Question One of the Twenty-Fifth Distinction.

Because the Master speaks about simony in the second and third chapters of this twenty-fifth distinction, I therefore raise several questions concerning it. First, what is simony? For a definition of terms is the starting point of any inquiry. In the questions that follow I shall speak in particular about cases suspected of the corruption of simony. Simony is commonly defined as follows: Simony is the deliberate will to buy or sell a spiritual thing, or something annexed to a spiritual thing. But Hostiensis says this definition is incomplete and that one must add “with a subsequent act,” because simony does not consist in mere desire alone. He cites canons to this effect, namely C.1 q.1 c. Qui studet. And the canonists now commonly follow him in the final chapter of this title. But the definition of the others does not entirely satisfy either, because the one he himself constructs is even less adequate, and he adds that clause badly.

I demonstrate these assertions as follows. Every act of simony is a sin of commission; no will is a sin of commission, since it is the soul; therefore no will is simony. The inference holds in the second mood of the second figure. But you will say: “will” is taken in place of “volition.” Against this: here there is still simony — “I refuse to give a benefice unless I receive money” — and yet it is not a volition i.e., a positive willing. Second, “deliberate” is badly added, because by “deliberate” you mean either a repetition of acts or deliberation in the act. Not the first, because if the first act were not simony, neither would any subsequent one be. Not the second, because a semi-deliberate simoniacal movement motus secundo primus, or an act not fully deliberate, is still simony. This is evident inductively in all cases of hatred, anger, and perjury — when indeliberate, they retain the character of the whole. Therefore. Against the position of Hostiensis, the argument runs as follows, proving that there can be simony without a subsequent act, and in this way: This act is a sin — “I will to buy a benefice with money” — and it pertains to no other vice than simony. Therefore. Moreover, the simony that originated from Simon Magus and bears his infamous name did not involve a subsequent act, as is clear from Acts 8. Furthermore, he who wills to commit adultery and does not carry it out in deed commits adultery just as if he had accomplished it, according to the Savior’s pronouncement: “Everyone who looks at a woman with lustful intent has already committed adultery with her in his heart” Matthew 5:28. The canons cited, however, are to be understood as referring to canonical penalties not imposed — such as suspension and the like. I therefore define simony differently, as follows: Simony is a volition, in form or in effect, of buying or selling a spiritual thing, or something annexed to a spiritual thing. I say that “buying” and “selling” extend to every non-gratuitous contract. I said “in effect” on account of such an act as this: “I refuse to give a benefice unless I shall have received money,” which in itself gives rise to a volition. All who buy or sell spiritual things are deemed simoniacs. And the same applies to things annexed to them. Hence the Master says in chapter three: “For whoever sells one of these things without which the other cannot be had, leaves neither unsold.” And this is clear from Pope Paschal, C.1 q.3 c. Si quis obiecerit: what is the right of one is shared with the other, C.3 q.6 Hec quippe, Digest, De iureiurando, Eu qui, Si libertus. Therefore from both reason and common usage it is clear that the definition is sound. And although Balaam wished to sell the gift of prophecy, as is clear from Numbers 22, and Petrus recounts in his second canonical letter, chapter 2: “They have hearts trained in greed, accursed children, forsaking the right way they have gone astray, following the way of Balaam son of Bosor, who loved the wages of unrighteousness, but was rebuked for his own transgression: a dumb donkey, speaking with a human voice, restrained the prophet’s madness” 2 Peter 2:14-16. And in the Epistle of Jude it is written: “And they abandoned themselves to Balaam’s error for profit” Jude 1:11. And Gezi received payment along with leprosy 2 Kings 5. Yet this pestilence is not called “Balaamia” or “Gezia” but simony. For names signify by convention, and a compelling reason need not be sought, although a fitting one can be given here for why it is called simony — namely, from Simon Magus, because he wished to buy a spiritual thing in order to sell it again, and this under the law of grace. As the poet Baptista Mantuanus says in the first book of his Alphonsus: “Simon flying through the air, that infamous magician and wretched author of profit.” From what has been said I draw several propositions. The first is: it amounts to the same thing to say “there is simony” and “a spiritual thing, or something annexed to a spiritual thing, is bought or sold.” Second, it follows that simony is a mental act and consequently largely hidden, although through external signs people sometimes arrive at a perfect or at least a dim knowledge of it. Third, it follows that there is simony without any pact, as is clear in the case between Petrus and Simon Magus. The text in c. Mandato, de simonia Extra, de simonia, in the older collections, speaking of mental simony, says that by penance alone one makes satisfaction to one’s Creator, and through simony

of this kind one is not bound — that is, after penance such persons are not simoniacs and are not subject to the penalties of law. Fourth, it follows that the Roman Pontiff can commit simony just as others can. This is clear: the entire definition can apply to him. And for this reason Petrus shrank from it, lest he accept money from Simon Magus. Fifth, it follows that there is a conditional simony — for example, “I would wish to buy a benefice if that man were willing to sell it” — and another that is absolute and categorical. Sixth, it follows that not every simoniac is bound to make restitution. This is clear: someone may be a simoniac who has obtained nothing by simony. Seventh, it follows that someone may be a simoniac in whom no act of simony is present. This is clear in the case of one who is sleeping or not performing any act, who has bought a benefice and has not yet sufficiently repented. For a habit alone does not suffice to designate someone a simoniac, as is evident when the habit remains after the act of simony has been purged. Eighth, it follows that this pestilence existed in the Church before it was called simony. This is clear from what has been said. Ninth, it follows that sometimes there is simony on the part of the seller only, or of the buyer only, and sometimes on the part of both. Tenth, it follows that someone may be simoniacally promoted and yet not be a simoniac. This is clear if the parents of Titius, acting in complete ignorance, buy a benefice for him: he acquires the benefice by a simoniacal title, and since he is in invincible ignorance, he is not a simoniac. Likewise, someone may be a simoniac and yet not simoniacally promoted — as when a bishop gives someone a just title to a benefice and the other mentally wished to buy the benefice, but the wish never issued in action. A third case: someone is both a simoniac and simoniacally promoted. That someone may be neither a simoniac nor simoniacally promoted falls outside any doubt.

Now I shall raise a few objections against the definition.

For an understanding of the terms “spiritual” and “annexed to a spiritual thing,” the following argument is made. It is simoniacal to sell the sacraments, and yet they are purely corporeal, as we have customarily explained at the beginning of each sacrament’s treatment. Perhaps you say: they are annexed to spiritual things. Against this: so too are the fruits of benefices, books, and chalices, and yet these may be sold. The response is that one can take “annexed to a spiritual thing” in such a way that it includes spiritual things and vice versa, but that is not the intention of the definition. “Spiritual,” as a concrete term derived from “spirit,” in one sense does not apply to a body — as Christ said: “A spirit does not have flesh and bones,” Luke 24 Luke 24:39. Yet we call a devout man “spiritual,” and we say that sight is more spiritual than hearing, because words must be understood according to their subject matter. It is commonly said that something is spiritual in three ways: first, by essence, as grace and the virtues; second, by causality, as the sacraments, which are the cause of grace, of a character, or of an adornment in the soul; third, things are spiritual by effect. Against this last category the following argument is made: a meritorious act would be spiritual in the second sense, and so would a man who preaches or teaches; likewise acquired knowledge, which can be sold — not that it passes from one subject to another, but incidentally, in the sale of knowledge the knowledgeable person produces knowledge in another, and for this reason he may receive a temporal payment, as will be said below. I say that “spiritual” in the present context is that which is ordered to a work that is miraculously and supernaturally hoped for from the Holy Spirit. Examples of such things: the sacraments are ordered to the infusion of grace by the power of the work performed ex opere operato; to bestow virtue, to cure the sick miraculously, to speak in various tongues, to prophesy, and other things of this kind. For this reason Heliseus refused to accept anything for the miraculous cure of Naaman the Syrian 2 Kings 5. And this accords with the response of Petrus in Acts 8: “Now when Simon saw that the Spirit was given through the laying on of the apostles’ hands” — that is, his gift of speaking in various tongues and acting supernaturally in the manner of the apostles —

