The Single Question of the Twenty-Fifth Distinction.

Concerning this twenty-fifth distinction, in which the Master treats of simony, I ask whether simony is itself a sin.

For the resolution

of the question, let us set aside a definition of the term. Simony can be defined thus: simony is the will to retain or to give a spiritual thing, or something annexed to a spiritual thing, not freely. “Spiritual” can be taken broadly enough to encompass what is annexed to the spiritual; we need not dwell on verbal dispute. “Will” is placed as the genus: every simony is a will, or its proportional equivalent — a refusal — as when someone is unwilling to administer a spiritual thing freely when he is bound to do so and in the manner in which he is bound. I said “placed as the genus,” yet this is not the quidditative genus of simony; the predication “simony is a will” is indirect — a less connotative term is predicated of a more connotative one — and the connotation of the term “simony” expresses the thing’s nominal definition. The remaining parts function as the differentia. “To retain or to give” is stated disjunctively so as to include both those who receive money and those who wish to give it. By “spiritual” some understand a gratuitous supernatural gift of God that cannot be had from purely natural powers alone — and this accords with the reply that Petrus gave to Simon Magus: thy money perish with thee Acts 8:20, adding the reason: because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money — such gifts as the varieties of tongues and the gift of knowledge, of which the Apostle speaks in 1 Corinthians 12. The sacraments are spiritual in the sense that in them something spiritual is given, namely grace (unless there be an obstacle in the recipient), even though in their material constitution they are corporeal, as we explain when treating the individual sacraments. The right to receive the fruits of a benefice is spiritual — that is, it belongs to the one who bears spiritual responsibility and hierarchical authority by reason of such a benefice, such as the duty to preach and to celebrate the liturgy. Likewise prayer and blessing are spiritual, being ordered toward a spiritual effect. One must attend not only to what is spiritual by essence, but also to what the term imports: the term “sacrament” carries a spiritual connotation. That may be called spiritual which is immediately ordered toward the benefit of persons in the attaining of eternal life; civil polity, by contrast, is ordered immediately toward the tranquility of peace. The vessels of a priest and benedictions can be called spiritual. What is “annexed to a spiritual thing” includes the fruits of a benefice, the right of patronage, and the like — things attached to spiritual goods — for in these cases the accessory follows the condition of the principal. Thus it is clear, though not easily explained, what is to be called “spiritual.” I do not follow the approach of others who classify the spiritual by essence, by causality, by consequence, and by concomitance. Just as Simon Magus — from whom this plague takes its name — disguised himself enigmatically under various forms, so it is with this monster: it is no easy matter in either case to distinguish simony from what is not simony.

From the foregoing, certain consequences follow. The first is:

There is such a thing as mental simony — indeed, every simony is mental, though it cannot be recognized except through external acts.

Secondly it follows:

Some simony consists in an act and some in a habit. From this a third consequence follows: a person may be in simony without imputable sin, as is clear in the case of one who retains a habit after sufficient detestation of it, since the habit has not yet been entirely expelled.

Fourthly it follows:

A contract is called simoniacal when it arises from simony and is commanded by it.

Fifthly it follows:

Simony sometimes exists without any pact. This is clear from what has been said, and in the case of blessed Petrus and Simon Magus there was no agreement between them. Bernardus errs in the final gloss on this title, where he speaks of restitution and not of simony. A similar point appears in the chapter Consulere, and in Tua. a. f. Tua nos Extra, de simonia.

Sixthly it follows:

The Supreme Pontiff can commit simony just as any other person can. This is evident: the entire definition can apply to him just as to another. Hence Petrus recoiled from Simon Magus lest he fall into that very sin.

Seventhly it follows:

There is a form of simony that consists neither in a will nor in its habit. This is clear: if someone harbors the resolve “I will not give a benefice without payment,” such simony consists in a refusal, yet it is equivalent to a will.

Eighthly it follows:

What is called studiosa deliberate simony goes beyond strict reason.

Ninthly it follows:

There is such a thing as conditional simony, as is clear in the case of one who thinks: “I would wish to buy a benefice if I had the money,” or “if I could find someone willing to sell.” The same applies to the act of selling.

Tenthly it follows:

It is possible for someone already holding a benefice to sin simoniacally with respect to it, and indeed to sin repeatedly with respect to the same benefice — as many times concerning that one benefice as another person sins concerning many — through the repetition of acts.

Eleventhly it follows:

Not every simoniac is bound to make restitution. This is evident: a person may be simoniacal while possessing nothing acquired simoniacally, and therefore is not bound to make restitution. One who wills to steal is a thief, just as one who wills to commit adultery is an adulterer, and yet such a person is not bound to restitution since he possesses nothing. It is possible to sin as grievously through repeated acts as one who does hold something obtained simoniacally, since the external act adds nothing to the malice of the interior act.

Twelfthly it follows:

Not every instance of simony belongs to the same most specific species as every other, since many objects differ in species, and many things fall under the object of simony — a spiritual good, or something annexed to a spiritual thing, a benefice, the sacrament of baptism, the sacrament of the Eucharist — nor is any one object more proximate than another, since any object can be proposed just as proximately to the will, even though the term signifying one may stand as a higher genus relative to the terms signifying specifically inferior things.

Thirteenthly:

It is clear that something annexed to a spiritual thing can be bought without simony. Proof: this particular village or house — which is or can be annexed to a spiritual thing — can be bought without simony; therefore. The same reasoning can be extended to the case of a consecrated chalice. From this, however, it does not follow that something annexed to a spiritual thing may ever be licitly purchased without the taint of simony.

Fourteenthly it follows:

This plague existed in the Church before it bore the name “simony.” This is evident: it existed in the time of Heliseus Elisha and before, even among the false prophets — and there was a Church at that time, which began with Abel the just — but it did not bear this name before Simon Magus (Acts 8). Baptista Mantuanus writes in the first book of his Alphonsus that the infamous magus Simon, wandering through the world, was the author of execrable gain. The name is taken from Simon rather than from Giezi Gehazi because Simon lived under the law of grace and wished to buy in order to sell, whereas Gehazi wished only to take temporal goods in exchange for spiritual ones.

