COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXV.

On the dispensing of holy orders.

It is also asked whether heretics cut off from the Church, etc.

DIVISION OF THE TEXT.

Above the Master treated of orders; here he treats of the power of conferring orders. And since this power requires both proper matter and proper administration, the Master first treats of the power of conferring orders; second, of the vice which arises in connection with the giving and receiving of orders, namely simony, at the place: Concerning simoniacs, however, there is no doubt; third, of the fitness of those to be ordained, especially with regard to age, at the place: Concerning the age of those to be ordained, in the final chapter.

The first part has three sections. In the first he argues toward the side—

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS.

For the understanding of the present distinction two principal questions are raised.

First, concerning the power of ordaining.

Second, concerning the capacity of those to be ordained.

Concerning the first, four questions are asked.

First, whether the bishop alone can ordain.

ARTICLE I.

On the power of ordaining.

QUESTION I.

Whether the bishop alone can ordain.

The first question proceeds as follows, and it is shown that the bishop alone can ordain.

1. Hebrews 7: Without any contradiction that which is less is blessed by that which is greater; but the conferring of orders is by way of blessing: therefore it is necessary that he who confers orders should have an eminence beyond all the orders. But no one is such except the bishop: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, Isidorus in the seventh book of the Etymologies—

—taking the false position, showing that heretics cannot confer orders. In the second section he argues to the true position, at the place: On the contrary, however, others seem to hold, etc. In the third he resolves the matter, at the place: Some, however, determine this as follows, etc.

Concerning simoniacs, however, there is no doubt, etc. This is the second part, in which he treats of the vice which arises in connection with the giving and receiving of orders, namely simony; and this part has two sections. In the first he treats of the fault. In the second he treats of the penalty, at the place: There is, however, a difference among those who are ordained, etc.

Second, whether a heretical bishop can confer orders.

Third, whether a simoniac bishop can validly sell any order.

Fourth, whether one who confers orders simoniacally becomes by that very act a heretic.

—chapter twelve, speaking of the office of the bishop, says: “He is named both the highest priest and the supreme pontiff; for he it is who makes priests and levites, he it is who orders all the ecclesiastical grades.”

3. Likewise, the matter seems clear by reason: for it belongs to the same person to establish orders in the Church as to govern the Church; but the governance of the Churches belongs to the bishops, who are the overseers [superintendents]: therefore the dispensing of orders also belongs to them.

4. Likewise, it belongs to him to confer orders in the Church to whom it belongs to generate perfect sons from the Church, since order establishes one in a state of perfection; but this belongs only to him who is the spouse, and this is the bishop: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, it is of greater dignity to dispense orders than to administer the Sacrament of confirmation; but the second is reserved to bishops alone: therefore the first as well.

ON THE CONTRARY (Sed contra): 1. 1 Timothy 4: Do not neglect the grace which is in you through the imposition of the hands of the presbyter: therefore in the primitive Church it belonged to the presbyters to impose hands on the bishops, and so likewise to ordain: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the ordination of the principal orders is performed by the imposition of hands: therefore to whomever the imposition of hands belongs, the power of ordaining also belongs; but the former belongs to presbyters: therefore, etc. Proof of the middle: at Distinction 23 [D. xxiii]: “When a presbyter is ordained, while the bishop blesses him and holds his hand over his head, let all the presbyters who are present also hold their hands over his head alongside the hand of the bishop”: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, that which is perfect has the capacity to produce one of its own kind; but the priestly order is a perfect order: therefore it has the capacity to produce one of its own kind: therefore it seems that a priest can make a priest.
4. Likewise, it is a greater thing to confect the Body of the Lord than to ordain someone to some ecclesiastical grade; but the former belongs not only to the bishop but also to priests: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the ordination of clerics belongs to them as well.
5. Likewise, a priest stands higher above a deacon than a bishop stands above another bishop; but a bishop can promote and consecrate another as bishop: therefore much more can a priest make a deacon.

For this reason there is a question: since the lesser is blessed by the greater, how can a bishop bless a bishop, and—what is more—an archbishop, indeed—what is still greater—the bishop of Ostia bless the Pope?

Conclusion

Bishops alone can confer holy orders.

SOLUTION (Respondeo): It must be said that, as the sacred canons declare, by common law no one can dispense orders—especially holy orders—except the bishop alone. This statute has its origin in sacred Scripture and in the ordering of the Holy Spirit. From sacred Scripture: because the Lord had two kinds of disciples, some in the number of twelve, others in the number of seventy. The first he named Apostles, and upon them he founded the Church—though founding them first upon himself; the others he called simply disciples. To the Apostles was the power of imposing hands and consecrating first granted, but not to the simple disciples, as is clear from the text and from the Glossa on Acts 8. And since bishops succeed the Apostles, while simple priests succeed the disciples, as is held at Distinction 21 [D. xxi], chapter In novo testamento: thus it is clear that, according to the form of the primitive Church, the authority of ordaining and imposing hands is proper to bishops. Hence the Apostle, writing to Timothy, 1 Timothy 5: Impose hands hastily on no one.

The counsel of the Holy Spirit likewise agrees, by which both the Scriptures were brought forth and the constitutions of the Church were established. For since order is power, or is conveyed in being ordered, it ought therefore to be conveyed by one who has power, and to the extent that he has power. Now to be able to distribute and confer grades does not belong to just anyone who has power, but to him who has preeminence in power, as is evident even in the governance of a secular court. Therefore, in order that order be rightly conveyed, the Holy Spirit disposes that it be conveyed by one who not only has order but who has orders—through which he has power like others—and the eminence of dignity, through which he has power over others. This is what we call order with eminence: hence it is clear that two things are required for a bishop to be able to

—to confer an order: namely, that he himself possess that order, and that he possess the episcopal dignity. — Another reason is that, if the power were granted indiscriminately to all, so many would be admitted to orders that no order would be preserved, but rather confusion would arise; and therefore it has been ordained by God’s counsel that the dispensing of orders, and of other things requiring perfection—such as the consecration of abbots, of nuns, of churches, and the like—is granted to bishops alone. — Another reason could also be assigned, either from the fact that the bishop is a spouse, or from the fact that the Sacrament of orders signifies a state of perfection; therefore it had to be reserved to those who have an eminence of power, and the bishop, as spouse, had to beget sons—that is, the perfect—and daughters—that is, the imperfect. — The first reason, however, has great weight.

1. To the objection concerning the imposition of the presbyter’s hands, it must be said that “presbyter” is there called “elder”; and the Apostle understood himself by the imposition of the presbyter’s hand — the Gloss: “he calls the bishop a presbyter,” or “of the presbyter,” that is, “of the presbyters,” because, as the Gloss says, at least three priests ought to impose hands; nevertheless they do not impose hands as giving the power or the order, since this can and ought to be given by one alone. Hence they do not bless, but only the bishop does so; rather, this is done as a sign of his consecration.
2. And from this the next point is clear, since the imposition of hands does not effect ordination, except that imposition which is joined to a blessing.
3. To the objection concerning perfection, it must be said that there is a perfection of sufficiency and a perfection of overflowing. For something to make another like itself or perfect, it does not suffice to be perfect with the perfection of sufficiency, but with the perfection of overflowing; and since in the priest there is the perfection of sufficiency, in the bishop, by reason of the added eminence, there is the perfection of overflowing: therefore this perfection suffices to beget perfect sons, but not the first.
4. To the objection that to consecrate the Body of the Lord is something greater, etc., it must be said that this argument is doubly defective: first, because the power of ordaining presupposes ordination and adds —

— to it, whereby a person is not only ordained but also an ordainer; therefore the first premise is false. And again, the consequence does not hold: for it does not follow that if someone can do the greater, he can also do the lesser, unless the greater includes the lesser, as carrying two bushels includes carrying one. This is not the case in the matter at hand.