the text continues: “He offered them money.” To whom Petrus replied: “May your silver perish with you, because you thought you could obtain the gift of God with money” Acts 8:18-20. And in Matthew 10, Christ, having first set forth miracles and given mandates to the apostles, added: “Freely you have received; freely give” Matthew 10:8 — supply: this. Now if theology were infused in someone, or any other knowledge, because a person naturally applies himself to teaching others, for the labors and the knowledge by which he teaches he may receive payment, just as for naturally acquired knowledge. Therefore the sacraments themselves, and performing those supernatural works, are spiritual things. What is annexed to a spiritual thing is the right that someone has to collect the revenues by reason of a divine office, and that which is needed precisely for maintaining such an office, as will be said at the end of the seventh question. Labor, however, although it is connected here, is something common that is necessary in any office, and therefore it is not annexed to a spiritual thing. Just as acquired knowledge is not spiritual in the present sense, so neither are books nor other necessaries annexed to a spiritual thing as we understand the term here. From this it also follows that not everything spiritual by essence is spiritual as we understand the term here. This is clear from the case of acquired knowledge.

But some hold that labor expended on spiritual things is not saleable.

So hold Durandus and Paludanus, because to say otherwise would be a cover for simony. Nor is it plausible, they say, that so much money would be given for such little labor, as is evident in the case of a priest celebrating Mass who is offered six small white coins. But those arguments are not conclusive. The reason: a priest celebrating, or anyone performing another divine office, can say that he receives money for his sustenance, which is lawful according to everyone. And if such a pretext ceases, there is as much cover for selling spiritual things by accepting money for sustenance as for labor. Nor does the other argument conclude — that for the small labor a priest has in celebrating he receives six small white coins — because he receives them both for labor and for sustenance. For by celebrating he has completed the work of the entire day, since for vespers and the other hours nothing is customarily given him. Also, one person receives more for a small labor than another who labors much. This is clear from the advocate and the stone-carrier. And that it is lawful to receive payment for labor is clear. In Numbers 18 it is written: “To the sons of Levi I have given all the tithes in Israel for their ministry by which they serve me in the tabernacle of the covenant” Numbers 18:21. And shortly afterward: “You shall eat them, you and your households, for it is your payment for your ministry in the tabernacle of the testimony” Numbers 18:31. This is held by the gloss on c. Significatum, de praebendis Extra, de praebendis: that it is lawful for a priest to hire out his services for a fixed period and receive payment for his labor, provided he is not already bound to this by reason of a benefice — in conformity with the divine law that renders to each his reward according to his labor 1 Corinthians 3:8. This is the view of Bonaventura here. Furthermore, there is another matter that weighs heavily: the determination of our Faculty, thirty-four years ago, against Brother Joannes Angeli, who in his second article preached as follows: “A parish curate ought to receive nothing from his parishioners for confession and the administration of the sacraments.” The Faculty defined thus: “This proposition is contrary to the disposition of natural and divine law expressly, and is therefore false and notoriously heretical.” For the priest does not receive payment for the sacraments but for their administration, which involves action and labor.

But whether one may accept money for teaching, counsel, or testimony is a debatable matter.

Altisiodorus, in the third part, in the penultimate question on simony, says it is simoniacal to accept anything for teaching. Others accept payment for labor, just as a hired priest accepts payment for labor — a position that Alexander Halensis follows in the second part. Another view, being both more common and more probable, holds that spiritual acts proceeding from a created spirit can be sold.

Proof: otherwise it would not be lawful for a craftsman to accept money for his craft, the opposite of which everyone asserts. Nor is it sufficient to say that he accepts payment for labor, because then the person who labors more should always receive more — which is false. Likewise, a jurist can sell his counsel and an advocate his services.

But against this position the argument of Altisiodorus is raised: the smith’s art cannot be sold; therefore no art can be. The antecedent is clear: it is a gift of God, as the interlinear gloss on Exodus 31 says concerning the word “Beseleel”: “I have filled him with the Spirit of God, with wisdom and understanding and knowledge in every craft, to devise whatever can be made by a smith” Exodus 31:3-4.

The response is this: although every thing in the world is a gift of God, and every art that illumines the intellect is likewise such a gift, this does not suffice to make it spiritual in the present sense, as is clear from what has been said. Second, the argument is made that to be able to sell knowledge without simony is contrary to a determination of the Roman Pontiff. This is clear from c. De magistris, chapters one and two Extra, de magistris. In the first chapter, concerning the license to teach, it is written: “For the license to teach, let no one exact a fee, nor under the pretext of any custom seek anything from those whom he teaches.” And in the following chapter it is written: “You shall prohibit anyone in your parish from exacting or even having promised anything for a license to teach. If anything should afterward have been paid or promised, you shall cause what was paid to be returned and what was promised to be released.”

The response is to deny that what we have said is contrary to the Pontiff’s determination. For in those passages what is prohibited is not accepting something for teaching — indeed it is lawful both to accept and to ask for payment, both for the teaching itself and for the labor involved in teaching, if one is not bound to this by stipends. But what the Pontiff prohibits there is accepting money for granting someone the faculty to teach, because in that way unqualified persons would be admitted. And therefore in the first chapter of De magistris cited above, the Pontiff forbids denying a qualified person the license to teach, saying: “Let them not forbid anyone who is qualified from teaching, once a license has been sought.” “But whoever shall presume to act against this shall be removed from his ecclesiastical benefice. For it seems fitting that in the Church he should not enjoy the fruit of his labor who, through cupidity of spirit, while selling the license to teach, strives to impede ecclesiastical progress.” And for this reason the Cardinal of Cambrai wrote a certain treatise against the Chancellor of Paris, laboring to show that it is simoniacal to accept anything for the conferral of a license. And this is clear from the two chapters cited.

Thus far we have discussed the definition of simony, of “spiritual” and “annexed to a spiritual thing,” and established that in the administration of spiritual things — such as the sacraments or any other such things — it is lawful to accept something temporal, not only for sustenance but also for labor itself. Also, anyone may sell any created quality, just as a painter accepts payment for the training in his art; and similarly a harpist accepts something — and not for labor alone. Indeed, a man trained and skilled in an art has less labor than one untrained and unskilled, and yet he receives more in payment. And so it is finally with all craftsmen. Not, however, because a craftsman produces the art inhering in himself in another person, for natural philosophy does not allow an accident to migrate from one subject to another. But a light — a spiritual light — produces its effect in a susceptible patient, just as one luminous body is illuminated by another. But in the production of spiritual light, the patient not only receives but also acts — which does not occur in the case of corporeal light.

Furthermore, consider carefully: whether you say that labor is saleable, or that created knowledge is or is not, the scope of simony is no more broadened than by saying the opposite. This is shown by the example of three equally learned craftsmen or philosophers, equal both in the transmission of their art and in their training, each accepting equal payment: one of whom says he accepts it for the sustenance of himself and his dependents; another says he accepts it for the labor which he is not bound to perform for others gratuitously;

to expend: and nothing for his knowledge. A third person may say that he accepts payment both for his sustenance and labor and for the transmission of his art. And this is evident in the administration of the sacraments. I grant, however, that it is permissible to receive something under one aspect and not under another, as will become clear later in this same distinction.