Fifteenthly it follows:

Simony sometimes exists on the part of the seller only, sometimes on the part of the buyer, and sometimes on the part of both.

Sixteenthly it follows:

Sometimes a condition is stated —

such as do ut des “I give that you may give”, as in “I will give you a benefice if you give me a thousand coins” — and sometimes this is understood without any explicit statement of words.

Seventeenthly it is clear:

A person sometimes enters upon a benefice as a simoniac through his own invincible ignorance — for instance, when his parents give something on his behalf, as is common practice. One says of such a person that he is simoniacal but was not simoniacally promoted. The term is also defined in another way: simony is the will to buy or to sell a spiritual thing or something annexed to a spiritual thing. A book and those things annexed to knowledge — that is, to the created spirit — do not render a person simoniacal. A reader in theology, law, or the arts who receives payment from students (where he has no salary for lecturing, as is the custom in Italy and in England) does not thereby sin; however, in the Decretals under the title De magistris, there is a prohibition against receiving anything for the license to teach — that is, for granting the authority to lecture — and to do so would be sinful. The chancellor of Paris, though he does receive money from bachelors, freely grants the gift of licensure; yet some of his staff receive payments from arts students for straw and minor items. There is little difference between these definitions.

Having set this out, I state my conclusion:

Every act of simony is a grave sin. Proof: every act contrary to natural law, divine law, and human law, from which many monstrous consequences follow in the commonwealth, is a grave sin. Simony is of this character; therefore. That it is prohibited by divine law is clear from 2 Kings 5 and Acts 8. That it is contrary to natural law is clear: the simoniac sells something over which he has no ownership — according to 1 Corinthians 4: Let a man so account of us — something he cannot transfer to another, and for which there is no proportion between the merchandise and the price. Whence Wisdom 3 says that wisdom is more excellent than all riches, and no desirable thing can be compared to her. For this reason Petrus rebuked Simon, because he thought the gift of God could be acquired with money. Freely you have received; freely give (Matthew 10:8). The Gloss says: this text condemns simony and the taking of money for preaching. That it is prohibited by human law is clear from many questions of the First Cause and in the titles De simonia on simony. For this reason it is compared to heresy C.1 q.1, Qui studet. Of the daughter-vices that follow from it, Baptista Mantuanus says in the third book of his Calamitates: “Temples, priests, sacred altars, garlands, fire, incense, prayers — heaven itself is for sale, and God too.” When Antiochus sold the priesthood to Jason (2 Maccabees 4), the sacred fire that had endured for seventy years of the Babylonian captivity was extinguished under water. If the one who steals a chalice, a book, or the like from a church is a sacrilegist, how much more so is the one who seizes an entire benefice by theft over many years — or at least harbors such an intention. That he is a thief is clear from John 10:1: “He who does not enter the sheepfold by the door but climbs in by another way is a thief and a robber.” To enter by the door is to enter by a just title. Hence the care of souls is entrusted to those who are like children in custody, to whom one would scarcely entrust two apples for safekeeping, and the unfit are promoted through gifts that blind the wise, so that the fit are passed over. The unfit, unable to rise to honors by their merits, resort to the mad counsel of Juno in Vergil Aeneid 7.312: “If I cannot prevail upon the gods above, I shall move Acheron.” Of these the Psalmist says: “In whose hands are iniquities; and whose right hand is

filled with bribes” (Psalm 26:10 Vg. 25:10).

I argue against the conclusion:

Daniel 4 says: “Redeem your sins with alms.” And Gregory in a homily says: “The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you have — one man acquires it for a cup of cold water, a widow for two small coins” (Luke 12). Reply: the kingdom of heaven is not bought, since God receives nothing from us and has no need of our goods; rather, we merit it through good works. The language of buying is metaphorical, not proper. I argue secondly: a priest celebrates Mass for six small coins, and an anniversary Mass is established for four or six crowns — in each case something spiritual is given for something temporal. Therefore, not every giving of temporal things for spiritual things (or vice versa) is simony, or else countless people must be condemned as simoniacs. To resolve this argument, a masterly fourfold distinction is applied to the matter. A priest who celebrates for six small coins can do so in four ways. First, as his chief and ultimate end. Second, as an adequate price, as though governed by commutative justice. Third, for six small coins as a lesser, subordinate end — one that is ordered or orderable to a further, higher end. Fourth, he wishes to celebrate for six small coins and to have the money for his sustenance. The first two intentions are simoniacal and illicit; the latter two are licit and, in one who has grace, meritorious. There is thus an amphibology here: “Sortes celebrates for six small coins” — the word “for” can signify a final circumstance, and this in two ways: either the circumstance of an ultimate end, or of a non-ultimate end; the other two senses follow from these. On this basis it is commonly and rightly said that a canon rises during the night in order to receive his distributions, and yet does so for the sake of God — and is not thereby guilty of simony. Similarly, many come to the choir office at the hour when distributions are given, who would not otherwise come, and yet they do so without the stain of simony.