5. To the objection that the priest surpasses the deacon by more, etc., it must be said that it is true that he surpasses him by more than a bishop surpasses an existing bishop over whom he has no power; but not by more than the one who is a bishop in act surpasses the one who is a bishop in potency. Moreover, although he may surpass him by more in the order according to which the character of being ordained is considered, nevertheless not in the order according to which the character of being one who ordains is considered, which exists in the bishop, not in the presbyter. And so that argument does not hold.

To the final question, how a bishop blesses a bishop, it must be said that there is no impropriety here, because the one blessed is blessed only insofar as he lacks the order or the episcopal dignity; and in this respect the other is greater. — But then there still remains the question how he blesses an archbishop, since the archbishop is superior, and “no one can give what he does not have.” If you say that he does this by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, who is above him, then no less remains the question concerning the Supreme Pontiff himself: how is he blessed by the bishop of Ostia? If you say that Christ gave him this authoritative power, then on the contrary: suppose he did not exist, and the power were not committed to another; could not the Supreme Pontiff be consecrated? — And for this reason it must be said that what the Apostle says is infallibly true—that the lesser is blessed by the greater, in respect of the state in which he is blessed; without contradiction it is true that no one gives another a greater dignity than he himself has, nor can he give the least order that he does not himself have. Therefore the bishop, when consecrating an archbishop or the Pope, in no way confers upon him anything beyond episcopal consecration. But the latter receives an ampler authority and jurisdiction from the election of his subjects, from his own consent, and from the institution of the Lord, who ordained Petrus and his successors over the whole Church, willing that all who shall have been canonically elected have the same power that Petrus had.

SCHOLION

I. With regard to the first question, the words of the Council of Trent (Session XXIII, can. 7) cited above (in the scholion on d. 24, p. II, a. 2, q. 3) are to be noted: that the power of confirming and of ordaining is not common to bishops with presbyters. This special power of bishops, at least with respect to the conferral of the priesthood, which is wholly reserved to them, has never been called into controversy by Catholics. See also dub. 1 here.

On this first question: S. Thom., here q. 1, a. 1; Suppl. q. 38, a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 1, a. 1, 2. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 1. — On this and the following questions, Durand., here q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 1.

II. Concerning the second question the Master discusses at length, here c. 1. On the errors and doubts concerning the validity of certain Sacraments conferred by heretics and those cut off (from which Petr. Lombardus himself could not entirely extricate himself), see the scholia above on d. 5, a. 1, q. 2 concerning baptism; on d. 13, a. 1, q. 1 concerning —

QUAESTIO II

Whether a heretical bishop can confer orders.

Second, it is asked whether a heretical bishop can confer orders. And it seems that he can.

1. Augustinus, against Parmenianus, says: “As we say of baptism, that it can be given by them, so also of ordination”; and there are several authorities to this effect in the text.
2. Likewise, by reason it seems so: for as the priest stands to the power of consecrating, so the bishop stands to the power of ordaining; but a priest, however heretical, if he has the intention of doing what the Church does, truly consecrates: therefore a heretical bishop also truly ordains, if he observes the ecclesiastical form.
3. Likewise, if a Catholic is ordained within the Church and afterward lapses into heresy, if he returns again, he is not reordained; therefore by lapsing into heresy he did not lose his orders, and by parity of reasoning neither does a bishop lose his dignity or episcopal grade: therefore, while remaining a heretic, he retains that dignity or excellence of order; therefore he also retains in fact the operation that follows from it: therefore if he ordains, the man has been ordained.
4. Likewise, the character is just as truly in the wicked as in the good, and is just as truly impressed upon the wicked as upon the good: therefore by parity of reasoning it is just as well given by the wicked or perverse as by the good: therefore, since the essence of order consists in the character, the conclusion is clear, etc.

On the contrary: 1. Innocentius says, and it is found in the —

— Eucharist; see also the text of the Master, d. XIX, c. 2, and the Commentary, a. 1, q. 2.

On the second question: Scot., in both Scripta here q. 4, where he also brings forward many points on ecclesiastical penalties. — S. Thom., in the places cited, a. 2. — B. Albert., here a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., loc. cit. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 1, q. 2, 3.

III. What simony is, and other matters concerning it, are explained below in dub. 2–6. These and many other points, together with the following two questions (3 and 4), are explained by S. Thomas (here q. 3, a. 1–3) in distinct questions, and still better in S. II–II, q. 100, a. 1–6; likewise by Alex. Hal., S. p. II, q. 169, throughout.

On both questions (3, 4) and others connected with them, besides S. Thomas: Scot., loc. cit. — B. Albert., here a. 2–6. — Petr. a Tar., here q. 2, a. 1–3. — Richard. a Med., here a. 2, q. 1–3; a. 3, q. 1–3. — Durand., here q. 3–5. — Dionys. Carth., here q. 2.

— text: “It is certain that he who has lost the honor cannot give the honor”; but such is the heretic: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Causa I, quaestio I: “The blessing is turned into a curse for him who is ordained to the end that he may become a heretic”: therefore, if no one is promoted to orders through a curse, the conclusion is clear, etc.
3. Likewise, to promote someone to orders is something greater than to absolve or to bind; but a heretic who has been cut off can absolve or bind no one: therefore he can promote no one to holy orders.
4. Likewise, a lower power cannot act except through continuity with the higher power and through its own power; but the fullness of power is in the Supreme Pontiff, from whom the heretic who has been cut off is separated and disjoined: therefore it seems that he can give nothing at all of those things which pertain to the ecclesiastical powers.

Conclusion

Among heretics orders can be dispensed as to their truth, but not as to their usefulness.

I reply: It must be said that, although this question was at one time very doubtful among the most distinguished doctors with regard to all the Sacraments, both concerning baptism —

as of the other sacraments — that they could not exist among heretics; nevertheless, through the most illustrious doctor Augustinus this question has been clearly opened up for us: that the sacraments of the Church, among heretics who preserve the form of the Church and have the intention of doing what the Church does, exist as regards their truth, although not as regards their utility. For they administer the sacraments, but they do not obtain the fruit of the sacraments, since the Holy Spirit is not outside the catholic Church. And therefore, in all those sacraments whose truth is distinct from their utility, it is universally true that they can exist among heretics. Now all the sacraments are of this kind except the sacrament of penance, whose reality is interior contrition, without which no absolution is true, and with which no absolution is empty or useless. Hence they can administer all the sacraments, and do truly administer them, except for the absolution of penance alone; and therefore none are repeated except that one — unless perhaps extreme unction. And so, since order possesses a character which exists apart from the grace of the Holy Spirit by which sins are blotted out, it must be said that among them [heretics] order can be truly administered.

1–2. To the objection drawn from Innocentius and Gregorius, in reply to those two authorities one must say that the man ordained by an excommunicate heretic is said to receive a curse because he does not receive grace, and is said not to receive the honor because he does not receive its exercise; and he is said to have lost the order because he has lost the exercise of the order, not because he has lost the character, which cannot be effaced.

3. To the objection drawn from the power of absol-

QUAESTIO III

Whether a simoniac bishop can sell any order.

Thirdly, it is asked whether a simoniac bishop is able to sell any order. And that he can, the following appears:

1. Because nothing is forbidden unless its being done is possible — otherwise the prohibition would be in vain. But the selling of a holy order is forbidden: in Causa prima, quaestione prima, Calixtus forbids it: “Following the examples of the holy Fathers, we forbid by every means, by the authority of the Apostolic See, that anyone in the Church of God be ordained or promoted through money.” Therefore, etc.
2. Again, what can be taken by stealth can also

be sold, one must say that the cases are not parallel. For a priest’s absolution is either null or it is without pretense; but no one is knowingly absolved by a heretic who lacks pretense. — In another way, however, it can be said that a fourfold power is found in the ministers of the Church. One is founded principally upon order, such as the power of consecrating; another principally upon canonical jurisdiction, such as the power of excommunicating; another upon order together with eminence, such as the power of ordaining; another upon order together with jurisdiction, such as the power of absolving and binding in the forum of penance. And since the character cannot be taken away, the power which follows upon the character cannot in fact be taken away. But since jurisdiction descends in orderly fashion from a higher to a lower level, such that its fullness resides in the Supreme Pontiff, he can take it away, and with it the power that follows upon it. Hence by excommunicating he can remove the power of absolving and of excommunicating, but not that of ordaining.

