Distinction 5, Question 1: On Intention in Baptism
Distinctio V, Questio Vnica: De Intentione in Baptismo
Gabriel BielDistinctionis quinte questio vnica.
Ipsa enim obligatio est vt hos non intendat ad illud ad quod obligatur. et per consequens non potest esse actus fortuitus : sed actus a proposito.et ita humanus. Huius etiam Alexander addit duas causas. Scilicet propter reuerentiam sacramenti. et cautelam baptisati. Vnde iniuria. et irreverentia sacramento fieret si sine intentione fieret ex impetu.temere et a casu. Similiter quia periculum salutis est baptisato: si non recte ministratur cum bona cautela. et prouidetia.ne quid omittatur q ad veritatem baptismi necessario requiritur.
Scilicet. q non tantum requirit intentio respectu actus baptisandi vt obiecti. Illa quidem requiritur vt probant rationes ad primam partem conclusionis alias enim non esset actus humanus.sed no sufficit.quia alias irrisorie baptisans pro ioco.siue pro alia qualibet causa lauans et proferens verba baptisaret. consequens falsum ex predictis. et patet consequentia.quia est intentio irrisorie baptisantis respectu actus.quia vult lauare et verba proferre in irrisionem et contumeliam christiane fidei et sacramenti. et nibil aliud deficit.nec materia nec forma. Tertia pars conclusionis (q requiritur intentio respectu effectus qui est finis baptismi) probatur. quia sicut deus vult istum actum exercitum esse humanum. et non tantum vt est talis actus in natura. quia i hoc non distingueretur a quacunqs alia ablutione cum alijs verbis ioco prolatis. Sed inquantum est actus ministri exercentis signum dei. habens autem actum humanum intendit finem illius actus.vt est sibi impofitus. Illud enim ratoabile vniuersaliter in vsu signi practici. Si quis enim legislator institueret in policia sua tactum manus esse signum amicitie. non intenderet q vtentes isto signo precife haberent actum humanum circa illud inquantum est tale signum institutum. Et si determinasset se ad tale signum aliquid daturum vel facturum.non daret nec faceret illud nisi homo exerceret illud signum vt est institutum ad talem finem. Sic in proposito non sufficit intentio exercendi baptismum vt est talis actus in natura : sed vt est signum ad certum finem institutum. Et afirmat Intentio ministri requiritur ex prima parte conclusionis. et non sufficit intentio actus talis.vt est talis actus in natura er secunda parte. ergo requiritur intentio actus vt ordinatus ad finem aliquem. finem vtiqs illum quem fideles (qui hoc signo vtuntur.id est ecclesia) intendunt tenet consequentia. quia nibil aliud assignari potest qd intendi debet vltra actum illum.vt est talis in natura.
Quod sequitur ex conclusione. Ebrius furiosus et generaliter carens ratione. pro tempore pro quo non vtitur ratione non potest baptisare. quia non habet tunc libertatem.nec intentionem illam que dicta est. Nec hoc est ptra Aug.o.5.sup.iob.no curo ebriosis.
Non enim dicit non curo ebrium. sed ebrium. Ebriofus autem non semper est ebrius. nec furiofus semper furit. Tales enim baptifare possunt. qui habent lucida interualla. non tempore ebrietatis aut furie. Ad hoc enim dicit Augustinus. non curo ebriofum. malitia enim facerdotis non impedit effectum sacramenti.
ad veritatem sacramenti non requiritur intentio ministri respectu effectus baptifmatis in specie. Sed sufficit intendere quod ecclesia intendit in genere. Probatur quia infideles et heretici. etiam circa hunc articulum baptifmi. laici ac mulieres possunt baptifare. ex prima conclufione. quorum quidam non credunt baptifma habere effectum aliquem circa anime purgationem. quidam non intelligunt qui fint effectus baptifmi. Et tamen poffunt habere intentionem baptifandi. vt baptifmus inftitutus est. vel vt chriftiani co vtuntur. Et hoc est dicere. intendere quod ecclesia intendit. etiam fi non credat quod aliquid efficiat quod dictum est.