Question Two of Distinction Twenty-Five

Secondly, concerning this distinction, it is asked: whether simony is a grave sin. The answer is given through conclusions. The first conclusion is affirmative to the question, and it is proved as follows. Every act opposed to natural, divine, and human law is evil; simony is of this kind; therefore. Proof of the minor premise: it is contrary to natural equity for someone to sell the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are not within his power — indeed, he hands over the Holy Spirit himself as though he were his own slave, as is evident from the letter of Tharasius, Bishop of Constantinople, sent to Pope Adrianus. And this is recited in the first question, chapter one, Eos qui, where it is written: “More tolerable is the impious heresy of those Macedonians who are assailants of the Holy Spirit himself. For they, in their madness, declare the Holy Spirit to be a creature and servant of God the Father and the Son; but these men make the Holy Spirit their own servant. For every master sells what he has if he wishes — whether a slave or anything else among his possessions.”

Moreover, it is contrary to natural law for anyone to take money for the transfer of a thing that is not within his power. Third, even granting that it were within his power, he sells a thing that is beyond temporal estimation, because it is something spiritual exchanged for money. Wisdom 7 states that wisdom is more precious than all riches, and desirable things cannot be compared to it.

Perhaps you say that one need not look to the value of a thing in itself, but that things are exchanged according to human need, in accordance with what Augustinus says in City of God XI, chapter 18: “For who at home would not rather have bread than lowly mice and fleas?” A slave will be sold at a lower price than a gemstone. Although you might refute the argument plausibly in the case of created knowledge, you cannot do so for the spiritual goods of which we speak, since they surpass human goods in the estimation of human need — that is, speaking of market value and not of the intrinsic value of the thing. And for this reason all people rightly censure the traitor Judas for having sold the Redeemer of the world, who is God, for so paltry a sum.

And although simony is contrary to natural law, it is still possible to have doubt about many cases — whether simony is present in them. This is evident from the cases of usury and simple fornication, which the pagans did not consider to be contrary to natural law. That simony is contrary to divine law is evident from Acts 8 and Matthew 10: Freely you have received; freely give, where the Gloss says: “Here simony is prohibited.” For there the discourse concerned performing miracles and astounding prodigies, because immediately before those words it says: Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out demons. Freely you have received; freely give, where the Interlinear Gloss says: “Just as I give you such power without price, so you too should give freely.” Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that one who possesses acquired knowledge freely must communicate it freely to others.

Furthermore, in 3 Kings 12 1 Kings 12, it is read concerning Hieroboam: Whoever wished, he filled his hand, and he became a priest of the high places. Perhaps you say that he worshipped idols and that they were priests of idols. Response: granted that this is so, by selling the priesthood and not taking priests from the tribe of Levi and from the house of Aaron, he gravely sinned, as is evident from the text that follows: And on account of this the house of Hieroboam sinned and was overthrown and

destroyed from the face of the earth. For this reason, the leprosy of Naaman clung to Giezi and to his descendants forever, as is evident from 4 Kings 5 2 Kings 5. Therefore it is contrary to divine law. That it is contrary to human law is evident from the title de simonia throughout, and from Causa I, quaestio i, throughout. Therefore the minor premise that remained to be proved is true.

Second Conclusion.

Simony is the worst monster in the Church. Proof: that plague is the worst in the Church through which unfit persons are promoted while the most qualified are passed over — just as it would be a contagious disease that drove people to take rotten stones for building a material temple while setting aside marble. But this happens most especially through simony, by which the wicked ascend to honors, being unable to rise through virtues, adopting the saying of the maddened Juno in Maro: If I cannot bend the gods above, I shall move the underworld Aeneid VII.312. For gifts placed before them bend the minds even of the prudent, according to the saying of Naso: Gifts, believe me, win over both men and gods; Jupiter himself is appeased by his own coins. Furthermore, that is the worst monster in the Church which renders a person filled with iniquity in both hands. But this happens through simony; therefore. The minor is proved by that saying of the Psalmist, Psalm 25 26: In whose hands are iniquities, and their right hand is filled with bribes. Moreover, that person is a wicked thief who steals the chalice, the books of the church, and things of that sort. But the simoniac steals the entire benefice. John 10: He who does not enter by the door into the sheepfold of the sheep — he is a thief and a robber. And in this theft his whole life is caught, for once one impropriety is granted at the beginning, many evils follow, as in Physics I. And it is difficult for things that began with a bad beginning to reach a good end, Causa I, quaestio i, chapter Principatus. Furthermore, the gravity of this plague is evident from God’s displeasure, for the fire of sacrifice that was given from heaven in the desert — namely, in the second year of the exodus from Egypt — and which endured until the Babylonian captivity, and which was then hidden by the prophet Jeremias in a deep well, where it remained intact for seventy years, and was recovered again in the time of Neemias, was subsequently extinguished when Antiochus sold the priesthood to Jason, as is evident from 2 Maccabees 1.

Against these conclusions it is argued as follows. Simony concerns the intellect; therefore it is not a sin. The consequence holds: every sin is within the free power of the one who commits it, and therefore concerns the will. The antecedent is evident because simony is heresy, Causa I, quaestio i, Quisquis and chapter Presbyter. Response: to assent to the proposition “the gift of the Holy Spirit can be sold for money” is heresy, and this is what Simon Magus believed. Hence Ambrosius, writing against Novatianus in the first book of De Poenitentia, says: “When Petrus saw that Simon, corrupted by the practice of the magical art, thought that the grace of Christ through the imposition of hands and the infusion of the Holy Spirit could be purchased with money, he said: You have no lot or part in this faith, because your heart is not right before God Acts 8:20-21.” That is: you err in the Catholic faith, and thus one who pertinaciously asserts this is a heretic. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that any other simoniac now hold heresy, for it can happen that a prelate rightly assents in his intellect that simony is committed in the sale of a benefice and that it is wrongly done, yet notwithstanding this he acts, because the will frequently, by its own freedom, goes against the right judgment of the intellect. Furthermore, the consequence drawn there is invalid, because it would prove that no heretic sins — for an erroneous assent in matters of faith resides in the intellect, is free, and depends on the will, because a person can freely refuse to admit heresy, or having admitted it, can set it aside.

Second argument.

A priest celebrates an anniversary Mass for six small albi coins, fixed at a certain sum of money. In our Faculty at Paris it is the custom that a master in theology gives the faculty ninety or one hundred francs for

a perpetual Mass to be said, in which every person attending the Mass receives twelve coins in distributions. But in these cases a spiritual thing is given for a temporal thing; therefore not every giving of a temporal thing for a spiritual thing and vice versa is simony — or else you will be declaring men of the highest repute to be stained with the taint of simony.

Response.

A person can celebrate for six small albi in seven different ways. First, as for a principal and ultimate end. Second, as for an adequate price, as if it were commutative justice and the value of one thing against another, as in the purchase of an ox at market. Third, for six small albi as for a less principal end, subordinated or subordinable to another, further end. Fourth, he may wish to celebrate for six small albi and to have the money for his sustenance. Fifth, for his labor, which he undergoes in celebrating. Sixth, for the distraction and impediment by which he is prevented in celebrating from attending to other business — and there can be a mixture of these types. The first two intentions are simoniacal by intrinsic denotation, and one who has such acts is a simoniac. The other simple intentions are licit, and in one who possesses grace, meritorious. But if one of the first two modes is mixed conjunctively with another, the mixture is illicit. Thus there is an amphiboly here: “Sortes celebrates for six small albi,” insofar as the word “for” can denote a final circumstance — and this in two ways: either the circumstance of an ultimate end, or of a non-ultimate end. The other senses are clear.

