Distinction XXV.

The division of this distinction resolved, in which the conferral and reception of orders is treated.

It is also customary to inquire. After the Master treated the difference and distinction of orders, he now in this 25th distinction treats of the conferral and reception of orders. And it is divided into two parts: for first he treats of the power of the one conferring. Second, of the fitness of the one receiving, at the words, He says “sacred.” The first [part] is divided into two: because first, he shows how heretics stand with respect to the conferral of orders. Second, how those stand with respect to the same who are made simoniacs by purchase or sale, at the words, But concerning simoniacs. The first [of these] is divided into three: because first he raises the question of whether heretics can confer the sacrament of order. Second, he draws arguments for both sides of the question from many authorities. Third, he responds to the question in accordance with the varied teaching of various opinions. The second [begins] at, For a certain view seems. The third at, But these things thus. The second of these divisions is divided into two parts: because first, he argues for the negative side. Second, for the affirmative side, at the words, But others on the contrary. The third part, in which he responds to the question, is divided into four parts, in accordance with the four opinions the Master adduces. The second [begins] at, But others. The third at, But certain ones. The fourth at, But some. There follows that part, But concerning simoniacs. And it is divided into two parts: for first he indicates the gravity of the sin of simony. Second, in accordance with the threefold species of simony, he shows the manifold penalty inflicted by law, at the words, Simoniacally. The first [part] is divided into three: for first he shows the deformity of simoniacal wickedness. Second he indicates that by reason of knowledge and ignorance there is great variety in simony. And third he removes the difficulty of a certain objection. The second [begins] at, They differ, however. The third at, But if. Concerning this distinction I inquire.

Question I.

Whether an ordainer who demands money from those he ordains becomes a simoniac.

[References: Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Book 4 of the Sentences, dist. 25, q. 1, aa. 1–3; Second Commentary, dist. 25, q. 2, a. 1; same, Summa Theologiae I–II, q. 100, a. 6. Also Alexander of Hales, part 2, q. 169 throughout, and q. 120, member 4, a. 2, cases 2–3; part 3, q. 36, member 5, a. 4. Bonaventura, dist. 25, a. 1, qq. 1–4 throughout. Scotus, dist. 25, q. 2. Bacon, dist. 23, qq. 4–7. Durand, dist. 25, qq. 2–4. Biel, dist. 25, qq. 1–2.]

WHETHER an ordainer who demands money from those he ordains becomes a simoniac. It seems that he does not, because those who sow spiritual things are owed temporal things by law [de iure]: but a bishop who confers orders sows spiritual things; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear from the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 9. The minor is also clear, because the sacrament of order is a spiritual thing.

On the contrary: whoever by pact [ex pacto] gives a spiritual thing in exchange for a temporal thing is a simoniac; such an ordainer gives a spiritual thing for a temporal thing by pact. The major premise is clear from the definition of simony, which will be set forth below. The minor is also clear, because an open exaction of money seems to be equivalent to a pact. Here we must first examine the power of the ordainer. Second, the unfitness of certain ordainers. Third, the qualifications of those to be ordained. And fourth, for the sake of the question under consideration, certain things about simoniacal wickedness must be examined.

Resolution.

Although by common law only a bishop can confer the sacrament of order, and no mere presbyter can consecrate a bishop, yet although a heretical bishop, or one subject to canonical penalty or ecclesiastical censure, is rendered unfit to confer the sacrament of order licitly, nevertheless [he remains capable of doing so] in an absolute sense, with the form and intention of the Catholic Church duly maintained.

Article I.

On the power of the ordainer.

WITH respect to the first [point] I set forth two conclusions.

The first is that by common law only a bishop can ordain, or confer the sacrament of order. For it requires no less power to dispose and ordain commanders than to enroll soldiers: but in the conferral of the sacrament of confirmation, soldiers of the Church militant are enrolled, and in the conferral of the sacrament of order, the commanders of those very faithful are disposed; since therefore only a bishop, by common law, can confer the sacrament of confirmation, as is clear from what was said in dist. 7, therefore episcopal power alone suffices by common law for the conferral of the sacrament of order.

Furthermore, the consecration of vessels pertaining to divine worship does not require greater power than the consecration of the ministers who use such consecrated vessels: but vessels, for example chalices, cannot by common law be consecrated except by a bishop; therefore neither can clerics and priests who use such vessels be ordained except by a bishop. And this seems to be the intention of Isidorus in his Etymologiae, where he says: the bishop is named the high priest and supreme pontiff; for he himself makes priests and Levites, and disposes all ecclesiastical persons.

Perhaps it will be said that when certain words are synonyms, then the thing signified by one is not of greater power than the thing signified by the other: but the word “bishop” and the word “presbyter” are synonymous terms. The major premise is clear, because synonyms are [words] whose names are many but whose thing is one. The minor is also clear in many places in the Apostle’s letters, where the Apostle himself seems to take the name “bishop” and the name “presbyter” as the same. Hence at the beginning of the letter to the Philippians he says: “Paul and Timothy, servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus who are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons: grace to you and peace,” etc. [Philippians 1:1]. Where it is plainly evident that by “bishops” he understands “presbyters,” because a single city does not have multiple bishops, unless by “bishops” we understand presbyters. But Philippi, to which the Apostle writes there, was one city. And the same is clear in Acts 20, where the Apostle, addressing the presbyters of the city of Ephesus, says: “Take heed to yourselves and to the flock, in which the Holy Spirit has placed you as bishops to rule the Church of God.”

Also conversely, by the name “presbyter” the Apostle expresses the office of bishop — 1 Timothy 4 [v. 14], saying: “Do not neglect the grace that was given to you through the laying on of hands of the presbyter,” that is, of the bishop, through whom Timothy was ordained.

On account of these and similar authorities, a certain opinion holds that these two names, namely “presbyter” and “bishop,” were once synonymous. But this does not hold: because from the very beginning of Holy Mother Church there were always certain gradations among presbyters, because Christ established Peter as prince of the others, and therefore called him Cephas, which is interpreted as “head.” Also he seems to have placed the twelve Apostles in a higher rank than the seventy-two disciples, and therefore the Apostles held the status of bishops, but

[as Gratian notes] in the Decretum, dist. 21, c. In novo testamento [In the New Testament].