ad baptifmi veritatem non exigitur dicta intentio actualis nec fufficit habitualis. fed requiritur intentio virtualis. Prima pars probatur. non requiritur intentio actualis. quia deus instituens sacramentum baptifmi tanquam sacramenti necessarium ad falutem. non obligauit hominem ad impossibile vel nimis difficile. Sed non diftrahi in quocunque actu humano. quo interrumpitur vel tollitur actualis intentio. vel est impossibile vel valde difficile. Quia Ambrosius iuxta Augustinum. 2. de lib. arb. non est in potestate noftra quibus vifis tangamur. ergo non obligauit baptizantem vt in actu baptifandi non diftrahaf ad cogitandum aliud aliquid non pertinens ad baptifmum. Cum vero diftrabitur non actu cogitat pro illo nec intendit ad baptifmum. quia non poteft homo fimul plura cogitare. quorum vnum non ordinatur in aliud. ita nec intendere. quia intendere praefupponit cogitare. ficut actus voluntatis actui intellectus.
Secunda pars quod non fufficit habitualis intentio. Probatur quia illa poteft effe in dormiente. Imo in habente contrariam intentionem actualem. fed neuter horum baptifat. Nam fi quis plebanus habens habitum baptifandi in fomno baptifaret puerum. quod non est impossibile. quoniam in fomno quidam ambulant. mirabiles operationes exercent. Similiter fi talis ex malitia licet exterius ablueret. intenderet actualiter non baptifare. neuter baptifaret. quis vterque haberet intentionem habitualem. Item propter folum habitum inexiftentem. actus non dicitur humanus. licet fit conformis propter habitum actui humano. Probatur quia actus procedens ab habitu fine intentione actuali eft actus pure naturalis. non liberi arbitrii. quia habitus non libere fed pure naturaliter inclinat ad actum. per quod actus talis non est humanus. cum omnis actus humanus eft actus liber. Et adducit Scotus exemplum. Si aliquis haberet habitum inclinantem ad desiderium fanitatis. fi currat. non intendens nec cogitans de fanitate. fed intendens ludere. Ille non ex curfu con-
fequitur fanitatem. non dicitur profequi eam per actum humanum fed cafualiter vel fortuite. non magis quam fi non habuiffet in fe habitum defiderandi fanitatem. Idem patet in furiofis. que in furia operantur ex habitu prius adquifito. tamen tales operationes non funt humane.
Tertia pars quod requiritur intentio virtualis probatur via diuifua. quia intentio requiritur ex conclufione tertia. non fufficit habitualis. vt nunc probatum est ergo requiritur virtualis. tenet per a fufficienti diuifione. Sufficit ergo in baptifante quod aliquando habuit intentionem actualem baptifandi ex qua defcendit actus baptifandi fiue in illo actu habeat intentionem actualem baptifandi vel non. quia forte intendit circa actum lauandi. vt est talis actus in natura. aut aliquid impertinens. Intelligendum tamen est quod defcenderit ille actus abfque omni motu voluntatis contrario. ficut fi induens fe ad miffam intendat celebrare fecundum vfum romane ecclesie. et ex illo procedat continue forte ex aliquo habitu derelicto in fantafia. cum magna distractione ita tamen faciat ea que neceffaria funt ad confecrationem vere conficit eucariftie Sacramentum. Hec Scotus.
fi plures eundem baptifent vere afferunt facramentum. dummodo tamen eorum quilibet perficit totum. Probatur. quia vnus totum faciens non annichilat per hoc factum alterius. Sed fi vnus faceret totum quod plures faciunt. baptifatus effet nihilominus alio fimilis faciente. Dicitur tamen dumtaxat dum eorum quilibet totum facit. id eft dum quilibet abluit. verba cum intentione baptifandi integre profert. quia fi vnus ablueret alter verba proferret nihil facerent. vt ponit communiter cafus. Si duo concurrerent mutus et mancus. mutus ablueret. mancus verba proferret. vterque baptifare intenderet. non effet veri sacramentum. Cuius ratio secundum Scotum non est nifi inftitutio diuina. que ficut voluit effe vnum principale agens. ita voluit habere vnum miniftrum in collatione integra facramenti. quod patet ex forma qua nos vtimur. nam proferens eam fignificat fe abluere. nec autem debet oratio effe falfa in forma facramentorum veritate. Similiter etiam debet intelligi de verbis grecorum dicentium baptifetur. quod non eft deprecatio. fed quafi quedam efficax optatio. vt eft fenfus. ille qui vult fieri circa iftum baptifetur ifte. Hec Scotus. vide par. dift. 3. q. 2. ar. 2. Illa congruentia de veritate verborum parum vel nihil facit. quia fi plurium quilibet baptifet. dicens ego te baptifo. oratio vera eft. cum quilibet baptifet. quid fi duo baptifantes vnum. dicant nos baptizamus te in nomine. Ridet Alexander
The Single Question of the Fifth Distinction.
