On Simony. Title I.

Since among the crimes of the Church the simoniacal heresy holds first place, as is clear in 1 q. ultima, c. Patet, so that this most dangerous plague may be better guarded against and rooted out, we must first consider simony itself.

Question One

Ask, then, what simony is. Answer: Simony is the deliberate will to buy or sell something spiritual or something annexed to a spiritual thing. This is the definition commonly given by both theologians and jurists. For they commonly add “or something annexed to a spiritual thing,” as does Thomas in his commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences, distinction 25, and Petrus de Tarantasia, and also Albertus in the same distinction; and Thomas in the Summa, q. 100, article 1. And when Raymundus, under the same title, § 1, says that the addition is unnecessary, this is not in conflict, as Ulricus explains in his sixth book, third treatise, c. 19, § Et non est contradictio and the following section, because the conflict is merely verbal. “Spiritual” is used both in a broad sense and in a strict sense. Taken in the broad sense it is further used in four ways: namely, essentially, as grace and the virtues; or by participation, as churches, cemeteries, sacred vessels, and the like — for these participate in consecration, which comes about through a spiritual blessing; or ordinatively, that is, what is ordered toward something spiritual, as tithes and first-fruits and all ecclesiastical benefices are ordered toward this end, that the ministers of the Church, sustained by them, may be free to devote themselves to spiritual things; or as a reward directed toward something spiritual. Spiritual in the third way named is like the presentation which, by reason of the right of patronage, someone seeks for another: it is a way presented for obtaining, through investiture, that benefice to which the candidate is presented. And this indeed is called spiritual inasmuch as authority with respect to a spiritual thing is in some manner spiritual. But inasmuch as that authority is not principal but preparatory to the act of the principal authority, it is something extrinsically added to the principal thing for which it is preliminary. Thus it is called annexed to a spiritual thing. Nevertheless, what is spiritual in the third sense is also called annexed to a spiritual thing, just as that which is ordered to assist something else is annexed to it. But spiritual in the strict sense is only that which is essentially spiritual. And this is twofold: for it is either purely spiritual, as grace, the virtues, gifts, and the like; or it is essentially spiritual but received in a corporeal element, as sacramental grace. And so the aforesaid last three are not spiritual things, but things annexed to spiritual things. Thomas in the Summa, article 1, in reply to the sixth argument, deals with this briefly, saying that just as the soul lives by itself while the body lives by its union with the soul, so some things are spiritual in themselves, as the sacraments and other such things, while some are spiritual because they adhere to spiritual things. The lord Hostiensis, book 5, rubric 3, De symonia, § 1 Quid sit, at the word “mihi videtur,” describes it thus: Simony is the receiving or giving of spiritual things, or of things annexed to spiritual things, with a preceding agreement of promise, condition, manner of service, entreaty, or any temporal consideration. This is to be understood of simony with respect to the Church. For without an agreement, the inten-

tion alone makes one a simoniac with respect to God, as the same Hostiensis says at the beginning, § Sed irregularitatem non inducit. On this see extra, same title, the last chapter. Note also that throughout this whole subject, whenever “money” is mentioned, under the name of money is understood whatever men possess on earth, whether movable or immovable, as in 1 q. 2 throughout. Raymundus says the same below, same book, title 2, De magistris, at the end. Note also, according to Raymundus here, that under the name of buying or selling is understood every non-gratuitous contract, except the contract of exchange, which will be treated below, same title, q. 6, Qualiter possit, where it is shown that not even by a settlement can a transaction be made over spiritual things — extra, De transactionibus, “Super eo,” where it is said that over a sacred thing under litigation no settlement can be made, although the parties may amicably compose the matter between themselves. The gloss here says that a settlement is a non-gratuitous agreement concerning a doubtful matter and an uncertain suit not yet ended. See more on composition in spiritual matters below, same book, title 15, De decimis, q. 154. I ask also.