The minor of the aforesaid objection must therefore be denied. In response to its proof it must be said that the terms “bishop” and “presbyter” can be considered in two ways. One way, with respect to their etymology; another way, with respect to their proper imposition and signification. In the first way, one of these terms can sometimes be taken for the other: because “bishop” means, as it were, one who oversees, as is clear from the text here; but “presbyter” means, as it were, one who provides a way [praebens iter]. Since therefore the same person who is a spiritual leader, providing a way to the people of God, ought to attend to that same people, and conversely, one whose task it is to attend to the people ought by word and example to provide a way to the people — for this reason the authorities of Scripture sometimes use one of these terms for the other, and vice versa. If [we consider them] in the second way, then the name “presbyter” is more universal and extends further than the name “bishop”: because the name “bishop” is not imposed to signify just any presbyter, but only one who is so placed in oversight that he has jurisdiction over all others, both clerics and laypeople, dwelling within his diocese. Also not only in such jurisdictional power, but also in the power of confirmation and the power of consecration, a bishop exceeds a simple presbyter: for he alone can by common law give the sacrament of confirmation, and ordain or consecrate clerics and priests.

But against this, and consequently against the principal conclusion, one can argue from the statements of certain doctors as follows. Whoever’s power extends to what is principal and to what is greater, that person’s power will be able to extend to what is accessory and to what is lesser: but the power of any presbyter extends sufficiently to the consecration of the sacrament of the altar, which is greater than the sacrament of order, and with respect to it the sacrament of order is accessory; therefore the power of any presbyter extends sufficiently to consecrating and conferring the sacrament of order.

2. Furthermore, spiritual power is not of lesser force than bodily power: but the vigor of bodily power over things corporeal is such that whatever is perfect in its species can generate something like itself, as is clear from Book 2 On the Soul [of Aristotle]; therefore one possessing the perfect power of a presbyter will be able to ordain another presbyter like himself.
3. Furthermore, a bishop can consecrate a bishop; therefore a presbyter can consecrate a presbyter, or at least a deacon, or subdeacon, or other lower clerics. The antecedent is clear; the consequence is proved as to its first part, because a presbyter stands in the same relation to a presbyter as a bishop stands to a bishop. And as to its second part: because the power of a presbyter exceeds the power of a deacon more than the power of one bishop exceeds the power of another bishop, and consequently the act of hierarchical dignity, namely ordaining, belongs to a presbyter with respect to a deacon no less than it belongs to a bishop with respect to another bishop.
4. Furthermore, Cardinal presbyters [presbyteri Cardinales] can confer minor orders; therefore conferring the sacrament of order does not belong to bishops alone. The antecedent is commonly conceded. The consequence is also clear, because Cardinal presbyters are not bishops, just as Cardinal deacons are not presbyters.

To the first [argument] it can be said that the major premise is not true, especially when the greater and the lesser are not of the same nature, such that the greater does not include the lesser within itself; which is evident in natural things: because although it is greater to reason than to fly, it does not follow that a man can reason, therefore he can fly — and this for the very reason that reasoning and flying are not of the same nature, nor does reasoning include flying within itself. This is also evident in artificial things: because although the art of bridle-making is subordinate to the art of war, and stands in an accessory relation to it,

inasmuch as everything that is called accessory with respect to another is ordered toward it in some way — yet it does not follow that one who has the art of war knows how to make a bridle. Since therefore the power of consecrating the body of Christ and the power of ordaining are not of the same nature, it is clear that the major premise in the matter at hand is false. Also the minor is not true: because by reason of implication [ratione implicationis], the power of conferring orders is in that case greater than the power of consecrating the body of Christ — for one who can ordain can also consecrate; for on the very day on which he ordains, he also consecrates the body of Christ, but not vice versa.

To the second [argument] it must be said that although spiritual power is not of lesser force than bodily power — indeed, speaking absolutely, it is of greater force, since it can produce an effect that bodily power cannot — nevertheless, with respect to making something like itself, it is of lesser force: because just as a prefect of the Imperial court can beget a son like himself, yet he cannot appoint a prefect like himself, since such an appointment either belongs immediately to the Emperor or to some superior official — so also because the spiritual power of which we speak establishes a man in a determined office and rank, it therefore does not always in such matters have the capacity to produce its like. For this purpose not even the power of sufficiency suffices — by which power, namely, one can hold such an office — but the power of redundance is also required, by which power one can establish another like oneself. Since therefore such a power of redundance is not found in every priest, not every priest can confer orders. In reply to the form of the argument it must also be said that the major premise is not true, insofar as it is applied to the matter at hand by the minor proposition: because spiritual power does not establish something like itself unless it is present with a certain redundance, and in such a way the spiritual power of which we are speaking is not found in just any of its subjects, but only in the greater prelates. Hence if every priest could ordain, or confer orders, then order would not be order — rather, horror and confusion would ensue. On account of which the Apostle said, in Hebrews 7: “Without any contradiction, what is lesser is blessed by the greater.” [Hebrews 7:7]

To the third [argument] I deny the consequence. In response to the proof of its first part it must be said that although a presbyter stands in the same relation to a presbyter as a bishop to a bishop in being, this is not the case in consecrating, as is clear from what has already been said.

To the second proof it must be said that in the ranks of offices and orders, not everything that exceeds another in power [thereby] has the capacity to establish another in the rank it exceeds. For even if a field commander [Campiductor], or a general [dux] of the Imperial army, exceeds in dignity the doorkeeper of the Imperial chamber, it is nonetheless not his business to establish such a doorkeeper — and this for the very reason that, although the general has sufficient power for the execution of his own proper office, he does not have the redundant power by which it would be his place to appoint a doorkeeper of the Royal or Imperial chamber. And so in the matter at hand, etc.

To the fourth [argument] it must be said that even granted that Cardinal presbyters can sometimes confer minor orders, this nonetheless does not belong to them by common law as it does to bishops, but rather by special grace; and this is not contrary to the aforesaid conclusion.

Conclusion 2.

is that a simple presbyter cannot consecrate a bishop: because no one can give what he is known not to possess, as Augustinus says in the book On Free Will [De libero arbitrio]: but a simple presbyter does not have episcopal dignity, therefore by consecration he cannot confer it.

2. Furthermore, one who ordains a bishop cannot be of lesser authority than one who ordains a deacon or subdeacon: but neither by common law nor by special grace can it happen that anyone confer the order of deaconate or subdeaconate unless he is himself a bishop, as the doctors commonly say; therefore one who is not a bishop cannot consecrate a bishop.
3. Furthermore,

Furthermore, this conclusion is expressly found at dist. 73, cap. Episcopi [in the Decretum]. It is also sufficiently established from the words of the Apostle in Hebrews 7, where he says: “Without any contradiction, the lesser is blessed by the greater” [Heb. 7:7]. But a simple presbyter is not greater than a bishop; therefore he cannot bless him, nor

Objection

by consequence consecrate or ordain him, since such consecration is a kind of spiritual blessing.