4. And from this the response is clear to many points, and to the following one as well. For when it is objected that the fullness of power resides in the Supreme Pontiff, this is true insofar as power follows upon jurisdiction — which is greatest and reaches its term in him — but not insofar as it follows upon the character, since that is imprinted immediately by God and is equal in all. Nevertheless, every exercise of power must take place under his governance; and therefore, if he forbids it, such a power cannot lawfully pass into act. Yet because in the order of fact [the power] does not depend upon him as regards its reality, the man acts just as any other does. And so the whole matter is clear.

QUAESTIO III

be purchased and sold with money. But a holy order can be taken by stealth, as is said in Extra, de Eo qui furtive ordinem suscepit, where a dispensation is granted to such men, provided they enter religious life, so that they may minister in the orders they have received. Therefore, etc.

3. Again, that which lies within human stewardship can be bought and sold, just as it can be freely administered. But the conferral of orders lies within human stewardship. Therefore it can be bought and sold; therefore it can be given simoniacally.
4. Again, the character of order stands together with any degree of guilt and malice; therefore so do the power of ordaining and

the power of receiving the order; therefore however great the simoniacal depravity in someone, it does not seem to impede the giving or the receiving of the order.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Gregorius says, in Causa prima, quaestione prima: “Whoever strives to receive a sacred order by the payment of a price is no priest, but merely desires to be called one in vain.” Therefore an order cannot be received through simony, and therefore neither can a simoniac confer it.

2. Again, Leo Papa argues thus, in Causa prima, quaestione prima: “Grace, if it is not freely given or received, is not grace; but simoniacs do not receive freely; therefore they do not receive the grace which is operative above all in ecclesiastical orders. But if they do not receive it, they do not possess it; and if they do not possess it, they can give it to no one, either freely or not freely.”
3. Again, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are in the power of God, not of man — for they are called and indeed are gifts of the Holy Spirit precisely because he himself bestows them. Therefore no one can possess them except from the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit, being most generous, can sell nothing nor does he sell anything; therefore his gifts can neither be sold for money nor be measured by a price. If, then, order is a gift of the Holy Spirit, it is impossible for it to be sold or bought for a price; therefore it cannot be conferred by any simoniac either.
4. Again, in the sacred orders, namely the diaconate and the priesthood, the Holy Spirit is given, as is clear from what is said there: Receive the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit cannot be sold; therefore neither can the sacred orders, which are conferred precisely by his bestowal. Proof of the minor: what can be bought and sold can be reduced to servitude; but the Holy Spirit cannot be reduced to servitude. Therefore, etc.

It is asked, then, since simony is the deliberate will to buy or sell something spiritual, how it can fall within the conferral of sacred orders, or of other spiritual things, since these, it would seem, cannot be sold.

Conclusion

A simoniac bishop can confer orders simoniacally.

I REPLY: For the understanding of the foregoing it must be noted that spiritual is said in two ways. In one way, that which is purely spiritual, such as grace and the virtu-

es and gifts; and this can be sold neither in fact nor by right. Indeed, if someone possessing such a thing should wish to buy it, not only would he not acquire any more, but he would even lose what he had. — In another way, spiritual is what is joined to a bodily thing, which is nevertheless consecrated by reason of that spiritual element and takes on the character of something spiritual. This, because it is spiritual, cannot by right be sold, since it cannot be put under a price; but in fact, by reason of the bodily thing, it can be sold; and such are the sacraments of the Church. There is also something spiritual which is joined to a bodily thing that nevertheless retains the character of a temporal thing, such as a consecrated chalice, or the right of patronage; for in these the consecration is joined to the silver, and the right of patronage to the land. And such a thing is called spiritual because it is annexed to something spiritual; and this can be sold in fact, but cannot be sold by right — yet it can pass in the sale together with that to which it is annexed. For a consecrated chalice can be sold, provided that the consecration is not sold but the value of the silver; and the land to which a right of patronage is annexed can be sold, but not the right of patronage itself by right, without simony being committed.

These things being noted, we must come to orders, in which there is something of the first kind, namely sanctifying grace; and something of the second, namely a ministerial power dispensed by means of some external sign, to which it is inseparably joined. The first it is impossible to purchase for a price or to sell; the second, however, can be given for a price, because it is inseparably joined to an exterior sacrament; and since that can be given for money, that power too can be sold. — And thus it is clear that a simoniac can confer orders simoniacally.

1–2. To the objections drawn from Gregorius and from Leo Papa the reply is clear: they speak of sanctifying grace, which can only be given freely, and which is what makes the recipient holy — not of the power that is joined to an external thing placed within human stewardship.

3. To the objection drawn from the gifts of the Holy Spirit, etc., it must be said that one can speak of such freely-given gifts in two ways: either by reason of themselves, or by reason of what is annexed to them. And accordingly they have a twofold dispenser: with respect to themselves they have as dispenser the Holy Spirit, who imprints the character, or the whole Trinity; but with respect to what is annexed

have a mere man as their dispenser. The first kind is never sold, but the second can be sold by what is attached to it, which is in some way spiritual, and on its account it is purchased; and so the gifts themselves are said to be sold and can be, since temporal goods to be dispensed have been committed to its power.

4. To that which is objected last, that the Holy Spi-

QUAESTIO IV.

Whether one who confers orders simoniacally thereby becomes a heretic.

Fourth it is asked whether one who confers orders simoniacally thereby becomes a heretic. And it seems that he does.

1. Gregorius in the Register, and it is found in Causa I, quaestio I, Presbyter si per pecuniam; and below: “That to buy or sell tithes or an altar or the Holy Spirit is simoniacal heresy no one of the faithful is unaware.”
2. Likewise, in the same place: “Whoever is ordained for money is promoted in order to become a heretic.”
3. Likewise, Causa I, quaestio I, Eos qui per pecunias; and below: “More tolerable is the impious heresy of Macedonius and of those around him who assailed the Holy Spirit; for they in their madness declared the Holy Spirit a creature and a servant of God the Father and the Son; but these men make the same Holy Spirit their own servant”: therefore it seems to be a most impious heresy.
4. Likewise, everyone who reckons that the gift of God can be possessed for money is in error and is to be judged a heretic; but everyone who sells or buys orders reckons that the gift of God can be possessed for money: therefore, etc.
5. Likewise, in matters of nature there is no greater error than to attribute to one contrary its opposite, as if one were to call white black; and in matters of morals none is greater than to call good evil: therefore neither in things divine is any error greater than to claim that the grace of God is not grace; but this is what everyone claims who strives to buy or sell it: therefore, etc.

rit cannot be reduced to servitude; one must say that he cannot be sold in himself, yet his effects can be sold, inasmuch as they have been placed under human authority. — And thus it must be conceded that true orders can be conferred by simoniacs, although they are conferred and received not unto benefit but rather unto damnation, and the good is turned for them into evil.

6. Likewise, just as wisdom is attributed to the Son, so generosity is attributed to the Holy Spirit; but anyone who attributed foolishness to the Son would fall into heresy: therefore he who attributes avarice to the Holy Spirit is a heretic. But anyone who believes that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are sold or bought for money is of this sort, since he holds that the Holy Spirit is for sale: therefore, etc.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. No heresy resides in a contract, but in belief; but simony resides in a contract of purchase and sale: therefore it does not seem that the simoniac becomes a heretic.