For the obligation itself is that he not direct [the act] toward something other than that to which he is obligated, and consequently it cannot be a fortuitous act, but an act proceeding from deliberate purpose, and thus a human act. Alexander also adds two further reasons for this: namely, out of reverence for the sacrament, and for the safety of the one being baptized. Hence an injury and irreverence would be done to the sacrament if it were administered without intention — rashly, impulsively, and by chance. Similarly, because the baptized person’s salvation is at risk if the sacrament is not rightly administered with proper care and foresight, lest anything be omitted that is necessarily required for the truth of baptism.
Namely, that intention is required not only with respect to the act of baptizing as its object. Such intention is indeed required, as the arguments for the first part of the conclusion prove — for otherwise it would not be a human act — but it does not suffice. For otherwise one who baptizes mockingly, as a joke, or washes while pronouncing the words for any other reason whatsoever, would truly baptize; and that conclusion is false on the basis of what has been said above, while the inference itself is evident — because the mocker does have intention with respect to the act: he wills to wash and to pronounce the words in ridicule and contempt of the Christian faith and the sacrament, and nothing else is lacking — neither matter nor form. The third part of the conclusion (that intention is required with respect to the effect, which is the end of baptism) is proved as follows: just as God wills that this act be exercised as a human act, and not merely insofar as it is such an act in nature — for in that respect it would not be distinguished from any other washing accompanied by other words spoken in jest — but insofar as it is the act of a minister exercising a sign of God; and one who performs a human act intends the end of that act as it is assigned to him. For this principle holds universally in the use of a practical sign. If a lawgiver were to establish in his polity that a touch of the hand is a sign of friendship, he would not intend that those using this sign should have merely a human act concerning it insofar as it is such an instituted sign; and if he had committed himself to giving or doing something upon that sign, he would neither give nor do it unless a person exercised that sign as it was instituted for that end. So too in the present matter: it does not suffice to have the intention of exercising baptism insofar as it is such an act in nature, but [one must intend it] insofar as it is a sign instituted for a definite end. And [Biel] affirms: the intention of the minister is required by the first part of the conclusion; the intention of merely such an act as it is in nature does not suffice, by the second part; therefore the intention of the act as ordered toward some end is required — and that end is indeed the end which the faithful (who use this sign, that is, the Church) intend. The inference holds, because nothing else can be assigned that ought to be intended beyond that act insofar as it is such in nature.
Which follows from the conclusion. A drunkard, a madman, and in general anyone lacking reason for the time during which he is deprived of the use of reason cannot baptize, because he does not then have freedom, nor the intention that has been described. Nor is this against Augustinus, 5, on Job: “I take no account of one given to drunkenness.”
For he does not say “I take no account of one who is drunk ebrius,” but “of one given to drunkenness ebriofus.” For one given to drunkenness is not always drunk, nor is a madman always raving. Such persons can baptize when they have lucid intervals, not during a time of drunkenness or madness. For with regard to this point Augustinus says: “I take no account of one given to drunkenness.” For the wickedness of the priest does not impede the effect of the sacrament.
For the truth of the sacrament, the intention of the minister with respect to the specific effect of baptism is not required; it suffices to intend what the Church intends in a general way. This is proved because unbelievers and heretics, even regarding this article of baptism, as well as laypeople and women, can baptize, as was established by the first conclusion. Among these, some do not believe that baptism has any effect with respect to the purification of the soul; some do not understand what the effects of baptism are. And yet they can have the intention of baptizing as baptism was instituted, or as Christians use it. And this is what it means to intend what the Church intends — even if one does not believe that it accomplishes anything, as has been said.