It will perhaps be said that, according to the statute of law, the Cardinal of Ostia has the right to consecrate the Pope; therefore a lesser person can consecrate a greater, and by the same reasoning a presbyter can consecrate a bishop. The inference is clear, because a cardinal is lesser than the Pope.

I reply that precisely because this right belongs to the Bishop of Ostia by an ordinance made by the Pope and all the cardinals,

Reply.

whatever he does, he does as though in the person of all of them; and consequently, acting in that capacity, the greater is not here blessed by the lesser — for insofar as he acts in the person of all the aforesaid, he is not lesser than the one he blesses, even granted that he is lesser when considered in himself alone.

ARTICLE II.

On the incapacity of certain ordainers.

Note. AS REGARDS the second article, it must be observed that a person can be incapable with respect to the performance of some act in two ways. In one way, because he cannot perform that act lawfully — and in this sense we are said to be able to do only what we can do justly. In another way, absolutely and simply, namely when he can accomplish nothing [of effect], even though he does everything that lies within him. In accordance with this, I set forth two conclusions.

Concl. 1.

The first is that a heretical bishop, or one otherwise subject to canonical penalty or ecclesiastical censure, is incapable of conferring the sacrament of orders in the first of the aforesaid ways.

For that which cannot be conferred without mortal sin on the part of both the conferrer and the one upon whom it is conferred, is not conferred justly or lawfully — and consequently the conferrer with respect to that conferral is said to be incapable in the first way aforesaid. But the sacrament of orders cannot be conferred by a heretical bishop, or one otherwise subject to canonical penalty — such as a bishop who is suspended, excommunicated, interdicted, irregular, deposed, or degraded — without mortal sin on the part of both conferrer and recipient; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear: for what is done justly and lawfully is done without sin; therefore, by contraposition, what is not done without sin is done neither lawfully nor justly. The minor premise is also clear: for one who rashly acts against the prohibition of holy mother Church sins mortally. But in the aforesaid cases, both the conferrer and the one who knowingly receives from him sin against the prohibition of the Church — for by the statutes of holy mother Church, each of the aforesaid persons is in canon law prohibited from exercising his office, and consequently from the conferral of sacraments, with the sole exception of the sacrament of baptism in a case of necessity; and consequently every faithful person is understood to be prohibited from receiving any sacrament from any of the aforesaid, except baptism alone in a case of necessity; therefore, etc.

2. Furthermore, no heretic or person subject to the aforesaid penalties can lawfully receive the sacrament of orders; therefore no heretic or person subject to the aforesaid penalties can confer the sacrament of orders. The antecedent is clear: for if it were lawful for any of the aforesaid to receive the sacrament of orders, this would seem most evident in the case of a suspended person, who has not yet been excommunicated or declared irregular. But this is not the case: for while suspended from an office already received, it is not lawful for him to advance to a higher grade, since one who is prohibited from executing a lower grade is thereby understood to be prohibited from receiving a higher grade. But in the lawful and orderly re-

ception of orders one always proceeds from a lower to a higher grade. The inference is also clear: for no less free and unimpeded power is required in the one who gives and confers a sacrament than in the one who receives it, since the agent must be more excellent than the patient, as is apparent from De anima, bk. 3 [Aristotle, De anima III]. And this conclusion can be proved expressly by the authorities of Innocentius [I], Gregorius [I], Cyprianus, Hieronymus, and Leo [I], which are set down here in the text at the first chapter of this distinction 25, at least as regards what this conclusion takes from the [authorities concerning] heretics.

The second conclusion is that, speaking in the second way concerning incapacity, none of the aforesaid persons is inca-

Second

pable of conferring the sacrament of orders, provided that

conclusion.

he observes in ordaining the form of the Catholic Church and intends to confer the sacrament of orders as it is intended in the Church. For as the priest stands with respect to the power of consecrating the body of Christ, so the bishop stands with respect to the power of conferring orders. But any priest whatsoever, however heretical he may be or subject to the aforesaid penalties, truly retains the power of confecting the body of Christ and truly confects it if he observes the form of the Church and intends, in pronouncing the words of the form over the due matter, what the Church intends — as is clear from what I said above at dist. 13, art. 2. Therefore any bishop whatsoever, however heretical or subject to canonical penalties, truly confers the sacrament of orders, provided that in ordaining he observes the form of the Church and intends what the Church intends.

It will perhaps be said: if in ordaining he were to observe the form of the Church and intend what the Church intends, then he would not be

Objection

a heretic.

I deny this inference; for although in this

Reply:

particular case he would not be a heretic, he could nonetheless in many other matters be a heretic, cut off and condemned by the Church.

Furthermore, in support of this conclusion there are clear authorities of Augustinus and Gregorius [I], which are placed at the second chapter of this distinction.

It will perhaps be said that none of the aforesaid can con-

Objection

fer the sacrament of penance; therefore none of the aforesaid can ordain a priest. The antecedent is clear from what I said at dist. 19, art. 3, concl. 2. The inference is proved: because one who confers sacerdotal ordination grants the authority to confer the sacrament of penance; but no one gives what he does not have; therefore if he himself cannot absolve, he will not be able to bestow on another the power of absolving, nor consequently to ordain a presbyter.

2. Furthermore, all the authorities of the first chapter of this distinction appear to militate quite strongly against this conclusion.
3. Furthermore, when certain powers are so related that one is inferior and depends upon another as upon a superior, then the inferior accomplishes nothing unless it remains conjoined with the superior power. But the power of the bishop depends upon the power of the Pope and of holy mother Church; therefore a bishop cut off from the Church cannot confer the sacrament of orders.
4. Furthermore, a bishop cut off from the Church is excluded from participation in the sacraments; therefore he appears to be excluded from the conferral of sacraments. The inference is clear: for it is far less to participate in a sacrament than to confer one. The antecedent is also clear: for if you grant the opposite, then he would not have been cut off from the Church.

To the first objection, I deny the inference.

To the proof, I say that granted that one of the aforesaid, in ordaining a priest, in some manner gives

Reply.

the power of conferring the sacrament of penance, he nevertheless does not give it free but bound — just as he himself also has such power in a bound state. For if he were to give such power or authority in an unbound state, he would be giving what he does not have, which is impossible. Hence anyone ordained by one of the aforesaid is suspended from the exercise of the power conferred upon him, until a dispensation has been granted to him

with respect to the fact that he presumed, against the prohibition of the Church, to receive the sacrament of orders from one of the aforesaid.