But against this:

He would not have his six small coins; nor would the canon come to the canonical hours if there were no distributions. Therefore money is the principal cause: when it is present the attendance follows, when it is absent the attendance ceases — therefore it is the principal cause. I grant the antecedent but deny the inference. When a lesser principal cause is present together with a principal cause, the effect is produced; neither of them alone is sufficient to produce the effect, and if either is removed, the effect ceases. But it does not follow that the six small coins are the principal cause. That cause is more principal which moves more greatly in terms of esteem — even if it carries less weight in formal degree — or to which the other is reduced. He wishes to have the six small coins in order to be sustained; he wishes to be sustained in order to serve God, and not the other way round — just as Socrates used to say that he wished to eat in order to live, not to live in order to eat. And the blessed Augustine says: “Let us eat so that we may preach the gospel — not preach the gospel so that we may eat.” That it is lawful for those who impart spiritual things to receive sustenance is clear from 1 Corinthians 9, where the Apostle says: “Who tends a flock and does not drink of the milk of the flock?” He cites for this the law of Deuteronomy: “You shall not muzzle an ox

when it is treading out grain” — and: “The laborer is worthy of his food” (Matthew 10). One should not undertake such labor for so paltry a return that too little would be given — and beyond that it would be a cover for simony.

But against that I argue:

By means of this fourfold distinction, a cover is provided for simony. One who buys a benefice can say: “I do not give a thousand crowns for the benefice as an adequate price or as an ultimate final cause, but as a subordinate end.” Furthermore, one who sells a benefice can say: “I do not receive a thousand crowns for the benefice, but I receive them in order to give to the poor — and if you give them to me, I will give you the benefice.” To the first I say: although a crafty person can hedge and equivocate before men, yet God is the searcher of hearts. I deny that he can rightly say “I give the thousand crowns,” etc., because the money is not a proper means ordered to that end — it is comparable to saying “I wish to kill this man for the glory of God.” Something can be ordered to an ultimate end, but not just anything — he cannot say it, that is, he cannot reasonably say it; for otherwise, anyone could say that the Arabian Gulf is not the Red Sea. To the second I say: no weight should be given to his words or to what he claims — the benefice must be freely given. A person interpretively sells a benefice when, in conferring it, he has no just cause for taking money. Furthermore, it is the same thing to give money to the bishop as to give it to someone to petition the bishop on one’s behalf. It is a different matter if one gives twelve coins to a doorkeeper so as to gain entry to speak with the bishop. Furthermore, even if things were as he claims, it would be a species of evil — and the Apostle teaches us to abstain from every species of evil. But you say: a bishop can take the revenues of a prebend in its first year for the fabric of the church, or for some pious purpose, or reduce the revenues for a time — therefore he can take those revenues on the very first day, directing his intention accordingly, without committing simony; therefore on the first day he can take a thousand gold coins while granting the benefice freely. I deny the inference, and also the antecedent, if this is made into a formal compact with the person receiving the benefice at the time of entry. However, when a rich prebend falls vacant, it is permissible to declare beforehand — before conferring it on anyone — “My intention is, for two or three years, to take one quarter or one third from this benefice for such a reasonable cause; the remainder will support the minister.” But it is another thing altogether to take all the revenues before they have been gathered, and in doing so one commits a species of evil, neglects one’s reputation (which must be preserved under pain of sin), gives scandal to others, and provides a cover for simony — no one will believe whatever he says. So he does not receive the revenues in a pious spirit, and God does not wish pious causes to be advanced in that way. If his intention is in truth to retain them for himself, that is worse still. And although a small gift is not considered sufficient to induce someone to act, yet before God there is no distinction between great and small — save in the gravity and smallness of the sin. But you say: a bishop can hold a benefice without conferring it for two or three years and thus collect three thousand gold coins. Perhaps you will object further: in cathedral or regular churches, an election must take place within three months, otherwise the right of election devolves to the next superior, and from him to the next, all the way up to the pope, on account of failure

to elect. This objection does not succeed: the three-month or six-month rule is human positive law, and in that matter the pope grants dispensations — and so the benefice can be held in this way. This is what some princes do with bishoprics, one of which is sometimes worth twenty thousand gold coins. Therefore it is equally permissible for a king to take sixty thousand gold coins on the first day by simply retaining the revenues while holding the benefice. I reply: it is against natural and divine law to hold benefices in this way, outside the hands of those to whom they ought to be assigned, since the church is meanwhile defrauded of its head or member, and the intention of the founders is violated. If it is lawful for a bishop to hold one prebend with a dispensation from the Roman pontiff, then by the same logic he could hold two, or all of them — though the sin would be greater with each. But when with a dispensation there is a period of waiting to determine who is the suitable candidate, and there has not been sufficient deliberation on account of certain reasonable causes that may arise, there is no sin; but six months is commonly quite sufficient for this purpose. There is no good reason to hold a benefice for two or three years while collecting the revenues in the meantime. I argue secondly: it is lawful to sell the right of patronage, and yet the right of patronage is something annexed to spiritual things — therefore. The major premise is clear: if Sortes sells to Plato his lordship over the estate of Caldus, Plato acquires the right of patronage. This is evident from the decretal Ex litteris in the same title X 3.38.19, as Alexander III wrote to the bishop of Hereford and the abbot of Ford. The argument runs: Sortes sells to Plato all the right he has in Caldus; the right of patronage is the right he has in Caldus; therefore he sells that right to Plato. I deny that it is lawful to sell the right of patronage directly — it passes with the sale of the lordship without being separately sold, unless the contrary is specified, as stated in the said chapter; and nothing may be given on account of it beyond what the lordship is worth. If the lordship is worth a thousand and no more, then no more than a thousand may be given by reason of the patronage. And I deny the major premise: he does not sell the right of presenting a suitable candidate to the prelate. If you say that Plato acquires the right of presenting a suitable candidate, and by no other title than purchase — therefore he bought the right of presentation — I reply that he acquires the right of presentation by another title, namely that of attachment or accession: just as one who buys a slave does not thereby purchase the slave’s good or evil angel, though they come with him. Yet I grant that the purchase is the sine qua non cause of the right of patronage.

I argue thirdly:

It is lawful to buy all the fruits of a benefice — such as tithes — and yet these are annexed to something spiritual — therefore. The major premise is clear: this is common practice. Perhaps you will say: it is lawful to buy these tithes — grain, lambs, goats, and the like — and to sell them, but it is not lawful to buy the right of collecting tithes, since that pertains to an ecclesiastical person who holds the title on which the right of collection is founded.

