DISTINCTION XXV.

On the dispensation of the sacrament of orders.

A. On those ordained by heretics.

It is also commonly asked whether heretics who have been cut off from the Church and condemned are able to confer sacred orders, and whether those ordained by them, upon returning to the unity of the Church, ought to be reordained. The words of the Doctors make this question perplexing and almost insoluble, for they seem to disagree considerably. For some appear to hold that heretics cannot confer sacred orders, and that those who seem to have been ordained by them do not receive grace. Innocentius says that the clerics of the Arians are not to be received with the dignity of the priesthood or any other ministry; to them he allows only that the baptism which is conferred in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit be held valid.

He also says that they cannot give the Holy Spirit, whom they themselves have lost; that those ordained by heretics have their head wounded; that one who has lost honor cannot confer honor; and that such a man has received nothing, since in the one giving there was nothing which he could receive. He further holds that, to those who come over from the heretics by the imposition of hands, only lay communion is to be granted, and that none of them is to be promoted to any clerical honor, however slight. Gregorius likewise says that the consecration of the Arians is sacrilegious when communion is received from their hand. Cyprianus too says that everything whatsoever the heretics do is carnal, empty, and sacrilegious; that their altars are false and unlawful, their priesthoods and sacrifices sacrilegious; that, after the manner of apes, which imitate the human form though they are not men, they claim for themselves the countenance and authority of the Catholic Church, though they themselves are not in the Church; and that, being sacrilegious, they administer a priest-

[they] administer the priesthood and set up an altar — although the offering cannot be sacrificed there where the Holy Spirit is not, nor can the Lord profit anyone through the prayers and petitions of him who has violated the Lord himself. Hieronymus likewise asserts that all things which are offered by heretics are defiled in the sight of the Lord: for although they may appear holy in their outward form, nevertheless, because they have been touched by one who is polluted, all are polluted. The same author: God hates the sacrifices of heretics and casts them away from himself; and as often as they are gathered in his name, he detests their stench and closes his nostrils. The same: They offer sacrilegious bread, etc. Leo also bears witness that outside the Church there are neither valid priesthoods nor true sacrifices. He likewise says that through most cruel madness in the see of Alexandria the light of all the sacraments was extinguished: the offering of the sacrifice was interrupted, the consecration of chrism failed, and by the parricidal hands of the impious all the mysteries withdrew themselves.

By these and other testimonies it seems to be established that the sacraments of the Church — especially those of the body and blood, of ordination, and of confirmation — cannot be administered by heretics.

B. He sets forth authorities which seem to run counter to the foregoing.

Others, on the contrary, seem to hold that sacred orders can be conferred even by heretics who have been cut off, just as baptism can; and that those returning from the heretics who were ordained and baptized there are not to be ordained again, just as they are not to be baptized again. Whence Augustinus: As to what certain persons say concerning heretics — even condemned ones — namely, that he who departs from the Church does not lose the baptism he received but does lose the right to confer what he received, this appears in many ways to be said in vain. First, because no reason is shown why he who cannot lose that baptism should be able to lose the right of giving it. For each is a sacrament, and each is given to a man by a certain consecration: the former when he is baptized, the latter when he is ordained. Therefore in the Catholic Church it is not permitted that either be repeated. For

when those coming from that very side, even their prelates, were received for the good of peace once the error of schism had been corrected—and if it seemed advantageous that they should exercise the same offices they had been performing, they are not to be ordained again. Rather, just as baptism remained whole in them, so in them the ordination remained whole: because the defect lay in the separation, which is corrected in the unity of peace, not in the sacraments, which, wherever they are, are themselves. And when it seems expedient to the Church that their prelates, upon coming to the Catholic community, should not there administer their honors, nevertheless the sacraments of ordination themselves are not taken away from them, but remain upon them; and therefore the hand is not imposed upon them, lest an injury be done not to the man, but to the sacrament itself. Now just as in baptism there is a right by which it can be given through them, so in ordination there is a right of giving—each, indeed, to their own ruin. But it is one thing not to have, another to have ruinously, and another to have salutarily. The same, [says]: Concerning those who are separated from the unity of the Church, there is no longer any question that they both have and can give; but they have ruinously, and ruinously