It will perhaps be said: just as in any of the aforesaid the authority or power of absolving is bound, so also in him is the power of ordaining bound. But on account of the binding of the power of absolving, he cannot absolve, and if he does absolve, everything he does is held to be void and null, because the one he absolved is not absolved; therefore, on account of the binding of the power of ordaining, he will not be able to perform the act of ordination, and granted that one who receives orders from him attempts it, he will not be ordained. The major premise holds: because both powers are understood to be bound for this reason, namely that their exercise is prohibited to him by the law itself. But the same law that prohibits each of the aforesaid from absolving also prohibits him from ordaining, since each of the aforesaid is suspended by the law itself from the exercise of his office; therefore, etc. The minor premise is granted by me and is commonly granted by all.

I reply to the major premise: although in any of the aforesaid bishops, both the power of absolving and the power of ordaining are bound by legal prohibition as to their exercise, nevertheless the power of absolving — or of conferring the sacrament of penance — is bound more, or in more ways, by such prohibition than is the power of ordaining or of conferring any other sacrament. For in all the other sacraments there is such a distance between the reality of the sacrament and its benefit that it is possible for someone to receive the reality of the sacrament who nevertheless does not receive the benefit of the sacrament, namely grace and charity. But in the sacrament of penance alone, reality and benefit cannot be separated from each other. For the reality of this sacrament consists in the fact that the penitent is absolved from sins; but absolution from sins cannot exist without grace and charity. And hence it follows that no one who approaches a sacrament insincerely [ficte] receives that sacrament truly — whereas the other sacraments an insincere person, such as one who is resolved to commit mortal sin, can truly receive. And therefore, whenever by the sentence of law or of a judge the power of absolving is bound in some priest, such a priest can neither by right nor in fact absolve. Not by right: because it is supposed that his power has been justly bound. Nor in fact: because whenever a sacrament is conferred or received in fact but not by right, it is so conferred and received as to the reality of the sacrament, yet the benefit of the sacrament is nevertheless neither conferred nor received. But, as has now been made clear, the reality of the sacrament of penance can neither be conferred nor received without charity or grace, which is the thing [res] and benefit of every sacrament; therefore, etc. Moreover, one who approaches the aforesaid priest for the sacrament of penance, knowing him to be bound, approaches insincerely — for he acts against the prohibition of the Church — and on this account cannot receive the grace that is the benefit of the sacrament of penance, nor consequently will he receive the sacrament or the reality of the sacrament of penance, on account of the inseparable connection of benefit with the reality of this sacrament. The opposite, however, holds in the conferral of the other sacraments: for granted that someone knowingly receives the sacrament of orders, or of confirmation, and so forth, from one whom he knows to be by right prohibited from conferring sacraments — though in so doing he sins mortally and approaches insincerely, and consequently does not receive the benefit of the sacrament, namely grace and charity — yet because the reality of these sacraments is separable from their benefit, even if not by right, yet in fact the one truly confers and the other truly receives such a sacrament. And this appears to be the express intention of blessed Augustinus, bk. 2 Against Parmenianus [Contra Epistulam Parmeniani II], where, speaking of heretics and those cut off from the Church, he says: “There is now no question but that they have [the sacraments] and can give them, but they have them perniciously and give them perniciously, because they are outside the bond of peace.” And that one ordained by such a bishop truly receives

the sacrament of orders, Augustinus proves in the same place by the fact that those ordained in this manner, when they return to the unity of the Church, are not reordained. And blessed Gregorius [I] touches upon the same reasoning, saying: “Just as one who has been baptized once ought not to be baptized again, so one who has been consecrated once in the same order cannot and should not be consecrated again.” And from these considerations it is also apparent that, among the four opinions which the Master [Peter Lombard] sets out at chapter 3 of this distinction, the third opinion is to be held — for it speaks consistently with the truth just stated.

To the 2nd [objection] it can be said that those authorities are to be understood in accordance with the truth I set forth in the first conclusion. For [the heretics and those subject to canonical penalties] cannot confer the sacrament of orders lawfully and justly, and with the salvation of the soul of the giver or receiver; and therefore their blessing is called a curse, because what is done with mortal sin is done with God’s curse; and the one ordained is said to receive nothing, because he receives nothing there that redounds to the salvation of his soul. It could also be said that those authorities are to be understood of those heretics who, in conferring sacraments, do not use the form that holy mother Church uses, or who do not intend to confer what the Church intends.

To the 3rd [objection] it must be said that the dependence of an inferior power upon a superior can be understood in two ways: in one way, as to coming-to-be and as to conservation; in another way, as to coming-to-be but not as to conservation. In the first way, the major premise is true, but not in the second way. Now the situation is such that while in conferring the sacrament of penance the sacerdotal power depends in the first way not only upon the power of God but also upon the power of the Church, yet in conferring the other sacraments it depends upon the power of the Church in the second way — but not in the first way.

For the understanding of this it must be observed that the power conferred upon some ecclesiastical person can stand in four relations: sometimes it rests on order alone, as the power of confecting the sacrament of the Eucharist; sometimes it rests on order together with an annexed indelible dignity, as the power of ordaining or confirming; sometimes it rests on jurisdiction alone, as the power of excommunicating; sometimes it rests simultaneously on order and jurisdiction, as the power of conferring the sacrament of penance. For as was established above at dist. 17, q. 2, art. 3, it does not suffice to possess order and the keys of the Church in order to be able to absolve someone in the forum of penance; it is further required that one has jurisdiction — either ordinary or delegated — over those one absolves. Since, therefore, the spiritual jurisdiction of any priest depends upon the supreme pontiff, in whom alone resides the fullness of jurisdiction both as to coming-to-be and as to conservation — for he can daily give and take away such jurisdiction as he sees fit for the governance of the state of the Church — therefore the power of excommunicating, which rests precisely on jurisdiction, depends upon the power of the Church or of the supreme pontiff not only as to coming-to-be but also as to conservation, since that which rests upon something is no less dependent than that upon which it rests. And by the same reasoning the power of absolving in the forum of penance, insofar as it rests upon jurisdiction, depends upon the power of the Church both as to coming-to-be and as to conservation. And hence it follows that when jurisdiction is withdrawn by the sentence of law or of a judge from a prelate or priest, they then cannot excommunicate or impose salutary penances; and if they attempt it in fact, what they do is void and null, because the power by which they ought to do these things is not preserved to them, but rather has been nullified by him upon whom the conservation of such power depends.

Perhaps you will say that I stated above that the sacerdotal keys cannot be taken away, but that the keys are this very power of absolving.