From what has been said it is evident

that a canon rises at night in order to receive his distributions and for the sake of God, and yet he does not thereby commit simony. Likewise, many come to the service at the hour when distributions are given, who otherwise would not come, without the taint of simony. And even if an unlearned priest does not know how to distinguish so precisely in what sense he celebrates for six small albi, he is excused, because he sees that such a custom of celebrating is accepted and not condemned by learned men; therefore he is to be pardoned, even if he errs somewhat in his end — for it can happen that he actually refers his action to no end beyond the six albi. And although simony is contrary to natural law in the extended sense of the term that the wise discern, it is not, however, contrary to natural law in the strictest sense.

But against that I argue.

A priest will not celebrate unless he receives six small albi. Likewise, a canon will not come to the canonical hours if he is not going to receive distributions. Therefore money is the principal cause, since when it is present the attendance is present and when it is absent the attendance is absent; therefore it is the principal cause. I reply: not conceding the antecedent, I deny the consequence, because when a less principal cause is present together with a principal cause, the effect is produced, yet neither of them suffices by itself to produce the effect, but the effect is removed if either of them is removed. Just as someone goes to the Sorbonne both to hear the disputants and to drink the wine of the bachelors, and yet would not go for one of those reasons alone, but for both together — for if one of them were removed, as on a fast day, he would not go. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the six small albi are the principal cause. For that cause is more principal which moves the agent to a greater degree in his estimation, or to which the other is reduced as an end under an end. But against this: by celebrating in order to have six small albi, those coins are the end of the celebration in one of the illicit senses, and therefore the six small albi are the principal cause. This is evident from a parallel: we do not preach the Gospel in order to eat, but we eat in order to preach. Likewise, we do not live in order to eat, but we eat in order to live. Response: although it is the opinion of some that the order of ends is perverted when the principal end is ordered toward a less principal end, this is not necessarily the case, as is evident from the solution to the argument, where the celebration is ordered toward sustenance. The same can be true of preaching, and consequently one must say that a person does preach the Gospel in order to eat, but

eating is not the ultimate final cause, nor vice versa.

Regarding the knowledge of ends,

certain rules are set down. The first rule is: God is the final cause of all things, just as he is the efficient cause. Apocalypse Revelation 1: I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end — to whom all good works are to be ordered virtually and finally, though not always actually. The second rule: among intermediate ends, that one is more principal which is more perfect than another and tends more immediately toward the ultimate end than the other. Thus it is to preach, communicating the word of Christ to the people, which is something highly excellent spiritually. But eating concerns the body, without which in this mortal life we cannot live. For however high an eagle may fly through the air, it must descend to earth for the sake of bodily food. The third proposition: nevertheless, the order of ends is not perverted when one mediate and more principal end is ordered toward another, less principal end in some good sense — as, for instance, when the principal end cannot be had without the less principal end. For example, one who has no provision from elsewhere cannot preach the Gospel without sustenance. Therefore he can preach in order to have sustenance. And in turn the prudent person takes that sustenance in order to preach; he preaches in order to please God and to attain blessedness; and thus there is a reciprocation of ends. And in this way there is in a certain sense only one end, according to the Philosopher in Topics III: “Where one thing exists on account of another, there is only one thing.” And thus one who preaches the Gospel receives a double reward: one temporal, with respect to sustenance from the people; another eternal, which he awaits from God. Hence, on the passage in 1 Timothy 5, Let the elders who rule well etc., the Gloss of Augustinus says: “Receiving the sustenance of necessity from the people, the reward of dispensation from the Lord.” From this it is evident that a person can enter religious life in order to have sustenance therein. Likewise, one can wish to be a priest in order to obtain a benefice — though not as an ultimate end.

But against what has been said you may perhaps object.

From this sixfold distinction offered in the solution to the argument, a cloak is given to simony. For one selling a benefice will say: “I take a thousand crowns in the bestowal of this benefice — not as an adequate price, nor as an ultimate end, but for sustenance, labor, or the like.” Response: to take a thousand crowns in the bestowal of a benefice is not a means subordinated to that purpose. And it is just as if you were to say: “I wish to kill this man for the glory of God.” Some things can be ordered toward an ultimate end; others cannot. And even if the crafty conferrer says, “I take a thousand crowns freely, and I give the benefice freely,” God searches hearts and minds, and the presumption marks both the one who takes and the one who gives with the taint of simony. And even granted that it were not simony (which is false), he would sin by scandalizing others and culpably neglecting his own reputation. And for this reason the Apostle commands in 1 Thessalonians 5 at the end: Abstain from every form of evil. For it can happen that something is not intrinsically evil, yet is evil because of the appearance of malice.

But against this it is argued.

When some rich prebend falls vacant and is to be conferred, a bishop can reserve for a time, for some pious cause, a certain portion of that prebend for two or three years according to the needs that arise. Let us suppose that the revenues to be collected amount to a thousand francs. Given this supposition, the argument proceeds as follows: the bishop can say to the one he is beneficing: “Give me a thousand francs on the spot and I will freely give you the benefice with all its revenues; I will apply your thousand francs to the fabric of the church, or to repairing or furnishing such-and-such a hospital.” If he can collect these revenues successively, why can he not take them at once? Response: that supposition is granted,

and especially after consultation has been had with wise men — there will then be no shadow of simony. But it is not permitted to take that money on the spot, both because it is unknown whether the conferrer will die before the revenues have been collected, and also because of the appearance of evil.

Third argument.

It is permissible to sell the right of patronage, and yet the right of patronage is something antecedently annexed to a spiritual thing, since it is ordered toward presenting a cleric for an ecclesiastical benefice; therefore. Proof of the major: one who sells an estate in which there is a right of patronage transfers the right of patronage to the buyer, unless there has been a special mention of its retention — de iure patronatus, chapter Ex literis. Response: I deny that he sells the right of patronage; rather, he transfers it with the attachment of the estate to which it is annexed. And if the estate is worth a thousand pounds sterling without the right of patronage, he may not take more when selling the estate on account of the patronage.

But against this it is argued.

Every right that the seller has, he transfers to the buyer by title of purchase and sale. But sometimes you will deny this proposition without qualification; in that case the question arises: by what title does he transfer the right of patronage to another? Response: by title of attachment — the right of patronage can incidentally be separated from the estate, but only in a special case. Just as one who sells a person alienates the good angel and the bad angel from his household, but not by title of sale except incidentally. I grant, however, that the sale is a sine qua non cause of the accession of the right of patronage.

Fourth argument.

A person can buy all the revenues of a benefice, such as tithes, and yet tithes are annexed to a spiritual thing; therefore. That it is permissible is clear, since tithes consist of grain, lambs, onions, and things of that kind. Perhaps you say that it is permissible to buy those tithes and to sell them, but it is not permissible to buy the right of collecting tithes. For this right belongs to the churchman who holds the title on which the right of collection is founded. Against this I argue: the right of collecting tithes is something; therefore it is either really the tithe-goods themselves, or the person collecting the tithes. If the first, then I argue as follows: it is permissible for Sortes, a layman, to buy these tithes; these tithes are the right of collecting tithes; therefore it is permissible for Sortes to buy the right of collecting tithes. And by the same reasoning I shall prove that it is permissible for another person to sell it. Furthermore, a layman who takes the revenues of a church for a three-year period from a prelate has the right of collecting tithes; otherwise he would collect them unjustly. If you say that the right of collecting is the priest himself: Sortes has the right of collecting just as he has a degree. I ask you: what thing is a degree? It is nothing other than a graduated person. But suppose that he is sold, as Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, sold himself for the liberation of the son of a widow. Then: the prelate buys this priest; this priest is the right of collecting tithes; therefore. This is laughed off by denying the consequence. But he who takes a benefice for three years and justly collects does buy the right of collecting tithes, and he has the right of collecting — but not by reason of office. A beneficed cleric, however, is the right of collecting by reason of office; it is otherwise for one who takes from him. And even granting, for the sake of argument, that a beneficed priest were a slave (though this is against reason), his master would not have dominion over the goods of the church, because they are not his, nor would it be permissible to dispose of them in that manner — let them collect the tithe-revenues. I likewise concede that he who buys from a prelate does buy the right of collecting tithes, but he does not buy the right of collecting tithes by reason of office. For “to buy” implies an act of the will, and thus qualifies the appellation of reason. This complex expression — “the right of collecting tithes by reason of office” — stands for the prelate while connoting that it pertains to his office to collect these revenues, or for the tithes themselves while connoting that they can be collected by such a person by reason of office.