Question Two

Why simony is also called a heresy, as is clear in 1 q. ultima, c. Patet, and in several other places. Answer, according to Thomas in the Summa, article 1 and article 10: Simony is called a heresy because, just as an outward profession of faith is a kind of religious act even if it is not in the heart, so conversely to sell spiritual things or the gifts of God is a kind of profession of unbelief, since by the very act, as it were, a person professes himself to be the master of the spiritual gifts, even though in his heart he does not disbelieve. Petrus in his commentary agrees with this, as does Ulricus, § 2. And Ulricus adds in the same place that this vice is called simony also from its first author, namely Simon, and that it sprang from the evil root of unbelief, on account of which Peter reproached him with heresy, saying: For you thought that the gift of God might be possessed with money. For Simon thought this, as Thomas says, because he said that the world was not created by God but by a certain higher power, as Isidorus says in the book of the Etymologies; and accordingly the simoniacs are reckoned among the other heretics, as is clear in Augustinus’s book De heresibus.

Question Three

Why the simoniacal heresy is said to hold first place. Answer, according to Ulricus, § Cum ergo and the following section: because simony is the greatest sin. For as is said in 1 q. ultima, c. Patet, all crimes in comparison with the simoniacal heresy will be reckoned as almost nothing. But this is to be understood not of just any simony, but when there is a perfect imitation of the sin of Simon, which was joined with unbelief and malice, as is clear from the words of Peter in Acts 8: “You have no part nor lot in this matter,” where Ambrosius in his book De penitentia gives the text thus: “You have no part nor lot in this faith.” And he adds: “You see that he condemns this man all the more because he did not have a pure conscience of faith” — so unbelief is clear. And concerning malice he says: “I see that you are in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity”; by “gall” the greatest malice is signified, and the “bond of iniquity” signifies obstinacy in malice. But if someone commits simony without the error of unbelief, out of desire for honor or riches and not out of malice, then it is not the greatest sin, but unbelief and the sin against the Holy Spirit, and in a certain case even sacrilege, are greater crimes.

Question Four

Why those who practice simony are rather called “simoniacs” from Simon, who wished to buy the gift of God, than “Gehazites” from Gehazi, who sold the gift of God. Answer, according to Ulricus, § Dicuntur autem: that the completion of the formal character of this sin lay in the act of Simon and in the deed of Gehazi. For Gehazi only sold the good of God, whereas Simon both bought, so far as it lay in him, and also sold by the purpose of his will, as Urbanus says in 1 q. 2, c. Saluator. This agrees with

Question 5

Whether in this matter the will alone, even a will that is not deliberate, makes someone a simoniac. For simony is said to be “the deliberate will to buy,” etc. The gloss of Guillelmus explains this as “a will that advances toward an exterior act,” and Ulricus and others say the same in their writings on Peter. The response, according to Raymundus and the Concordia of the title [on simony], § 2, “Simony is,” etc., and according to the other jurists commonly, must be this: that certain things are forbidden which are simoniacal, such as to sell or buy sacred things, and in brief, whatever things were simoniacal in the Old and New Testaments — in these the will alone suffices. But certain things are simoniacal which are forbidden, namely, because they are simoniacal only by a constitution of the Church — as when someone resigns a church on the condition or pact that it be given to his nephew or to another. In such cases the will alone does not suffice, unless it proceeds into act, as in extra, de officio delegati, Ex parte [part one]. Goffredus says the same under the same title, § “It is committed, however.” And Petrus says so in his writing on Innocentius, in the gloss on the chapter Tua nos, under the same title. This gloss also says: Note that, since Gehazi was a simoniac and yet is not read to have made any pact, anyone who said that there is no simony without an express pact would be in error. As to what Raymundus says here, “unless it proceeds into act,” understand it according to the gloss here: into act, I do not mean the act of resigning, but the act of making a pact. Hence Ulricus, § 3, “In the aforesaid,” says that in these matters one does not sin by the will alone, nor even by the will proceeding into act simply. But if the will proceeds into act in that manner according to which the thing is forbidden — namely, under a condition and a pact — then it is simony. For if without this someone resigns a benefice with the intention that the one who is worthy should receive it, there is no sin. This gloss agrees with these things. Among the number of those things which are simoniacal because they are forbidden, as Goffredus says, is to sell a vicariate, a castellany, a stewardship, an advocacy, and the like, as in extra, under the same title, Ad nostra; 1 q. 1, Si quis episcopus; and q. 2, Salvator. Ulricus says the same.