give, because they are outside the bond of peace. To neither sacrament must an injury be done. Just as one who withdraws from unity does not rightly have, yet still they do have, and therefore it is not restored to one who returns; so also one who withdraws from unity does not rightly give, and yet gives: and therefore one who receives from him is not re-ordained upon coming to unity. The same, [says]: It is one thing not to have something, another not to have it by right, or to usurp it unlawfully. Therefore the sacraments of Christ and the Church are not on that account not sacraments, because not only heretics but also all the impious use them unlawfully; but those persons are to be corrected and punished, while the sacraments themselves are to be acknowledged and venerated. Likewise, Gregorius: What you say, that one who has been ordained should be ordained again, is utterly absurd. For just as one baptized once ought not to be baptized again, so one consecrated once cannot be consecrated again in the same order.

By these and other authorities it seems to be asserted that in all the impious, even in heretics who have been cut off and condemned, the sacraments of Christ remain, together with the right of giving. For they are able to give, but ruinously; and those to whom they have given are not to be ordained again—which seems to run counter to the premises set forth above.

C. Resolution of the foregoing contradiction among the authorities.

Some, however, resolve these matters as follows. They say that heretics who, after receiving priestly or episcopal unction, depart from the Church do indeed retain the right of conferring baptism, but do not have the power to bestow sacred orders or to consecrate the Lord’s body once they have been cut off and condemned by the Church — just as a degraded bishop does not have the power to bestow sacred orders, though he has not lost the faculty of baptizing. What Augustinus says, they understand to be said of those heretics who are divided from the truth of the faith and the unity of doctrine not by any sentence of the Church, but by the perversity of their own judgment: such men, though they be of this kind, nevertheless still have the right of ordaining and consecrating. And those who are ordained by them before any manifest cutting-off — even if they openly go out with them and are condemned by the sentence of the Church — are not, if they return, to be ordained again. And wherever one reads concerning those ordained by heretics that, with their orders preserved, they may minister, or that they are not to be ordained again, they say this is to be understood of men of this kind. For once the heretics have been cut off and condemned by the judgment of the Church, they assert that the right of ordaining and consecrating has been taken away from them, as from men who have been degraded or excommunicated.

Others, however, say that the sacraments celebrated by heretics and those cut off [from the Church], provided they are celebrated according to the form of the Church, are true and valid: because in departing from the Church they did not lose the right of conferring and consecrating; and those who are thus ordained by heretics, when they return, are not to be ordained again. But those things which are performed by heretics otherwise than as in the Church are false and void, and those who seem to be ordained by such men receive no gift but a wound. And it is in accordance with this distinction that the Doctors speak of these matters in various ways. Some indeed say that the same sacraments can be celebrated by heretics who have been cut off as by Catholics, provided the form of the Church is preserved by them, and that when so celebrated they are true and valid in themselves; but as regards their effect, they are false and void both in those who administer them wrongly and in those who receive them wrongly, and therefore null and false: because what they promise, they do not bestow. They are also said to be worthy of condemnation, because to those who unlawfully give or receive them they are unto judgment. They are also said to be polluted

are so called, not in themselves, but on account of the unworthy administration by heretics. Hence Gregorius calls the communion of Arius an execration, and Innocentius calls the ordination of Bonosius a damnation — not because they are such in themselves, but because the wicked state of those giving or receiving makes them so. In the same way Hieronymus calls their sacrifices “the bread of mourning,” not with respect to themselves, but with respect to their effect. Some, however, hold that those heretics who were ordained within the Church retain the right of ordaining and consecrating even after they have been separated from it, whereas those who, while placed in schism or heresy, have been ordained and anointed by them, lack that right, and therefore when they wish to ordain they inflict a wound rather than confer grace.

Division of the text

“It is also customarily asked, If heretics, etc.”

In this chapter of the distinction two matters are contained, namely, whether heretics can confer holy orders;

and, concerning the diverse kinds of simony, at the passage, D, “Concerning simoniacs, however, there is no room for doubt, etc.”

Article I

Whether heretics cut off from the Church can confer orders

Concerning the first point the Master disputes at length in the Text, and there we ask whether heretics cut off from the Church can confer holy orders or not. It seems that they cannot.

1. For everything that descends from one person to another descends into him either by personal merit or by the merit of the Church; but in

a heretic there is nothing of personal merit, nor of the merit of the Church, since he has been cut off from the Church, as has been laid down; therefore nothing descends through him; therefore nothing is conferred; therefore neither is order.