I reply, as I said at dist. 14, art. 3, that although the keys cannot be taken away as to their essence, yet they can be taken away as to their exercise. And the reason for this statement can be drawn from what I have said here, because the keys

the keys [of the church] as to their essence rest upon the order and sacerdotal character, which cannot be taken away; but as to their execution, they bear upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction, upon which they rest, and which can be taken away by a superior prelate and above all by the Supreme Pontiff. By contrast, the sacerdotal order and dignity communicated to a bishop through consecration — upon which the power of ordaining rests — are indelible and do not depend upon the church militant as to their preservation, but upon God alone; and consequently no prohibition of the church can simply impede the effect of that power, even if it may impede it with respect to the salvation and profit of both the one conferring and the one receiving such an effect, assuming that both act contrary to the prohibition of Holy Mother Church. And by the same reasoning, the effect of the power of conferring other sacraments — when that power rests upon order alone and not upon jurisdiction — cannot simply be impeded.

To the fourth objection it must be said that, even granting the entire argument, nothing is thereby gained against the conclusion. For just as one who is cut off from the church is by right excluded from participation in the sacraments — yet if he thrusts himself beyond this into communion with the faithful, he truly receives the sacrament, with the sole exception of the sacrament of penance — so too he is by right excluded from the conferral of sacraments, though he truly confers the sacrament if, contrary to the prohibition of law, he in fact confers it.

ARTICLE III.

On the quality of those to be ordained.

As for the third article, in which the question concerns the quality or condition of those to be ordained, it should be known that we can speak in many ways about the things required on the part of the ordinand himself, for some things are required not of necessity but only of propriety or fittingness.

Other things, however, are required of necessity, and this in two ways: for some things are required of the necessity of the sacrament — that is, things without which the ordinand does not receive the sacrament of order, even if all that the ordainer ought to do with respect to the ordinand is done outwardly. Other things are required of the necessity of precept, even though they are not required of the necessity of the sacrament — namely, such things as are prescribed to be observed, either affirmatively or negatively, by law on the part of the ordinand himself. In accordance with this I set forth three conclusions.

The first is that, if the ordinand has attained the age of discretion and has the use of reason at the reception of minor orders, this is required not of the necessity but of the propriety of the sacrament; for that which is fitting and appropriate to observe with respect to any ordinand whatsoever seems to be required also in the case of one receiving minor orders — if not of necessity, at least of propriety. But it is fitting and appropriate that whoever receives the sacrament of order should know and discern the office into which he is placed by the conferral of this sacrament; and this cannot come about unless the ordinand has attained the age of discretion and has the use of reason in some degree. Therefore, etc.

Against this, however, there is a certain ancient opinion which holds that the use of reason is required of the necessity of the sacrament in the reception of any order whatsoever.

[In support of this:] 1. The use of reason is required of the necessity of the sacrament in the sacrament of matrimony; therefore also in the sacrament of order. The antecedent is clear, because matrimony requires mutual consent, which cannot occur without the use of reason. The consequence is proved, because the more dignified a sacrament is, the more the use of reason is required for its reception. But the sacrament of order is more dignified than the sacrament of matrimony, because in the conferral of any order the one who is ordained is placed in some spiritual office, which does not occur in matrimony.

2. Furthermore, when the use of some office cannot belong to a person, then that office is committed to him in vain; but the use of no order can belong to one who lacks the use of reason; therefore order is conferred in vain and to no purpose upon one who lacks the use of reason.

Furthermore, one who does not intend to receive the sacrament of order does not receive that sacrament; but one who lacks the use of reason does not intend to receive the sacrament of order. The minor is clear, because intention presupposes the use of reason. The major is proved, because the intention to receive the sacrament in the one who receives it is required no less than the intention to give or confer it in the one who confers it. But in order for an ordainer to confer the sacrament of order, it is necessary that he intend to confer it; therefore, etc.

Furthermore, a definite time and age are determined with respect to the reception of orders in the book of Decrees, dist. 77; but this would not be the case if the use of reason were not necessary for the reception of orders.

But this opinion is not held in modern times, because it is common enough for minor orders to be conferred upon those who are under age and lack the use of reason.

Furthermore, in the Decretals, under the title de clerico ordinato per saltum [on a cleric ordained by skipping a grade], it is stated that a certain cleric had been promoted to minor orders while under the age of discretion, and yet afterward permission was granted to that cleric to minister in those orders without their repetition. This, however, the Pope would by no means have done if he had not judged that cleric to have received the minor orders before he had the use of reason — that is, when he was under age.

To the first supporting argument of this opinion, therefore, it must be said that the inference does not hold. Against the proof I deny the major, because the sacrament of baptism is more dignified and gracious than the sacrament of matrimony, and yet in the reception of baptism the use of reason is not required of the necessity of the sacrament — otherwise infants could not be truly baptized.

To the second it must be said that, although the major is true when the one upon whom an office is conferred is so incapable of having the use of that office that neither for the present can it belong to him, nor, when separated [from his present condition], will he ever in the future be able to exercise such an office, nevertheless it is false if there is a reasonable hope that at some future time he will be able to exercise such an office fittingly. But the present case is such that, although a boy who has not yet attained the age of discretion cannot exercise the office of minor orders, he will nevertheless be able to do so in the future.

To the third it must be said that the lack of intention by which someone is said not to intend the reception of order can come about in many ways. In one way through a positive act elicited, for instance when he intends not to receive the order and explicitly refuses such a reception. In another way, through inattention — for instance, because he is not actually thinking of this when he receives the order. In a third way, because he does not at that time have the use of reason by which he could intend such a reception. Now although the major is true in the first way, it is not true in the other two ways.

To the proof it must be said that, although the major may in some way be true of adults, it is nevertheless not true of infants; whence it is commonly enough said that in sacraments in which a character is imprinted, the intention of the recipient is not required of the necessity of the sacrament — as is apparent from the sacrament of baptism and confirmation, which for the most part are conferred upon infants who are under age.

It will perhaps be objected: if this were true, then an infant lacking the intention to receive the order of the priesthood could receive that order if ordained by a bishop; but the consequent is absurd. The inference is clear, because a character is imprinted in the conferral of a higher order no less than in the conferral of baptism, or confirmation, or any minor order.

