On Simony. Tractatus Twenty-One

Having spoken of usury, we must now speak of simony. Concerning it, we must first see what simony is and in what matter it consists. Second, we must consider the spiritual cases in which the sin of simony has its origin; and this chapter is divided into many chapters according to the diversity of the matters in which such cases occur. Third, we must consider the punishment of the simoniac himself.

Simony is described as follows. Simony is a deliberate will to buy or sell something spiritual or something attached to the spiritual. And it is also described thus by some: simony is a pact concerning temporal things for the sake of obtaining spiritual things, or conversely.

Concerning the first definition, it is asked whether a secular judge commits simony by selling justice. It seems that he does, because it is commanded: “Love justice, you who judge the earth.” Since justice is commanded to be loved and seems to be a spiritual thing, when a secular judge sells justice, he sells a spiritual thing, or something attached to the spiritual, and therefore commits simony — or else simony is not a deliberate will, etc.

But on the other hand: on that passage of the Gospel, “He overturned the tables of the money changers and the seats of those who sold,” the gloss says that the sellers of doves are the prelates who sell the Holy Spirit. Therefore the sin of simony is committed in selling only by prelates, whose office alone it is to give. Therefore the sin of simony is not committed in selling by a secular judge. Likewise, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell the crosses and chalices of the church, and these are spiritual things or attached to the spiritual; therefore either simony is not a sin, or simony is not a deliberate will, etc.

Likewise, the rule is that it is lawful for anyone to redeem his own right. Suppose then that someone has a prebend which in truth is his own, yet it has been brought into court, and suppose that unless he gives money to the judge, the judge will not give sentence in his favor. It is lawful even in this case to give money to the judge so that he may recover his right; and thus he buys the sentence, which is a spiritual thing, or the prebend. Therefore either it is not a sin, or simony is not a deliberate will, etc.

Likewise, the law grants that it is lawful for an advocate to sell the right of pleading; therefore by the same reasoning it is lawful for a judge to sell just judgment. This is proved: for just as to judge justly is a work of justice, so to plead is a work of justice — for it is commanded to defend orphans and widows. Therefore either both may be sold, or neither.

Solution: in this matter the spiritual is usually defined by a distinction in the following way. The spiritual is that which has the Holy Spirit, or that by which He is given, or that by which He is shown to be had: that by which He is had, namely as virtue; that by which He is given, as a sacrament; that by which He can be had or is shown to be had, as the gift of prophecy and the power of working miracles. But without distinction the spiritual can be defined

in the following way. The spiritual is that by which the Holy Spirit is had: for He is had through virtues and sacraments, namely for doing the works of the virtues. And through the gift of prophecy and the power of working miracles the Holy Spirit is had for doing certain excellent works. Therefore only these four are properly speaking spiritual: virtue, sacrament, the gift of prophecy, and the power of working miracles. But the right of receiving tithes is not properly spiritual but attached to the spiritual, namely to the sacrament of orders: for a bishop, insofar as he is a bishop, has the right of receiving tithes.

To the first, then, we say that a secular judge cannot commit simony by selling, but he can by buying: for he cannot give the Holy Spirit, since he can give neither virtues nor sacraments, and thus neither can he sell. The solution to that argument is therefore clear: for the justice which the secular judge dispenses is not a spiritual thing — to restore my cloak to me is not a spiritual thing.

To the second we say that there is a thing unsalable by law but not in fact, and there is something unsalable both by law and in fact. Unsalable both by law and in fact is virtue, which ought not to be sold; and thus it is unsalable in fact, for God, whose part it is to give it, cannot sell it. Unsalable by law but not in fact is the sacrament: for it ought not to be sold, yet it can be sold, because God gives the sacrament through the ministry of the priest; whence the priest can sell it in fact but not by right. And in fact there are the chalice and such things, and these are neither spiritual nor attached to the spiritual: for what is attached to the spiritual, properly speaking, is what is in that in which the spiritual is. And there are certain sacred possessions, and on this account, if it should be necessary to sell them to laymen, they ought to be brought back into the common holdings of the church, or they can be sold under the same form.

To the third objection we say that, although he redeems his own right, he nevertheless does not buy anything, because he is not making something his own out of what is not his own. To the last objection, the solution is the common one: that it is lawful for an advocate to sell the right of pleading on account of the labor attached to it, because he must run through the case and plead it. It is not so, however, with a judge, and for this reason the cases are not parallel.

In what things simony has its being. The second chapter

Concerning the second chapter, it is asked about the spiritual things in which simony has its being. And this is divided into three. For there is something which is spiritual only. There is something which is only attached to the spiritual. Both spiritual and attached to the spiritual is preaching: for preaching is spiritual, because through it the Holy Spirit is given, and it is attached to the spiritual — for it is attached to orders, since it belongs properly to priests to preach, or at least to those in orders. Spiritual things are the sacraments of the church, which it is not lawful to buy or sell. Attached only to the spiritual is the right of receiving tithes, the funeral rites of the dead, prebends, and similar things.

Concerning the first case, he lays down the rule that it is not lawful to preach for the sake of temporal gain, vainglory, or human favor. For there is a threefold gift, as blessed Gregorius says, namely the gift of the tongue, the gift of the hand, and the gift of the heart. If anyone preaches for the sake of any of these, he commits simony.

But it seems that it is lawful to preach for temporal things, because it is lawful to pray for temporal things: for the Church prays thus, “vouchsafe to give and preserve the fruits of the earth,” etc. Therefore it is lawful to preach for temporal things, for prayer is spiritual, as is preaching. Likewise, the Apostle preached to the Corinthians for temporal things, namely that he might take up collections for the holy poor who were in Jerusalem; therefore it is lawful to preach for temporal things. But if so, then it is lawful to give a prebend for temporal things, for preaching is more than giving a prebend, since through preaching the Holy Spirit is given, but through the giving of a prebend He is not given.

Perhaps one will say to this that preaching is twofold and prayer is twofold: for there is a certain spiritual prayer by which we ask that the name of God be sanctified in us, and other spiritual things; and a certain earthly prayer by which we ask for temporal things. Similarly, there is a certain spiritual preaching, and this it is not lawful to perform for temporal things; and a certain earthly preaching, which it is lawful to perform for temporal things. But on the other hand: that preaching to which the Apostle was exhorting the Corinthians, namely to take up collections, was such as that [of which it is said]