2. Again, through a channel not joined to the spring nothing flows from the spring; but a heretic who has been cut off is like a channel not joined to the spring; therefore nothing descends through him; therefore neither does order.
3. Again, no wise person works toward the destruction of his own work; but if a heretic, as is said, were to confer the sacraments of the Church, this would be to the destruction of the Church; therefore the Author of the Church does not perform that work; but the Author of the Church performs every effect of a sacrament; therefore through heretics who have been cut off he performs nothing; therefore they confer nothing.
4. On this same point many authorities are adduced in the Text.

To the contrary it is objected as follows:

1. In the conferral of the sacraments nothing operates except the form and the intention; if therefore these are preserved by a heretic, the effect, which is the sacrament, will of necessity be conferred by the heretic.
2. Again, in the conferral of the sacraments a wicked minister does not differ from a good one; therefore neither does a faithful minister differ from an unbelieving one, provided he preserves the form and intention of the sacrament; therefore even those who have been cut off confer [the sacraments]; and on

On this part many authorities are likewise adduced in the Text.

The Master, for the resolution of these matters, introduces four opinions, which are known to anyone who inspects the Text. But among the moderns there is no doubt about this: that by heretics, whether still within the Church or even existing outside it, all the sacraments are conferred, provided that they are priests or bishops, or stand in the other orders in which they are able to minister sacraments, and that they preserve the form and the intention of the Church.

According to this, therefore, it must be said to the first [objection] that the sacrament is not effected by the merit of the Church, but

by the power of him who instituted it, who gave this power to man, so that when he preserved the form and the intention, this or that sacrament would be effected.

To the other [objection] it must be said that this channel is joined to the Church through the likeness of form and intention: and these suffice, as has been said.

To the other [objection] it must be said that God does not work toward the destruction of his own work, but rather toward its construction: for he shows the power of his work by operating even through evil men; and on account of this the Church cleaves to him all the more, and the damnation of heretics is the more just.

D. On simony — whence it is so called, and what it is.

Concerning simoniacs there is no doubt that they are heretics; nevertheless, before the sentence of degradation, they both ordain and consecrate. And although, properly speaking, those are called simoniacs who, after the manner of Simon Magus, wish to procure for a price the grace that cannot be priced, while those who receive a price for sacred ministry, in the manner of Gehazi, ought to be called Gehazites: nevertheless both givers and receivers alike are called simoniacs, and both are struck by the same sentence.

E. On those who are knowingly ordained by simoniacs.

There is, however, a difference between those who are ordained by simoniacs knowingly and those who are ordained unknowingly. For those who have knowingly permitted themselves to be consecrated — nay rather, execrated — by simoniacs: their consecration is entirely void. But those who are ordained by simoniacs whom, when they are ordained, they do not know to be simoniacs, since at that time they are also held as Catholics: their ordination is mercifully sustained.

F. On those who say that they are buying corporeal things, not spiritual ones.

If, however, some should object that they are not buying consecrations but the things themselves which proceed from consecration, they are shown to be utterly out of their senses. For whoever among these sells the one without which the other is not had, leaves neither unsold.

ARTICLE II.

What is simony?

Next, inquiry is made concerning the second part, namely what is said there at D, “Concerning simoniacs, etc.”

Here four questions are asked concerning simony.

First, what is it?

Second, is it a heresy, as the Text seems to say?

Third, can an inferior commit simony with a superior?

Fourth, in what ways is simony committed?

To the first, the definition is taken from the Jurists, who commonly define it thus: “Simony is an eager will to buy or sell something spiritual, or something annexed to a spiritual thing.”

It is asked, therefore, what is called an eager will?

1. For either this is the will that strives to go forth into act but does not go forth, or the will that is completed and does go forth. If in the first way, then the will

to buy something spiritual would be simony, which is false, as is clear below in the division of simony. If, however, it is the will that strives and does go forth into the act of buying or selling, then many simonies are committed in the sale of chalices and other vessels of the Church, which again is false, since such things can lawfully be done.

2. Further, it seems that the will alone, without eagerness, suffices for simony: for simony is more shameful than usury, and one is a usurer from the mere hope of gain; therefore it seems that one is also a simoniac from the mere will or hope of buying.

