as the one dying of hunger must be fed before being instructed. Richard [of Middleton] posits a manifold distinction; but what has been said suffices. [Alexander of Hales,] speaking of the utility of almsgiving both as to the perfection and as to the utility of the giver: in this way corporal almsgiving can have a spiritual effect, since when it is given from charity of God and neighbor it merits an increase of grace and glory. Hence Ecclesiasticus 29 [:11–12]: “Lose your money for the sake of a brother; lay up your treasure according to the commandments of the Most High, and it will profit you more than gold.” Likewise, almsgiving moves the recipient to pray for the giver and to obtain for him grace and many spiritual gifts, by which he may advance toward the kingdom of heaven, according to Luke 16 [:9]: “Make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous mammon, so that when you fail they may receive you into the eternal tabernacles.” And according to this, almsgiving — whether corporal or spiritual — is more excellent when it proceeds from greater charity and piety and is given to the more devout poor. And so much for this question.

Question V.

Fifth: Concerning the second form of the third part of the proposition — the third [form] concerning penance for venial sins.

For regarding the first part of it, namely penance for sins committed after baptism — whether it is necessary or not — this was stated above at dist. 4, q. 2, the same distinction 14. The question therefore is:

Whether penance for venial sins is necessary for salvation.

The resolution of this question proceeds through three articles in the customary manner.

Article I.

First notable: it must be noted that there is a manifold difference between venial and mortal sin in kind. The first and principal [difference] is that mortal sin is a disorder and deviation from the necessary order

for the attainment of salvation. Venial [sin] is a deviation from an order that is not necessary but useful. A luxurious petition is a disorder, deviation, and departure from the order directing a human being toward salvation. Now this order instituted by God is twofold. The first is the necessary observance of the commandments, according to Matthew 19 [:17]: “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments.” The other is the compendious and useful — though not necessary — order for attaining salvation, such as the observance of the evangelical counsels. Departure from the first order, which is the transgression of the commandments, is always a mortal sin, because it brings perpetual death, deprives the soul of the life of grace in the present and the life of glory in the future. Departure from the second order — such as the observance of the counsels — through a perverse and disordered attachment to a creature, short of transgressing the commandments, is a kind of venial disorder. It is called a venial sin — a disorder in adhering to a creature that is less useful while forsaking what is more useful — since it does not corrupt rational choice (cf. Aristotle, Ethics I) and does not bring death, hence “venial.”

[Venial sin,] moreover, neither takes away grace nor diminishes it. Otherwise, since grace is finite, it could be entirely removed by the multiplication of venial sins — and thus venials would not be venial. It does, however, diminish the fervor of grace, that is, it impedes grace from its operation, as Augustinus says [cf. Confessions X]: “He loves you less who loves something together with you that he does not love on account of you.” He loves less — not by privation of the habit of charity, but in that, by turning to a creature through an act of love, he is impeded from actual purification by an actual act of charity toward God. For just as the intellect does not simultaneously understand many things through distinct acts, so neither does the appetite simultaneously tend toward diverse things through acts of love.

From these [observations] further [corollaries] follow.

Mortal [sin] deprives [one] of glory and obliges [one] to gehenna. Mortal [sin] turns [one] away from the end. Venial [sin], however, does not turn [one] away but deflects and somewhat impedes progress toward the end. Likewise, mortal [sin] always has annexed to it contempt or interpreted contempt of God. Venial [sin], however, does not involve contempt of God (for no one despises what one loves), but involves a certain sloth or tepidity by which one adheres rather to a creature than hastens to adhere to God. Likewise, mortal [sin], if it is not blotted out in this life, remains forever inexpiable. For in the future [life] it avails nothing, where there is no place for penance. But venial [sin] is also remitted after this life, as will be said below, dist. 21. Indeed, to discern in particular regarding any inordinate act whether it is a mortal or venial sin is exceedingly difficult on account of the infinite circumstances that vary an act. Hence concerning this the venerable Gerson, chancellor of Paris, labored greatly in his book De vita animae [“On the Life of the Soul”], and offered many most useful rules for following this discernment, yet by his own testimony he did not arrive at sufficient certainty of discernment.