sows sparingly will also reap sparingly; but it is clear that this preaching is spiritual. Therefore the Apostle’s preaching, which was undertaken for the sake of temporal goods, is spiritual; and therefore no preaching is earthly. Again: “the words that I speak are spirit and life.” Therefore, on this account, all preaching is spiritual and none is earthly. Perhaps someone will say that it is not lawful to preach principally for the sake of a temporal good, but it is lawful to do so secondarily. Therefore, since preaching is more spiritual than the giving of a prebend, it is lawful to give a prebend for a temporal good not principally but secondarily — as when a bishop gives some prebend to a good man principally so that he may serve that church, and secondarily gives it to him so that he himself may give a hundred pounds to some monastery, from which the monks who serve God there may be supported. Therefore to give a prebend in this way is not a sin. Again, the point is proved by Augustinus, who says that different wills have different ends; but if those wills are referred to that End which is God, then those wills and actions are upright. Now in this kind of action — that is, in this giving of a prebend — all the ends are referred to God, for it is good that the man himself serve in that church for God’s sake. Again, it is good that he should give a hundred pounds for the support of poor monks, so that they may serve God more freely and have leisure for contemplation. Therefore whatever is in that giving is referred to the supreme End; therefore that giving is good. Therefore to give a prebend for a temporal good is not only lawful but even good — which is manifestly false. Solution. One must not preach for the sake of a temporal good, because this preposition “for” denotes a first, principal, and immediate cause. For Augustinus does not say “we ought to evangelize in order that we may eat,” but “to eat in order that we may evangelize,” so that food is not the first thing sought, but is added to that which is principally sought. For he who ploughs ought, as the Apostle says, to plough in hope, not for hope, as the gloss says. The principal end of preaching ought in no way to be temporal things; but the consequent or secondary end may be. For someone may preach principally in order to move men to works of piety; and from this kind of end there follows the direction and, upon request, the giving of temporal goods. Hence it is permitted to a preacher preaching in this way to have regard for temporal goods as for a consequent end. And in this way it is permitted to the preachers of the hospital to preach about temporal goods — so that by this preposition “for” a consequent and secondary cause is denoted. To the first objection, then, we say that the case of preaching is not like that of prayer, for some prayer is earthly, but no preaching is earthly. To the second objection we say that the Apostle did not preach for a temporal good in such a way that a principal, immediate, and proper cause was denoted; but he preached for a temporal good in such a way that a consequent and secondary end was denoted — one that moved to piety, in which the likeness of God consists. The case of the giving of a prebend, however, is not the same, because from the works of piety to which men are moved by preaching there follows directly and properly the giving of temporal goods. Hence it is in no way lawful to give a prebend for a temporal good, since a temporal good cannot enter into the giving of a prebend either as the principal end or as a consequent and secondary end. If, therefore, it enters in there as a price, then it is placed under that pact which is attached to a spiritual thing, and so simony is committed. Nor is it true that all those acts of will which are at work in the giving of a prebend on the condition that the recipient should give a hundred marks to some monastery are referred to God; for charity and every virtue shrinks from a prebend given for a temporal good as for a price. Hence this cannot be done with a good end. Hence the referral of actions of which Augustinus teaches cannot take place here. And thus the solution to all the objections is plain.

In which cases the sacraments of the church seem to be sold.

Second question of this chapter.

The question is asked concerning those cases in which the sacraments of the church seem to be sold. The objection is raised, then, from what is commonly done by the church, for many testators enter into an agreement with the church at the point of death concerning the celebration of an anniversary; but an anniversary is

prayers of the church or the celebration of masses. Therefore they are giving temporal goods for the prayers of the church and the celebrations of masses. Therefore they are buying the sacraments of the Eucharist; and so they are buying a sacrament of the church; therefore they are committing simony. Likewise, the church that makes a pact concerning the celebration of an anniversary in exchange for certain revenues is selling the sacraments of the church, and so is committing simony. Likewise an objection is raised concerning priests who take a church on lease from scholars who go off to the schools, and enter into a pact with the scholars for a fixed sum of money to serve in the church — to sing masses, to baptize, and to administer the other sacraments of the church to the people. These priests seem to be selling the sacraments of the church, for otherwise they would not sing masses and so forth unless so much money were given to them. Therefore they are committing simony, and therefore the church that tolerates this is sinning. But there is also an objection concerning prelates who receive money from the excommunicated before they absolve them, for they seem to be selling the sacraments of the church to those who had been excommunicated. Therefore they are committing simony. Solution. The church takes money for three reasons. The first is on account of devotion. The second is for the support and stipend of the ministers of the church. The third is for the sake of correction. According to the first reason the first objection is resolved; but to make this solution clear, it must be noted that the Lord said to Moses, “Make for me a tabernacle according to the pattern that was shown to you on the mountain,” by which it is signified that the church militant ought to imitate the church triumphant as much as it can; and thus do the saints who are on earth — they imitate, then, those who are in the fatherland as much as they can. Hence Ecclesiasticus: “the birds gather to their like.” The birds are the saints who are on earth, who fly with the wings of the virtues; and they gather to their like — that is, they imitate the saints who are in the fatherland. For with those who exist in the church triumphant devotion is highly pleasing, and with them it counts for much. For the Lord does not weigh how much, but out of how much, as the gloss says on that passage in Luke, “the poor little woman cast two small coins into the treasury.” For the gift itself, taken in itself, is not pleasing to God; rather, what pleases is the devotion of the giver, and the gift on account of the devotion. Hence, on account of the devotion that Tobias had in burying the dead, the angel offered up his prayer to God. And the Apostle, imitating the church triumphant, said, “I do not seek the gift, but the fruit”; and the fruit is in devotion. On account of devotion, then, which is spiritual, the kingdom of heaven is acquired — not on account of money given taken in itself. To the first objection, then, we say that the church ought to celebrate that man’s anniversary not for the revenues, but for the devotion of the penitent. Yet because the devotion of the penitent is not known to the church militant, it can receive the revenues which he gives either as a sign in memory of his devotion, or as a cause provoking the devotion of the clerics who are present at the anniversary; for the distributions which are made in the choir provoke and stir up devotion in those who receive the pennies. He who wishes his anniversary to be celebrated ought to say it thus: “I ask for the suffrages of your church out of devotion; I ask for the suffrages, and as a sign of devotion I give you so much.” But if he has regard for the money as for the principal cause on account of which the anniversary is to be celebrated, it is simony. We do not, however, say that this is what happens, but only what ought to happen. The second objection is resolved through the second reason. For it is lawful for priests who hold a church on lease to receive a fixed sum of money for their support and stipend, for “the laborer is worthy of his hire,” as the Lord says in the Gospel, and likewise the Apostle: “he who serves the altar should live by the altar,” and again, “he who ploughs ought to plough in hope and not for hope.” Hence for this money, regarded as the principal cause, it is not lawful for the leasing priest to sing masses and the like; but it is lawful to do so for money, provided that it is not designated as the cause — not without [some legitimate] cause. And the same must be said of bishops and archbishops who receive procurations, and of poor clerics who read through psalters for God’s sake, and of the poor: take the case of the first abbey to which someone comes asking for fraternity, but the abbey does not have the means by which to support him. In this case it is well and lawful for the one asking for fraternity to bring along with him the means by which he may be supported in the ab