2. Likewise, heresy is a sin against the Son and against truth; but simony sins against the grace and goodness of the Holy Spirit: therefore he does not seem to be a heretic.
3. Likewise, he does not seem to fall into any sin by selling a gift of the Holy Spirit, because it is said in 1 Samuel 9 concerning Saul, and in 1 Kings 14 concerning the wife of Jeroboam, that both of them brought a payment to the holy prophets for a prophetic disclosure; and it is established that prophecy is a gift: therefore, etc.
4. Likewise, through the New Testament, 1 Corinthians 9: If we sow spiritual things for you, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things? Therefore it is permitted to receive carnal things for spiritual things: therefore he does not seem to sin.
5. Likewise, the one who buys does not seem to sin: because the kingdom of heaven, which is the highest of all things,

can be sold and bought, as Gregorius says: “The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you have”: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, he who buys gives a temporal good for a spiritual one, therefore he holds the spiritual dearer than the carnal: therefore he does not turn himself away from the unchangeable good, but rather turns toward it: therefore he does not sin, because “sin is a turning away from the unchangeable good and a turning toward the changeable.”

Conclusion

A simoniac is not properly a heretic, unless he believes that spiritual things are for sale.

I reply: One must say that neither holy orders nor any of the sacraments can be given for money without grave and enormous sin, since what is spiritual—which on account of its dignity ought to be given out of pure liberality—is treated as merchandise and made cheap; and again, because what was beyond price is placed under a price; and this can in no way be done without insult being offered to the Holy Spirit: and therefore it is evil not only in itself, but indeed according to its very nature.

But if you ask me whether it is a sin in faith or in morals, one must say that he who buys or sells spiritual things of this sort either believes that they can be valued at a price and made equal to the worth of an earthly thing and possessed for money—and this is manifest heresy, and so Simon Magus reckoned. Such a one errs in faith, because he believes that grace is not grace. — Or he who sells and buys does not believe this, that the grace of God is acquired by money, but nevertheless, burning with avarice, he strives to obtain or secure for money something that pertains to human dispensation; and so it is not a sin of faith but of morals, since such a one knows perfectly well and does ill; just as he who fornicates, knowing that fornication is a sin, does not err in faith but in the path of morals. — And so the simoniac is a covetous man, and of the worst species of avarice, and is not properly a heretic, but nevertheless is called a heretic by the saints, either because he acts in the manner of a heretic, or

because, like a heretic, he is cast out from the service and worship of God on account of his enormous wickedness.

And so it is clear how response is to be made to what was objected, that the simoniac is not a heretic; it is also clear that objections are raised on both sides.

3. To that which is objected, that it is not a sin to sell, on the example of the prophets; one must say that no prophet who was good and holy ever sold the gift of prophecy, but only the wicked, as such are expressly rebuked in Micah 3: Her judges judged for bribes, and her priests taught for hire, and her prophets divined for money; and below: Therefore on your account Zion shall be plowed as a field, and so on. — To what is objected concerning the wife of Jeroboam and Saul; one must say that it is never read that those prophets accepted anything; but those people said it ignorantly, because they had grown accustomed to take up this custom in some way from the diviners, who were not true prophets.
4. To what is objected, that one who sows spiritual things may reap carnal things; one must say that if he sows for this purpose, to reap those things as his final end, especially if a pact intervenes, this is not justice but rather wickedness and avarice; but if he does not intend this principally, but rather reaps carnal things in order to sustain himself and sow spiritual ones; there is no avarice, no merchandising, but rather manifest justice, as the Apostle proves by many examples in 1 Corinthians 9, since such a man ought to be sustained. Whence from this it is clear that if a teacher and a counselor and a physician and others who labor receive a payment for counsel or instruction on account of their labor and their sustenance; there is no fault, no simony. If, however, anyone were to sell a gift divinely given to him, not his labor, he would be judged a simoniac. The same is to be understood of the celebration of Masses and the like.
5. To what is objected, that the kingdom of heaven is bought; one must say that such buying is not a buying, because its price is nothing other than good will, which does not regard recompense; whence although one cannot serve without recompense, yet, because he serves liberally, no pact at all intervenes; whence the whole is spiritual.

6. To the objection that the simoniac turns toward a spiritual good, it must be said that, although he does turn, he turns in a disordered way; and this is more a turning away than a turning toward. An example of this is found in

ARTICLE II.

On those who can receive orders.

Next, with regard to the second article, an inquiry is made concerning the possibility of receiving orders, on which four questions are asked.

The first asks whether, in order for orders to be received by someone, the male sex is required, or whether

QUESTION I.

Whether the male sex is required for the reception of orders.

As to the first question, that the male sex is required is shown as follows:

1. First thus: no order can be conferred on one who does not have the natural possibility or aptitude for it; but no one has the possibility for orders who does not have the aptitude for the tonsure and crown; and no one has natural aptitude for this whom it always befits to have the head veiled. If therefore by nature it befits only a man to pray with head unveiled, while it befits a woman to pray with head veiled, as is said in 1 Corinthians 11, where nature itself teaches this — therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, no one is capable of receiving orders unless he bears the image of God, because in this sacrament a man in some way becomes God or godlike, since he is made a partaker of divine power. But by reason of his sex, the man is the image of God, as is said in 1 Corinthians 11. Therefore in no way can a woman be ordained.
3. Likewise, in orders spiritual power is given to the one ordained; but a woman is not capable of receiving such power, as is said in 1 Timothy 2: I do not permit a woman to teach in the Church, nor to have dominion over a man. Therefore neither can she receive orders.
4. Likewise, the other orders prepare one for the episcopate, if one conducts oneself well in them; but a bishop is the spouse of the Church. Therefore, since a woman cannot be promoted to the episcopate but only a man, otherwise the spou-

Lucifer, who, in turning himself toward God and wishing to be equal to him, fell more than he ascended. So too, one who turns himself toward buying the gift of the Holy Spirit withdraws from God more than he approaches him.

a woman can receive them.

Second, whether the use of reason is necessary for the reception of orders.

Third, whether indivision of the flesh is necessary.

Fourth, whether the condition of freedom is necessary.

-se of the Church would not exist; therefore being promoted to the preceding orders belongs to men alone.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. In Judges 4 we read that Deborah judged Israel and presided over it. Therefore it seems that judicial power belongs to a woman, especially when she abounds in grace. Therefore the priestly power belongs to her as well.

2. Likewise, in the new dispensation we see abbesses to whom the governance of communities is entrusted. Therefore it seems that the power of absolving and binding ought to be committed to them. Therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that the priestly order could be conferred on them.
3. Likewise, the priestly order and the others have to do with the soul and not the flesh; but with respect to the soul there is no distinction of sex — indeed, a woman is just as much the image of God as a man. Therefore she is equally capable of receiving orders.
4. Likewise, there is no greater perfection than the state of religion, nor greater fortitude than that found in the endurance of martyrdom; but women are admitted both to the religious state and to martyrdom. Therefore they ought to and can be admitted to sacred orders.

CONCLUSION.

Women neither by right nor in fact can receive orders.

I REPLY: It must be said that the common opinion holds that women ought not be admitted to sacred

orders. For it is expressly stated in Distinction 23: “It has been brought to the notice of the Apostolic See that among you women consecrated to God, or nuns, are touching the sacred vessels or consecrated palls and carrying incense around the altar; and none of those who rightly think can doubt that all these practices are full of blame and reproach. Wherefore, by the authority of this holy See, lest this plague be spread more widely, we command that it be most speedily wiped out throughout all the provinces.”

And thus all agree that they ought not to be promoted; but whether they are capable of it is in doubt. To be sure, there was an opinion of certain men — called the Cataphryges — that they are capable; and these rely not only on the authorities already cited but also cling to the authorities of the canons, adducing in their favor passages in which it is shown that women received orders in antiquity. For it is said in Causa 27, Question 1: “We decree that a deaconess ought not to be ordained before the age of forty”; and in the same question: “If anyone abducts or solicits a deaconess”; and likewise in Distinction 32 mention is made of a presbytera. But certainly, if one attends to what is said in Distinction 32, Presbyteram, etc., it is there shown that widows and elder women and matrons are called presbyterae; and from this it is gathered that those women who shared with the deacons in reading the homily, and on whom a certain blessing was conferred, were called deaconesses. Hence it is in no way to be believed that women were ever promoted to sacred orders according to the canons. And according to the sounder and more prudent opinion of the doctors, not only ought they not, or cannot by right, but they also cannot in fact.