Against this I argue:

The right of collecting tithes is something — therefore it is either really the tithes themselves, or it is the man who collects the tithes. If the first, then I argue: Sortes the layman may lawfully buy these tithes; these tithes are the right of collecting tithes; therefore it is lawful for Sortes to buy the right of collecting tithes. And in the same way I will prove that it is lawful for another to sell them. Furthermore, a layman who receives the fruits of a church from a prelate for three years has the right of collecting tithes — for otherwise he would collect them unjustly. If you say the right of col-

lecting is the priest, then Sortes has the right of collecting just as he has a degree — and I ask you: what kind of thing is a degree? It is nothing other than a graduated man. But suppose such a man were to be sold, as Paulinus bishop of Nola sold himself to free the son of a widow. Then the argument runs: Plato buys this priest; this priest is the right of collecting tithes; therefore Plato buys the right of collecting tithes. I deny the inference. One who receives a benefice for three years collects justly and has the right of collection — but not by reason of office; a beneficed person has the right of collection by reason of office. It is otherwise with one who receives from such a person. And grant for the sake of argument the impossible case that a beneficed priest were a slave: even though it is contrary to reason, his lord would have no dominion over the goods of the church, which are not the lord’s, nor may they be alienated in that manner. If the lord’s own goods are placed at the disposal of the tithe collection, I grant that similarly Plato buys the right of collecting tithes — but he does not buy the right of collecting tithes by reason of office. “To buy” implies an act of the will and thus entails a rational designation. The complex expression “the right of collecting tithes by reason of office” either refers to the prelate — connoting that it is incumbent upon his office to collect these fruits — or to the tithes themselves — connoting that they can be collected by virtue of such an office.

I argue fourthly:

It is lawful to purchase burial in a sacred place, and yet burial is something annexed to spiritual things — therefore. The major premise is clear: it is the common practice of parish priests. Furthermore, the patriarch Abraham bought the double cave at Hebron, the city of Arba, from Ephron son of Zohar (Genesis 23). And one cannot say that the place was not sacred, since Adam and Eve were buried in it — therefore. I reply by denying the major premise, as is clear from the chapter Abolenda on burials X 3.28.2, and from Causa 13, Question 2, Questa est C. 13 q. 2. After the fact, however, it is lawful to compel the friends of the deceased to observe praiseworthy customs — but not beforehand. There must be no exaction and no compact in advance. Perhaps you will say: the custom had an evil origin and arose from the avarice of parish priests — therefore no one should be compelled to observe it; for wherever there is a bad custom or corrupt practice, anyone can be compelled to fulfil it. I answer: it is to be presumed that the custom had a good origin, since the contrary has not been established before us — it is otherwise with a corrupt practice that is established as such. But our parish priests pursue this matter more zealously than they pursue sins in their subjects. The Apostle, however, said: “I seek not yours, but you.” To the other point: there is nothing inconsistent in something being a matter of counsel for a time, and then becoming a matter of precept as time goes on in order to eradicate abuse. To the argument from the patriarch: it is said that he bought those fields in which the double cave is enclosed, just as it is lawful to buy a district or village in which there is a church. Or he asked for it as a gift — the text says “give me” — and although Ephron said he wished to give it to Abraham, he nonetheless assessed the price above the just value, and without offending him Abraham could not have obtained it. Abraham had need of Ephron’s friendship, being a stranger, and so he redeemed himself from the difficulty. In those days the custom was different, as the blessed Ambrose says.

Fifth, it is argued:

Jacob bought the birth-

right from his brother Esau (Genesis 25), and yet that was annexed to the priesthood — for the firstborn served as priests until the days of Aaron. Reply: I deny that he bought the right of primogeniture from him. Rather, he redeemed himself from a vexatious situation, waiting for the opportune moment. For when Esau came in from the fields utterly exhausted and nearly consumed with faintness, Jacob seized the moment to advance his own affairs. And the birthright was given — as was the divine will in the matter — which had been made known to him through his mother, who had been informed. On the matter of the case, the text of Genesis says: “And Rebecca went to consult the Lord, who answered her: ‘Two nations are in your womb, and one people shall overcome the other, and the greater shall serve the lesser.’” This, it is thought, he had received from Melchizedek and Heber, prophets of God — it does not matter whether directly from God — and this the mother signified to her son. The son, though simple, without duplicity or guile, yet prudently always waited for his moment in matters that concerned him. God can grant a right without the father’s knowledge or even against his will. If you ask how a man of such exemplary character as Jacob could have acquired the birthright for so small a price, and how a man as nobly born as Esau could have sold his birthright for so little — especially since he was entitled to a double portion of his father’s goods, as is evident from Ephraim and Manasseh, the sons of Joseph, who received a double portion and the territory of two tribes — as regards Jacob, it does not matter whether he paid much or little. Jacob had redeemed himself from a vexatious situation. Although he said to his brother “sell me your birthright,” he meant “give me the birthright, as you yourself shall judge, by way of sale” — foreseeing that Esau would fall into hunger and preparing food for him. The other, making light of the matter and thinking he would die if help were not given, said: “Behold, I am dying.” Whether Esau sinned through intemperance or through contempt of the birthright in selling it is beside the point. And in order to prevent him from retracting, Jacob rightly asked that it be confirmed by oath.

Against this you argue:

It is not lawful for a man elected by the greater part of a chapter to give money to the minority so that they desist, even though this would be in defense of his own right. This is evident from De electione, chapter Cum in cunctis. Therefore the solution is null; the assumption is evident from De simonia, chapter Matheus. The reply is: he did not have an acquired right. It is simoniacal to give money for a right being acquired; the case is otherwise for a right already acquired and where it is established that it is fully acquired. And where one person were as suitable as Hieronymus and others were also suitable, he should not confer anything for a right being acquired. The case is otherwise with Jacob, who had a right acquired from God, who does not need the consent of Isaac or of anyone else. God alone transfers dominions, and no one can resist when he so wills — sometimes partly with the cooperation of another, as he does in the common law. So also in baptism: where a person with a disability cannot find anyone to baptize his dying child, and a wicked person refuses to baptize the infant without payment, the father may give money — not for the baptism, whatever the other may say, but to redeem the harassment that he unjustly suffers, and especially so in a sacrament that is necessary for this infant.