Further, this seems to be shown at Acts 8:18ff., where Simon never in fact bought something spiritual, but only willed to buy it, and yet he was a simoniac, such that all simoniacs are named after him. Therefore it seems that the will alone makes a simoniac.

3. Further, it is asked why it says eager. For what is done out of ignorance is done without eagerness; but there are many who are ignorant that spiritual things ought not to be put under a price. Therefore, if those men put spiritual things under a price by buying or selling, they do not have an eager will in this; therefore they do not commit simony, which is absurd.

Likewise, Tully says that “eagerness

is a vehement application of the mind to doing something.” Therefore it seems that this does not pertain to buying or selling, and so it is wrongly placed in this definition.

4. Further, a question is raised about that part where he says, Of buying or selling something spiritual. For there was an eager will in Abraham to buy a burial place, when he made an agreement with Ephron about the double cave of the field; and yet he is not called a simoniac. Therefore the definition is false, as it seems.
5. Again, Nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven; and yet it is bought and sold all day long, as it seems, Matthew XIII, 45: The kingdom of heaven is like unto a merchant seeking goodly pearls, etc. And Augustine says: “I have it for sale, etc.” Gregory: “The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you have.” Therefore it seems that other spiritual things too can be sold.
6. Further, it is asked what is called “attached to the spiritual”? For nothing is attached to itself; therefore neither is a spiritual thing attached to itself. Therefore what is attached to the spiritual is something corporeal. But a corporeal thing that is attached to something spiritual can be sold, as is clear when a knight sells a village in which he has the right of patronage. Therefore the definition is false.

Response. To this it seems that the definition is good. What is said, An eager will, refers to the will together with the effect of the work, so far as concerns the simoniac. What he says, Of buying or selling, refers to the proper act of simony. And what he says, Something spiritual or attached to the spiritual, refers to the matter.

To the first, then, it must be said that it refers to the will together with the act on the part of the simoniac. To the objection against this, it must be said that chalices and the like are spiritual things according to the fourth mode of spirituality, as will be clear below, and such things can be sold; and this is the solution of the Decretists, and it has no rational force. Hence it must be said,

that when he says, Of buying or selling something spiritual insofar as it is spiritual, it is understood that the buying or selling falls upon the spiritual insofar as it is spiritual, so that its spirituality increases the price; and then the definition is true, because thus simony is committed both in the case of chalices and of other things.

To the other it must be said that although this sin is more shameful [than usury], nevertheless it is completed in something other than usury is, namely in an external act; or else a completed will suffices for its perfection. And there is a counter-instance: for homicide is more shameful than usury, and a greater sin, and yet it is not completed in the will alone, as usury is.

To the other it must be said that “eagerness” [studium] is here taken for the diligence applied by the simoniac himself in order to complete the sin; and so the equivocation misleads, because it is not defined by Tullius [Cicero] in that sense.

To the same it must be said that ignorance excuses no one; and someone can well be diligent in something concerning which he is ignorant whether it is a sin, yet he knows it insofar as it is a certain act which he strives and intends to perform.

To the other it must be said that Abraham was not a simoniac, but Ephron was, as Hieronymus says, because he knew that unless he [Abraham] gave something for the redemption of his [Ephron’s] right, he would afterwards be harassed by him. And if it please Hieronymus, it could be said that neither was a simoniac: because he did not buy a cemetery but rather a non-sacred place, namely the field of a certain peasant called Ephron; and he afterwards made a cemetery of it, because he buried there the bodies of the saints, in whom the Holy Spirit had rested; and this every man is always permitted to do.

To the other it must be said that the kingdom of heaven is not properly bought but merited. For what is properly bought passes from the ownership of the seller into the possession and ownership of the buyer. But here the one buying the kingdom of heaven passes into the ownership

of the one selling it, so that the Lord of the kingdom of heaven may possess this buyer as well.

Another reason is given for the same point: that one who buys in this way gives nothing to God that was not already his, but merely orders toward the Lord what had been disordered through sin; and this is a work of virtue that every person ought to perform.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that what is “annexed to something spiritual” is called annexed to spiritual things because it ought not to be held except by spiritual persons or places—such as the right of patronage. For although a knight is said to hold it, nevertheless he holds it only for the use of spiritual persons and places. And by this the objection fails, because the very same thing numerically is not annexed to itself, but the same in genus or in species.

ARTICLE III.

Whether simony is a heresy?