And if the reason for this is asked, it must be said that this comes not so much from the institution of the Church as from the fact that the sacrament of orders does not befit them. For in this sacrament the person who is or-

dained signifies Christ the mediator; and since the mediator existed only in the male sex and can only be signified through the male sex, therefore the possibility of receiving orders pertains only to men, who alone can naturally represent him and, in accordance with the reception of the character, actually bear the sign of this. And this position is more probable and can be proved by many authorities of the saints.

1. To the objection concerning Deborah, it must be said that hers was a temporal power, not a spiritual one. It is indeed permitted to women to rule temporally, but not with spiritual dominion — which is a sign that the one who rules bears the figure of Christ the head. Since, therefore, a woman cannot be the head of a man, she cannot for that reason be ordained.
2. To the objection concerning abbesses, it must be said that they do not hold the position of ordinary prelacy, but are substituted, as it were, in place of an abbot on account of the danger of cohabiting with men. Hence they cannot ordinarily absolve or bind. The priestly office, however, or that of any order to which this power and order are ordinarily given, has a signification that does not befit a woman, even though governance may befit women.
3. To the objection that orders has to do with the soul, it must be said that it does not have to do with the soul alone, but with the soul as joined to the flesh — and this by reason of the signification, which is found in the visible sign, and through this also in the body; and the execution and use of orders has to do with the joined [soul and body]. Since neither the signification of orders nor its dispensation befits a woman in the manner shown above, this point is clear.
4. To the objection concerning the perfection of the religious state and of martyrdom, it must be said that there is one perfection that has to do with sanctifying grace, and of this a woman is equally capable as a man; and there is

the perfection of a state which concerns something freely given, and this can belong to one sex even though it does not belong to the other; for this perfection does not regard only what is

SCHOLIUM.

I. The common teaching, together with the inviolable practice of the Church, holds that by divine law women are unfit to receive any order whatsoever.

On Question I: Scotus, here q. 2, n. 1-2. — Thomas Aquinas, here q. 2, a. 1, quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 39, a. 1. — Petrus de Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, a. 4, q. 1. — On this and the following questions: Durandus, here q. 2; Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.

II. As regards Question 2, Durandus (loc. cit. n. 8) sought to defend the first opinion reported here; concerning which Thomas says that it is confirmed neither by reason nor by authority. — The exception which the Holy Doctor lays down concerning the episcopate is confirmed by Thomas and by Petrus de Tarantasia, but not by Scotus nor by what seems now to be the common opinion. That ancient opinion, as is plain, coheres with the teaching just mentioned, that the episcopate is not properly an order and that consequently it does not imprint a character.

On Question 2: Scotus, here q. 2, n. 3. — Thomas Aquinas, in the places

QUESTION II.

Whether the use of reason is necessary for the reception of orders.

Secondly it is asked whether the use of reason is necessary for the reception of orders. And that it is, the following arguments seem to show:

1. Because the Sacrament of orders is a nobler and more perfect Sacrament than the Sacrament of matrimony, and places one in a higher state; but the Sacrament of matrimony cannot be contracted by the insane and those lacking reason, as is expressly stated below: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, this seems to follow from the form: for no one offers anything to one who does not understand; but in ordination the one ordaining says to the one ordained: “Receive the power,” etc.: therefore he presupposes in him discretion. If, then, he has no discretion, it does not seem that he can receive orders.
3. Likewise, the use of this Sacrament can belong to no one except one having the use of reason: therefore if it is given to another, it is given in vain: therefore, since “God does nothing in vain,” it seems that the Sacrament of orders is never to be conferred on one who lacks the use of reason.
4. Likewise, if someone were to offer a power to one who refuses, there would be no reception of the power; for, just as conferral depends on the will of the giver, so reception depends on the will of the receiver: therefore if the giver does not give unless he wills and intends, the receiver does not receive unless he wills and intends.
5. Likewise, the time and age for the reception of orders are determined at Distinction 77 [D. lxxvii];

interior, but also what is exterior. Such is the perfection of orders, in which there is a conferral of power, which a manifold reasoning shows in no way befits women.

cited, quaestiuncula 2 and a. 2. — Albertus Magnus, here a. 7. — Petrus de Tarantasia, here q. 3, a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4, q. 2.

III. The third question is treated by authors on moral and canonical matters in the treatise on irregularities, and specifically on the defect of Sacrament, which is bigamy, whether true, or interpretative (as when someone has taken in marriage a widow or one corrupted), or by likeness. Other commentators on the Lombard treat bigamy more extensively below at d. 27, but Scotus below at d. 33, q. 2. — Thomas Aquinas, d. 27, q. 3, a. 1-3; Suppl. q. 66, a. 1-5. — Albertus Magnus, d. 27, a. 20-22. — Petrus de Tarantasia, d. 27, q. 5, a. 1-2. — Richard of Mediavilla, d. 27, a. 4, q. 1-4. — Durandus, d. 27, q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, d. 27, q. 4.

IV. Question 4 treats of irregularity from a defect of liberty according to the canons. — On the same question: Thomas Aquinas, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 1; Suppl. q. 39, a. 3. — Petrus de Tarantasia, here q. 3, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 5, q. 1.

but this is for no other reason than because of discretion and the use of reason, which is not had in younger years: therefore, etc.

6. Likewise, continence is of necessity annexed to sacred orders; but no one is bound to continence unless he has the use of reason and consents through his own will: therefore at least to the sacred orders no one can be promoted before the years of discretion: therefore the use of reason is necessary.

ON THE CONTRARY (Sed contra): 1. Other Sacraments which imprint a character, such as baptism and confirmation, can be given before the use of reason: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that this Sacrament also can.

2. Likewise, this very thing seems clear from the Extra, De Clerico ordinato per saltum, where it is said that someone was promoted to the minor orders before the years of discretion, and afterwards, without iteration, was permitted to minister in such offices.
3. Likewise, when a priest is ordained, the keys of binding and loosing are given to him, even if the priest lacks knowledge: therefore much more can the order be given to a boy, even if he lacks the use of reason.
4. Likewise, if someone compelled by fear of death allows himself to be ordained, and prefers to be ordained rather than to die, he is ordained, just as plainly can be

held in the case of baptism: therefore a coerced will suffices: therefore it is not necessary that he freely consent: therefore age does not seem to be necessary.

5. Likewise, it belongs to the wise man to look not only to the present but also to what is future: therefore if many lack discretion, of whom it is presumed that they will at some time be discreet, it seems that at least the order may be committed to them and that its exercise may remain in suspense.
6. Likewise, if anything on the part of the recipient were necessary in the ordination itself, it would be required that he at least express his consent, and that it be required of him, as is done in matrimony; but it is not done this way in ordination: therefore it does not seem that consent is necessary, nor consequently the use of reason.

CONCLUSION.

For the reception of the seven orders the use of reason is not required by necessity of the Sacrament, but by necessity either of precept or of fittingness.

I respond: To this some say that for the reception of any of the orders the consent of reason is required, because in every order an office is committed in respect of an act elicited by reason; and an office is committed to no one except to him who wills to receive it: and therefore they say that the use of reason is required in the one ordained, otherwise nothing whatever takes place. — But this seems contrary to the decretal De Clerico per saltum ordinato, where it is touched on that someone was promoted to minor orders before the years of discretion. Moreover, every day we see little ones promoted to minor orders who neither know what an order is nor what is given there. And again, the use of confirmation is not before adult age, and yet the Sacrament can be given.