abbey, provided that he has lived for a long time and the money is not the principal cause for which he is received into the fraternity, but rather a cause without which he would not be received: even in this way it is not simony, provided that the revenues which the monk brings do not compel him to leave the abbey after his death. For in that case it would be simony; rather, it must be at his good pleasure to leave or not to leave. To the third objection the solution lies in the third cause: for a prelate ought not to accept money from an excommunicate in exchange for absolution, but for the sake of penalty and correction, lest he despise excommunication thereafter. For some are better corrected by the emptying of the purse than by other means. It is honorable, however, that the prelate not fill his own purse with that money, but give it to the poor, lest he seem to have accepted it out of cupidity. For if he accepts it out of cupidity, he sins mortally. Likewise objection is raised concerning those cases in which simony seems to occur through the sale of a sacrament. It seems that one who chants a mass for temporal goods commits simony: for he chants a mass for the fruits of the earth, and for someone’s health, and for temporal peace. All these are temporal goods. Therefore he sets the mass, which is spiritual, under a temporal price. Therefore he commits simony. Likewise he chants a mass for temporal goods: therefore he consecrates the Eucharist for temporal goods; but the Eucharist is a grace-giving good. Therefore he sets a grace-giving good under a temporal price: therefore he commits simony. Likewise the Church praises God for temporal goods, for after a meal she says: “We give you thanks, almighty God,” etc., which is understood of temporal benefits. But the praise of God is something most spiritual, since it is a part of eternal beatitude. Therefore the Church sets the most spiritual thing under a temporal price. Therefore she commits simony. Likewise objection is raised concerning canons who rise for matins and run to matins: they do these things in order to have the daily distributions. But masses and matins are spiritual things, while those distributions are temporal. Therefore they set spiritual things under a temporal price. Therefore they commit simony. But on the contrary: these men sell in order to receive what is owed to them. Therefore they do not commit simony. Likewise it is commanded in Exodus [Exod. 23:15]: “You shall not appear empty in my sight three times a year, at Passover, at Pentecost, at the Feast of Tabernacles.” This precept the Church still observes. For the laity are bound to make offerings to their priests on three feasts: at Easter, at Pentecost, and at the Nativity. And unless they offer, they are compelled by the priests to render the oblations. Therefore the laity are bound to give temporal goods to priests for the spiritual goods which the priests give them. Therefore it is lawful to give temporal goods for spiritual goods: therefore it is lawful to buy spiritual goods for temporal goods. Therefore it is lawful to sell spiritual goods for temporal goods. For the reason for the laity to give temporal goods and for the priests to receive them is the same. Therefore it is lawful to sell the sacraments of the Church for temporal goods. Which is contrary to what has been said. Solution. God gives temporal goods for four causes. The first cause is necessity. Temporal goods are necessary so that the ministers of God may be sustained. Whence Malachi [Mal. 3:10]: “Bring every tithe into my barn, that there may be food in my house.” The second cause is the consolation of the weak. Whence at the end of Isaiah [Isa. 66:13]: “As a mother caresses her son, so will I console you,” namely by the benefit of temporal goods. For great want causes the little ones to sin or others to despair. Whence in Proverbs [Prov. 30:8-9]: “Give me neither beggary nor riches, lest, compelled by want, I steal and forswear the name of my God.” The third cause is spiritual commerce. Whence the gospel [Luke 19:13]: “Trade until I come.” For this reason God gives the mammon of iniquity — that is, of inequality or superfluity — so that out of that superfluity the rich may give to the poor, and thus acquire the kingdom of heaven. For this is spiritual commerce. The fourth cause is provocation to the praise of God: for many are provoked to praise on account of spiritual goods conferred upon them. In these four ways men are permitted to use the necessaries, namely those that are necessary, or consoling, or commercial, or as it were provocative. But in a fifth

way men use temporal goods when they use them with the end of enjoyment, and this is an abuse and a sin; for as Augustinus says, it is a sin to use things to be enjoyed and to enjoy things to be used. Therefore to use temporal goods in this last way is a sin, but in the first four ways it is not a sin. Therefore the signification of the preposition “for” in this statement must be distinguished: when it is said, “the Church chants a mass for temporal goods.” For if it denotes the end of enjoyment, it is false. But if it denotes necessary subject-matter, etc., it is true. For this is true: “the Church chants masses for temporal goods,” understood in this way: in the office of the mass the Church requests temporal goods as necessary, etc., and it does not follow, “Therefore she sets a spiritual good for a temporal price.” For this would only follow if the preposition “for” in the statement denoted the end of enjoyment: which is not to be conceded. “The Church consecrates for temporal goods,” because temporal goods are not the end of the consecration in this way; rather, the body of Christ is the matter of the consecration. Whence this argument is invalid: the Church chants a mass for temporal goods — because in the office of the mass, according to some part of it, temporal goods can be the matter of prayer, but not so in the consecration. The statement could however be conceded per accidens: “the Church consecrates for temporal goods,” with the preposition “for” denoting the cause — not the matter of the consecration itself, but of the intention to consecrate. For on account of the temporal goods received, the priest is bound to consecrate. The solution to the first objection is thus clear. To the second objection we say that the Church praises God as for provocative subject-matter, and thus it is clear that she does not set spiritual goods under a temporal price. Whence the temporal goods do not stand there as a mercenary cause. To the third objection we say that to rise for matins or to hurry to church is not a spiritual thing. Whence it is permissible to do these things for temporal goods. But to chant in church or to praise God for temporal goods as for an end of enjoyment or as mercenary subject-matter is simony. To the fourth objection we say that this statement is twofold: “the laity are bound to give temporal goods for spiritual goods” — and this qualification “for spiritual goods” can qualify either the verb “are bound” or the verb “to give.” If it qualifies the verb “are bound,” it is true, insofar as the preposition “for” denotes efficient cause, since the spiritual goods which are given by the priests are the efficient cause why the laity are bound to give them temporal goods. But this is not to buy spiritual goods. If, however, it qualifies the verb “to give,” it is again true, insofar as the preposition “for” denotes final cause, for the spiritual goods are the end of the temporal goods, but not their price: whence there is no purchase there. Similarly this statement is twofold: “priests are bound to give spiritual goods for temporal goods.” If the qualification “for temporal goods” qualifies the verb “are bound,” it is true, insofar as the preposition “for” denotes motivating efficient cause. But if it qualifies the verb “to give,” it is false, because the preposition “for” denotes either final or material cause, and temporal goods are not the end of spiritual goods. And so the reasoning is not the same for priests as for the laity. It is therefore lawful to give temporal goods for spiritual goods, whether the preposition denotes final or motivating cause. But this is not to be understood of those spiritual goods which are eternal, but of the spiritual goods which the priest gives. There is a doubt whether it is lawful to give temporal goods for those spiritual goods as a final end, or to buy them. And it seems that it is: for at the end of Proverbs [Prov. 31:16] it says of the valiant woman: “She considered a field and bought it.” Therefore it is lawful to buy the field of paradise or the heavenly inheritance. Similarly in the gospel [Matt. 13:45-46]: “The kingdom of heaven is like a merchant seeking goodly pearls: and having found one precious pearl, he went and sold all that he had and bought it.” Thus, therefore, it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven and to give temporal goods for it. Therefore much more is it lawful to give temporal goods for the spiritual goods which the priest gives, which are less spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. Likewise it is lawful to give temporal goods to certain good religious men so that they may pray for us; but prayer is spiritual. Whence [Matt. 7:7]: “Ask, and you shall receive” — which is understood of the petition by which the Holy Spirit is requested, for it is not true of the petition for temporal goods: for many request temporal goods which they do not receive and are not going to receive; but he who asks the Holy Spirit from a true heart will receive him. Therefore the Holy Spirit is given through prayer. Therefore prayer is a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to give temporal goods for prayer, which is spiritual. By the same reasoning it is lawful to give