From these considerations it is evident

that simony is a grave sin, and in what manner it is permissible to accept money for a spiritual thing — namely, as for sustenance and labor, but not as an adequate price for the thing, as if it were commutative justice. And in receiving, one ought not to make it a matter of conscience, for one person can licitly gain just as much as another illicitly — as when a preacher collects money, namely, as the adequate value of the word

of the divine. The other, for sustenance, earns equally in the purse: one licitly, the other illicitly. Moreover, we have said a few things about the reduction of ends and about discerning what is more and less principal.

Question Three of Distinction Twenty-Five.

The third question concerning the matter of simony is whether simony is committed through prayer and service. For the resolution of the question, certain conclusions are set forth, the first of which is: It is not simoniacal to offer prayers on behalf of a suitable candidate, whether for oneself or for another. That a person may petition for a benefice for himself we demonstrated in the preceding distinction. The conclusion is proved thus: every act of simony is a sin; to offer prayers on behalf of a suitable candidate is not a sin; therefore to offer prayers on behalf of a suitable candidate is not simony. The inference holds in Baroco a valid syllogistic mood. Proof of the minor premise: a person may licitly petition for himself; therefore, a fortiori, he may petition for another suitable candidate toward whom he is less personally involved. A second proof of the same point: I see that Sortes is highly suited for the duties of a parish cure and would make an excellent pastor for the flock, yet he is in need. Who would say that I act wrongly in asking the collator to confer a benefice upon him?

Second conclusion.

A bishop who confers a benefice on a person who is suitable — even though prayers are the cause without which he would not have done so — acts rightly. For it may happen that the person offering the prayers is one whose testimony regarding the worthiness of the candidate deserves to be trusted.

Third conclusion.

Although by a fiction of law a bishop who confers a benefice on a suitable candidate principally on account of prayers, without attending to suitability, does not become simoniacal, nevertheless before God and in truth he is simoniacal. The first part is evident: there is a presumption that he gives the benefice on the basis of suitability. And an ambiguous case, concerning good and evil, is to be interpreted in the more favorable sense, as the rule provides.

The second part is evident.

For if the candidate were unsuitable, the bishop would confer the benefice on him no less readily. Let us suppose the case of a person who has no concern for suitability: such a man is moved principally by the gift of words i.e., flattery. The same part is further evident: one who wishes to kill Titius and strikes a statue that he believes to be Titius is imputably a homicide. The reason is that his intent tends toward the destruction of Titius, with no concern for the statue. In the same way it is in our case.

Furthermore, the same point is argued.

If the suitability of the one for whom prayers are offered were unknown to the collator, it would be simony; but the collator gives the benefice in consideration of the prayers, whether the candidate is suitable or not, and thus commits simony. For his knowledge of suitability does not in this case move him, and he proceeds just as if the suitability were hidden from the collator. Therefore, if suitability in no way moves him to confer the benefice, it is simony; and even if suitability moves him, but only as a less principal motive, it is simony — though less grave. For a wicked man can pervert the order of ends. The same must be said of service.

Fourth conclusion.

One who gives a benefice to an unsuitable candidate on account of prayers commits simony. This is clear: he gives precisely on account of prayers. For since there is no suitability in the man, he does not give on account of suitability. And this is no different from taking money from the candidate for the benefice, because prayers can be worth a great deal of money in the estimation of the collator — for instance, because the collator desires the friendship of the petitioner, or his praise, or the like. This is evident from the well-known distinction concerning the threefold gift: namely, the gift from prayer, from the hand, and from service munus a prece, a manu, ab obsequio.

Fifth conclusion.

A person reasonably serves the collator of a benefice, believing that the collator will recognize his good and faithful service and that his suitability will thereby become known, so that he will be promoted sooner than another; but the benefice will be conferred on him on the basis of suitability, without any pact. If, however, he serves principally in order to obtain a benefice, he acts unjustly. Nor does it matter what kind of service he renders, provided he is suitable and serves honorably with moral integrity.

Sixth conclusion.

One who gives a benefice to his servant in relief of wages owed to that servant commits simony. Proof: he virtually takes money for a spiritual thing that is annexed. Therefore he commits simony. For it is the same thing to remit to the collator a hundred crowns that he owes the servant, as to receive the money and then give it to the collator. For this reason the dictum of Hostiensis is worthless when he says: if a bishop takes a cleric into his service, promising him an annual salary until he provides him with a suitable benefice, and after conferring the benefice remits the salary — this is not simony. On the contrary, it is simony, because the understanding between them is that the cleric will serve without pay once the benefice has been obtained. Therefore the bishop virtually takes the money he ought to give for the service on account of the benefice. Therefore it is true simony. This is clear from the common dictum concerning the threefold gift — namely, the gift from the hand, from the tongue, and from service — any of which suffices to incur simony.

Seventh conclusion.

In truth, it does not matter that the collator takes only a small amount as the cause for conferring a benefice, even though it is not presumed that a bishop is corruptly moved by a trifle. Proof: to give a benefice on any consideration other than suitability and public utility is unjust and amounts to respect of persons, as we showed in the preceding distinction; and this is simoniacal, as will be clear from what follows. Furthermore, a petty theft — petty on the part of the object that moves the thief to steal — is nonetheless theft and sin, just as a large theft is, even if not as grave. Therefore a small amount received that moves the collator to confer corruptly is a sin just as a large amount is. Another person’s small gift moves the complaisant and imprudent man to act corruptly just as a large gift moves the generous and prudent man. Therefore one must look not to the magnitude of the object but to the disposition of the one who is corruptly swayed. For it happens that a man is moved as much by a gilded image scarcely worth two crowns as another man is by a first-rate riding horse.

Against the foregoing, an argument is raised concerning the threefold gift.

If these conclusions were true, the following conclusion would follow: that a collator who confers a benefice on a relative on account of kinship would be simoniacal, just as the cantor of Paris maintained. This position Altissiodorensis, Blessed Thomas, and all subsequent authorities reject. And that it follows is shown thus: the collator gives in return for a gift of blood munus a sanguine. But you will say — as these doctors do — that the bishop here receives nothing, and thus, although he sins in building Sion with blood cf. Micah 3:10, he does not commit simony. I prove that these authorities contradict themselves in saying this: for neither does the collator take money when he confers a benefice on an unsuitable candidate, or on a suitable one principally on account of prayers. Therefore there is a contradiction in granting the one case and denying the other on the same grounds. The Lord Innocentius, in the chapter Tuam De aetate et qualitate ordinandorum, says that prayers, considered merely as entreaties, do not cause simony, but they do if they are directed toward money. And in the same chapter the Cardinal follows suit.

Against this.

These doctors and the common opinion cannot consistently say this, because on their account this distinction between types of gifts would be meaningless. The point is also argued on rational grounds: the prayers of a particular person move a collator to confer a benefice corruptly as much as two hundred or three hundred ducats, because the prayers are equivalent to that amount in the estimation of the one conferring. But the one suffices for simony; therefore so does the other. Moreover, Seneca rightly says in the second book of De beneficiis: “He did not receive it freely who received it after having asked.” Furthermore, nothing costs more dearly than what is purchased by prayers. As is clear in the chapter Sunt nonnulli C.1 q.1: “There are some” (says Blessed Gregory) “who take absolutely no payment for ordination, and yet they bestow sacred orders for the sake of human favor.