Question 6

How an exchange of ecclesiastical benefices may be made. The response, according to Ulricus, § “I have excepted, however”: it must be said that either there is an exchange of benefices only, or of possessions only, or of both — as when benefices unequal in their possessions are exchanged, and therefore the one more abundant asks that a certain sum of money be added to him, so that they may thus be able to arrive at an equality of exchange. The first cannot be done by the authority or the pact of the parties without simony. But the bishop, if he sees that it would be useful, can by virtue of his office transfer the persons and make the exchange. Hence the parties also ought not to confer with one another about this. But each, or one of them, may disclose to the bishop his desire and the reason or usefulness of his exchange. Some nevertheless say, as Guillelmus does in the gloss here, that the parties may without sin intimate their wishes to one another. But the first is safer, as Ulricus says. Innocentius IV also, in the gloss on extra, de rerum permutatione, on the chapter Quaesitum, says that it is not lawful for the parties to make a pact and treat about this among themselves. He also says in the same place that such words may be addressed to the bishop: “Since I cannot safely remain in my church or make progress” — namely, on account of a difference of language or for some other just cause — “I beg that you provide for another from my prebend or church, and provide for me in another.” We also believe that he may say to him that his church would better suit so-and-so and that so-and-so’s would better suit him, by the argument of extra, de praebendis, Inter cetera. Hostiensis also agrees with this in the gloss in the same place. It continues in Ulricus: An exchange of possessions, however, is not in itself prohibited, as Pope Clement III says in extra, de rerum permutatione, Ad quaestiones, because there a temporal thing is given for a temporal thing. The third of the aforesaid is also lawful

as the same Pope Clement says in the same place — yet in such a way that the contracts are by no means mingled with one another, but the contract for the exchange of churches is made separately from the contract for the possessions, and those exchanging take care that, on the occasion of the spiritual rights of which one church has more than the other, more or less of some temporal thing not be given. Innocentius agrees with these things in extra, de rerum permutatione, in the gloss on the chapter Ad quaestiones, and so does Raymundus in the title de symonia, § 2, “Simony is.” Yet the gloss in the same place says that an exchange of this kind of churches with one another — namely, with an equalization of possessions — has no place among persons who have only the usufructs of churches, and that only for their lifetime; but it does among ecclesiastical persons to whom the ownership of such churches has been granted in perpetuity, as in that decretal Ad quaestiones.

Question 7

In how many ways simony is committed. According to Raymundus, under the same title, § 3, “It is committed”: it is committed in three ways, as the gloss says on that passage of Psalm 33: “Blessed is he who shakes his hands free from every bribe.” It does not say only “from a bribe,” but “from every bribe.” For a bribe of the hand is one thing, a bribe of service another, a bribe of the tongue another. A bribe of the hand is money. A bribe of service is servitude unduly bestowed. A bribe of the tongue is favor — 1 q. 1, Sunt tamen nonnulli. Goffredus says the same under the same title, § “It is committed.” Raymundus adds: Note also that an ordination is called simoniacal: one on the part of the ordainer only, another on the part of the one to be ordained only, another on the part of both, another on the part of neither — which is when, with both being ignorant, a friend of the one to be ordained gives or promises something to a counselor of the bishop — 1 q. 1, Statuimus and the chapter Si qui a symoniacis.