I reply that, although that consequent is absurd, it is nevertheless not impossible; because, although the age of discretion [continues below...]

of discretion — at which a person can have the free use of reason — is required of the necessity of precept for the reception of any sacred order, it is nevertheless not required of the necessity of the sacrament. Hence, granted that someone under age, say not yet having fourteen years, were ordained a priest, although both the presenter and the ordainer would sin gravely, nonetheless when that boy came to the age of discretion, he would not need to be reordained; but only after obtaining a dispensation for the offense committed regarding him, he could lawfully minister in the order of the priesthood.

To the fourth it must be said that this determination of time was not introduced by law on account of the necessity of the sacrament, because the sacrament is still conferred even if that requirement is not observed — since according to that determination, a priest to be ordained ought to be thirty years old, yet this is not commonly observed.

The second conclusion is that the ordinand must be of the male sex; this is required of the necessity of the sacrament. For that person, or that sex, to whom it has always been forbidden by apostolic ordinance to teach in the church, and who is commanded to have the head veiled in church when praying, is not capable of the sacrament of order; the female sex is of this kind; therefore it seems to be required of the necessity of the sacrament that the ordinand be of the male sex. The major is clear, because it belongs to one ordained to teach in the church, either in act — as in the case of a priest or deacon, since even to a deacon it belongs to preach the Gospel — or in capacity, if one is in the other orders below the order of the diaconate.

Furthermore, it belongs to no one ordained always to have the head veiled in church when praying, as is self-evident. The minor can also be proved from the words of the Apostle, because a woman ought to pray with veiled head, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 11; nor ought she to teach, because the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 2: I do not permit a woman to teach in the church.

But the opposite of this conclusion was held by the sect of certain people called the Cataphrygians, who, to cloak their error, adduce authorities from both canons — that is, from law and from sacred scripture.

1. From law indeed, because in Decretum C.27 q.1 it is prescribed that a deaconess should not be ordained before she is forty years old; therefore the order of the diaconate can sometimes be conferred upon a woman. And in the same question it is prescribed that no one should seize or solicit a deaconess. Likewise, in dist. 32, a presbytera is instructed how she ought to govern her household; therefore it seems that the order of the presbyterate can be conferred, and that it has in fact sometimes been conferred upon, a woman.
2. Furthermore, if order were incompatible with the female sex, this would be above all because the power of judging could not belong to a woman; but this is no obstacle, because as is clear from Judges 4, Deborah judged the people of Israel and presided over them for many years; therefore according to sacred scripture order is not incompatible with a woman.
3. Furthermore, they confirm this by the following argument. With respect to the soul, there is no distinction between man and woman; but order does not regard a person with respect to the body, but rather with respect to the soul, since it is a kind of spiritual power; therefore with respect to the capacity to receive orders there seems to be no distinction between man and woman.
4. Furthermore, whenever there are several patients of the same species, then by the same reasoning that the same agent can produce a given effect in one of those patients, it can produce a like effect in another; but man and woman are of the same species; therefore by the same reasoning that a bishop can confer the sacrament of order upon a man, he can confer the same sacrament upon a woman.

Against

But this opinion cannot stand, because Christ did not confer the sacrament of order upon his Mother, notwithstanding that she was the most noble and most holy creature; therefore he did not wish any woman to be capable of this sacrament.

The antecedent is known, because as is clear from what has been said above, Christ conferred the sacrament of order only [upon men — continued below].

upon men. The inference is also clear, because Christ, as a good son, honored his Mother above all creatures, and consequently, if according to divine ordinance a woman were capable of this sacrament, Christ would by no means have withheld this degree of honor from his venerable and most beloved mother.

Solution

To the first argument of those [who hold the opposite] it must be said that in antiquity certain nuns were called deaconesses, not because they held the order of the diaconate, but because they were licensed to read the Homily at the morning office. A presbytera, moreover, among the Greeks is the wife of a priest; in the Roman Church, however, a presbytera used to be called an abbess, or any other respectable matron who provides a path of conduct and example for others. And so she is not called a presbytera from the order of the presbyterate, but only from the etymology of the name.

To the second it must be said that the power of judging is twofold: one in temporal matters, and the other in spiritual matters. The first is not incompatible with a woman, because many women have had great and extensive temporal power and still do in various parts of the world. Such also was the power of Deborah, from whom the argument proceeds. But spiritual judicial power belongs to no woman, and consequently neither does order, whose power is simply spiritual.

To the third it must be said that, although there is no distinction between man and woman with respect to the soul in those things that pertain to the merit of eternal life — since in this regard, whether one is a man or a woman, whoever loves God more and conducts himself more virtuously in this world will have a greater reward in eternal life; and in accordance with this the Apostle says: In Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free, neither male nor female — there is nevertheless a distinction between man and woman with respect to the soul in those things that pertain to office, especially if such an office is one whose exercise the soul pursues by means of the body and by means of bodily operations that pass outwardly, as is the case with the office of any order. And therefore, although order is a certain spiritual power, yet by reason of the annexed office it is not communicable to a woman by divine ordinance.

To the fourth it must be said that the major is not true when speaking of an instrumental agent, and especially with respect to such an effect as is attained by the instrumental cause only according to the external disposition belonging to it by the ordinance of the principal agent, who freely and contingently induces such an effect. When these conditions hold, then notwithstanding the similarity of the patients, an action with respect to one of them can belong to the instrument beyond what belongs to it with respect to the other, according as the ordinance of the principal agent determines the instrument toward one of those patients and not the other. But as regards the conferral of the character or power of which we now speak, the ordaining bishop is an instrument of God, externally disposing — by divine ordinance — the male sex and not the female for the reception of the aforesaid power; therefore, etc.

Conclusion 3

Conclusion 3 is that it is required of the necessity of precept, though not of the necessity of the sacrament, that the ordinand not be subject to any canonical penalty justly imposed upon him — for instance, that he not be suspended, excommunicated, irregular, interdicted, infamous, deposed, or degraded. All of these can be proved from various citations of law, which for the sake of brevity I here omit.

Regarding irregularity in particular, however, it should be noted that under this penalty a very great many people are comprehended, all of whom are excluded by the necessity of precept from the reception of this sacrament. For this reason it should be known that in general a person can incur irregularity in three ways: in one way through crimes; in another way without crimes; and in a third way through things that are in some manner indifferent — that is, because they are sometimes criminal and sometimes not criminal.

The first case occurs in four ways. First, on account of simony — for instance, when someone purchases an order or a benefice. In cases of simony of this kind, sometimes the Pope alone can dispense, as is clear from Extra, “De simonia,” c. “Nobis” [X.5.3.20]; and the same is clear from Decretum 1.q.1 [C.1 q.1].