temporal things for the spiritual goods that the priest gives; and so it is permitted to buy the sacraments of the Church. Likewise, it is permitted to give temporal things to this end, that one may have the Holy Spirit. This is proved by what Gregorius says: “Meanwhile, do whatever good you can, that God may illuminate your heart unto penitence.” Therefore it is permitted to give temporal goods to the poor, that God may illuminate one’s heart by infusing the Holy Spirit. Therefore it is permitted to give temporal things for the Holy Spirit; but nothing is so spiritual as the Holy Spirit, nor more beyond price. Therefore, much more strongly is it permitted to give temporal goods for the spiritual goods which the priest gives, and thus to buy the sacraments of the Church. Solution. To the first we say that this argument does not hold: “It is permitted to buy spiritual goods that are eternal; therefore it is permitted to buy the spiritual goods that the priest gives.” And this is because eternal goods fall under merit, but the first grace, which is given through the sacraments of the Church, does not fall under merit [since] otherwise it would not be grace unless it were given without merit. The kingdom of heaven, however, is for sale, and it is bought with God’s coin, namely by the works of God informed by charity. But the first grace cannot be bought, since one who does not have the first grace has no coin of God’s, but only the coin of the devil, namely the coin of sin; or if he has some good works of a sort, these are purely temporal and do not reach to grace, which is above time. To the second objection we say that this proposition is false: “It is permitted to give temporal things to religious men, that they may pray for us.” For prayer cannot be the immediate end of the giving of temporal things; but when they give temporal things to certain persons for God’s sake, they incite the recipients to friendship, and from friendship they are moved to pray. Hence it is clear that prayer is not the immediate end of the giving of temporal things, but rather friendship, or the inciting to friendship, when the giving of temporal things is rightly done. For Cicero says that friendship properly exists only among the good, since in the wicked, insofar as they are such, there is nothing lovable. Hence the Lord says in the Gospel of Luke, “Make for yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity”[Luke 16:9]—that is, give to the poor for God’s sake, so that they may be incited to friendship, and out of friendship be bound to pray for you. It is clear, therefore, that prayer is not the immediate end of the giving of temporal things; indeed, just as the giving of spiritual things ought to be gratuitous, so the giving of temporal things ought to be gratuitous. Hence Augustinus says concerning the Apostles: “They received gratuitous bread from those to whom they offered gratuitous preaching.” For such ought to be the account of giving and receiving, of which the Apostle speaks to the Philippians, saying: “No church communicated with me in the account of giving and receiving, except you alone”[Phil. 4:15]. To the third objection we say that the case is not similar, since to give temporal things to God in order to have the Holy Spirit is to incite God to friendship, because this is to give temporal things to the poor for God’s sake; but to give temporal things to a man taken in himself is not to incite him to friendship. From what has been said it is clear that it is not permitted to give temporal things for trental Masses, or for thirty Masses to be sung. Hence it is forbidden in the synods that priests receive anything before they have sung those Masses. But however much giving is giving, and however much receiving is receiving; therefore, just as it is unlawful to receive temporal things before the Masses are sung, so also after. By the same reason that it is forbidden to receive beforehand, by the same reason it ought to be forbidden afterwards as well. Likewise, it is permitted to give temporal things to religious men that they may pray for us, because it is permitted to “make for ourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity,” as has been said. Therefore it is permitted to give to priests even before they sing. Likewise, as has been said, it is permitted to give certain revenues to some church for the celebration of an anniversary. Therefore it is permitted to give temporal things to priests, not only for Masses to be sung, or after Masses have been sung, but also for Masses to be sung, and even before they sing. Solution. To the first we say that neither before nor after is it permitted to receive temporal things for Masses. Hence temporal things are not to be given to priests even after Masses have been sung for those very Masses. But because “the laborer is worthy of his hire”[Luke 10:7], so that there may be food in the Lord’s house, it is forbidden to receive beforehand, but not afterwards, on account of the appearance of evil and to avoid scandal. For it would

be an appearance of evil if he received beforehand, because he would seem to be selling spiritual things. Likewise, it would be an occasion of simony to many priests. But if a priest had nothing on which to live, it would be permitted for him to receive temporal things given for God’s sake even before he sang those Masses; and thus he would be incited to friendship, and thus bound to celebrate. But for priests who have means to live on, it is forbidden in the synod to receive beforehand. To the second objection we say that the case of religious men and that of priests is not similar, since in the former there is no appearance of evil; and besides, religious men know better the account of giving and receiving than priests do. To the third we say that it is the general custom of the Church that before the faithful die they make their testament and their bequest, and in that bequest some assign revenues to some church for the celebration of the anniversary day of their death; and this is not an appearance of evil. And for this reason the case is not similar to that of what is given to priests before they sing Masses.

Whether it is permitted to give anything for baptism

The third principal question.

It is asked afterwards whether it is permitted to buy or to give temporal things for baptism and the nuptial blessing. It seems that it is. For let it be the case that some women bring a little child laboring in extremis to some priest that he may baptize him, and he is unwilling to baptize him unless they give him money. It seems that in this case they ought to give it to him, because unless they give it the child will die and be damned. Likewise, it is permitted to each person to redeem his own right; therefore it is permitted to give money in that case, that the child may be baptized. If it be said that a simoniac priest is to be reckoned as a madman, and thus as nothing, and that therefore the women themselves in that case ought to baptize that little child, since they have no priest—On the contrary: suppose that they cannot obtain water from a priest; it seems that then they ought to give money to the priest for the baptism. The same objection arises concerning those whose marriage has been so far promulgated, and nothing remains except that they should have the nuptial blessing, and the priest is unwilling to give it unless they give him money. It seems that it is permitted for them to give, since they themselves cannot bless. But on the contrary: if they give money for the sacraments, they buy the sacraments; therefore they commit simony. Solution. To the first case, concerning baptism, we say that in that case the women can baptize; but if they do not have water, it is permitted for them to give money to the priest, not for the baptism, but for the removal of the madness or obstacle on account of which they do not have what is owed to the child. To the second case we say that one must have recourse to a superior; and if the superior is unwilling to bless them without money, two ways remain: one, that they abstain, and this is the counsel of the perfect; the second, that if they are unwilling to abstain, they give money to the priest not for the blessing, but for the removal of the obstacle on account of which they do not have what is owed to them. But according to this it seems that if there are three good clerics, religious men, in some diocese, and their bishop is unwilling to give them prebends without money, it would be permitted to them to give money in order to remove the obstacle on account of which they do not have what is theirs; for the prebends of a diocese are owed to good men who are of that same diocese. To this we say that the case is not similar, because the prebend is not owed determinately to this man or that, but baptism is owed to this one, and the nuptial blessing is owed to this one. Yet where the custom is that one who ministers spiritual things may receive temporal things, after the spiritual things have been given the priest can ask for temporal things, because “the laborer is worthy of his hire”[Luke 10:7]. From what has been said it is clear that it is not permitted to give temporal things for spiritual things, so that this word “for” denotes the immediate end of the giving of temporal things—and thus