Secondly it is asked, whether it is a heresy, as is said in the Text.

Now it seems that it is not, because:

1. On Titus 3:10, on the passage “A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid, etc.,” the Gloss says: “Heretics are those who attack the law through the words of the law.” But simoniacs are not such: therefore they are not heretics.
2. Again, above, Augustinus says that “a heretic is one who, for the sake of some temporal advantage, and especially for the sake of his own glory and rule, begets or follows false or novel questions.” But a simoniac does not do such things: therefore it seems that he is not a heretic.
3. Likewise, heresy lies in matters civil or credible; but simony lies only in matters operable: therefore simony is not heresy.

If perhaps you say that he errs in his operations—AGAINST this: because if this were so, then since every wicked person is ignorant, every wicked person would be a heretic, which is false: therefore, etc.

RESPONSE. To this it must be said, according to some, that heresy is to attribute to God what does not belong to him, as Augustinus says in the book On the Trinity; and this the simoniac does: therefore they call him a heretic, because he says it belongs to himself that his own things, and he himself, be set under a price. But it seems strange if this is what moved the holy Fathers.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that simony is a heresy: because simoniacs do not attribute this as asserting it [to be so], but rather as wishing in whatever way to possess [spiritual things]. Hence it seems one must say, as Hieronymus says and as was noted above, that heresy is incurred from words disorderly uttered, especially when those words concern spiritual things to be believed and hoped for. Now there are two things which we believe and hope concerning spiritual things: namely, that they exist, and that they exceed these worldly things infinitely in value, because they are the things which “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him” [1 Cor 2:9]. Against the first of these, then, heresy strictly taken sins. But against the second, simony sins directly: for it places spiritual things at a lower value than the temporal things for which it sells and buys them. And therefore it is called heresy.

TO THE FIRST, then, it must be said that heresy is there taken strictly, insofar as it is opposed to things to be believed on the side of the knowledge that is had of them, namely that they exist. And it is similarly taken by Augustinus above, dist. XIII. But simony sins rather against the value that one ought to believe is in spiritual things themselves.

And by this the solution to the whole is clear.

ARTICLE IV.

Can an inferior commit simony together with a superior?

Third, it is asked whether an inferior can commit simony together with a superior, and particularly whether someone from the Church can do so with the Lord Pope.

And it seems that he cannot, because:

1. Jacob did not commit simony by buying what was owed to him by right of succession; rather, Esau did, who wished to give it away in another manner. Therefore, since all things that belong to the Churches are entrusted to the Lord Pope, it seems that he never commits simony by accepting something from ecclesiastical persons in exchange for spiritual goods, since otherwise they would not give those things to him.
2. Furthermore, no person has a right in ecclesiastical goods except through the jurisdiction of the Lord Pope. Therefore, just as that person receives [those goods], so the Pope can receive [from him].

ON THE CONTRARY:

1. Simony is called “simony” from the contract which Simon wished to make with Peter, who was Pope of the Apostles. Therefore, much more can simony be committed with other Popes.
2. Furthermore, one who assists in a mortal sin, and does not prevent it though he could, sins with an equal sin as the one committing it, as the Saints say. But the Pope knows that this person can commit simony with him and is committing it. Therefore, if he does not forbid it but rather assists by deceiving [the party] and granting what he requests, he himself sins with an equal sin. Therefore, he is made a simoniac.

REPLY. It must be said that in truth I readily think he can commit simony, and this seems to me beyond doubt when he sells a spiritual good.

TO THE FIRST, then, it must be said that the case is not

similar. Rather, the right of primogeniture had been given to Jacob by the Lord, and therefore [the transaction] was a redemption from the harassment which [Esau] inflicted rather than a contract of purchase. But the goods of the Churches are not given to Prelates to possess, but to dispense for the use of others, namely the poor. Hence they cannot buy and sell, nor even give them freely to whomever they wish, but they are to be spent on the general needs of the Church or on the use of the poor or of the persons of the Church.

TO THE OTHER it must be said that it is true that no one has a right in the Churches except through him. Yet I do not think this is because those things are his own or that he confers them as his own, but because the patronage of their defense has been committed to him. Just as the lawgiver says that all things belong to the Emperor for [their] defense and protection. For, as Basilius says—and Aristotle had said before him—he is a tyrant who extorts all things for his own use and does not seek the welfare of his subjects.