And therefore there is another opinion of greater authorities, that the use of reason is required for some by necessity of the Sacrament, for one order by necessity of precept, and for others from honor and fittingness. For the episcopate, since in it a spiritual matrimony is contracted, consent is necessarily required, without which no marriage—neither spiritual nor corporal—comes about, as will be seen below; and through this the use of reason and discretion is necessarily required by necessity of the Sacrament, although many other things are required by necessity of precept. — For the sacred orders, however,

the use of reason is required by necessity of precept, since to those orders only those should be admitted who can be bound to continence; and therefore those who knowingly ordain men who cannot be bound—because they lack reason—act against the statute and precept of the Church; and so, if such men are outwardly ordained, they receive the character de facto, because they do not contradict, even though they do not consent. — For the minor orders, the use of reason is required out of honor, because there offices are committed which pertain not only to those who have the use of reason but even to those who have knowledge of letters. But still, because those orders are ordered to a certain habituation, where some utility or necessity makes it seem expedient, they can be promoted even to the minor orders before the years of discretion. But that they should be promoted thus indiscriminately, and endowed with ecclesiastical benefices, can scarcely be without contempt of the canons and scandal of men and danger of souls. — One must therefore concede the arguments showing that the use of reason is not necessary for the Sacrament’s being or being received, but only for its well-being and worthy reception, speaking of orders properly.

1. To the objection from matrimony, it must be said that the cases are not alike: for in matrimony the use of reason is required not on account of the dignity of the Sacrament, but on account of the signification of the union of God and the soul, which exists only in mutual consent. Moreover, this argument does not conclude generally about the Sacrament of orders, but only about the dignity of the bishop.
2. To the objection that the bishop says “Receive,” it must be said that that offering signifies rather the command and power of the giver than the exercise of the receiver. Hence it is for him not only to offer but to confer; and unless there is an obstacle of a contrary will—such that he is altogether unwilling—he receives the Sacrament, in the same way as is declared concerning the Sacrament of confirmation.
3. To the objection from use, it must be said that even if he does not have the use immediately, yet because he is hoped at some time to have it, the Sacrament is not given in vain, just as priesthood is given to one who long afterwards defers celebrating.
4. To the objection about the one who refuses, it must be said that this is a fallacy of the consequent: the one who refuses does not receive; therefore, the one who receives must con-

sent; for there is a middle ground between one who altogether refuses and one who consents.

5. To the objection drawn from time and age, it must be said that this determination of time pertains not to the necessity of the Sacrament, but rather to the fittingness and solemnity of receiving it. This determination must be observed in the major orders, at least with respect to the years of discretion, on account of the vow of continence and the dignity of the orders; but a further extension of time in regard to priests

QUESTION III.

Whether indivision of the flesh is necessary for the reception of orders.

Thirdly it is asked whether, for the reception of orders, indivision of the flesh is necessary. And that it is, seems to be the case.

1. In 1 Timothy 3: “A bishop must be the husband of one wife”; and the same is said of the deacon.
2. Likewise, Ambrosius writes to the people of Vercelli, and it is found in Distinction 34: “We acknowledge that the Apostle not only laid down this rule concerning the bishop and the presbyter, but that the Fathers also, in the proceedings of the Council of Nicaea, added that no man should be a cleric who has entered upon a second marriage.”
3. Likewise, he who has had a wife whose flesh is divided cannot be promoted; therefore much less can he who has had several wives. The first is plain from what Innocentius Papa says in Distinction 34: “If anyone, even a layman, has married a widow, whether before baptism or after, let him not be admitted to the clergy.”
4. Likewise, the priest or bishop bears the figure of Christ; but Christ was not divided, but rather united in unity; therefore in such a person the signification of the order fails; therefore the order itself also fails, since signification is essential to the Sacrament.
5. Likewise, bigamy is a property that is never lost, nor can he who is a bigamist become non-bigamist; therefore if it impedes the Sacrament, it seems that he renders himself incapable of receiving orders.

is not required in modern times, because, just as in many cases “malice supplies for age,” so in many cases goodness and holiness supply for it. Moreover, many are now ordained who are not set over a people, such as religious; and so it is not necessary to observe the prescribed ages in their case as strictly as in others, especially if there is sanctity of life, learning, and maturity of character.

6. To the objection drawn from continence, the response is already plain; for continence belongs to the sacred orders not as a matter of their being, but of their well-being.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. Corruption of the flesh does not impede the reception of the Sacrament; therefore neither does division, by parallel reasoning.

2. Likewise, if division of the flesh impedes — namely that which takes place with a wife — then since that which takes place with a harlot is far more shameful, it would impede much more strongly; but it does not impede; therefore neither does the former.
3. Likewise, if division of the flesh impedes, this is either by reason of something occurring in the flesh or by reason of something occurring in the soul. By reason of something occurring in the flesh: this does not seem to be the case, for it leaves no different disposition than would the knowledge of a single woman. By reason of something occurring in the soul: this is not so, since, the wife having died, nothing remains of the marriage.
4. Likewise, I ask: why does it impede? If on account of a defect of the Sacrament, I ask: of which one? If of marriage, on the contrary: he who has never contracted marriage is more deficient with respect to the Sacrament of marriage than he who has contracted it twice; therefore he is not deficient with respect to the Sacrament of marriage. If of the Sacrament of orders, on the contrary: bigamy is not reckoned with respect to the Sacrament of orders, but with respect to marriage; therefore the order does not fail.

The question therefore is: why does division impede, and not corruption?

And again: why does corruption impede in a woman, so that she may not be consecrated, while it does not similarly impede in a bishop?

And again: why does the fornication of the wife render the husband irregular rather than the fornication of the husband himself, since he should be punished more for the division of his own flesh than of another’s?

CONCLUSION.

Bigamists are, by reason of a defect of signification, unfit for the reception of orders, especially sacred orders, yet in such a way that they validly receive the order.

I respond: For understanding what has been said, it must be noted that the Sacrament of orders surpasses the others in its character of signifying, since not only does what is applied externally signify, but the recipient himself is a sign, and the consecrated bishop or ordained presbyter himself signifies Christ Himself, as was touched upon above. And in this property it differs from the other Sacraments, except for matrimony, in which the man himself, who is the subject of the Sacrament, is a sign of Christ Himself, just as the woman is a sign of the Church, and so they concur in signifying the same thing.

Since, therefore, the primary signification of orders is that the one ordained signifies Christ as the Spouse of the Church — and the bigamist who has had a widow as wife cannot signify this, since the Church had a single Spouse and Christ a single Spouse — hence such persons are unfit for orders, especially the principal and sacred ones, in which a man already begins expressly to figure Christ. Hence bigamy renders a man unfit for the diaconate, the subdiaconate, the priesthood, and most of all the episcopate; and therefore in these orders we never read of a dispensation having been granted, nor should one be granted; not because the Sacrament is essentially deficient — indeed the bigamist does receive the character — but because the perfection of the Sacrament is lacking in him, a perfection which can by no means be supplied or compensated for through man. Nevertheless, in the inferior orders he does receive a dispensation in cases of necessity, as is said in Distinction 34, Necessitate cogente; and again, Lector si viduam, etc. From these things it is plain that division of the flesh impedes, and why it impedes, and which kind of division.

1. 2. To the objection drawn from corruption, it must be said that the case is not parallel, because corruption is not repugnant to the necessity of the Sacrament or to its signification,

as bigamy is. Similarly, division through fornication does not impede, because it is not a division by way of signification; but this latter is a signifying division.

3. To the objection — that this is either on the part of the soul or on the part of the flesh — it must be said that the reason is drawn from the whole man, whose role it is to contract marriage, and who is the subject of marriage. In this man, the impediment arises not by reason of uncleanness or of any absolute quality occurring in the flesh, but on account of a defective signification. For because he contracted marriage with one woman, he signified Christ; but because he departed from one and contracted marriage with a second, he departed from that signification; and so there is a defect of the Sacrament, namely of unity, which ought to have been signified in the Sacrament of marriage and of orders.
4. And by this the following objection, concerning the defect of the Sacrament, is also clear; for I say that in him the Sacrament of unity is defective, and whether this defect arises on his own part or on the part of the wife, it renders him less fit for the Sacrament of orders. If, then, you ask which Sacrament is defective, that of orders or that of matrimony, I say that the Sacrament of orders is defective, because there is not that perfection which can signify what the order requires. Furthermore, there is a defect of the Sacrament of matrimony — a defect, I say, not of mere negation, as it is in him who was never married, but a defect of privation, where there is something of the signification and something of privation, which generates a certain enormity or deformity, by reason of which he ought not to be admitted to so noble a Sacrament.