They seek only the reward of praise from their generosity itself. Assuredly, those who receive freely do not give freely in return, because from the sacred office they have performed they seek the reward of favor. Whence, when he was describing the virtuous prophet, he aptly said: Blessed is he who shakes his hands from every gift Isaiah 33:15. He did not say merely ‘from a gift,’ but ‘from every gift,’ because one kind is the gift from service, another from the hand, another from the tongue.” So says Gregory.

I hold, therefore, that a gift of blood — that is, carnal kinship alluring a man to confer a benefice corruptly — does cause simony;

and not blood alone, but fear instilled by a tyrant, and all other things of that kind, whatever they may be. Nor should one be concerned with the threefold distinction of gifts, for there are many other categories. Perhaps you will say: when a collator confers a benefice on a kinsman or in-law or on another person, some man or woman speaks on behalf of the kinsman, and so it should be considered a gift of the tongue munus a lingua. This does not help the adversaries who speak of blood as something separate from the other three categories. And moreover, it remains the case that a collator may give a benefice with no one speaking on the candidate’s behalf, solely out of regard for kinship or affinity. Therefore.

But against this position it is argued: In the preceding distinction I said that an unsuitable candidate who subsequently attains suitability is not bound to restore the benefice conferred on him, and that anyone who holds a benefice obtained simoniacally is bound to resign it. Furthermore, according to what has been said, anyone who sins in conferring a benefice would be committing simony, and so a collator who confers a benefice on a suitable candidate while passing over a more suitable one would commit simony — which is absurd.

To the first objection, I grant the major premise. The minor premise is false. Indeed, in the case of the third conclusion, a benefice is conferred on a suitable candidate simoniacally, and yet that suitable candidate is not bound to restore the benefice, since he is capable of holding it. And the collator does validly confer, even though he acts from a bad motive: this does not vitiate the conferral. Just as if I were to give ten coins generously to a brave man while adding a circumstance — venial or mortal — falling under the formal aspect of the object, the gift holds, and the other party acquires ownership of the gift. We discussed this in the preceding distinction in the case of the hypocrite and the poor man. The argument of the Lord of Armagh, in the tenth book of his work Ad Armenios, is not valid when he says that one who enters a benefice through sin does not acquire true title to it, since he does not enter through the door but by another way, and therefore is a thief and a robber (John 10:1). “But far be it from a Christian to say” (he writes) “that one who enters through sin enters through the door.” This argument, I say, is not valid, because in many ways a person acquires true title to a thing through sin. This is evident in the case of someone who sells a horse on a prohibited feast day: the seller acquires ownership of the money, and the buyer acquires ownership of the horse — even if the other party is excommunicated and is a cleric for whom such commerce is forbidden, so that he sins on three counts. And yet the transfer of property takes place. Therefore it is not inconsistent that someone enters upon a benefice through sin, as through a door: the act by which he enters is a sin, and he enters through sin — but not by reason of the act being sinful, but by reason of the fact that all the essentials for the conferral of the benefice or for the transfer of property are present. The passage in John 10 is to be understood literally as referring to the Catholic faith, as the interlinear Gloss explains: he who holds right belief about Christ enters the sheepfold through the door; he who climbs in by another way — by holding false belief about Christ — is a thief and a robber.

To the second objection, the assumption is denied,

because it is established that a man may sin with a sin that is irrelevant to the conferral of a benefice, and yet on that account the conferral will not be simoniacal. But if he sins in the act of conferring itself, I grant that he commits simony. And it is granted that one who confers a benefice on a suitable candidate while passing over a more suitable one commits simony — but the recipient is not bound to make restitution, as we said in the preceding question. When we speak of the penalties for simoniacs, this will become further apparent.

Secondly, an argument is raised concerning the gift from the hand.

Perhaps one may licitly give money to a prelate so that he will intercede on one’s behalf with the bishop for obtaining a benefice.

Therefore in the same way one may give money to the bishop for obtaining a benefice. The antecedent is clear: a person licitly gives money to a doorkeeper so as to gain access to the bishop — at least without the vice of simony. This is evident: if the petitioner were to open the lock with a latch or with a key hidden under the door, or were to break down the doors, even though he would sin in doing so by removing the obstacle that prevents him from gaining access to the bishop, he would not commit simony.

The reply is that it is denied that a person may give money to another to intercede on his behalf. And I grant the point that is assumed about the doorkeeper, provided the doorkeeper says nothing further — especially if the petitioner is suitable — because he is merely removing an obstacle that prevents him from gaining access to the collator. This is without the vice of simony, as the argument has sufficiently made clear.

Thirdly, it is argued: Service is a less principal cause,

or a cause without which the conferral would not have occurred causa sine qua non. Therefore money may serve in the same way. The reply: it is not the same thing to say “it is a less principal final cause” and “a cause without which not.” For knowledge, according to many, is a cause without which volition does not occur, yet it is not a final cause. Service in this case is a cause without which not, because through it the man’s faithful diligence and industry become known. Nothing comparable applies to money.

Fourthly, it is argued.

The Roman pontiff licitly sells benefices, and in his case it is not simoniacal. Therefore it is simoniacal in no one’s case. You say, moreover, that the Lex Julia on electoral bribery ambitus does not apply in the city of Rome, because there the prince creates the magistrates Digest, Ad legem Juliam de ambitu, lex unica. And thus the turpitude of trafficking in benefices ceases when a benefice is purchased from the supreme spiritual prince. He also appears to dispense with the one to whom he sells the benefice, so that that person may hold it.

The reply: some things are simoniacal because they are prohibited mala prohibita, and in these matters the supreme pontiff does not commit simony. An example: as in the blessing of chalices, priestly vestments, and the like — things instituted solely by the Church. These are not simoniacal by natural or divine law. But other things are prohibited because they are simoniacal mala in se — namely, those that contravene natural and divine law. In such matters the pontiff commits simony, just as any other person is subject to some law — though he does not incur the positive human penalties that an inferior would incur. Taking anything temporal for the conferral of a benefice that one is bound to confer freely contravenes divine and natural law. The text is clear in the chapter Ex diligenti, De simonia X 5.3. And this is the position of Panormitanus on De simonia, chapter 1. Durandus and Petrus Paludanus prove this sufficiently, because since it is simoniacal to take anything for the license to teach (as was established above), a fortiori it is simoniacal to take anything for the right to elect a bishop and to officiate in divine services. Blessed Thomas, in the Secunda Secundae, question 100, says it would be heretical to hold that the pope cannot commit simony. To the last part of the argument — whether he dispenses with the one to whom he sells the benefice — Joannes Andreae says in the Mercuriales commentary on the rule Cui licet: If a bishop establishes a penalty of excommunication, applicable equally to all who gamble at dice hasardum, he is not thereby released if someone, induced by the bishop, plays dice with him. On the contrary, the other party incurs the excommunication, and the bishop, playing with him again, incurs a greater excommunication — by communicating with a person who is criminal in a crime for which he has been condemned. For the first offense, the induced party incurs only the lesser excommunication if the bishop induced him, because the bishop is then considered the cause of the other’s playing, and thus as the principal agent he incurs the greater excommunication — just as if by his command or counsel a cleric were struck cf. the chapter Mulieres, De sententia excommunicationis. Just as one who knowingly participates with an excommunicated person by word or kiss is not thereby deemed to have absolved that person — unless he expressly states his will that the person be regarded as absolved cf. De sententia excommunicationis, chapter Si summus pontifex, in the Clementines — so it seems entirely that in our case the pope does not dispense with the buyer unless he makes this clear by some other means.

Fifthly, it is argued.