Question 8

What of a simoniacal ordination, especially on the part of an intermediary, and what in similar cases concerning the conferral of a benefice. The response, according to Hostiensis, § 3, “In what manner it is committed,” at the verse “But also if anyone,” and the following, who says thus: If anyone should offer or promise prayers or money on my behalf when I have expressly forbidden it, it does not stand against me, as in extra, under the same title, Sicut nobis tuis litteris; § penultimate, de homicidio, the chapter Petrus. It is otherwise if it is done with my knowledge and consent, for then I am said to interpose my own will, and therefore, however hidden it may be, I ought to resign if I wish to save my soul. But if this is done while I am wholly ignorant, and by an enemy wishing my promotion, by which he hopes to hinder me, simony is not committed as regards me — lest by his deceit he obtain what he intends — extra, under the same title, Sicut non tuis litteris, and the chapter Nobis. The response of 1 q. [1], Si amicus meus: if money was given, I am promoted simoniacally, but I am not a simoniac; I am nevertheless bound to resign, as in extra, under the same title, de symoniace [?], the first chapter, de regularibus, and the chapter Nobis. Innocentius agrees with these things in the gloss on the chapter Sicut tuis litteris. And as for what is said there, that to one who is ignorant and forbidding nothing ought to be imputed as a penalty — this is to be understood, according to Innocentius, if the money was given after the election for the confirmation; it is otherwise if it were given for the election, even though he forbade it, unless this were done by an enemy. Vincentius says the same in his Apparatus; so does Bernardus in the same place, and Hostiensis in the gloss, and Raymundus below, § 13, “What shall be done,” at the end. The gloss of Guillelmus adds there thus: I believe, however, that if my enemy were to give money to the bishop to my prejudice, and I knew this before the bishop summoned me to it, and it were established for me that he would not summon me except on account of that bribe, I ought not to accept it. Innocentius, under the same title, in the gloss on the chapter Tanta est labes, says thus: Note that if someone obtains an order or a benefice while another gives money, it is not simony if he was going to obtain it even without money, by the argument of 1 q. 7, Sicut

the chapter Sicut is, at the end. If, before he himself was ordained, he had given money, then even if he was going to receive orders without money, it is simony, by the argument of 1 q. 2 Quam pio, and 1 q. 3 Si quis obiecerit, and the last chapter, and 1 q. 6 c. 1. Ulricus says the same at chapter 20. Yet Hostiensis, under the word “penalty,” adds this further: Joannes, however, said that whoever has once conferred orders simoniacally cannot thereafter give to him the right to exercise them, however hidden it may be and however much the recipient is unaware — as in 1 q. 1 Si qua simoniacis; therefore he says there “mercifully.” But this seems to be rejected in Extra, in the same title, Per tuas, in the second part; by which it seems one should say that even if I received an order from one whom I did not know to be a simoniac, I may exercise it — although I have also heard this from certain people — unless my conscience were to gnaw at me. You have a similar case in Extra, on the sentence of excommunication, Cum illorum, rubric 1 of the title, under title 6. In the same case, see more fully on this below, q. 21, “what is the penalty of a simoniac.”

Question 9

What if money was promised on my behalf without my knowledge, and afterward I paid or repaid it? The answer, according to the gloss of Guilelmus here, the fourteenth, “what shall be done,” is that as for paying the money, it must be said that, although I have sinned gravely — and although in evil deeds ratification has retroactive effect and is equivalent to a mandate — nevertheless the bishop can dispense, since in truth he was not a simoniac in the receiving of the benefice, as Tancredus noted in Extra, on simony, Sicut nobis tuis litteris; for Bernardus and Hostiensis say or report the same in the gloss in the same place, and do not reject it.