From these things the following questions are clear: namely, why division impedes and not corruption — because no Sacrament is taken away, nor is one rendered defective by reason of corruption as it is by reason of division.

To the question why corruption does not impede the consecration of a man as it does that of a woman: certain jurists say that the bishop signifies the Church militant, while the virgin signifies Christ, who was a virgin. But this does not stand up to sound reasoning. And so it must rather be said that the bishop signifies Christ, while the woman signifies the Church triumphant, or the Church itself, which is a virgin and has never been anything but the wife of Christ; whereas Christ, although He was a virgin, nevertheless had the Synagogue not as a wife, but as a concubine.

And from this the last point is clear: namely, why he who marries a woman corrupted by another, and knows her, is unfit

and is judged a bigamist. The answer is that this is because there is not one man for one woman: for she is not the one and only, and a greater unity ought to be signified on the side of the wife than on the side of the husband, since the Church was joined to none but Christ, neither in marriage nor in any other way. But Christ—

QUESTION IV

Whether the condition of freedom is necessary for the reception of orders.

Fourthly and finally it is asked whether the condition of freedom is necessary for the reception of orders. And that it is, the following arguments seem to show:

1. Distinction 54: “Let no bishop presume to promote another man’s slave to the clerical state.”
2. Likewise, in the same decretal, chapter 2: “Let no one of servile condition be promoted to sacred orders unless he first obtains lawful freedom from his masters.”
3. Likewise, if a slave enters religion, he is returned to his master and cannot enter unless he is made free: therefore by parity of reasoning, unless he is made free, he cannot be promoted to sacred orders.
4. Likewise, no one can serve two masters, as the Savior himself testified: therefore, since the clerical office requires the whole man to be dedicated to it, no one who is in the power of another can be promoted to it.

ON THE CONTRARY: 1. “A wise servant shall rule over foolish sons,” as is said in Proverbs 17: therefore it seems that where there is wisdom and goodness of life, nothing on the side of servitude stands in the way.

2. Likewise, an order denotes spiritual power, while servitude denotes bodily subjection; but bodily subjection is not incompatible with what is spiritual: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, God is no respecter of persons: therefore the service of a slave pleases him as much as the service of a master: therefore just as masters can be taken up to divine worship and the clerical state, so likewise can slaves.
4. Likewise, slaves can receive the other Sacraments just as freely as masters, and are admitted to them just as commonly: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems that they can be admitted to orders.

—Christ, however, was joined to the Synagogue, though not indissolubly, and therefore not by way of marriage. — And so it is clear that all such statutes are entirely reasonable, since in their establishment what is weighed is not fault but rather fitting signification.

In connection with this it is asked: if a slave has been ordained without his master’s knowledge, whether he ought to be restored to him.

Likewise, if he is to be restored, why are not other consecrated things [restored as well]; and again, for how long a time can the master reclaim him.

CONCLUSION

A slave ought not to be ordained, on account of the honor due to the Sacrament.

I REPLY: For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that the Sacrament of orders surpasses the others not only in respect of the character of sign—because not only the Sacrament but also the one who receives the Sacrament holds the character of sign—but also surpasses them in respect of the character of remedy: for here grace is given not only to heal the subject but also grace which equips him to heal others; whence it places a man not only in a state of health but also in a rank of honor and dignity. And therefore for this Sacrament not just any person is required, but an honorable person, to whom clerical honor and dignity is fitting. And because honor regards many external things, a man is rendered unfit to receive this Sacrament not only by defect of life but also by defect of many other things.

For a person to be honorable, honor must concur in him from the side of origin, name, body, action, condition, and conduct. Through a defect on the side of origin, the son of a priest born of fornication, or indeed any illegitimate person, is unfit, Deuteronomy 23. — On the side of name or reputation, the infamous and those publicly doing penance are unfit, Distinction 50, Ex poenitentibus. — Through a defect on the side of body, those mutilated—

—those bodily defective, and demoniacs, and epileptics, Distinction 33, Communiter definimus. — Through a defect on the side of action, as when one falls into a grave sin, whether of deed, such as homicide, Distinction 50 nearly throughout; and this is because of the great horror present in the shedding of blood, whether done justly or unjustly, or because it divides the unity of soul and body. — Through a defect of condition, such as a slave, Distinction 54. — Through a defect of conduct, such as those engaged in worldly affairs, Distinction 51. — In all of these the [canonical] distinctions and exceptions are set forth; but these belong to a lower science. Let it suffice to have said in general only this: because the Sacrament of orders considers not only the merit of the person but also his honor, since the cleric is a public person and orders places one in a rank of dignity, those must be excluded in whom the Sacrament and, consequently, other things might be brought into dishonor. Since a slave, so long as he is in such a state, is ignoble and can be compelled to ignoble works, and therefore cannot bind himself wholly over [to God’s service], being subject to another: for this reason he cannot be promoted to sacred orders, as far as the honor of the Sacrament is concerned, though he does [validly] receive the order.

1. 2. 3. 4. As to the objections that servitude is no impediment, the reply to all is clear from what has already been said.

Nevertheless, as to the question whether the slave ought to be returned to his master: the answer is that either he has been ordained with his master’s knowledge and consent, or without his knowledge and against his will.

Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the letter [of the Master’s text], and first an inquiry is made about what he says: Nor should any of these be substituted in any clerical honor, even the slightest. For he seems to say it amiss, because either such a one has an order, or he has nothing. If he has nothing, then he can be promoted by a Catholic bishop with a dispensation, as is plain in the case of heretics. If he has orders, then he has already been promoted.

I reply that he does not say this because the man has not been ordained, but because he has been wrongly ordained. Now wrongly

—and unwilling. If with his master’s knowledge and consent, or even without his opposition, he creates against himself a prejudice such that he can no longer reclaim him. If without the master’s knowledge and against his will, then either the presenter and the bishop are also ignorant, or one or both of them know. If they are ignorant, then the slave is bound to redeem himself, if he has money; but if he has not, and the Church is unwilling to redeem him, he must be returned to his master. If, however, the one ordaining and the presenter know, they are bound to the master in money, or in another slave, or in twofold restitution; and if they have not the means, the master can take his slave back. — Some, however, say that this does not hold if he has reached the priesthood; but in every case it seems that the master ought to be kept indemnified, while still retaining the right to claim him within a year; and some say [the year runs] from the ordination, others from the time of his coming to know of it. And all this is proved by those canons cited at Distinction 54.

There are many other matters determined in canon law concerning those who are to be ordained, which are drawn from various places of Scripture, and especially from 1 Timothy 3, and all of which are determined from Distinction 23 to the end of the first part. And since this matter belongs more to a lower science, let what has been said for the present suffice, lest we go beyond the bounds of our own science. It is true, however, that all such ordinances have their origin from Sacred Scripture, and all could be traced back to her as to their source, by anyone who had skill in canon and divine law.

Doubts concerning the letter of the Master.

—ordained in two ways: either because he is ordained by one from whom he ought not [to be ordained], or because he is ordained otherwise than he ought to be. In the first way, in three ways: either because he is ordained by a heretic, or by a simoniac, as here in the case at hand; for then, if he knowingly does so and shares in the heresy or the simony, he cannot exercise [his orders], nor is dispensation easily granted, and this is what he means to say in the letter. — Or he is ordained by a Catholic not his own [bishop], without the leave and authority of his proper bishop; such a man ought to be deposed, Causa 7, quaestio 1, yet he can be dispensed with, if such an ordainer places some hope in the ratification of the proper bishop. — Or he is ordained by a bishop who has resigned both his place and office—

office, because such a man ought not to confer orders; but if he has renounced only the place, he can give the minor orders, and by the license of the bishop he can give all of them; and one who, without the license of his proper bishop, receives orders could be deposed by the rigor of the law, yet a dispensation can be granted to him.