Second notable: concerning the remission of the fault of venial sin.

Notable 2.

[Cf.] co. dist. 2 of the fourth [book]. The first opinion, as [Alexander of Hales] recites it:

Opinion 1.

First: the remission of venial fault is nothing other than the discharge of the temporal punishment owed for sin. Proof: because what remains after the passing act of venial sin is nothing but the liability to the punishment owed. This liability is only to temporal punishment; and consequently, by the very act of discharging the temporal punishment, the guilt of venial [sin] is remitted. Now that one who has sinned venially owes temporal punishment — not eternal punishment — according to divine justice (as they have already stated): the doctor proves this as follows. The debt of eternal punishment is incompatible with charity; but venial [sin] is compatible with charity,

Charity coexists with venial sin not only when it has not yet been blotted out after the act, but even when it is actually being committed, as is clear to all. A stronger proof: through charity one is worthy of eternal life. If together with this there stands a debt to eternal punishment, then that person is at once worthy of eternal life and of eternal punishment — which is impossible.

Furthermore, after the act of mortal sin nothing remains of the sin except the debt of eternal punishment, as was established above in Question 1, Distinction 14. If the debt of eternal punishment could coexist with grace, then an unremitted mortal sin could coexist with grace in the manner in which it persists after the act, and thus the same person would be simultaneously friend and enemy of God. Moreover, the essential punishment of the damned is not the punishment of sense but the punishment of loss [poena damni]. This necessarily accompanies any punishment whatsoever, because no punishment can coexist with blessedness; therefore the debt to any eternal punishment includes the debt to eternal loss — which is the essential punishment of damnation — and that does not correspond to venial sin. Furthermore, venial and mortal sin are proportionate in the character of their malice or offense, inasmuch as infinitely many venial sins would not equal one mortal sin in the character of offense, since not even all of them together would turn one away from the ultimate end as one mortal sin does. Therefore, the punishment corresponding to mortal sin by divine justice exceeds infinitely — that is, disproportionately — the punishment owed to venial sin. This excess is not proportionate according to intensity, since no punishment is intensively infinite; therefore it is according to extension or duration. Hence eternal punishment is not owed to venial sin. And this refutes what others say, namely that eternal punishment corresponds to venial sin by divine justice. Incidentally, however, when someone joins himself to charity — by which he is ordained to the kingdom — he owes temporal punishment. And so when someone is damned for mortal sin, his venial sins are also punished eternally in hell; nor would they be punished eternally by God unless eternal punishment were justly owed to them. That they are punished eternally is clear because otherwise there would be redemption in hell. And by contrast one would say that for venial sin, temporal punishment is owed of itself, but through its conjunction with mortal sin, eternal punishment in hell is owed incidentally. Against this he argues: God always punishes below what is deserved, and even if he always punished strictly to the measure deserved, it would be entirely unjust to inflict eternal punishment for something to which, in itself, only temporal punishment is owed. For whoever imposes something on another does not do so in order to exact it infinitely for a fault; therefore a punishment exceeding it infinitely does not justly correspond to it. From these considerations he concludes that for venial sin — whether punished in this life or the next, whether in hell or elsewhere — only temporal punishment is owed, neither in itself nor incidentally, because the offense is such that it is sufficiently punished by temporal punishment taken in itself. Nor is it incongruous that the temporal punishment owed to venial sin be determined [and completed] in hell. For example, if someone coming [to purgatory] in the first manner [i.e., dying in grace] relapses into mortal sin — having completed part of an imposed penance but not all — and is thereby damned, that venial sin, depending on how and by what it came about, requires a doubled penance to be rendered and discharged; he pays the punishment in hell, but only a temporal one, because from the moment a prior remission of sins converted the debt of eternal punishment into a debt of temporal punishment, he is never a debtor for those [sins] except for temporal punishment. And consequently, once the temporal punishment is paid, he will be free from these. Yet there seems to be redemption in hell for those sins for which he is damned, because for them the debt of eternal punishment was never converted into a debt of temporal punishment, so that debt always remains and will never be discharged. And this is how one should understand the statement that there is no redemption in hell. All these are [the views of] Scotus.