is understood when it is taken in the proper sense. Hence, taken properly, this proposition ought not to be conceded: “It is licit to give temporal things for spiritual things.” But in an improper sense — namely, so that the word “for” denotes not the immediate end but, as it were, a consequent end from the side — it can be conceded in this way: “It is licit to give temporal things in view of an obligation which is brought about on account of the giving of spiritual things.” The obligation is the immediate end of giving the temporal things, and the spiritual things are, as it were, a consequent end from the side. And in this way this authoritative text is to be understood: “Meanwhile, do whatever you can so that God may enlighten your heart; give alms for the sake of God, and in this way God will be moved to enlighten the heart.” It is clear, then, that the enlightening of the heart is not the immediate end of giving alms, but a consecutive end. The immediate end, however, is the pleasing of God, or the love of God, or the precept, or something of that sort. Alms are to be given because it is good to give them, or because it is commanded, or because it is pleasing to God, and because there follows from it the enlightening of the heart. For if the one who gives alms intends that the alms themselves be the price of the enlightening of the heart, there the thought is illicit and the intention utterly evil. It is clear, then, that the word “so that” [ut] ought not there to denote the immediate end.

But to the contrary: the sons of Israel said to Aaron, “For this reason we offer among the gifts of the Lord rings, bracelets, and anklets, that you may intercede for us with the Lord” [Numbers 31:50]. This was their intention: that they should give those temporal things for prayer, which is spiritual. They were giving those temporal things for spiritual things, and they are praised in that text; therefore it is licit to give temporal things for spiritual things.

Likewise, it seems so from what Judas Maccabeus did, who sent twelve drachmas of silver to Jerusalem so that he might have them offered for the sins of the dead — “for unless [he hoped] that those who had fallen” etc. [2 Maccabees 12:43–45]; by that offering, then, he caused prayer to be made for the dead, and so he gave temporal things for spiritual things, and he is praised in all things; therefore it is licit to give temporal things for spiritual things.

The solution to these is clear from what has already been said. To the first, then, it must be said that the sons of Israel did not intend that the intercession be the immediate end of giving those ornaments; rather, they offered them among the gifts of the Lord because, namely, they were pleasing to God. That offering had its own immediate end besides intercession — namely, the pleasing of the Lord or the love of the Lord — while the intercession was a consecutive end. We say the same about the offering of Maccabeus: for it had three ends, one immediate, namely the goodness of the offering itself or the pleasing of God, and two consecutive ones: one, the prayer of the priests; the other, the remission of sins which God granted.

On the simony which is committed concerning things annexed to spiritual things. Third chapter.

Next we must speak of the simony which is committed against things annexed to spiritual things. The question, then, is about a bishop who gives a prebend to some kinsman of his solely on account of kinship — whether he commits simony. It seems that he does not, because there is no will to sell a spiritual thing for a temporal thing; therefore he does not commit simony.

But to the contrary: this bishop gives something annexed to a spiritual thing solely for a temporal thing; therefore he commits simony.

Again, in this precept — “Freely you have received, freely give” [Matthew 10:8] — simony is prohibited. But this bishop acts against this precept, which is proved thus: because in that case he does not love God, since he does not serve [God] for His own sake; and as for “freely”: if he does not give the prebend for the sake of God, he does not give it freely; therefore this bishop commits simony.

Again, if he were to give many prebends to many of his nephews so that he himself might pocket the temporal goods of those prebends, as knights

do, he would commit simony; likewise, if he were to give a prebend to some bishop so that the bishop’s father might have the temporal goods of that prebend, he would commit simony; by the same reasoning, if he gives a prebend to some kinsman so that that kinsman himself may have the temporal goods of that prebend, he commits simony. This the Cantor of Paris and all his followers conceded. Jeremiah: “Cursed is the man who does the work of God fraudulently” [Jeremiah 48:10]. On which passage the authority says that he does the work of God fraudulently who does it for a gift.

Now there is a threefold gift [munus]: the gift of the heart, namely human favor; the gift of the tongue, namely human praise; and the gift of the hand. But besides these the Cantor posited two others, namely the gift of blood — “woe indeed to those who build Sion in blood” [Micah 3:10] — and the gift of fear, when the bishop gives a prebend through the violence and entreaties of princes. If for any of these gifts the bishop gives a prebend, he commits simony, according to the Cantor. Hence he said that this is not the true definition of simony: “Simony is a deliberate will to sell” etc., but it should be defined thus: “Simony is the conferral or acceptance of spiritual things not freely given.”

This solution seems to be true. For suppose that the same bishop gives a prebend to someone for money, and to his kinsman gives another solely on account of kinship: he gives both of those prebends out of the same cupidity, which is proved thus — because out of the same charity I love the highest good for myself and for my neighbor; therefore out of the same cupidity that bishop loves money for himself and for his kinsman; therefore the sin is the same in the giving of each prebend; if in the giving of the prebend for money there is the sin of simony, therefore in the giving solely on account of kinship there is the sin of simony.

But to the contrary: in the Acts of the Apostles, when Simon Magus offered money so that [Peter] might give him this power, that on whomever he laid hands [that person] might receive the Holy Spirit, Peter said: “May your money be with you unto perdition, because you thought the gift of God could be possessed with money” [Acts 8:20]. Simon, then, wished to buy the gift of the Holy Spirit, and on this account he committed the sin of simony. Likewise Gehazi wished to sell the gift of the Holy Spirit to Naaman the Syrian, and on this account he committed the sin of simony. And in Sacred Scripture we have no other examples of simony than these two. But in those two examples the proper object of the evil will is to buy or sell a spiritual thing or something annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore, since wills differ in species by their proper objects, and in the proper simoniacal will the proper object willed is to buy or sell a spiritual thing or something annexed to a spiritual thing — whereas in the will of the bishop who gives a prebend to a kinsman solely on account of kinship the object willed is not to buy or sell, etc. — therefore his will is not of the same species as the simoniacal will; therefore he does not commit simony.

This we concede, insofar as simony is taken properly; he sins mortally nonetheless, because “woe to those who build Sion in blood,” and in him there is a threefold sin. The first is excessive love of his own flesh. The second is cupidity, because he covets temporal things too much for his kinsman. The third is contempt for spiritual things, which he gives solely in view of a temporal thing.