Question 10

Whether in some cases something may lawfully be given for spiritual things. The answer, according to Raymundus in the same title, under the section “Furthermore there are cases,” is that it must be said that in some cases something is lawfully given for spiritual things — namely, a gift from the hand, a gift from service, and a gift from the tongue. A gift from the hand can be given in five cases. The first: if it is offered freely, not for a spiritual thing, as in 1 q. 1 Quicquid invisibilis. For as the gloss of Guilelmus says in the same place, if this preposition “for” denotes a valuation or an exchange, then it is never to be granted that a temporal thing be given for a spiritual thing or vice versa. But if it denotes a final cause — so that the meaning is “he gave money for the sacrament,” that is, on account of veneration for the sacrament or in order to venerate the sacrament — this can lawfully be done and granted. Likewise if it denotes an efficient cause — so that the meaning is “he gave for the sacrament,” that is, out of the devotion he had toward the sacrament — it can lawfully be done and granted. And Ulricus, at chapter 19, agrees well enough with this, likewise concerning this preposition “for.” But if it is doubtful whether the thing was given freely, or out of an agreement, or out of a corrupt intention, three things especially must be attended to, according to Raymundus: the quality of the giver and the receiver — namely, whether by a poor man to a rich one or vice versa, or by a rich man to a wealthy one; the quantity of the gift — namely, whether the thing given is of great or lesser value; and the time of the gift — namely, whether it is conferred under pressing necessity or at another time. According to this a presumption is to be made, either for or against, as in Extra, in the same title, Si questiones. But these things are to be understood, as Ulricus says here, as all said with respect to the forum of litigation, where a presumption of simony is taken from many factors. In the forum of conscience, however, the intention is what is regarded. Hostiensis says the same here, in the third part, “how it is committed.” The second case, according to Raymundus, is for spiritual works to which one is not bound by office, as in 12 q. 2 Caritatem; Hostiensis takes an argument from the fact that a priest may hire out his labors if he has no other means of living. The third: for certain spiritual works that are owed — for instance, when a bishop consecrates a church or visits the diocese, he may demand moderate procurations, as in Extra, in the same title, Cum sit Romana; 10 q. 2 Relato; Extra, on prescriptions, Cum ex officio; Extra, on taxes, in the Novella of Innocentius, the chapter Romana, in book 6. Goffredus says that he does not dare to say that for

the act of visiting or consecrating the bishop may demand anything, but rather for the labor of the journey. But Bernardus, in the gloss on the chapter Cum sit Romana, says that it is not even for the labor, but rather because this procuration is permitted by law. Indeed, even if a church on account of its poverty could not provide procuration for the bishop, he will consecrate the church at his own expense, as in 10 q. 2 Cavendum — so Bernardus. Hostiensis agrees with him in the gloss in the same place. The fourth: for eternal life or the remission of sins, as with almsgiving, Daniel 3: “Redeem your sins with alms.” But according to Thomas and Petrus in their writings, when it is said that eternal life or the remission of sins is bought, it is a metaphorical manner of speech, since merit is taken in place of a purchase; for nothing can accrue to God from any price of ours. The fifth case: for redeeming a vexation that is unjustly inflicted upon oneself concerning a spiritual right, as in Extra, in the same title, Dilectus filius, “the answer,” and the Apostle, “Redeeming the time, for the days are evil,” and 1 q. 2 Quesitu, Extra, on masters, Prohibeas. Both Goffredus and Hostiensis also set down these cases. They add, however, one more case — namely, that all the conditions concur which are set down in that decretal, Extra, in the same title, Si questiones — as when the gift is small, and neither the cause nor the time is suspect, and the like. Note also, according to the gloss of Guilelmus here, that when it is said here that something is given for spiritual things, as for a Mass or for a visitation, the word “for” denotes, as it were, a contributing efficient cause — as if I were to say, “I will sing the Mass if you grant me a book or a chalice.” Note also that what is said here in the fifth case, about redeeming a vexation, does not, according to the gloss, hold with respect to a spiritual right unless it is established for certain to the one redeeming concerning his own right. And Thomas says the same in the Summa, in the article here, in the argument, and Petrus in his writings, in the solution here: it is equivocal.

Question 11

What about gifts of hospitality? The answer, according to Hostiensis, “it is asked about gifts of hospitality”: they do not induce simony, provided they are not extended to too great a quantity. Understand this as: provided they are given without an agreement and without any corrupt intention; for otherwise simony is committed even in a small thing, as in 1 q. 1 Iudices vel duces.