Opinion 2

The second opinion holds that the remission of guilt, even of any [kind of sin], is distinguished

from the remission of punishment. Hence guilt is frequently remitted while not all the punishment corresponding to that guilt is remitted. Likewise, God can remit punishment without remitting guilt. And these authors further say that the remission of venial sin comes about through some act of displeasure at the venial sin, an act rendered more acceptable to God. This [remission] is either referred by the agent himself to that venial sin’s remission, or it is not so referred by the agent but is accepted by God in relation to it — as the works of one dying in charity with a venial sin not referred by that person toward the remission of the venial sin in which he dies, nor even at the death of the blessed one any meritorious act with respect to the remission of a venial sin, may nonetheless have their prior works accepted by God in relation to the remission of that venial sin at death. This can be understood as follows. Every meritorious work has a twofold effect: one with respect to the guilt to be remitted, another with respect to grace and glory to be conferred. For example: a satisfactory work by which the temporal punishment owed to venial sin — or to mortal sin deleted through penance with respect to guilt — is remitted, merits beyond this remission of punishment also a degree of grace and glory, and no less of either than if it were not a satisfactory work, as was shown above in Question 2, Distinction 1. For unless this were so, the Church would err in imposing a satisfaction on a penitent — since it would be better for the penitent to be absolved without any penance and then to defer the payment of punishment to purgatory. If indeed satisfaction can be made for another in this regard, [and if] enduring this punishment temporally would diminish essential misery, then it would be better to suffer this temporal punishment than to lack even the least degree of grace and, throughout all of eternal glory, than to be without a better degree of eternal glory without some better measure. This is the remission of temporal punishment. And on this matter blessed Bonaventura [speaks] at length above, Distinction 1, Question 2, in the sixth difficulty. For the present purpose: every meritorious act is remissive of some part of the temporal punishment owed to venial sin. Being accepted by God for this [purpose], whether the agent refers it to the discharge of punishment or not — the agent himself does not [directly] remit the punishment, due to an impediment; but once that impediment ceases, it has its effect. Sin that persists constitutes the impediment. For the punishment of sin cannot be discharged while the sin persists in act or in the will. Therefore if someone remains in venial sin until death, he impedes [the remission] until that death; because a cause that is impeded, while impeded, does not produce its effect, but once the impediment ceases, it does produce its effect. In the instant of death, once the impediment — namely the sin — ceases, then remission of the venial sin takes effect in virtue of the antecedent merits. If there were many [merits], much [is remitted]; if few, little. It is clear how the opinion of the Master [of the Sentences] may be understood to agree with what was said above in Distinction 14 on [the view of] Bartolinus.

Note 3

Thirdly, it should be noted that penance is understood in two ways, as was said in Question 1, Distinction 14: first, as the sacrament — namely, the priestly absolution given by a confessor to the penitent; second, as the virtue or act of the virtue, namely displeasure, contrition, or preceding sorrow. Here it is taken in the second sense; what pertains to the sacrament of penance will be treated in the following Distinction. And in this second sense it can be taken in two ways: in one way, strictly, for the habit or act of detestation of sin, or for the disposition presupposed by such an act; in another way, much more broadly, for the cessation of the will from the act of delight in sin. Hence blessed Thomas, in Book IV, Distinction 16, Principal Question 2, Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 2, says: for the will to withdraw from what it previously willed is for it to be displeased by what it willed. This is the office of contrition. Such grace, or such displeasure, is [even] a little pain. And in this way one has formed penance. Thus Thomas. [One has] penance or attrition for sin even while having no

memory of the sin. And this concerns the first article.