To the first objection we say that this argument is not valid: “He gives something annexed to a spiritual thing for a temporal thing; therefore he commits simony.” Rather, there is a fallacy of equivocation, because in the premise the word “for” denotes a final or efficient cause and matter [i.e. a material cause], but one proceeds as if it denoted the cause of a commercial exchange. For such a cause properly constitutes the sin of simony. To the second objection we say that this argument is not valid: “He does not freely love God for God’s own sake alone; therefore he does not freely give a prebend, who does not give it solely for the sake of God.” And the point is: to give a church freely is not to give it solely for the sake of God, but to give it so that nothing be received from it in return; and this sometimes happens solely from natural piety. The case is similar with a prebend. Hence that bishop does not act against this precept, “Freely you have received, freely give”;

but, on the contrary, he does many other things, on account of which he sins. To the third objection we reply that this is false: “that bishop puts what is beyond price under a price,” because there is no commerce there, since he intends to acquire nothing through that giving. To the fourth objection we reply that this argument does not hold: if he were to give a prebend to someone so that his [the recipient’s] father might have its temporal goods, he would commit simony; therefore if he gives it to a kinsman so that the kinsman may have the temporal goods, he commits simony. And this is so because in the first case there is commerce, in the second there is not. To the last objection we reply that this argument does not hold: from that cupidity he gives a prebend for money, and he gives a prebend to a kinsman on account of blood; therefore if there is simony in the one giving, there is simony also in the other. And this is so because from one and the same cupidity diverse vices can arise, for the root of all evils is cupidity. Concerning this an objection is commonly raised about Gehazi. For it is shown that Elisha had given [something]; but he had given only bodily health, which is not a spiritual thing; therefore he did not intend to sell a spiritual thing, nor one annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore he did not commit the sin of simony. Furthermore, if he committed the sin of simony, why is that sin named more from Simon than from Gehazi? Solution. We reply that Gehazi did not intend to sell bodily health, but the giving of that health, which giving was spiritual, that is, a work of the Holy Spirit; and on this account he committed the sin of simony. That sin, however, is named more from Simon than from Gehazi because Simon Magus sinned more gravely than Gehazi: for he sinned in the time of revealed grace, when all things were already manifest, and on this account he sinned more gravely. From the last two cases it is clear that the decretists lie when they say that there is no simony except where there is an outward expressed pact, since in the first simony there was no pact, as is plain in Simon Magus and in Gehazi, who are the first read to have committed simony — the one in selling, namely Gehazi, the other in buying, namely Simon. Likewise, let it be posited that some bishop gives a prebend to a certain cleric who has served him, and that he owes him so much for the service which he rendered. The question is whether that giving is simoniacal. It seems that it is not, because “the laborer is worthy of his hire” [Luke 10:7]; and the Apostle says, “Those who serve at the altar ought to live from the altar” [1 Corinthians 9:13]; and to Timothy he says, “If anyone does not have care of his own, and especially of his household, he has denied the faith and is worse than an infidel” [1 Timothy 5:8]. Therefore it seems lawful for the bishop to give a prebend for service rendered to him; therefore he does not commit simony in that giving. On the contrary: he gives a spiritual thing and receives a temporal one; therefore he places what is beyond price under a temporal price; therefore he commits simony. To this some have said that service is twofold: lawful service and unlawful service. If he gives a prebend for unlawful service, he commits simony; if for lawful service, he does not. But on the contrary: if it is lawful to give a prebend [for lawful service], it is lawful to give it for a payment of money, for where the cause is the same, the effect is also the same; but this is false; therefore the first [is false also]. Others have said that it is lawful to give a prebend principally for God, and secondarily for lawful service, so that there be an end under an end. But on the contrary: if we wish to know about some act of will, which one says is good because it is referred to the supreme end, although one must seek through many intermediaries whether it is good or not, a resolution must be made into those intermediaries; and if in such resolution some evil act of will is found, the first was not good, nor was it principally referred to God. According to this teaching of Augustinus, let the resolution be made in this way: that bishop willed to give that man the prebend because he willed to reward him for God’s sake. In such a resolution the first act of will is evil; hence it is not true that he refers it principally to God. But if all are lawful, then the first is lawful too. Furthermore, if it is lawful to give a prebend for God principally and for lawful service secondarily, similarly it is lawful to give a preben-

d for God principally and for money secondarily, so that there be an end under an end. For some bishop can be in need and accept a price from some cleric for God’s sake. But if this is true, no bishop will ever be convicted of simony, for he will always say that he gave the prebend principally for God, and secondarily for money. On account of this, others have said that it is not lawful to give a prebend either for lawful service or for unlawful service, provided this preposition “for” denotes a final cause; but if it denotes an inciting cause, it is lawful to give a prebend for lawful service — just as someone goes to church at the sound of the bell, and the sound is not properly the cause of his motion, but nevertheless incites him to go. In the same way service incites the bishop to give a prebend. But by the same reasoning money can incite him to give a prebend, and so, as before, the bishop will not be able to be convicted of simony. Solution. Among lawful services, some are temporal or bodily, such as going to Rome, handling lawsuits, and the like; and some are spiritual, such as preaching and singing Mass and the like. For spiritual services it is lawful to give a prebend secondarily and for God principally, so that there be an end under an end; for this is lawful: that man gives a prebend on account of preaching, if the preaching is done for God’s sake, nor is a spiritual thing then placed under a temporal price. But for temporal service it is not lawful to give a prebend such that that service be the final cause, whether principal or secondary. Yet it is true that temporal service incites one to give to one rather than another. Just as we hold that a father is to be loved with greater charity than a nephew, and a nephew than a household member, and a household member more than a stranger, yet kinship is not the proper matter of love, but is a certain inciting cause of love which makes the order of charity — in the same way temporal service incites one to give a prebend, and makes the order of giving prebends: it brings it about that prebends should rather be given to those who serve than to those who do not serve, other things being equal; but service is not the true cause of this. Hence Pope Alexander admonishes a certain bishop to give a prebend to a certain cleric who had faithfully served him, and this not on account of the service but on account of his fidelity: for this is a lawful prebend — it is given on account of his fidelity. Hence the Cantor used to say that the courts of prelates are the proving-grounds of clerics. And it could happen in some case that the giving of money would lawfully incite a bishop to give a prebend to someone, as happened in the case of Bishop Maurice, who gave a prebend to a certain cleric in view of a temporal benefit which the father of that cleric had conferred upon the bishop in his necessity. For works of piety incited the bishop, not the money itself. It must be known, however, that in the prebend itself there are two things: one spiritual, the other corporeal. The spiritual is the brotherhood, and in this, so far as in it lies, the Holy Spirit is given. For the brethren pray for absent brethren, and it is impossible that the prayers of many should not be heard, as Augustinus says. The temporal is the right of receiving the fruits, which is by necessity annexed to that brotherhood; hence without this the prebend cannot exist. The Decretum says: “Whoever sells one without which the other does not come about leaves neither unsold.” The burial of the dead is not only a thing annexed to a spiritual thing, but it is itself spiritual, inasmuch as burial is an office that properly pertains to priests. For it contains spiritual prayers by which the priest prays for the soul of the deceased, by which the punishment of sin is remitted. Hence it is simony to sell burial. And on this account priests ought not to demand anything before burial, because it would be either simony or at the least the appearance of evil. But after burial they can demand [something] where there is such a custom — yet not for the burial, but because it is owed to them. Just as a bishop after the dedication of a church can demand procuration, yet not for the dedication, but because it is owed to him according to the word of the Apostle: “If we sow spiritual things to you, it is no great thing if we reap your car- [1 Corinthians 9:11]