Question 12

When does a gift from service induce simony and when not? The answer, according to Ulricus here, “a gift from service”: it must be said that a gift from service sometimes consists in services rendered improperly, and this is of two kinds: either the service is in itself improper — that is, unlawful and dishonorable — or, by reason of the intention of the one bestowing it, the service is improper, since any service is improperly bestowed which is bestowed for some spiritual thing. So that if “for” expresses the cause principally motivating toward this — hence in either case it is simony. But if the service is honorable, this is either bodily or spiritual. If it is bodily — as if someone goes to Rome for the affairs of some church, or serves the church or the bishop or some other prelate by another honorable service — for such a service a spiritual thing may be given, provided it is done without an agreement, and also provided the word “for” does not express the principal motive but rather what some call the “stimulative” cause, since it stirs the affection of the one giving some spiritual thing toward love of the one rendering the service, so that thereafter, out of the generosity of love, he confers that spiritual thing — yet looking principally to the gift and the merits of the person, which he has acquired through such services and other good works. But if the service is spiritual, then he ought not to bestow it by agreement or condition for some spiritual thing — as if, when a benefice falls vacant, some spiritual service has been imposed by statute upon that benefice itself, the one who receives the benefice is bound to bestow that service. As in Extra, on prebends, the chapter Significatum, Alexander III confirms a statute concerning a Mass of the Blessed Virgin to be celebrated by the one to whom a certain prebend had been conferred. Goffredus agrees with these things in the same title, under “in a gift from service.”

from service. And Raymundus, §. 6, “on a gift from service,” with the gloss there. ¶ Thomas too, in the Summa, article 5, argument 1, and Petrus in his commentary, say that in honorable services of this kind regard must be had to the dignity of the person. For by the very devotion of the service one is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. ¶ Thomas adds that if, however, the service is dishonorable or directed toward carnal ends — for instance, if someone served a prelate for the advantage of his own relatives or of his patrimony or anything of this sort — it would be a gift from service and simoniacal.

Question 13

What if two priests agree between themselves, “You will celebrate the high Mass for me, and I another for you.” The response, according to Willelmus in the gloss there on the section: a spiritual thing is licit, especially when there is a [good] cause; and when it is said that this man renders a spiritual service for some spiritual thing, the word “for” does not denote a final cause or a pricing but a supporting aid, since this man cannot sing in place of the other unless the other sings in his place, given that he ought not to sing two Masses.

Question 14

What is a gift from the tongue, and when is simony committed in it. The response, according to Thomas in the Summa, article 5, argument 3: it must be said that a gift from the tongue means either praise itself, pertaining to human favor and falling under a price, or also entreaties by which human favor is acquired or its opposite avoided — as when the entreaties are armed. Which example he adds in his commentary; and therefore, if someone aims principally at this, he commits simony. And he seems to aim principally at this who grants entreaties on behalf of an unworthy person, whence the act itself is simoniacal; but if entreaties are offered on behalf of a worthy person, the act is not simoniacal — yet simony can lie in the intention, namely when one has regard not to the dignity of the person but to human favor. With these things Ulricus agrees, §. “a gift from the tongue” and the following one. Raymundus, §. 7, “on a gift from the tongue,” distinguishes: for either someone is ordained or chosen through another’s entreaties or through his own. If through another’s, then either they are carnal entreaties and are made on behalf of an unworthy person — then it is simony, 1 q. 1 “de ordinationibus,” for then the entreaties take the place of a price, 1 q. 1 “sunt nonnulli.” But if they are spiritual entreaties and on behalf of a worthy person, simony is not committed, provided that the one ordaining or electing has regard not to the entreaties but to God and the merits of the person, extra “de etate et qualitate” “tuam,” 1 q. 1 “latorem.” With these things Thomas, Petrus, and Ulricus agree, §. “preces autem,” and Hostiensis, §. “si autem.” ¶ But if someone is ordained or chosen through his own entreaties, Huguccio and many others have said that it is simony, however worthy he may be, 7 q. 1 “in scrip.,” 1 q. 1 “ordinationes.” Raymundus says: I, saving a better judgment, distinguish: that one who holds the cure of souls cannot petition for himself a church or dignity or other benefice; and in this I agree with Huguccio, by the laws cited above and extra “de iure patronatus” “per nostras.” But a simple benefice, if he is in need and feels himself worthy, he may petition without fear of the sin of simony, extra eodem titulo “tua nos,” and the argument from “de rescriptis” “ad aures,” extra “de prebendis” “cum secundum.” And in this I agree with the others. With these things Thomas agrees in the Summa, article 5, argument 3, and also in his commentary; and Hostiensis, verbo “lingua”; and Goffredus. But the gloss of Willelmus here says that this opinion seems harsh, and the contrary is often done, whence I believe that one holding a benefice with the cure of souls annexed may petition for something himself if he is worthy, after the example of Isaiah, who said, “Behold, I; send me,” Isaiah 6. And Ulricus agrees with him. ¶ But if he is not in need, Raymundus says that he sins, even if he petitions for a simple benefice, as is clear from that decretal “ad aures,” and 1 q. 2 “clericos,” 12 q. 1 “illi au-