Article 2

Regarding the second article, the proper conclusion is as follows. Venial sins are not remitted in the proper sense through an act of delight residing in the will. This proposition is established from Article 1, Conclusion 1, Question 1, Distinction 1. It is proved by reason, because it is self-contradictory for a sin to be remitted while it remains in the will. If an ordered [act] pleases [the will], the sin remains in the will, because that very act of delight is the sin. While the sin remains, it is neither blotted out nor remitted.

Conclusion 2

The second conclusion: for the remission of venial sin, penance taken in the strict sense is not required — neither actual nor habitual, neither sacramental. This is proved because one who remains in venial sin until death is not damned but will ultimately be saved; therefore the venial sin committed is remitted, since every debt of guilt is incompatible with beatitude — “for nothing unclean shall enter it,” Apocalypse 21 [Rev. 21:27]. Now it is remitted through the act of the one who sinned, because it [remission] comes from a determined merit of any kind, both of congruity and of condignity. Therefore this conclusion is true. It is remitted, moreover, through satisfaction in purgatory, by which the temporal punishment owed to a venial sin not remitted in the present life is discharged. Furthermore, an act performed with fervent charity consumes venial sin, just as fire does, even if in that very act one has no memory of the venial sin — according to the saying: “Charity covers a multitude of sins” [1 Peter 4:8]. And such an act is not an act or habit of penance, nor a sacrament.

Conclusion 3

The third conclusion: taking penance in the second, broader sense, venial sins are not remitted in this life without penance. This conclusion follows from the first, because venial sin is not remitted while it is pleasing to the will. But not to take pleasure in a sin already committed is adequate penance for that sin, speaking broadly of penance, as was said in the article. Therefore the conclusion is true.

Conclusion 4

The fourth conclusion: venial sin is remitted not only through an act of displeasure but through every meritorious act, especially when it is directed toward its remission. The conclusion is proved because every meritorious act is satisfactory with respect to temporal punishment, as was said in the first article. This [satisfaction] is applied to venial sin, in proportion to the degree of the venial sin. The reasoning holds because the punishment owed to a sin is never remitted while the sin itself persists. Therefore a good work that remits punishment remits the sin to which the punishment is owed, if it has not previously been remitted. Yet not every meritorious work remits the entire punishment owed to venial sin — just as not every satisfactory work for a remitted mortal sin, as enjoined, removes all its punishment. Rather, a certain proportion is required between the meritorious work and the punishment to be removed; this proportion, known in the divine acceptance, is determined by God alone. This is especially so when what such an act includes is displeasure at the sin to be blotted out. For in directing an act toward the remission of a venial sin, one wills the venial sin to be remitted, and consequently wills it not to persist — and this willing is displeasure at the venial sin. Among all other works, contrition or displeasure especially merits the remission of sin.

Conclusion 5

The fifth conclusion: neither the virtue nor the sacrament of penance is required for the remission of venial sin. This is the view of Bonaventura. The conclusion is clear because venial sin is remitted even after this life, as will be said in Distinction 21, where meritorious penance has no place for us. Regarding the third article:

Article 3

The first question is: whether one venial sin can be remitted without another. The brief answer is yes, according to either of the opinions stated by Paludanus [Petrus de Palude] in Distinction 1 of the present question. For the punishment owed to one can be discharged while the punishment owed to another venial sin remains. The reasoning holds: because once the punishment is discharged, the liability [reatus] is discharged.

[Continuing from the previous column:] “petition: and we [suffer] penalty for penalty” — the other opinion. And the greater [satisfaction] will apply likewise to venial [sin]. For greater satisfaction is owed for mortal sin remitted as to guilt than for venial sin. If one holds the other opinion, this is proved because there is no connection among venial sins to one another, nor is it [connected] with respect to aversion from God, since venial sin does not turn one away from him as mortal sins do — in this respect mortal sins form a single burden, so that one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another. Nor is this [connection] with respect to conversion toward the creature, as is sufficiently clear. For no connection is apparent where one deals with an appetite for disordered eating or with somewhat less than perfectly ordered solicitude short of transgressing a precept, since one can be remitted without the other.