The second crime by which irregularity is contracted is theft in the reception of an order — for example, when a bishop commands that those who have done such-and-such a thing are not to present themselves for ordination, and yet someone knowingly acts against such a prohibition and receives orders clandestinely: such a person becomes irregular, as is clear from Extra, “De eo qui furtive ordines suscipit” [X.1.11].

The third crime is in one who ministers in an order he has not received, especially if it is a sacred order and the ministration solemn. That such a person is irregular is clear from Extra, “De clerico non ordinato ministrante” [X.3.43].

The fourth crime by reason of which a man becomes irregular is conducting oneself contumaciously in failing to observe canonical penalties; and this is clear from Extra, “De clerico excommunicato vel deposito ministrante” [X.3.44]. And what is said there about excommunication is to be understood of major excommunication, because, as is likewise said there in c. “Licet,” although one who celebrates in minor excommunication sins gravely, he nonetheless incurs no taint of irregularity.

The second case occurs in three ways. For irregularity follows upon serfdom, even though serfdom is not itself a crime. Hence any bonded serf is prohibited by the law itself from receiving the sacrament of orders, unless he has been restored to freedom with the consent of his lord, as is clear from Extra, “De servis non ordinandis” [X.1.18]. Irregularity also follows upon illegitimate birth, even though such illegitimacy is not the fault of the one born in that condition; and this is clear from Extra, “De filiis presbyterorum non ordinandis” [X.1.17].

It follows also, third, upon bodily defect — either the loss of a notable member through grievous mutilation, or debilitation from a serious and loathsome disease. Such persons are irregular and ought not to receive orders, as is clear from Extra, “De corpore vitiatis” [X.1.20] and Extra, “De clerico debilitato.”

The third case occurs in two ways — namely, through homicide and bigamy — each of which is sometimes without sin and sometimes with sin. This is evident for homicide, because a just judge may sometimes lawfully put guilty men to death by true judgment and without sin; and nonetheless both the judge and the witness, and the notary who records the sentence, and the counsellor of the judge, are all irregular, as is clear from Extra, “De homicidio voluntario” [X.5.12]. The matter is also treated at Decretum dist. 50, c. “Miror,” and dist. 55, c. ult. [D.50 c.25, D.55 c.ult.].

That homicide is sometimes a sin — for instance, when a guilty person kills an innocent one — is self-evident, since it is against the commandment of God. That such a person is also irregular is clear from the same passages just cited. That bigamy induces irregularity is clear from Extra, “De bigamis” [X.1.21]. That it can exist without sin is also clear, because a man who marries a woman previously corrupted becomes a bigamist, though he may do so without sin, as will be shown below, in the treatment of matrimony. That bigamy may sometimes befall someone with sin is also evident: for suppose that a man marries a virgin wife and thereby does not contract bigamy; but if that woman subsequently commits adultery with another man to her husband’s knowledge, then in the first act of intercourse in which the legitimate husband cohabits with his now-adulterous wife, he contracts bigamy — and this is not usually without sin, especially if out of a desire to satisfy his lust he knowingly continues to harbor an adulteress without correcting or repudiating her.

ARTICLE IV

There are certain things to be examined concerning simoniacal deprivation.

As for the fourth article, two things are to be examined. First, what simony is. Second, whether

simony is committed in every purchase and sale of a spiritual thing.

As for the first, it should be known that doctors quite commonly give this as the definition of simony: Simony is the deliberate will to buy or sell something spiritual or annexed to a spiritual thing. This description is reasonably well given. For just as virtuous habits are known — and consequently defined — by their acts and their objects, so too are vicious habits; and therefore in the present case simony is defined first by an interior act, when “deliberate will” is placed first; second by an exterior act, when “to sell or to buy” is added; and third by the object, when “something spiritual or annexed to a spiritual thing” is appended.

But against this definition certain objections are raised as follows. Simony takes its name from Simon Magus; but Simon does not seem to have wished to sell spiritual things — rather, he wished to buy them from the Apostles, as is clear from the Acts of the Apostles [Acts 8:18–19]. Therefore the will to sell is wrongly included in the definition of simony, which is named after that Simon.

Furthermore, the mere will to buy or sell a spiritual thing does not induce irregularity; therefore such a will is not simony. The antecedent is clear, because such a will can be expiated by penance without a suspension by a superior — which could not be done if it induced irregularity. The consequence is also clear, because, as has been said above, simony does induce irregularity.

Furthermore, one who obtains an order or benefice through prayers or favor commits simony; but such a person neither sells nor buys; therefore simony is not sufficiently defined by the will to buy or sell.

Furthermore, the right of patronage is something spiritual, and yet it can be sold without simony; therefore it is not well defined by the will to sell a spiritual thing. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved as to the first part: because the authority to confer an ecclesiastical benefice is a spiritual right, and the right of patronage is precisely such an authority. It is also clear as to the second part — namely, that it can be sold without simony — because we often see in practice that it is sold, and yet those who sell it are not on this account reproved.

Furthermore, a consecrated chalice can be sold without simony, and therefore simony is not well defined by the sale of something annexed to a spiritual thing. The antecedent is clear, because we read of Ambrosius that he had chalices sold for the ransom of captives and the support of the poor [cf. Ambrosius, De officiis 2.28] — which a man of such great holiness would by no means have done if simony were committed in the sale of a chalice. The consequence is also clear, because being consecrated is something spiritual, just as consecration itself is; but a consecrated chalice cannot be separated from its being consecrated.

Solution

To the first objection it must be said that Simon wished to buy spiritual power from the Apostles precisely in order that he might afterwards sell it; and therefore he had not only the will to buy but also the will to sell. On this account, not only those who buy spiritual things are rightly called simoniacs, but also those who sell them. And accordingly it is clear that, although simony takes its name from Simon, it is nonetheless well defined by the will to buy and to sell the spiritual thing itself. If, however, someone wished to call only those who buy spiritual things simoniacs, he could name those who sell them Gehazites, after Gehazi, the servant of Elisha, who received gifts from Naaman the Syrian for the healing granted to him at the prayers of Elisha himself, as is clear from 2 Kings 5 [2 Kgs 5:20–27].