ARTICLE V.

In what ways is simony committed?

Fourth, it is asked: in what ways is simony committed?

Many modes are set forth by the Jurists, which are noted in these verses:

Gift, tongue, fear, flesh, together with popular fame, Do not allow the spiritual to be given freely.

Or thus:

Praise and kinship, violent entreaty, gifts, Base servility—these sell spiritual right.

Let it therefore be inquired concerning these:

1. For praise is a gift of the mouth. Now praise, as the Philosopher says, properly

perly pertains to the act of a virtue, and to the virtue insofar as the act proceeds from it, and it is sought from those who are good and who know us. But it is agreed that the good, insofar as they are virtuous, intend no evil; therefore they do not buy spiritual things; therefore simony is not committed through praise.

2. Furthermore, Praise is not a bodily gift, since reputation too is necessary even to the saints; therefore in praise something spiritual is not given for something bodily, but rather for something spiritual; therefore simony is not committed.
3. Likewise, kinship does not seem to constitute simony, because in every case of simony there is a contract, whereas kinship makes it so that a gift is given without a contract; therefore kinship undoes simony rather than constitutes it. The first point is proved by the fact that into the definition of simony there enters buying or selling, which do not occur without a contract. The second is established by the fact that kinship serves to foster friendship, which causes gifts to be given freely.
4. Furthermore, we see that the priesthood of the Old Testament was held by right of kinship, along with all the other grades of the Levites; therefore it seems that kinship too can be a ground for holding spiritual dignities in the Church; therefore it does not constitute simony.
5. In the same way an objection is raised concerning what he calls a violent request. For it seems to be a contradiction in terms: for if one requests, one does not compel; and if one compels, one does not request; for a request is made to incline a free will so that it may act on the petition, whereas violence excludes the will from its extremes, since the violent (as the Philosopher says) is that “whose principle is in another, the one acted upon contributing nothing of force”; and “principle” here denotes the efficient cause, as Damascenus says; therefore it seems that there is no such thing as a violent request or armed entreaties.
6. Further, an objection is raised concerning gifts. For the Philosopher says that “a gift is a giving that does not seek return”; therefore gifts do not seek that something be given to them in return for the gifts, neither spiritual nor temporal; therefore they do not constitute simony.

7. Lastly, also concerning base service. For base service has to do with base matters; therefore if one were to serve in honorable matters, one would not seem to commit simony — and this is false; therefore it seems that none of these are what are said to constitute simony.

Furthermore, there is inquiry about the cases that arise daily, namely of hypocrites who sell long prayers for human praise: are they simoniacs?

And it seems that they are, because they give something spiritual for something temporal.

Furthermore, cloistered religious or canons do not indeed make a pact; yet they delay and weigh the circumstances so long, until they know with some probability what the one to be received will give to be made a confrere; and if it is much, they receive him; if it seems little, they refuse. The question therefore is: Are they simoniacs?

It seems that they are: because a cause (as the Philosopher says) is that which, when posited, the effect is posited, and when removed, the effect is removed; but among these men, when the expected benefit they calculate they will receive is posited, they offer the prebend, and when it fails, they do not confer it; therefore the temporal thing is the cause of conferring the prebend; therefore they commit simony.

If perhaps you say that they do not inquire in their own persons, but others do so on their behalf who are nevertheless their procurators — against this: It makes no difference whether one acts personally or through another, where the whole cause of the conferral of the prebend is the expectation of temporal gain; for through whomever it is done, they themselves expect this in return for the conferral; therefore simony is committed however it is done.

But if this be said [in defense]:

1. Then all religious houses would perish, because so many would be placed in them that their goods would not suffice; and this seems inadmissible.
2. Furthermore, It is not evil to induce men to almsgiving; therefore if they induce him to bestow an alms by receiving him, whom they would not otherwise receive, it is not evil; therefore it is not simony.

Response. It seems one should say, as the jurists say, that the spiritual is of four kinds.

For there is one kind which cannot be sold because of its spirituality, since it has nothing in common with bodily things, and therefore cannot pass into the ownership of another, as the very gifts of the Holy Spirit, the virtues, and the beatitudes.

There is a second kind of the spiritual, which is essentially wholly spiritual, yet given in bodily things, such as sacramental graces: and therefore this indeed cannot be sold by its nature or by right, but it is often sold with respect to the bodily labor which is within the power of the ministers, though it is never sold without simony.