The prophets received money for the act of prophesying, and

nevertheless the act of prophesying is a gift of God and cannot be obtained by human means. The major premise is clear from the case of Saul (1 Samuel 9), who offered money to Samuel so that he might reveal the whereabouts of his father’s donkeys. The text reads: “Again the servant answered Saul and said: Behold, I have found in my hand a quarter of a shekel of silver; let us give it to the man of God, that he may tell us our way.” The same is evident from 2 Kings 14 1 Kings 14, concerning the wife of Jeroboam, who brought gifts to Ahijah the prophet. Likewise we read of Elisha, to whom Naaman the Syrian and Ben-hadad king of Syria offered great gifts. I grant that it is simoniacal to accept money by prophetic contract; nor did the prophets do this. Or as Hieronymus says commenting on Micah: the Jews, accustomed to true prophets, offered the most trifling gifts for the prophet’s sustenance. The wife of Jeroboam, queen of the kingdom of Israel, brought only ten loaves, a cake, and a jar of honey; she judged that a man of God, content with very little, would be vexed by a lavish royal offering. And indeed we do not read that the prophets accepted such things, though it was lawful for them to do so — not, however, by accepting them under a prophetic contract. Rather, it was the idolatrous pagans, deluded by false prophets, who were accustomed to trade immense gifts for prophecy. As we read in 3 Kings 1 Kings concerning Naaman the Syrian. And in the eighth chapter of that book it is written: “Elisha also came to Damascus; Ben-hadad king of Syria was sick, and they told him, saying...” And shortly afterward it continues: “So Hazael went to meet him, bringing with him gifts and all the good things of Damascus, the loads of forty camels.” But nothing is read to the effect that Elisha accepted them; indeed, that he did not accept is proven by what Naaman the Syrian said to him: “I beseech thee, take a blessing from thy servant.” And he answered: “As the Lord liveth, before whom I stand, I will receive none.” And when Naaman pressed him, he utterly refused. And it is plausible that in a similar case he would have done the same. Behold, then, how in the threefold gift — namely of the tongue, of entreaty, and of service — and in other things that draw persons improperly toward the conferral of benefices, simony is committed; and how certain kinds of service and entreaties induce simony, while others do not. And that someone may acquire a benefice simoniacally and wrongfully, yet not unjustly against distributive justice — that is, he does not lack what is essential for the conferral of the benefice, even though something is added that vitiates the moral goodness of the act in the one conferring, or in the one receiving, or in both. Such a person is not bound to relinquish the benefice; rather, it suffices to repent of the sin, serving well since he is suitable.

Question Four of Distinction Twenty-Five.

The fourth inquiry concerning the matter of simony is this: Is it permissible to receive something by reason of custom and to compel the unwilling to give according to the lawful custom of the place in the conferral of sacraments and benefices? This question is difficult and touches upon matters of conscience. For this reason I shall dwell upon it a little; yet ever mindful of prolixity, lest I weary my readers. First I shall set out conclusions stating the manner of speaking of others; afterward I shall state what seems to me the right thing to say.

Let this be the first conclusion of all that is to be said.

It is permissible after the fact to accept something as a gratuitous gift. Proof: no one sins by accepting a gratuitous gift; and when money is given after the fact, it is the clearest possible sign of a gratuitous gift. Therefore, one who confers a benefice may accept something after the conferral of a benefice or sacrament in the nature of a gratuitous gift. For if the opposite were maintained — that he cannot accept — this consequence would follow: that the benefactor of someone would be less capable of receiving a free gift than a highway robber of Jericho. And that is absurd. I presuppose a right intention on the part of both the one offering and the one accepting, and the other requisite conditions. If the one conferring gives a gift for the sake of

obtaining a further benefice, then his act is evil; but it does not vitiate a good act already past — whether the gift is given immediately after the fact or long afterward.

Second conclusion.

Although the one who compels laypeople to give money before spiritual services have been rendered perhaps acts wrongly, nevertheless once those services have been rendered, he can by the authority of his superior compel laypeople subject to him to observe praiseworthy customs — that is, to pay according to the custom that has not been disapproved in that place. This conclusion is proved by the chapter Ad apostolicam X 5.3.4, De simonia, where the pontiff writes thus: “It has come to our apostolic hearing by frequent report that clerics demand and extort money for the burial of the dead, the blessing of those marrying, and similar things; and if their cupidity is not satisfied, they fraudulently raise fictitious impediments. On the other hand, certain laypeople, from the leaven of heretical wickedness, endeavor to abolish praiseworthy customs introduced into holy Church by the pious devotion of the faithful, under the pretext of canonical piety. Wherefore we prohibit wrongful exactions from being made in these matters, and we command that pious customs be observed, decreeing that the sacraments of the Church be freely conferred, and that those who maliciously endeavor to change a praiseworthy custom be restrained by the bishop of the place once the truth has been ascertained.” Therefore the pontiff means to say that sacraments and benefices must be given freely, without a prior pact or one made at the time of conferral; but nevertheless those who receive them are to be compelled to observe praiseworthy custom.

Third conclusion:

This is commonly held by Hostiensis, Panormitanus, and the canonists generally: that no custom is valid by which clerics give anything temporal for spiritual things received or to be received from other clerics. This is clear by argument from the contrary sense in the chapter just cited, in which special mention is made of laypeople. But you will object: an argument from the contrary sense does not hold when an absurdity follows from the opposite, as is the case here — for it is scarcely possible to give a reason why laypeople should be compelled to observe praiseworthy customs and clerics should not. In support of the conclusion: by the chapter Jacobus X 5.3.30, De simonia, and the first chapter of the same title, and C.1 q.3, chapter Si quis episcopus. Hostiensis, commenting on the chapter Jacobus, assigns the distinction between the third and second conclusions — explaining why custom excuses laypeople but not clerics — namely: it serves the public good when clerics receive from laypeople, but it serves only private interest when clerics give to clerics. The Franciscans are exceedingly hostile to clerics in this regard. Likewise, one should not be concerned that the Church possesses what does not arise from it, since goods remain with the laypeople. This distinction is of no weight. The force of the distinction rests on this: that clerics can and ought to receive everything from laypeople because laypeople are hostile to clerics. But in the same way, many clerics are hostile to laypeople and live slothfully on the goods conceded by laypeople. And if one should not be concerned about what the Church possesses, then any church should concede its revenues to another — which is false. There is a certain canonist who wrote a booklet on this subject, which I have seen in the past, though I do not recall the name; he excuses everyone indiscriminately. For he goes so far abroad that he is content to lick with an ulcerated finger i.e., to gloss over festering wounds, while he wishes to excuse indiscriminately all these monstrous plagues of prelates regarding exactions. For this reason a different distinction between clerics and laypeople must be given: namely, that prelates who are collators are bound by their office to administer freely those things that are incumbent upon them, because they have stipends from the revenues of the Church for this purpose. And therefore they commit simony by exacting anything further from ecclesiastics, and they are bound to restitution. And Saint Thomas (Summa theologiae II-II, q.100, a.3) says that the one to whom spiritual power is committed is bound by his office to exercise the power committed to him in the dispensation of spiritual things; and he also has stipends established for his sustenance from ecclesiastical revenues. And therefore, if he should accept anything for the exercise of spiritual power, he would not be understood as hiring out his labors — which he is bound to expend by reason of the office he has undertaken — but rather as selling the very exercise of spiritual grace. For this reason it is not permissible through any