To the second objection it must be said that the will to buy or sell a spiritual thing can be understood in two ways: one way, precisely, without any exterior expression; another way, as it is expressed outwardly in some manner — for instance, because the will is so intent upon this that it is signaled outwardly by word, nod, or sign. In the first way it does not induce simony in the forum of the Church, although one who has such a will is truly a simoniac before God, that is, in the forum of God. The second [kind of] will makes a man a simoniac not only

before God alone, but also in the forum of the Church. And because the will seems to be posited in the definition of simony in this second sense — since a will can be called deliberate [studiosa] when its earnestness or solicitude appears outwardly in word or sign — therefore, if in the argument the will is taken in the first sense alone, then the consequence must be denied, because simony in the forum of God can exist without the irregularity that is to be remitted in the external forum of the Church. But if it is taken in the second sense, as it ought indeed to be taken in the present context, since what is posited in the definition of simony is not mere will but deliberate will, then the antecedent is false, because, as has just been said, a deliberate will — inasmuch as its earnestness has been expressed and declared outwardly — does induce irregularity.

To the third objection it must be said that if the prayers are of such a character, or the favor of such a kind, that they induce simony, then such prayers or favor are equivalent to payment, and therefore in such prayers and favors, although they are not formally a buying and selling, they are so equivalently. Hence Gregorius rightly says that there is a threefold gift: the gift of the hand — for example, money or other temporal things; the gift of the tongue — for example, prayers or influence; and the gift of service — for example, service rendered to someone [cf. Gregorius, Moralia in Iob 18.15]. And in each of these simony is sometimes committed, and sometimes not. This can be seen first with regard to the gift of the hand: a person who accepts a temporal thing for a spiritual one either is bound to confer that spiritual thing — as a parish priest is bound to baptize the child of his parishioner — and then, if he is unwilling to confer that spiritual thing without a gift, he is truly a simoniac; or he is not so bound, and this in two further ways, because when such a person demands a gift he either intends thereby to put that spiritual thing up for a price, in which case he is also a simoniac, or he intends it as a stipend for his bodily labor, in which case he is not a simoniac. One can also make a distinction with regard to the gift of the tongue: either the one who by his prayers promotes another to an order or a benefice petitions knowingly for an unworthy person, moved solely by carnal attachment — for instance, because the person for whom he petitions is his kinsman or friend — in which case he commits simony; or he petitions for a worthy person, and then he does not commit simony, especially if his consideration is directed toward the merit of the one he is promoting.

A similar distinction can be made with regard to the gift of service: either the service is spiritual — for instance, because the person is a chaplain or instructor and master [magister], by reason of which a benefice is conferred on him — and then simony is not committed, because the spiritual thing is not given for a temporal but rather for a spiritual one; or the service is temporal, and this in two further ways: either the service is honorable, and then simony is not committed, especially if the person provided for is worthy and the consideration of the one making provision is directed to that end; or the service is dishonorable, and then simony is committed.

To the fourth objection it must be said that the right of patronage cannot in itself be sold without simony; however, the temporal lordship [associated with a property] can be sold, together with which the right of patronage may pass without simony — provided that the said temporal lordship is not sold at a higher price because the right of patronage passes with it, since if it were sold at a higher price on that account, such a contract would not be free from the vice of simony.

To the fifth objection it must be said that if a chalice is sold for the use of another church, it can be sold while remaining intact — provided, however, that in the sale no regard is had to the consecration, but only to the material and the craftsman’s work. For if it were sold at a higher price on account of the consecration, simony would be committed. But if it is sold to a secular person not for the use of another church, it must first be broken before it is sold, so that the consecration is removed, because it is not lawful for a consecrated chalice to be handled by an unconsecrated person.

Perhaps it will be said that at least in this case something annexed to a spiritual thing is being sold — since lordship is annexed to the right of patronage, and the chalice, while it remains intact, is annexed to its consecration — which seems to constitute simony according to the aforesaid definition.

Solution.

I reply that the sale of something annexed to a spiritual thing does not induce simony, unless it is sold insofar as

it is annexed — that is, if in the sale regard is had to the spiritual thing, and the temporal thing is sold at a higher price because of that annexation.

The Second Inquiry of the Fourth Article.

As for the second question in this fourth article, it should be known that certain things are called spiritual in two ways: one way, because they are ordered and referred to what is spiritual in the sense of the rational soul — such as knowledge, counsel, and the like — and in the sale of such things simony is not committed, although in other respects one sometimes sins gravely in such transactions. Another way, because they are ordered toward spiritual grace; and this in two further ways, because either such things are spiritual by essence, as are the gifts of grace, and with respect to these simony cannot be committed, because they can be sold neither by right nor in fact; or they are spiritual causally, as are the sacraments, which are in some manner a cause of the spiritual grace conferred upon recipients in their administration. And with respect to these, simony can be committed, because, although not by right, they can nonetheless be sold in fact.

1 Perhaps you will say that matrimony is a true sacrament, and yet in the marriage contract a stipulation is made concerning a temporal thing without simony — for if those contracting matrimony were thereby to commit simony, the Church would prohibit such stipulations.

2 Furthermore, the Mass is a thing of great spiritual value, and yet money is frequently given for a Mass to be celebrated.

3 Furthermore, a man does not seem to sin, nor consequently to commit simony, in preferring a spiritual thing to temporal things; but one who gives temporal things for spiritual things is preferring spiritual things to temporal ones. Therefore he does not seem to contract simony.

Solution.

To the first objection it must be said that such a stipulation ought not to be made for the sacrament of matrimony itself, nor for the blessing of the contracting parties — for since those are spiritual things, if a temporal thing were demanded precisely for them, simony would be committed. But because the contracting parties, both for themselves and for the offspring they intend to generate, stand in need of temporal things, a stipulation concerning a temporal thing can therefore be made, with consideration directed toward that end, whenever the contraction of matrimony is at issue.

To the second objection it must be said that one who were simply and precisely to buy or sell a Mass would sin and commit simony; nonetheless, money or another temporal thing can be given without sin to one who celebrates Mass for his labors, because no one is obliged to serve at his own expense.

And in this sense the Apostle says that those who sow spiritual things are owed temporal things [1 Cor 9:11].

To the third objection I deny the minor, because one who judges that a spiritual thing can be matched to a temporal price does not prefer the spiritual; rather, he equates it to the temporal thing, since what is appraised is made equal to its price.

But what is to be thought of claustral religious — and especially of certain nuns in Germany — who quite openly demand temporal things from those who are to be received into their community, given that the religious state is a spiritual thing?

Note.

To this, Thomas de Aquino replies in his commentary on book four of the Sentences, dist. 24 [In IV Sent. d.24], saying that when the possessions of a religious house are insufficient to support more persons than it currently has, then from one who desires to serve God in that place there can be required [a contribution] — not as a price for the religious life, but so that the monastery may have the means to provide for him — and in this way simony is not committed. But if he can be received without burden to the house, then it is simoniacal to exact anything for his reception.

To the principal argument, the answer is clear from what has been said at the beginning of this second inquiry.