The third is not essentially spiritual, but rather bodily, though attributed to spiritual persons in order to sustain them in spiritual exercises, such as prebends and other revenues of the Churches: and therefore these are sold, but simony is committed in them by reason of the spiritual to which they are attributed.

In the fourth and final mode of spirituality, inanimate bodily things are called spiritual by which certain spiritual things are handled, such as vessels for the adornment of the house of God, like chalices, the censer, crosses, books, and the like: and only of these is it true that they can be sold without the commission of simony. But they differ, for either the Church sells to another Church, and then they can be sold whole with the price not increased for the consecration of the objects; or they are sold to lay persons, and then they must first be broken up and melted down by sacred persons, a prayer having been offered beforehand for pardon of the breaking. Cemeteries, however, appear to have a spiritual claim: either they are merely consecrated, or bodies are buried there. If they are merely consecrated, they say that they can be deconsecrated and reduced to other uses. But if the bodies of the blessed are buried there, since the ashes of the bodies cannot be separated from the rest of the earth, then just as the body of a Saint cannot be sold and reduced

to other uses, on account of the Holy Spirit whose temple it was while he lived, so neither can the place of burial of that body be reduced to other uses.

Therefore it must be said to the first that one thing is that for which praise ought to be [given], and another is that for which it is [actually given]: for the Philosopher touches only on what ought to be praised, yet even the wicked is praised when he has done evil; and therefore, when the reason for giving something spiritual is praise, simony occurs.

To the next it must be said that popular praise has nothing spiritual about it: indeed it is more temporal even than time itself, since it is more rarefied and dissolves into the air; but the fame of the Saints belongs among spiritual things, and therefore is spiritual.

To the next it must be said that it is understood similarly, that kinship must be the cause and reason of giving: for if goodness of life were the cause and kinship only a concurrent cause, it would not be simony, since kinship is something bodily and derived from the flesh.

To the argument, however, it must be said that selling and buying are not taken so strictly in the definition of simony: but it is called selling when any price whatever causes spiritual things to be given, “price” being taken in a broad sense for any temporal thing that is the whole and sole cause of the giving.

To the next it must be said that the priesthood of the Old Testament did not have the Spirit, but was the shadow of the spiritual priesthood; whereas the New possesses the Spirit: and therefore the spiritual things of the new priesthood must be bestowed in the liberty of the Spirit.

To the next it must be said that violent entreaty is taken there for that which induces fear in a steadfast man. And by “fear” I mean fear of the loss of property, or injury to reputation or person. For when this is the cause of giving, simony is committed.

To the argument it must be said that “violent” is not taken so strictly here: but for violence here it is sufficient that the necessary be mixed with the violent, as is the throwing of goods into the sea in time of storm: for of such things the Philosopher says that

are mixed of the voluntary and the involuntary; and this is sufficient here for the liberality of the giving of spiritual goods to be lost.

To the next it must be said that every temporal service which is the cause of giving spiritual goods is base in comparison to spiritual goods, even if it be honorable or useful in an unqualified sense; and it is in this way that “base service” is here understood.

To the last it must be said that in the conferral of a prebend three things seem to me to require consideration, namely the poverty of the place, the liberty of the spiritual goods, and the intention of the salvation of the recipient. If the place is poor, it seems that a prebend cannot be conferred without much burden upon the persons dwelling there, however liberally they might wish to give the spiritual good, if they could, and to intend the salvation of the recipient. And then it seems to me that by themselves or through others looking after their interests they could say that, if their goods were to increase, they would willingly receive him, but otherwise they could not receive him. And I understand “increase”

as meaning a notable increase, such that the person received can be sustained without notable burden upon the others in that place. But if they do not increase, then they cannot receive him. But to receive him under a pact, especially when there is no necessity of the place, is openly simony.

To the argument it must be said that this does not constitute the cause of the giving, but rather necessity extorts it; for they would willingly give freely, and therefore they have an eye to this in the conferral.

To the authority of the Philosopher it must be said that in natural things what he says is true, but in voluntary matters it fails every day. For it may well be that I simply will something for a good and honorable cause, and yet I cannot; and then, if on some condition being supposed I act, and on that condition not being supposed I do not act, still this is not the cause of the action insofar as it proceeds from my will, as is plain to anyone.