reap your carnal things. Nevertheless, it would be good if this custom — namely, of accepting anything after a burial or before — were entirely removed from the Church. For many indiscreet priests are scandalized by it and commit simony. Just as it is simony to sell the burial of the dead, so it is simony to sell blessed ground dedicated for the burial of the dead. Hence Ephron is censured, who sold to Abraham the field in which lay the double sepulchre in which the dead were buried; and as a sign of this censure his name was changed. Hence, whereas at first he was called Ephron, afterwards he was called Ephraim, by which, as Hieronymus says, it is signified that one who could sell the memorials of the dead was not of perfect virtue. It seems therefore that he committed the sin of simony. But on the contrary: everything he sold is temporal; it is therefore neither spiritual nor annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore he did not commit simony. Again, if he committed simony, then he sold what should not be sold; therefore Abraham bought what should not be bought, and committed simony in buying, just as Ephron did in selling. Again, Abraham seems to have sinned more than Ephron, because Ephron wished to give him the field gratis for burying his dead, and Abraham was unwilling to accept it except for a price; therefore he scandalized him, and so seems to have sinned more than Ephron. To this some say that Abraham bought a certain large field in which lay that great cave in which the dead were buried. Hence he did not sin, because that cave passed with the whole property — just as when someone buys an estate to which is annexed the right of patronage of some church, he does not commit simony, because the right of patronage passes with the whole property. But by the same reasoning Ephron did not sin in selling the field etc., and with it the cave passed. Why then was his name changed? To this Prepositinus used to say that one does not read that this field was consecrated for burial, nor was that cave blessed or consecrated for this purpose; but the ancient fathers had themselves buried in that double cave hoping that they would rise again with the Son of God. And that cave was called “double” because it had two chambers — one upper, in which the men were buried, and another lower, in which the women. Hence that ground was not blessed, nor did Abraham sin by buying nor Ephron by selling. Yet his name was changed because he descended from a state of perfection to a state of imperfection: for at first he wished to give what belongs to the perfect, and afterwards he sold it at the highest price. Hence at first he was called Ephron, that is, “consecrated and perfect,” and afterwards Ephraim, that is, “infirm and imperfect.” The same is the reason for the change of name according to another solution, which says that the cave passed with the whole property. Now just as it is simony to sell blessed ground — not on account of the ground, but on account of the blessing which is spiritual — so simony is found in certain very small matters. Hence it is simony to sell blessed bread and blessed water, for these are spiritual and wipe away many venial sins.

On the sale of knowledge.

Another principal question.

But concerning other very small matters there is the question whether it is simony, as when a chancellor sells the schools, or the power of teaching. It seems that it is. The chancellorship is an ecclesiastical dignity, hence spiritual, and the power of teaching is annexed to it; and if a bishop were to sell that chancellorship he would commit simony. Therefore the chancellor received the power of teaching gratis, and he ought to give it gratis; therefore if he sells it he commits simony. But on the contrary: the power of teaching grammar is not a spiritual thing — for a layman can have it,

and it is not annexed to a spiritual thing; and if it is sold he does not commit simony. Again, if that chancellor gives it gratis, the one who receives it gratis ought to receive it gratis; but what is received gratis ought to be given gratis, and he commits simony if he accepts money from the boys whom he teaches. To this certain masters say that there is simony here, and although knowledge is not properly a spiritual thing, nevertheless it is in some way spiritual: for it is a perfection of the soul, which is spiritual, and is a gift of God, and is necessary for having the virtues; nor is it permitted to accept anything from boys for the teaching, but for the labor — just as a hired priest accepts payment for his labor in order to have a livelihood. But against this is what was said above, that a spiritual thing is that by which one has the Holy Spirit; yet when one has obtained the license in the liberal arts, or has been granted the power of teaching, the Holy Spirit is not had — this is self-evident; therefore such knowledge, or the power of teaching such knowledge, is neither a spiritual thing nor annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore to sell or buy it is not simoniacal. Again, Proverbs 23 [Prov. 23:23]: “Buy truth, and do not sell wisdom.” Here the sale of wisdom is forbidden, and not of a spiritual thing — for a spiritual thing is rather to be sold and put out at interest [cf. Matt. 25:27]. Solomon therefore is speaking in this authoritative text of material sale; therefore when he says, “Buy truth,” etc., by this the buying of truth is enjoined as corresponding to the sale that is forbidden; therefore it is permitted to buy truth, or the knowledge of truth, by a material purchase; and thus what it is permitted to buy it is permitted to sell, and to buy or sell the knowledge of truth is not simoniacal. But on the contrary: he says in that authoritative text, “Do not sell wisdom and instruction and understanding” — wisdom, which concerns the liberal arts; understanding, that is, prudence concerning matters open to consideration; therefore it is a sin to sell the teaching of grammar, logic, and so on for the rest — but it is only the sin of simony; and to sell knowledge of this kind is simoniacal. Again, Augustinus in his book On the Master [De magistro] says that other masters, distinct from the one Master, propose signs (that is, propositions); and once the meanings of these signs are known, the hearers consult the inner Master (that is, reason) as to whether the proposition put forward is true or false, and [reason] judges according to what it sees there. It is plain therefore that the knowledge of truth comes from the inner Master; for the inner Master has the knowledge of truth immediately from the truest Master, who is God. And this is what he says in the Gospel: “The Holy Spirit will teach you all truth” [John 16:13]. The knowledge of truth therefore is immediately from the gift of God; and this is plain from what he says in Exodus 25 about Bezalel: “Whatever a craftsman can devise, God has placed in his heart” [cf. Exod. 31:3, 35:31]. And the Interlinear Gloss says that it is a gift of God; for if the craftsman’s knowledge, which is mechanical, is a gift of God, much more is the knowledge of the liberal arts a gift of God. But it was on this account that Simon sinned, because he thought the gift of God might be possessed with money, as blessed Peter says in Acts 8 [Acts 8:20]; and the sin of simony is to sell or buy such teaching. Again, if it is not simoniacal, it is asked why not: when such knowledge is had, the Holy Spirit is not had. He proves that this is no obstacle: for the power of working miracles is had without the Holy Spirit, and the power of prophesying, as appeared in Balaam, and the power of speaking with tongues. For it is better to prophesy than to speak with tongues [cf. 1 Cor. 14:5]; yet it is simoniacal to buy or sell powers of this kind, and this because such a power is immediately a gift of God. And since the knowledge of the liberal arts is immediately a gift of God, it is simony to buy or sell it. Again, it is not permitted to a judge to sell his judgment, nor to a witness his testimony; yet it is permitted to an advocate to sell his just advocacy. But why? It is customarily said that a witness is a judge for both parties, and on this account neither witness nor judge is permitted to accept anything for his judgment or testimony, but only an advocate,