Doubt 2

The second doubt is whether a venial sin can be remitted while a mortal sin remains. An argument is raised that it cannot, because sin cannot be remitted except in a state of grace, and where mortal sin is present there can be no grace — therefore [it cannot]. The antecedent is proved from Proverbs 10: “Charity covers all offenses.” On the other side it is argued that the penalty can be discharged even while in mortal sin, and [so too] can venial sin — and this holds entirely — since the remission of venial sin is nothing other than

Thomas’s Opinion

the remission of liability to penalty. On this doubt there are two opinions. One is that of the blessed Thomas and his followers: that it cannot [be remitted]. They strive to prove this as follows. Just as mortal sin takes away charity, so venial sin takes away the fervor of charity. Therefore, just as mortal sin is not forgiven unless charity is restored, so neither is venial sin forgiven unless the fervor of charity is restored. But the fervor of charity, being subsequent to charity itself, cannot be restored unless charity is first restored — and charity cannot be restored while mortal sin remains. Furthermore, while God remains angry because of the ongoing mortal sin, the sinner is his enemy. An enemy does not forgive an offense, whether small or great. But while mortal sin persists the sinner is God’s enemy — therefore [venial sin cannot be remitted]. Furthermore, venial sin is not forgiven unless some act more acceptable to God [compensates for] the venial sin that displeased him. But no act is acceptable to God unless the one acting is himself acceptable to God — for the Lord first looked to Abel, and only then to his gifts [Genesis 4:4]. But one who is in mortal sin is not acceptable to God — therefore [no such act can avail].

Scotus’s Opinion

[Scotus] similarly argues by parity of reasoning on the other side. The second opinion holds that a venial sin can be forgiven while mortal sin remains, because the penalty owed for a venial sin can be discharged by one who is in mortal sin — whether in this life or in hell, as has been shown above. Once the penalty is discharged, the venial sin is discharged and forgiven, since when the act of sin has passed, nothing remains in the soul that would be opposed to the sin’s remission — beyond the liability to penalty (this qualification is added on account of vicious habits) — but once the penalty is paid the liability to penalty is removed, and so nothing of sin remains. This second opinion is clearer and more probable, and by it the arguments of

Response

of the first opinion are answered. To the first argument, concerning the fervor of charity: one must ask what is meant by “fervor.” If it means something belonging to charity itself — say, a certain intensity of charity — then it can be answered from what has been said that venial sin does not take away the intensity of fervor, since it does not diminish charity according to anyone. But if by “fervor” one means an act of charity: if one means an act actually present, then venial sin does not destroy fervor either, since it is not necessary that on account of an act of venial sin some other act currently present is destroyed. If, however, one means an act of charity that could be present — for example, that a venial act could have been an act of charity had the requisite circumstances of end and the rest been present to render it meritorious — then the argument proceeds, because [venial sin] destroys that fervor, that is, such an act. But it must be denied that sin is not forgiven unless that act is restored, since that act is not necessary for the remission of venial sin, because venial [sin]

can be remitted through any meritorious act directed toward the remission of venial sin, or through the discharge of the penalty owed — and this can be accomplished by anyone existing in mortal sin. Furthermore, one who is in mortal sin can still sin venially, and in so sinning does not destroy the fervor of charity, since such a person does not possess charity and therefore does not possess its fervor. To the second argument — that an enemy does not forgive an offense on account of which he remains angry — it must be said that no one is made God’s enemy on account of venial sin. Thus [God] does not forgive it with the forgiveness that reconciles an enemy, but he can forgive it with the forgiveness that satisfies, as was said above in the first distinction, question 2. To the third argument, the major premise is not simply true, since sometimes venial sin is remitted through satisfaction without any act [of charity], as in purgatory. And conceding the major premise for the sake of argument, regarding remission made in this present life: to the minor premise it must be answered that no act is acceptable to God — with respect to merit toward eternal life — unless the one who acts is himself [first] acceptable to him, since no act without charity is meritorious of eternal life. Nevertheless, some act or suffering is accepted [by God] for the remission of the temporal penalty owed for venial sin, even in one who is not acceptable [to him] with respect to [eternal] life. Otherwise the good works done by one who is in mortal sin would be accepted as nothing at all — and the authority cited must be understood accordingly.