For the truth of baptism, the said actual intention is not required, nor does habitual intention suffice; rather, virtual intention is required. The first part is proved: actual intention is not required, because God, in instituting the sacrament of baptism as a sacrament necessary for salvation, did not bind man to what is impossible or excessively difficult. But not to be distracted in any human act that interrupts or removes actual intention is either impossible or very difficult. For Ambrosius, following Augustinus, [On Free Will] 2, [says] that it is not in our power what impressions affect us. Therefore [God] did not oblige the one baptizing to refrain from being distracted during the act of baptizing by thinking about something else not pertaining to baptism. Now when one is distracted, he does not actually think about or intend [baptism] at that moment, because a person cannot simultaneously think about several things none of which is ordered to the other — and likewise he cannot simultaneously intend them, because intending presupposes thinking, just as an act of the will presupposes an act of the intellect.
The second part, that habitual intention does not suffice, is proved because such intention can exist in a sleeping person — indeed even in one who has a contrary actual intention; but neither of these baptizes. For if a parish priest who has the habit of baptizing were to baptize a child in his sleep — which is not impossible, since some walk in their sleep and perform remarkable actions — and similarly if such a person were out of malice to wash [someone] externally while actually intending not to baptize, neither would baptize, though both would have habitual intention. Moreover, an act is not called a human act by reason of a habit alone residing [in the agent], even though it is conformed by the habit to a human act. This is proved because an act proceeding from a habit without actual intention is a purely natural act, not an act of free will, since a habit inclines toward an act not freely but purely naturally — by which [reasoning] such an act is not a human act, since every human act is a free act. And Scotus adduces an example: if someone had a habit inclining him to desire health, and he were to run while neither intending nor thinking about health but intending to play, he would not through running con-
[he] attains health. He is not said to pursue it through a human act, but by chance or accidentally, no more than if he had never had within himself the habit of desiring health. The same is evident in the case of the deranged, who act in their frenzy from a habit previously acquired; yet such actions are not human acts.
The third part — that virtual intention is required — is proved by exhaustive division: because intention is required by the third conclusion, and habitual intention does not suffice, as has now been shown; therefore virtual intention is required. This holds by way of a sufficient division. It suffices, therefore, in the one baptizing that he at some point had an actual intention to baptize, from which the act of baptizing proceeds, whether or not he has an actual intention to baptize in that very act — since perhaps he is attending to the washing as such a natural action, or to something irrelevant. It must be understood, however, that the act proceeds without any contrary movement of the will. Just as one who vests himself for Mass, intending to celebrate according to the usage of the Roman Church, and from that intention proceeds continuously — perhaps by force of some habit lodged in the imagination, amid great distraction — yet performs what is necessary for consecration: he truly confects the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Thus Scotus.
If several persons baptize the same [subject], they truly confer the sacrament, provided that each of them performs the whole [rite]. This is proved because one person performing the whole does not annul the act of another. But if one person did everything that several persons do, the baptized would be baptized none the less with another performing the same. It is said, however, with the qualification that each of them performs the whole — that is, provided that each one washes and pronounces the words in their entirety with the intention of baptizing. For if one person washed while another pronounced the words, they would accomplish nothing. The case is commonly put thus: if a mute and a one-handed man came together, the mute washed, and the one-handed man pronounced the words, and both intended to baptize, it would not be a true sacrament. The reason for this, according to Scotus, is simply the divine institution, which, just as it willed there to be one principal agent, so too willed there to be one minister in the integral conferral of the sacrament — as is clear from the form we use, for the one who pronounces it signifies that he himself is washing. Nor should the formula in the forms of the sacraments be false in fact. The same must similarly be understood of the words of the Greeks, who say “let him be baptized,” which is not a petition but a kind of efficacious optative, the sense being: “let this one be baptized by him who wills to do this toward him.” Thus Scotus. See [Scotus,] Part [IV], Dist. 3, q. 2, art. 2. That consideration about the truth of the words counts for little or nothing, because if each of several baptizers baptizes saying “I baptize you,” the proposition is true, since each one is baptizing. What then if two persons baptizing one [subject] say “we baptize you in the name [of]”? Alexander laughs [at this].