The sixth argument:

Sortes intercedes for Plato so that he may have a benefice, and thus acquires

in that case something annexed to a spiritual thing is acquired for something temporal. Similarly in the service of princes. And if such persons are simoniacs, you will condemn them all indiscriminately. I respond: the Gregorian distinction concerning the threefold gift is well known — namely, a gift from the hand, from the tongue, and from service. The same applies to gifts of blood and other illicit causes of conferral. A conferral is not gratuitous when a benefice is given to an unsuitable relative. If you say that the bishop receives nothing — certainly this is true amid a multitude of petitions. Let us pursue what we have begun: first, from the side of the petitioner; second, from the side of the one conferring. A person may lawfully petition for a suitable candidate, and at times is bound to do so, extolling him and urging that provision be made for him so that he may benefit others. A person may also modestly petition on his own behalf, as was said in the preceding distinction, whether for a cure of souls or not, provided it is certain that he is not seeking a charge beyond his capacities. This is in no way simony. But if someone directs his petitions on behalf of an unsuitable candidate, he acts simoniacally. This is clear: he wishes that something annexed to a spiritual thing be conferred not freely. Offering petitions — especially when one judges them to be efficacious — is the same as giving money. Perhaps the petitions of the one asking are worth as much to the one petitioned as a thousand florins, as is commonly said of the “armed prayers” of princes. Strictly speaking, money is more disgraceful. Let those who petition on behalf of unsuitable candidates consider, I beg, the response of blessed Bernardus to Count Theobaldus, who wished to ask him to secure a benefice for a certain young son of his. Speaking in his own manner, Bernardus said: “You know that I love you — but as much as God knows, better than you do, I do not doubt that I am also loved by you. On whose account, if I offend God, there will be no reason for you to love me, since God will no longer be the cause. Therefore, lest I offend God — and perhaps it is not expedient for you either — I would certainly offend him if I did what you ask. For I am not unaware that ecclesiastical honors and dignities ought to be given to those who both wish and are able to administer them worthily and according to God. Moreover, to acquire them for your young son by my prayers or yours — know that this is neither just for you nor safe for me.” And shortly afterward he continues: “Indeed I wish well for your son in all things, but above all I wish him God. What is this? I do not wish him to have anything against God, lest he not have God. And if another should wish otherwise, I do not wish him to have it through me, lest I too lose God.” This response was worthy of such a man. And the Apostle says: “If I were pleasing men, I would not be a servant of Christ” (Galatians 1:10). Concerning service: a person runs to the tumults of the court in various ways. In one way, so that he may relieve his poverty — if a benefice should present itself, he sees that it will be given to him sooner than to another. In another way, principally for the sake of the benefice. The first is licit, provided he is suitable — suitability is the fundamental root upon which the title to a benefice must be grounded. The second is manifestly illicit. As for the one conferring: provided he gives to a suitable servant whose prudence he has tested in service, the one who is a suitable recipient of the benefice acts well. But if he gives it because the person served him, he acts simoniacally. He ought to reward him in some other way than with a benefice. In that case he confers the benefice in exchange for four or five years of service, which is the same as if he received a hundred scudi from the one receiving the benefice — if in two years he was due to have

a hundred scudi. It is an indication of simony when benefice-holders pay nothing; if others commend him, let him pay — if he has a benefice adequate to his suitability. Otherwise he is already unsuitable for the position, as is clear from the first question of the preceding distinction. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to make a pact concerning the obtaining of a benefice on account of service, as is evident from the Decretals, De simonia, chapter Cum essent. However, it does not seem to involve simony to agree to teach canons or to remain at one’s teaching post in a university; in such cases a spiritual thing is exchanged for a spiritual thing — as in “pray for me and I will pray for you,” or “if you die before me, I will celebrate Mass three times for you; do the same for me,” or “celebrate today at the eighth hour and I will celebrate at the tenth,” and similar arrangements.

The seventh argument:

Saul, in 1 Samuel 9, gave money to Samuel so that he might render judgment about the donkeys. His servant said to Saul: “Behold, there is found in my hand a quarter of a shekel of silver; let us give it to the man of God, that he may show us our way.” The same is evident from 1 Kings 14, concerning the wife of Jeroboam, who brought to Ahijah the prophet ten loaves, a cake, and a jar of honey. Furthermore, the Roman Pontiff can sell a canonry, since in the Roman Curia simony has no place, just as the Lex Iulia on electoral corruption ceases to operate in the city of Rome Digest, ad legem Iuliam, lege una. Likewise, there is no prohibition on the sale of a canonry in either the Old or the New Testament. To the first point: we do not read that the good prophets accepted anything for the gift of prophecy. Samuel fed Saul and his servant, but we do not read that he accepted anything. Secondly, a bishop may rightly accept something given freely, without any agreement — he accepts a palfrey offered liberally. Elisha accepted nothing from Naaman the Syrian; it appears he did the same in the case of Benhadad, king of Syria. The Jews brought only small gifts to the prophets; foreign gentiles alone brought great ones. To the other point: it seems to some that the Roman Pontiff can sell a canonry, and they say that certain things are simoniacal because they are prohibited, while others are prohibited because they are simoniacal. In the first place, the supreme Pontiff can grant dispensations; the prince is released from the laws. But this distinction is empty: all simony is prohibited because it is evil and is contrary to natural and divine law. Therefore the Pontiff sins against every such precept if he commits simony, just as anyone else does — and indeed more so on account of the dignity of his person. It is, however, quite true that certain things are prohibited on account of their proximity to simony, under certain human penalties by which simony is prohibited. This is evident from De rerum permutatione, chapter Quaesitum, and the same title, Cum olim. In those chapters it is stated that no prior agreement concerning the exchange of benefices should be made, and that those who exchange them on their own authority lose their benefices. And yet this is not simony: I see that a benefice would be more useful to me among certain people wavering in the faith, so that I might instruct them in it and so that I might be removed from my relatives, or because the people hold me in contempt; for another, the place where I am might be more useful. For these reasons we exchange benefices. If there were no prohibition or nullification, this would not seem to be simoniacal in any way. But because under this pretext men greedy for gain can frequently accumulate the goods of the Church avariciously, the Church has prohibited it. This is not simony. Let them, I ask, produce some example of something properly simoniacal and show that the Pope can contravene it without sin. To the first of the arguments adduced: I concede that the Pope does not incur the positive canonical penalties, nor does the person with whom he dispenses. To the second: I deny the assumption. This is evident from 2 Samuel