is for one party. But on the contrary: an advocate is said to be for both parties, since it is not lawful to mix anything false into his pleading; therefore he is for both parties, and yet it is lawful for him to sell his advocacy. It seems therefore by this reasoning that it is lawful for a witness to sell his testimony. [But on the contrary,] it is not lawful to sell known truth, nor is it likewise lawful for a judge to sell his understanding, even though such knowledge is merely about vineyards and meadows. If therefore it is simoniacal to sell such knowledge, much more is it simoniacal to buy or sell knowledge of the liberal arts. Again, the soul is better than infinite worlds, if there were such; therefore its perfection too, namely knowledge, is better than infinite worlds, if there were such; therefore it is beyond price; therefore he who sells or buys it places what is beyond price under a price; therefore he commits simony. And this we concede on account of the aforesaid reasons. To the first objection we reply that knowledge is spiritual, and when it is possessed, the Holy Spirit is possessed. But the Holy Spirit is possessed in two ways: in one way as illuminating the intellect, and he is possessed when knowledge is possessed; in another way as inflaming the affections, and thus he is possessed through the sacraments of the Church. To the second objection we reply that truth or the knowledge of truth is to be bought — not with money, but in the way which Solomon teaches in Proverbs 4 [Prov. 4:7], saying, “The beginning of wisdom, get wisdom, and with all thy possession purchase prudence.” As if he were to say: if you wish to have wisdom, take it; for sometimes it offers itself. Hence in Wisdom 6 [Wisd. 6:15]: “He shall find her sitting at his doors”; and when you have her in your possession, acquire her more and more, for she is bought and acquired through wisdom itself. Hence in the Gospel [Matt. 13:46]: “Having found one precious pearl, he sold all that he had and bought it.” Hence in Proverbs [Prov. 17:16]: “What doth it profit a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom?” It is clear that he does not speak of the buying that is done with money, but of the spiritual buying by which a fool, remaining in his folly, cannot buy wisdom — and this is so because he does not have it. We therefore concede that to buy or sell any kind of knowledge is simoniacal; but according to the diverse degrees of the nobility of the sciences, the simony is lesser or greater. We say therefore that it is not lawful for an advocate to sell his knowledge or his counsel. Likewise a judge and a witness, if they travel to other regions, may receive their expenses; but for their judgment and testimony nothing may be received.

Whether the tithe can be simoniacal.

Another principal question.

It is asked next whether ecclesiastical tithes can be the matter of simony. It seems that they cannot, because the right of receiving tithes is purely earthly, since that which underlies it is by nature purely earthly. For the right of receiving the produce of some house is purely earthly. Since therefore the right of receiving tithes is purely earthly, it can be priced under an earthly price; therefore if laymen buy the right of receiving tithes, or clerics sell it to laymen, no simony is committed. Again, knights have the right of receiving a particampus [a share of the field]; and the particampus is sometimes a tithe of the sheaves, namely either one in eleven or one in twelve, according to the diverse customs of diverse regions; and that right is purely earthly, since only what is earthly underlies it. By the same reasoning the right of receiving the tithed sheaf is purely earthly, and so it is not simoniacal for laymen to buy tithes. But on the contrary: the right of receiving tithes is annexed to a spiritual thing, that is, to holy orders, since only clerics have the right of receiving tithes; but simony is the will to buy or sell a spiritual thing, or one annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore it is simoniacal for laymen to sell or buy tithes. Again, the whole Church says

that laymen ought not to have the right of receiving tithes; but the right of patronage is more spiritual than the right of receiving tithes; therefore they ought not to have the right of patronage. But the contrary of this is false: for kings confer many benefices, and many knights have the right of patronage in churches, and the Church even approves this. Again, a certain decretal says that if some knight sells a village in which a church has the right of patronage, it passes with the whole property. But according to this it seems that that right is sold: for that right does not pass into the dominion of the buyer of the village except in the way the village passes; but the village does not pass except by sale; therefore neither does the right of patronage except by sale; therefore the right of patronage is sold. Again, this whole [property] is sold; therefore every part of that whole [is sold]; therefore the right of patronage is sold, at least within that whole; therefore there is simony there. Perhaps one will say that it can be sold within the whole, but not in itself. But on the contrary: it is not lawful to sell a prebend and a village together; therefore neither a right of patronage and a village together. Again, the right of patronage is beyond price in itself, and much more beyond price is it within the whole; just as therefore it ought not to be sold in itself, so it ought not to be sold within the whole. Solution. The right of receiving tithes is not spiritual, but annexed to a spiritual thing; for tithes are to be given to the Levites, as Ezekiel 2 [and] 2 Chronicles 22 [teach], so that they may be free for the law of God. Hence those alone who are free for the law of the Lord ought to live without bodily labor; for after nature was corrupted it was said to man, “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread” [Gen. 3:19]. Hence even kings and princes receive from their subjects, because they are bound to labor for them even bodily — namely by defending them and fighting for them, and punishing evildoers; for the Levites are free for the law of God, and for this reason tithes are owed to them without bodily labor. The right of receiving tithes is annexed to a spiritual thing and beyond price; hence simony is committed if it is sold or bought. And thus the solution to the first two objections is plain. To the third objection we reply that this argument does not hold: laymen ought not to have the right of receiving tithes, therefore they cannot have the right of patronage; for they receive nothing from the right of patronage. Moreover, tithes are instituted for another purpose. To the last objection some reply that the right of patronage is not annexed to anything spiritual, nor is it spiritual. For they say that patronage is nothing other than the power, possessed by a layman, of presenting a fit person whom the bishop ought to receive — and he would similarly be bound to receive him if another were to present a fit person. But since we see that some right is acquired by the cleric who is presented if he is a fit person, for this reason we say that the right of patronage is spiritual; therefore it ought not to be sold or bought. Hence if someone buys a village in which there is a right of patronage, and on this account buys it at a higher price, it is simony; but if he holds that right as if for nothing as regards that contract, then it is said to pass with the whole property, and is not a part of the whole that is sold.

That the simoniac is irregular.

Another chapter.

Concerning the third chapter we say nothing further except that the simoniac is irregular according to the institution of the Church. We understand this, however, of simony which is subject to the judgment of the Church — that is, of simony which is in the outward act, not of simony which is only in the will. For the Church has instituted that if they do not abstain from selling spiritual things through the fear of God, at least they may abstain through human fear. Such a simoniac is excommunicated with the lesser excommunication, the excommunication of which does not pass over to another person. Again, he is irregular; hence if he carries out his office he sins mortally. Nevertheless, if he consecrates, the thing is consecrated, and if he ordains, the man is ordained, for he has the character whence he imprints it. But those who are ordained by a simoniacal bishop, if they know that they were ordained by a simoniac,

they ought not to carry out their office until a dispensation has been granted to them; and because that chapter is purely a matter of decretal law, we therefore pass over it.