Doubt 3

The third doubt concerns why certain good works are specifically assigned as remedies for the remission of venial sin, when in fact a venial sin can be remitted through any meritorious work, as has been said above. [The answer is found in] a certain mnemonic verse in which these works are specifically assigned: Giving, sprinkled [with holy water], eating, having confessed, giving, blessing. Saying the Lord’s Prayer, “Forgive us our debts.” The expanded list is: Sprinkled with holy water. Eating the Eucharist. Receiving the sacraments or a general confession. Giving bodily alms. Receiving the episcopal blessing. Under “prayer” is included the striking of the breast. Under “communion of the Eucharist” is included the worthy reception of any of the sacraments. These works are assigned not because others are thereby excluded — for contrition, that is, displeasure at venial sin committed, avails far more than the rest — but they are said to be specifically assigned because these means stir the free will toward detestation of sin, through which [sin] is more effectively remitted; and also because in them the prayers and merits of the Church concur; and also because they are frequently directed, by the intention of the agent or of the Church, toward the remission of venial sin; and also because all other [means] are reducible to them. Thus any meritorious work has the power to remit venial sin. On this matter at length: Paludanus [Petrus de Palude], dist. 1 of the present question, art. 2. And on the value of holy water the same author speaks well, dist. 2, q. 1, art. 2, conclusion 2. To the same point: Hugo [of Saint-Victor] On the Sacraments bk. 2, pt. 9, at the beginning. Thomas [Aquinas], dist. 1, q. 2, art. 4. Alexander [of Hales], pt. 4, q. [...], member 1, art. 2, §1. Henricus [of Gorichem], dist. 21, art. 5, q. 1, at the end. The same, dist. 1, art. 1, q. 3. Also Augustinus Enchiridion ch. 70. Also On Penance dist. 3, Water and salt, etc.

Doubt 4

The fourth doubt: whether a venial sin can become mortal, and conversely whether a mortal sin can become venial. For the solution, one must recall what was said in Book III, dist. 23, q. 1, and dist. 1, q. 1, doubt 1: that there is a twofold virtuous act, and likewise a twofold vicious act — namely, elicited and commanded. The elicited act is intrinsically and invariably virtuous, vicious, or indifferent by nature. Thus an elicited virtuous act cannot become vicious or naturally indifferent, nor can the reverse occur — because if such a virtuous act were to become vicious, something about the act would have to change, namely its object or circumstances. But

if the object is changed, the act no longer remains the same; and if the circumstances are changed, the elicited act no longer remains the same — since circumstances are the objects of the elicited act, though not of the commanded act. Therefore a commanded act, remaining numerically the same in the order of nature, can be first virtuous and then vicious, and vice versa. And much more so can an indifferent commanded act, on account of the change of the elicited act, be first indifferent, then vicious, then virtuous. On this matter more fully in Book III, where the authorities cited also adduce the first proposition of the Doctor [Scotus] on this topic.

Second Proposition

A venial sin that is a commanded act, remaining numerically the same, can become mortal, and vice versa. This is proved as follows: a person may enter a church out of a desire for carnal pleasure, and then — the motion continuing — may change his intention and enter in order to incite disordered love toward some person to whom he is inordinately attached. That continuing motion is numerically the same in the order of nature, being the same movement; in the first instance it is a venial sin, in the second it is mortal. The same can be illustrated with many other examples. A fuller treatment is to be found in the place cited, dist. 23, q. 3 of the [Book III] commentary.