13: whoever wished filled his hand and became a priest of the high places, and on this account the house of Jeroboam sinned and was overthrown and wiped from the face of the earth — whoever gave more money acquired the priesthood. The point is evident above from the case of Antiochus in the proof of the conclusion. To accept anything for a license to teach is simoniacal; therefore, a fortiori, for the office of electing a bishop or for officiating in divine worship. Likewise, it is simoniacal to accept anything for preaching, as stated in Matthew 10; therefore, a fortiori, in this case. This is evident from the text of the chapter Ex diligenti Extra, De simonia. To sell a lay office seems to be wrongly done, and many abuses arise in the avaricious collection of money given for office. Neither to a poor man nor to a greedy rich man should an office be given. Thus Valerius recounts in Book 6, Chapter 4: two men were contending over which of them should be sent to Spain to receive Scipio’s provisions. He said that neither should be sent — since one had nothing and for the other nothing was ever enough — this was an indication of avarice. When a rich man sets about purchasing such things, it is a sign of avarice; and poverty, on the other hand, compels a man who will not forsake the world to many unlawful acts. Let judges be chosen according to the counsel of Jethro (Exodus 18).

The eighth argument:

When someone has an apparent title to a benefice and accepts certain revenues so that such a claimant may desist, he sells something annexed to a spiritual thing for a temporal consideration — and yet this is not condemned, since it is practiced by everyone. Furthermore, for admission to religious life a certain sum is accepted, for vessels and things of that kind.

The reply is that it is not lawful to make a settlement regarding a benefice.

This is evident from De transactionibus, chapter Super eo licet. If two persons have been elected to some dignity, let them submit the matter to arbitrators; the arbitrator will be able to confirm one and make provision for the other from the revenues, for the sake of peace. This is evident from De praebendis et dignitatibus, chapter Nisi essent. But if one of them were certain that he had no right, he ought to desist and accept nothing. To the second point: the reply is that nothing should be accepted for admission to a religious order De simonia, Non satis. But if a monastery were poor, it may be said to him: “Brother, we cannot conveniently support more than we already have. If it pleases you to enter this community, bring a portion from which you may be sustained.” This is evident from Causa 1, quaestio 2, Si quis propter hoc.

The question is raised concerning the penalty for simoniacs.

The reply is that, setting aside the strictly ca-

nonical penalties and coming to the matter of restitution, which seems to be penal: if anyone has been promoted to an order simoniacally, such a person receives the order, which he cannot restore since the character has been impressed, though he does not have the exercise of the order without a dispensation. If he is a simoniac but was not promoted simoniacally, the dispensation is easier. If he is both a simoniac and was simoniacally promoted, the dispensation is more difficult. Although such a person acquires orders through an unlawful means, nevertheless the orders are truly acquired, as happens in many cases of this kind. Concerning the acquisition of benefices, the question is graver and more difficult for simoniacs. A simoniac who holds a benefice simoniacally is bound to relinquish it into the hands of the person to whom it falls, and to have the intention of relinquishing it as soon as he conveniently can. He is further bound to surrender all the fruits collected, minus the expenses he incurred in collecting and preserving them — and this if he was a simoniac promoted simoniacally. This is evident from De restitutione spoliatorum, chapter Gravis, and Digest, Familiae herciscundae, Fundus, quaestio 1, responsione in fine — that is, concerning fruits collected. In the case of a simoniac not simoniacally promoted, once he has been informed of the truth, he too is no longer a possessor in good faith. To hold a title simoniacally is the same as having no title at all: he enters as a thief and a robber. Now a thief is bound to restore what he has obtained by theft. And I believe this should be understood of the person who holds a benefice through money. If someone obtains a benefice from a collator by reason of kinship, prayers, or service, he is not bound to make restitution any more than anyone else, provided he is suitable — even though prayers, kinship, or services greatly influenced the decision. He is not bound to make restitution; otherwise no flesh would be saved. It suffices, it seems, to repent of the sin by which he procured the title, or because he unworthily received it. And thus the saying of the lords the jurists is partly true: there is no simony except pactional simony — that is, simony subject to the canonical laws requiring restitution. And I understand “pactional” to mean either formal or interpretive. An example of the formal: “I give so that you may give” — that is, “I give a thousand so that I may have this canonry or this cure.” Some simony is interpretive, differing from formal simony only in words: at the time of the conferral of a benefice, Sortes says to the collator, “I will give you a thousand pounds sterling freely; give me the benefice freely” — while nevertheless having his mind’s eye fixed on the benefice, and the collator acting in like manner. Or, as I have understood of certain persons: he says to the collator, “I will wager six hundred gold coins against an equal sum. You would not dare confer the benefice on my son, would you? Or will you not confer it?” But if you suppose someone assenting to this proposition — “I give you a thousand freely” — at the very moment of the conferral of the benefice, with the external execution of the benefice, to assent to that proposition which he utters: I say that he cannot assent to it freely. And whatever may be said, it is ridiculous to claim that such presumed simony is not punished under the penalty for formal simony. The recipient is bound to restore the money to the church that has been wronged — thus a bishop who receives such a payment must give it to his church. But if a multitude sins, the whole amount must be given to the poor. Do not investigate too scrupulously whether great prelates were made simoniacally — that is not your concern. Excuse them in all things through invincible ignorance, and God supplies the rest. Nor is it called invincible ignorance because it cannot be overcome, but because one is not bound to overcome it. It suffices for you that he receives from the multitude as your prelate. Go boldly to receive orders; obtain a dispensation for a vow, a benefice, a marriage, and in other matters when there is a reasonable cause for having one. Here a rough moral certainty suffices — namely, that it is so considered by others and the opposite is not established to you. Few are those — or fewer than you think — who acquire benefices by money. No one possessing the appearance of respectability ascends by that path. You frequently interpret your neighbor’s case in the worse sense. Even when a bishopric is conferred: the order is conferred and the character is impressed. Simony does not impede this, even though it impedes the exercise of orders. And even granting that the order were not conferred, the character is still impressed, and this suffices. In this respect it is proportionate to the sacraments as regards reception. If you speak of the case of a single Pope: Pope Nicolaus says Distinctio 99, chapter Si quis pecunia, “Let him who is elected by money be regarded not as apostolic but as apostate.” The Gloss says this is true when he is elected by persons other than the cardinals and those lacking authority. It is evident that this Gloss is from the school of Orleans. Others have no power to elect, whether simoniacally or otherwise — and this contradicts the text. I do not admit that the lord cardinals would commit this vice. A sufficient portion for election would not be corrupted — namely, two-thirds — and perhaps all of them. And this is confirmed by the fact that so many mendicant religious and others have been elected; it is a sign that money accomplishes nothing.