In the second way one is said to be wrongly ordained because he does not receive orders in the manner in which he ought; and this is either by stealth or by skipping. If by stealth, this is in two ways: either because he receives two orders on the same day, so that he steals one of them — speaking of the sacred orders — and the penalty for all such men is deposition, as is said in [Decretum, Distinction] 77, Subdiaconus, and in Extra, de Eo qui furtive, Innotuit, etc. But if by stealth he receives only one, then either it was forbidden under threat of anathema, and then only the Pope grants a dispensation, [Extra,] de Eo qui furtive; or, if it was not forbidden, he can be permitted to remain in the minor orders, and if he enters the cloister, the prelate can dispense with him. If, however, he was ordained by skipping, this is in two ways: either out of malice, or out of negligence. If out of malice, although he receives the character, he must nevertheless be deposed. If through ignorance, then with the penalty imposed on him by the bishop, he will be able to be promoted to the lower order, while he is meanwhile suspended from exercising the higher one, [Decretum, Distinction] 52, and Extra, de Clerico ordinato per saltum.

Note also here that, although one may skip from one order while omitting another, nevertheless if the priesthood has been passed over he cannot be a bishop, Extra, de Excessibus praelatorum, Ex litteris, at the end. But if he has omitted the diaconate, he is a bishop, yet he cannot give the order which he omitted, [Decretum,] Cause 1, Question 1. It is not so, however, in baptism, because that is the first Sacrament.

DUB. II.

Likewise, a question is raised concerning what he says, that all are called simoniacs — both those who give and those who receive. For this seems to be wrongly said, because Symon only wished to buy: therefore only buyers ought to be called simoniacs,

and sellers ought to be called Gehazites. — Likewise, Gehazi did more than Symon, since Symon only wished to buy, but Gehazi sold: therefore they ought rather to be named from him.

I REPLY: It must be said that Symon wished to buy precisely so that he might afterwards sell; therefore each evil and sin is imputed to him, and for this reason both parties are named from him.

As to the objection drawn from the will, it must be said that, since Symon, already in the time of revealed grace, wished to buy a power both greater and more spiritual, and moreover wished to make a pact, he therefore sinned far more gravely and more enormously than the one who asked out of a certain liberality and who believed it to be a small matter; but the penalty of perpetual leprosy showed how great that crime was.

DUB. III.

Likewise, a question is raised concerning what he says, that both parties are struck by the same sentence. For this seems to be wrongly said, because, as it appears, those who sell sin more gravely, since they value spiritual things at less than the buyers do: therefore they ought to be punished more gravely. — On the contrary it appears, since the buyer affords the occasion to the seller and receives beyond the principal: therefore if the receiver of usury sins more gravely than the giver, the case is plain, etc.

I REPLY: It must be said that, as to the kind of sin, there is uniformity, because each does injury to the grace of the Holy Spirit; but the sin is weighed as more grave according to the greater appetite and intensity of desire and according to the rank of the person selling or buying. For a bishop who sells sins more gravely than a subject who buys; nevertheless, because the kind of sin is the same, both are struck by the same sentence.

DUB. IV.

Likewise, a question is raised concerning what he says: But those who are ordained by simoniacs, whom, when they are ordained, they do not know, etc. For this seems to be wrongly said, because such

simoniacal ordainers are irregular and do not possess the exercise of their office; and “no one gives what he does not have”: therefore they do not confer the exercise either. — Likewise, suppose that some simoniac, known to me, is tolerated by the Church, and he is my bishop, and I am compelled to receive sacred orders: it is asked what I ought then to do. For if I am ordained knowingly by a simoniac, I am irregular and am punished as a simoniac. If I do not obey, I sin mortally and give scandal: therefore it seems that in such a case a man is in a perplexed position.

I REPLY: It must be said that in the first case he has the exercise of his office from the law, which on account of such ignorance reckons him excused, while he has the order itself from the simoniac. In the second case, he ought, as far as he can, to evade it; but if he cannot, he suffers rather than acts, and he is then held excused. Hence he must either defer the orders, or go to another bishop; but if he can do nothing else, he must endure it, and since the Church tolerates the simoniac, he too must tolerate him and is excused, just like one who is ignorant.

DUB. V.

Likewise, a question is raised concerning what he says: Whoever of these sells the one without which the other cannot be had. For this seems to be wrongly said, because the right of patronage is annexed inseparably to the estate: therefore, since the right of patronage is spiritual and cannot be sold without simony, it is impossible that such an estate be sold without simony.

I REPLY: It must be said that the Magister is not speaking of temporal things to which spiritual things are annexed, but rather the reverse — of spiritual things to which temporal things are annexed, such as a prebend; and the Magister’s word holds in such cases, not in the first. — Or it must be said that he understands it of that which is so joined to a spiritual thing that it takes the place of a spiritual thing. But an estate or a village to which a right of patronage is annexed truly holds the character of a temporal thing.

DUB. VI.

Likewise, concerning what he says — The simoniacal heresy is threefold — it is asked: in how many ways is simony contracted? And it is customarily said that it is contracted in five ways, which are contained in these verses:

Nummus, lingua, timor, caro cum fama populari
Non faciunt gratis spirituale dari.

That is: coin, tongue, fear, flesh, together with popular favor do not allow a spiritual thing to be given freely. Therefore, according to this, it seems that the Magister insufficiently assigns only three modes.

In connection with this, the question is raised concerning the sufficiency of these modes. For since reputation is a “good odor,” like a good example, it does not seem to be a temporal thing. — Likewise, in the Old Law the priesthood was held by right of kinship: therefore, since that was not a sin, it does not seem [that this is a mode of simony either], etc.

I REPLY: It must be said that, properly speaking, simony lies in a price, which indeed avarice aims at, especially when a pact intervenes, and this simony is determined here by the Magister. And it can occur in three ways: for the price can be given in such a way that the simoniac himself does not receive it — as when it is given to his associates; or it can be given by the associates of the one being ordained; or the one being ordained can himself give it to the ordainer, and then there is simony in the reception of the order itself — and, properly speaking, simony occurs in these three ways. — Or, otherwise: either the ordained gives and he receives, and then the man is ordained simoniacally by a simoniac; or the ordained gives but he does not receive, and then he is ordained simoniacally by a non-simoniac; or neither does the one give nor the other receive, but the ordainer was on some other occasion a simoniac, and then the man is ordained non-simoniacally by a simoniac. — On this basis the Magister’s distinction is taken, and it is sufficient enough; but in the common distinction of the modes, simony is taken more generally, from which few in the clergy are today free, compared with the multitude — as, for instance, when he who confers orders does so from an indirect cause, or another acquires either the order or the benefice from a disordered cause; and these are the five modes, whose sufficiency is shown thus. If anyone is moved in a disordered way, it is either out of fear evilly

humbles him, and this is one mode; or from love that wrongly inflames him, and then — since love is threefold, namely the pride of life, which loves honors, and the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes — under the concupiscence of the eyes is reckoned that which lies in money, which embraces every earthly thing and every base service. Under carnal love is reckoned another member, namely the flesh, which embraces disordered love whether with regard to kinsmen or with regard to others, as when someone, out of love for a harlot, promotes the son of a harlot. But if it is a matter of pride, then in two ways: either insofar as he seeks favor, like the hypocrite, and so it is popular favor or fame; or insofar as he seeks to be praised, and so it is the tongue.

And thus the sufficiency [of the enumeration] is plain. — Or, alternatively, the gift may be distinguished as a gift of the hand, of the tongue, and of the heart, with two motives, fear and love; and thus there will be five modes. And by this the number and the sufficiency are made plain.

To what is objected concerning fame, it must be said that fame is a great good for one who does not seek it, as for a just man, but for one who seeks it and labors to attain it, it is not a great good, as for the hypocrite; whence Proverbs 10: The memory of the just is with praises, and the name of the wicked shall rot.

To what is objected concerning consanguinity, the case is not parallel: for the priesthood of the old law was carnal, but that of the new is spiritual. — And thus those things are plain which pertain to this part.