Doubt

But regarding this matter it is first asked whether the frequent repetition of a venial sin renders it mortal. This question arises on account of the words of Augustinus among those cited: “sins, however small, if recurring ones have been accumulated, will weigh upon us and overwhelm us just as some one great sin.” To this doubt the answer is that frequency alone, or the habit of sinning venially, never changes a venial sin into a mortal one. As Scotus argues, dist. 29, Book III, concerning the habit of swearing: if the first venial sin is venial, then any subsequent act of the same species is likewise venial, since the same moral reasoning applies to each act of the same species in the genus of morals. Nor does an interior habit render a sin grave, since there is no greater gravity in the habit than in the act from which it is generated — although an interior habit more strongly inclines toward the act, it does not incline toward an act of a different genus, nor toward a graver act, but toward an act similar to the one from which it was produced. Now the act of venial sin and the act of mortal sin differ in kind within the genus of morals. And therefore the habit generated from venial

sins do not incline one except toward venial sins. To Augustinus the answer is given that he speaks dispositively — not indeed disposing by necessity but by inclination. For the habit of sinning venially makes a person less fearful, increases the appetite for sinning, and easily grows toward contempt. As if someone were so delighted in a jocular lie that he would not abandon it even if prohibited — once committed with such contempt of a precept, it would then be mortal. And to this purpose are Augustinus’s examples of the accumulation of drops of water and grains of sand: for they do not overwhelm and sink the ship, but they dispose the ship to be easily overwhelmed by waves in which it perishes.

Doubt 6

It is asked whether [God’s being] offended in a venial sin that pleases [the sinner] makes it mortal. As Augustinus testifies: “No sin is so venial that it does not become mortal while it pleases.” To this little question S. Bonaventura and others distinguish a threefold venial sin. One is venial by reason of surprise alone — that is, without advertence, it forestalls deliberation. This kind, just as it cannot be avoided, so likewise never becomes mortal; it remains long in that genus of surprise. It is otherwise if the act begun by surprise were to remain or be continued until full deliberation supervenes, because then it is no longer a matter of surprise. The second is that which occurs with thought or advertence, but without full consent — as in a thought about a woman, and in delight short of consent to that delight. The third is venial with reason and consent, but is venial because it is not against a precept — as an idle word or a jocular lie. And in reply to this, it is said: a venial sin of the first or second kind, if full consent supervenes, will become mortal. For it was venial on account of defect of consent or its imperfection; once consent supervenes, the venial character ceases, and it no longer lacks the character of mortal. And the answer notes specifically full consent, because, as Scotus says in dist. 39 of the third [Book], just as a meritorious act requires that it be fully human — that is, from full deliberation and consent — so no less does a demeritorious act require the same, because [God] is not more inclined toward condemnation than toward pardon. And when an act of the genus of mortal sin occurs without full deliberation, due to defect of perfect consent — and mortal sin further presupposes perfect deliberation — it is not counted as mortal. But it must nonetheless be observed that one who is habituated sometimes does not realize he has deliberated, because his deliberation is so brief — since he possesses great prudence which is prompt to deliberate in a time almost imperceptible. Such deliberation is sufficient for the character of merit and sin. To a venial sin of the third order the reply is that nothing must be placed in it as in a final end — as if someone were so seized by appetite for a jocular lie that he would even beg with entreaties to continue it if his lord were to forbid him: there he would place his rest in the jocular lie more than in God. And then contempt of God would always concur, to whom in that case he would prefer the jocular lie. And there is room for Augustinus’s words: “No sin is so venial that it cannot become mortal while it pleases” — not by any kind of pleasure, but [that pleasure] by which the will rests in it as in a final end. This happens when it pleases more than God — for instance, because one wills the act of that sort more than the friendship of God, which is the true and simply ultimate end. Or this authoritative statement is understood of venial sins that are also

of lesser [weight] in their kind. Or thirdly, as Gerson expounded in De vita animae, lect. i: while it pleases, it is a sin insofar as it is offensive to God — apart from any other motive or inducement to sin. For that indeed bespeaks a diabolical obstinacy in the one who fights out of hatred for the one he has offended. Hence briefly: one who perseveres in a venial sin as venial, even deliberately, commits only a venial sin. And although one who sins venially from deliberation abuses the mercy of God — having assumed that sin to be venial and not mortal — nonetheless he does not sin mortally. And this reflects greatly on the mercy of God, that such abuse, even when deliberate, is only venial. And so much for that question and the whole distinction.