And if as many religious were as renowned as at the beginning, just as many would be elected. Furthermore, God preserves this. You should not give credence to every malicious spirit that speaks to the contrary. And even granting that point, ignorance would excuse those of lower rank, as with other prelates. Concerning annates, continued widely by Boniface IX and in part by John XXII, and rarely by their predecessors — would that they were buried! On account of these, other prelates make exactions under the name of “joyful entry” — an entry more of sorrow than joy — and they triple in their subjects what they give to their superiors. It is, however, fitting that if sufficient provision has not been made for the Apostolic Camera, provision should be made for it by some other means, since the Roman Pontiff is the head of the Church and has need of the counsel of the cardinals and the assistance of servants. It is fitting, I say, that he be maintained according to his station from the goods of the Church. The supreme evangelical priest should not be in a worse condition than the supreme Mosaic priest, who had the tithe of tithes — that is, a sufficient provision. If your enemy has made efforts and given money to impede my promotion, the title to the benefice is not thereby vitiated. This is evident in the title under discussion, chapter Nobis. In that case it is presumed that the enemy acted in fraud against me.

But against this I argue:

After a lawsuit, relatives are accustomed to bear the greatest enmity toward one another; they weigh even a small injury inflicted upon a kinsman, and they contend over the same matter. Therefore, when Titius is about to be elected bishop, Sempronius his cousin, following a superficial quarrel, can offer a thousand pounds sterling to the canons to elect Titius as bishop, pretending that he does so out of hatred for Sempronius, when in fact it was done out of love for him. I reply: either the money given by the enemy is the reason why this person holds the benefice — and if this is in fact established, the benefice must be resigned, for he entered by an unjust title, and the law looks to what commonly happens and proceeds on the basis of presumptions — or, when a known enemy offers money for another’s election, the judgment is that he regards the other as supremely suitable and to be sincerely elected. And even granting that he gives money, the indication is that it is irrelevant to the obtaining of the benefice. Concerning a relative, no such presumption holds; on the contrary, prudent persons would presume the opposite — namely, that the lawsuit is fictitious, or that it arose from a first impulse and has been settled. A man may wish to strike a relative or do him some other small harm, yet at the same time wish that the relative had a bishopric or a cure, for the good of both. But you say: if my friend, against my prohibition, gives money for my promotion, I am not bound to resign the benefice. This is evident in capitulo Sicut tuis litteris, in eodem. And yet it can be the case that the money given was the cause of my promotion, even though I say that it displeases me. I reply: the person discussed in capitulo Sicut had already been actually and sincerely elected; the struggle arose over the confirmation. Had the prohibition been at issue during the election, it would make no difference whether the money was the cause of the promotion. But you say: the right was not fully acquired. The reply is: there was a presumption that the giving of that money was irrelevant to the confirmation and that he was being confirmed freely. It is presumed that the money was given in fraud, because the Pontiff says, “since he is not joined to you by kinship.” Third, an election that was not simoniacal is not to be revoked; but the confirmation is simoniacal. Fourth, since that man had under anathema forbidden money to be given, the supreme Pontiff yielded to him by confirming his right.