tem qui.” Thomas agrees with him. But the gloss again contradicts this here, whence it says: this again is harsh. And I believe that, since someone has been promoted to sacred orders — given that ordination of this kind requires an ecclesiastical title — he may petition for an ecclesiastical benefice even though he abounds in temporal goods. And the laws which the master adduces to prove the contrary speak according to the state of the primitive Church, when revenues were slender and distribution was made from the resources of the Church as each one had need. And Ulricus agrees with him, §. “secundum est preces.” For no one is compelled to serve as a soldier at his own expense. If, however, he petitions for himself a dignity or the cure of souls out of such great presumption as renders him unworthy of such a benefice, it is simony, because the entreaties are on behalf of an unworthy person.

Question 15

Which simony is the graver sin. The response, according to Ulricus, §. “quamvis autem in omnibus”: although simony is committed in a gift from the hand, from the tongue, and from service, nevertheless, because a gift from the hand is more properly a price than one from the tongue or from service, therefore that simony is the greater sin.

Question 16

Whether to sell sacred vessels, sacred vestments, a cemetery, holy water, and the like is simony. The response, according to Ulricus, §. “est tamen differentia” and the three following: all sacramentals ordered to some spiritual effect ought not to be sold, such as holy water, blessed bread, and the like, through which venial sins are remitted. Whence a sacrament cannot be sold even by reason of its matter, as is clear from 1 q. 1 “placuit,” sections 1 and 2. But those things which are spiritual by participation, such as a chalice and a cemetery and the like, before consecration can simply be sold. But after consecration, if they are sold and bought, it is not simony in itself, provided the intention refers only to the temporal thing and not to the spiritual. But if it is simony, this is by reason of the Church’s prohibition; and therefore those things which are prohibited cannot be sold without simony, such as balsam or the oil of chrism and the blessed water of baptism and the like, as in the chapter “predictis placuit” and extra eodem titulo “ad nostras.” It is otherwise with plain water, in which, since it was granted beforehand, there is no simony in its buying or selling — as with a chalice, which can be sold to another church in the same form. But it cannot be sold to a layman or a private person unless it is melted down, 10 q. 1 §. “hoc ius porrectum.” The same judgment applies also to a cemetery, which by reason of the land can be sold and bought, as is clear in the example of Abraham. The same holds for other sacred vessels and vestments. Goffredus and Hostiensis, §. 2 and “Item queritur,” say simply that in any ecclesiastical ministry simony can be committed, extra eodem “ad nostras.” There it is said that for the funerals of the dead and the blessing of those marrying and the like nothing should be exacted; pious customs, however, are to be observed. Raymundus too, §. 6, “on a gift from service,” at the end, and the gloss of Willelmus there, do not seem to disagree from these, if it is rightly understood. Likewise the gloss, §. 16. Likewise through the question. And Thomas, article 4, argument 2. And on the principal point.