And from this the solution to the whole is plain.

G. The Division of Simoniacs.

The simoniacal heresy has a threefold division. For some are ordained simoniacally by simoniacs; others simoniacally by non-simoniacs; others non-simoniacally by simoniacs. Whence Pope Nicholas: We establish a decree concerning the threefold simoniacal heresy, that is, concerning simoniacs simoniacally ordaining or ordained, and concerning simoniacs simoniacally [ordained] by non-simoniacs, and concerning simoniacs non-simoniacally [ordained] by simoniacs. Simoniacs simoniacally ordained or ordaining, according to the canons, shall fall from their proper grade. Simoniacs also simoniacally ordained by non-simoniacs shall likewise be removed from office. But those not simoniacally ordained by simoniacs we mercifully permit, through the imposition of hands, to remain in office for the necessity of the times.

This is to be understood of those who are ordained by simoniacs while unaware that the ordainers are simoniacs. What makes such men simoniacs is not the guilt of a crime, but the ordination performed by a simoniac.

H. Pope Alexander on those who are ordained under compulsion by simoniacs or heretics.

Likewise, when Pope Alexander decrees that simoniacs are altogether to be condemned and deposed, one must understand this as admitting an exception: unless someone has been drawn in by force. For concerning such men, and concerning those who have been ordained under compulsion by heretics of any kind, Innocent says that they can have some pretext of excuse, provided they immediately depart from them and renounce their wicked conventicle.

ARTICLE VI.

Why are sellers of spiritual things called simoniacs, when in fact they do not follow Simon but rather Gehazi?

Next there is an inquiry concerning what he says at [the passage marked] G, “Now the simoniacal heresy, etc.” It is asked:

1. Since sellers imitate not Simon but rather Gehazi, why are they called simoniacs?
2. Again, it is asked: since simoniacs have no right to receive prebends, are they bound to make restitution? It seems that they are, because they are taking what is not their own.
3. Further, a question is raised concerning a certain case. Let us suppose that I know my bishop

to be a simoniac, or otherwise irregular, and that he is such in secret. He is still tolerated by the Church. The time for orders is pressing, and I am commanded to receive orders — what ought I to do? For if I receive them from a simoniac, I must be degraded; but if I do not receive them, I am disobedient. Therefore I am caught in a dilemma.

Reply. To the first it must be said that men are called simoniacs in a broad sense whether they buy or sell, because even Simon afterward contemplated selling the grace he had purchased. Nevertheless there is a line of verse marking the difference,

What Gehazi sells, Simon seeks to procure.

To the next it seems one must say that, if he knowingly committed simony, he is bound to restitution. But if simony was committed on his behalf by others without his knowledge, he is not bound so long as he remains ignorant; but once he has come to know of it, he is bound, so it seems.

To the next it must be said that in such a case I ought to seek permission, or some other way

of escape; but if I cannot obtain that, I ought to seek an evasion of obedience; and if I cannot obtain even this, then, with grief, I ought to receive the order by title.

To the argument against, it must be said

that this is not understood of those who are hidden, whom the Church still tolerates. But today this scarcely has a place, because almost no one except a money-changer has a place in the temple.

I. Concerning the age of those to be ordained, Pope Nicholas decreed as follows.

The sacred canons, he says, have established that a subdeacon should not be ordained before fourteen years, nor a deacon before twenty-five, nor a presbyter before thirty. Thereafter, if he be worthy, he can be chosen to the episcopate; and we likewise command that this be observed in the same manner. Likewise, Fabianus: If anyone has not completed thirty years of age, let him by no means be ordained a presbyter, even if he be very worthy, because the Lord himself was baptized at thirty years of age, and thus began to teach.

ARTICLE VII. Whether the canons have rightly established the age of those to be ordained, given that it is nevertheless not observed?

Next there is an inquiry concerning what is said there: “The sacred canons, he says, etc.”

For today this is especially not observed in the religious orders; therefore it seems that they violate the canons of the holy fathers, and this is a mortal sin.

Response. It must be said that, just as in matrimony malice sometimes supplies for age, so conversely in the religious orders gravity of conduct and discipline supply for age — especially given that what is said here pertains to those who are promoted not only to orders, but also to jurisdiction, such as archdeacons, presbyters, and bishops.

And let these things be said by us concerning Order for the present time.