Fifth, what I posit about the consent of the one confirming is merely a presumption of simony. If someone has sincerely held a single benefice and it is afterward said — though falsely — that he obtained it through simony, even if he believes this and later discovers the truth, it suffices to repent of the evil act; his title is not thereby undermined. But concerning the resignation of a simoniacally acquired benefice, there is a den of thieves: they resign with one hand so as to receive with the other. If it were asked of them whether they would resign if they had no hope of recovering the benefice, I do not know how I would answer. It would perhaps be good never again to confer these benefices on such persons. I said “perhaps,” because if there were no other hope of recovery, they would perhaps not resign but would always retain the benefice with great loss to their souls. Straightforwardly: where someone resigns a simoniacally acquired benefice into the hands of the competent authority, purely and simply, and receives it from the one who has the power to dispense and confer — provided he is suitable for performing what is incumbent upon that benefice — he accepts the benefice with a clear conscience and now holds by just title what he formerly held unjustly. If Barabbas were to steal the horse of Plato, and Plato in the meantime conferred it upon him as a free and lawful gift, Barabbas would now justly possess that horse. But the fruits expended throughout the entire period of the simony, which belonged to him no more than to any other person, must be applied to pious uses; if they are no longer extant, their equivalent must be provided. It does not suffice to say, “The Roman Pontiff remits these things to you so that there need be no further mention of them,” because this has not been committed to him by Christ except for edification — nor will he ever attempt it. You will depart under a great burden on your conscience. It is better for a man of formed conscience to resign the benefice purely and simply, and to allow the collator to give it to whom he will, so that the matter may be clear.

The second doubt:

Against the foregoing, one who holds a benefice through gifts of the hand munus a manu is bound to restore the benefice into the hands of his superior. But a gift of the tongue munus a lingua sometimes moves a person just as much as a thousand crowns; the same applies to service and kinship. Therefore, if the one is bound to resign, so is the other. I deny the consequence: the cases are not otherwise equal. You see that one who receives a gift of the hand is bound to restore it. It is otherwise with a gift of the tongue and of kinship. For service, a servant should be paid in proportion to his labors — indeed, to give a benefice and nothing else is a strong presumption of simony. Secondly, the one case is certain and shameful, and gifts commonly have more influence: they blind the eyes of the wise. When someone is suitable and serves through kinship or prayers, the presumption is in his favor, and on account of the particular uncertainty the benefice may be retained. But when it is patently established that someone was unsuitable at the time the benefice was given to him, and he is now suitable, the wise course would be to seek it anew from the one who has the right to confer. If he does not obtain it, I do not know whether he is bound to make restitution — perhaps not. But where the matter was doubtful from the beginning and he is now suitable, he is in no way bound to make restitution. If someone confers a benefice on a child in order to collect money meanwhile contrary to reason, you see that he collects money for something annexed to a spiritual thing, and the solution is ready at hand. Nor does it suffice for the child to remit the money to him when he has grown up, even in the Church triumphant; the entire amount must be restored. You will not be pressed in the Church militant, since no one other than that person will demand from you an account of your stewardship.

The third doubt:

Whether one who agrees with the patron that he will receive nothing from him, after a title of sustenance has been assigned to him, is tainted with the stain of simony. The reply is that the patron

takes money by virtue of the spiritual thing annexed, since by reason of the title he assigns him twenty or ten and gives the benefice on account of the office, reducing the sum that he gives; he takes a temporal thing for something annexed to a spiritual thing. This is evident from De simonia, capitulo Si quis. The one ordained is suspended until the supreme Pontiff dispenses with him, the ordainer is suspended from conferral, and the patron from the exercise of orders for three years. Therefore it is well ordained in capitulo Episcopus, De praebendis: if anyone ordains someone as deacon or priest without a title, he is bound to support him from his own resources until he has a title, unless the man has sufficient patrimony to support himself. The same applies in the case of the subdiaconate, capitulo Cum secundum. The excessive multitude of priests thus admitted, together with their unsuitability and abundance outside religious orders, renders the clergy contemptible.

The fourth doubt:

Whether one is bound to make restitution in the case of mental simony. The reply is that he is not, capitulo ultimo of this subject matter. But why, then, is one bound to make restitution for mental usury, as is recounted in Causa 14, quaestio 3, capitulo 1, and De usuris, Consuluit, and by blessed Augustine on Psalm 36? To this question the canonists customarily offer multiple distinctions, none of which is valid. Both simony and usury are forbidden by divine law. The argument of Johannes Andreae is invalid, that in simony there is error on the part of both parties and thus the condition of the possessor is stronger — for sometimes there is error on the part of only one party. Nor is his argument valid that in the case of a benefice the giver gives more of his own: the opposite is true. Who would place a distinction between these two contracts? Sortes gives a bishop a thousand gold pieces, saying, “Lord Bishop, I give you a thousand freely,” and the bishop confers a benefice, saying he gives it freely — though he would never have given it except for money. Plato says, “I give so that you may give” — that is, “I give a thousand so that you may give the benefice.” It is always equivalently pactional. The second party, as is evident, has no title to the benefice but is a thief and a robber, and the longer he holds it the more he sins. A thief is always in default. He does not properly resign the title he holds in the benefice, but rather the title presumed by men. If he is nevertheless of good reputation, he ought to have the intention of resigning as soon as he conveniently can, without defaming himself, when the matter is secret. Nor is the Pope’s permission required in this situation, even if the person is a bishop. This is evident from the Gloss on capitulo Nisi, De renuntiatione: as is stated there, an intruder and a simoniac have no title. This is evident from Causa 1, quaestio 1, Ordinationes. Mental simony in the present context can be committed in various ways. In one way: I would wish to give money and I offer it, but the bishop confers the benefice on me freely since I am suitable — just as when I wish to steal your horse, you give it to me as a gift. In another way: if I had money, I would wish to buy a benefice, and the other party would wish to accept it if it were offered; yet nevertheless, categorically, he gives the benefice without any payment. Furthermore, the discussion here concerns simony that is prohibited by human authority — speaking in the manner of the canonists. In such cases, penance suffices and restitution is not required. Accordingly, the same rule applies to both usury and simony with respect to restitution and non-restitution. Secondly, it is evident that someone confers a benefice through an act that is sinful, and yet the other party truly receives the benefice. The same applies to the recipient. That a simoniac is called a heretic is an extension of the term, as in Causa 1, quaestio 1, capitulo Cum liqueat. Frequently a right judgment stands in the intellect while simony resides in the affection and in the effect. And these things concerning simony — from which may He preserve us who gave to Simon Peter the care of feeding His sheep and lambs.