dispensation to accept anything, nor even to accept anything for correcting one’s subjects or for desisting from correction. And it is proved that this is true through the canons of the supreme pontiffs, canons most reasonable and grounded in natural equity, which cannot be overturned by contrary custom, as these sellers of oil i.e., peddlers of dispensations claim. And he argues a posteriori thus: for indeed, if the third conclusion were true, you would say that all bishops act rightly who by fair means and foul heap up the revenues of their bishoprics, both in the conferral of benefices and of sacraments — bishops who abound in goods to the point of nausea, while they take from the poor on whom they ought to have pity, to the great disfigurement of the clergy, from which the sacred canons have commanded us to guard as from a serpent. Furthermore, the same point is argued: if current custom excused them in this way, for the conferral of a single order, in the course of time a way would be opened so that it would be permissible to take four or five scudi — not by reason of the sacrament (they will say) but under the veil of custom. This would open the way to sinners. Moreover, since this is contrary to the sacred canons — canons founded not merely in positive law but in natural equity — no custom can remove these canons from their force. I believe that Aristotle and Plato, walking in the darkness of paganism, would freely confess that it is contrary to reason for one member of the clerical estate — even though he is the head of the diocese — to suck nourishment from the lowly members to their detriment, especially when the head is monstrously too large, for whom an ample and honorable reduction would be most expedient — at least by refraining from extorting from the poor members, if not by giving up what he has. Again: if you wish to excuse all of them on the basis of custom — or rather corruption — this will be because, under this third conclusion, a great many bishops are living in a perilous state. But this does not overturn the conclusion, as is evident from the many who live wickedly, both in the clergy and among the people. Some bishops, however, are good and immune from all these things. I therefore hold the third conclusion and would not dare in conscience to excuse them in the manner of that canonist.

Against the second conclusion the following argument is made.

To take this money introduced by custom is to collect beyond the revenues owed to the Church, as is clear from the revenues the pastor had before the custom was introduced. Therefore he unjustly compels the people to observe the custom. The response is: pastors often sin in this matter too, and are excessively solicitous, as is clear from the chapter Suam X 5.3.14 of this title. But in kingdoms where every village regularly has a parish church, the livings are commonly meager. It is natural that when clerics labor in spiritual things for the people, they should be sustained by them. And they do not have tithes in respect of their quota in a great many places. The ordinary revenues before this payment of moneys did not suffice. Therefore, by a free gift, the people of their own accord, after spiritual services had been rendered, piously gave the clergy something. And although some livings are rich, as we see in Paris, those are few in comparison with the entire multitude. In such places too, pastors can compel their subjects to observe customs, even though the rationale for the law is not the same — especially when the curate is not very suitable. But when a law or custom is general, it must be observed even if the same force of the law does not apply in every individual case. Regarding the preservation of this custom, the Roman pontiff in the chapter Ad apostolicam says that the truth is to be ascertained by the bishop of the place — as if to say: if the parish priests demand exorbitantly, they are to be restrained. And although at first glance it might seem that in a meager living the pastor should compel his subjects to observe the custom but not in a rich one, this does not hold — because it would be to enervate the custom of the diocese and consequently to abolish the force of custom to the detriment even of a very suitable man who is worth more than two others combined. But against this it is argued: the people freely and of their own accord originally granted this sum of money to the parish priest,

from the very beginning. But from a free gift no obligation to continue arises. If I freely give you ten on the first day of every year, even if I repeat this twelve or twenty times, you cannot on that account compel me to pay in a court of law. And the same applies to my son or grandson.

A second argument is made to the same effect.

It may be that this manner of paying was introduced through exaction and with the sin of avarice. Therefore it is not a praiseworthy custom but a corruption, which does not bind at all. And this is clear from the chapter Suam nobis X 5.3.14, De simonia. To the first argument it is conceded that the people originally gave freely and of their own accord — for instance, some devout persons at the beginning, seeing a curate wholly worthy, by whose example neighbors were moved to give similarly and freely, so that such giving continued for some time until many came to think it was obligatory; and afterward the greater part concurred, and thus there was a virtual consent of the people binding themselves to this — the people being unable to discern whether such a sum of money was owed to the prelate by right or not, since the fruits of his labors depended on customs. An analogous example: only for the feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin is fasting a precept of the Church, and yet by custom the people fast on all the vigils of feasts of Our Lady; those who omit them judge themselves evildoers. And so the custom is binding upon them, yet it had its origin only in counsel voluntarily taken up — because the people erroneously believed it to be a written law obligating them, or because they believed the same about the vigil of the Nativity of the Christ-bearing Virgin as about the Assumption into heaven. Thus through some plausible rationale a preceptive custom is introduced. And the same would apply if a farmer holding lands from a lord were to give of his own accord from the beginning certain capons: by continuing the free gift he can convert it into an obligation when he cannot prove its origin — because it is not presumed that he would continue so freely. And if the farmer already owes certain rents to the lord, the presumption is even stronger. But the first case alone suffices. You see, then, that the analogy is not apt if I give someone a scudo on the first day of the year, where I can prove the free origin and the voluntary continuation. From this it is clear that this argument is of no weight: I can prove that this payment of money after funerary rites was originally free, therefore I am not now bound to it. For the priest ought to take this money not by reason of the spiritual services rendered to the people — because those he renders freely. Just so, Christ who commanded that these things be rendered freely also commanded that those to whom they are rendered should give the ministers what is necessary for their sustenance, as is clear from Matthew 10, where those two things are commanded together in a single continuous passage. Let the priest therefore say that he takes it by reason of sustenance, and his title to this is grounded in custom — because otherwise he cannot prove in a particular case that anything is owed to him.

But against this the following argument is made.

Innocentius III in the aforesaid chapter Suam X 5.3.14 states the opposite, saying thus: “Their parishioners from Villafranca have sent us their complaint that their chaplain unlawfully demands and extorts money from them for the burial of the dead and the blessing of those marrying.” And further on: “We command that you admonish the said chaplain to desist from such presumption, and also to make fitting satisfaction for his excess; and if he refuses to obey, inflict canonical punishment upon him.” And in the chapter Cum in ecclesia X 5.3.15, after reciting the same spiritual services, the pontiff says: “Many people think this is permissible because they consider that a law of death has prevailed through long usage, not realizing that crimes are all the graver the longer they hold an unhappy soul in bondage.” And afterward it continues: “Lest therefore these things be done henceforth — whether for ecclesiastical persons being installed in their seats, or for priests being instituted, or for burying the dead, or for blessing those marrying, or for conferring or having conferred other sacraments — we most strictly prohibit that anything be demanded.

If anyone presumes to act contrary to this, let him know that he shall have his portion with Gehazi” cf. 2 Kings 5:27. You see that these chapters are apparently against the second conclusion and seem to wage war with the chapter Ad apostolicam. But we say that these chapters are to be understood of cases where the custom has not been sufficiently established — because at least ten years are required while the people do not resist, since it is well established that a custom against laypeople alone is strengthened by a decade, as is customarily noted on the law De quibus Dig. 1.3.32, De lege, and through the gloss on the final chapter De consuetudine in the Liber Sextus. To the second argument I say two things. First: even if it were so i.e., introduced with sin, it does not follow that the custom is not now good. This is clear from the first Gauls, who did not fast on the vigils of all nine Apostles’ feasts. And from all those who introduce a custom contrary to written law while sinning — yet their successors do not sin, because the law has now been abrogated by custom. Moreover, to establish a custom it is not necessary to prove that its origin was good, because some custom is now reasonable that could have had its origin in sin, and some without sin. Secondly, I say that the more favorable interpretation is to be presumed where the opposite is not demonstrated. From the entire solution it is clear that where there is no custom of accepting money for the things named, the prelate cannot compel the people to give. It is clear that where the custom has been introduced in some fashion but not sufficiently established, he cannot compel — as is evident from the chapter Cum in ecclesia — and therefore all the more so he cannot compel where nothing of custom has been introduced. Likewise the question arises: by what title does he demand such money? It does not suffice to cite other places — for in that way I could eat the inner parts of animals in France on every Saturday outside of Lent, because the Castilians do so. And on those days between Christmas and Candlemas inclusive, it would be permissible to eat meat in Brittany after the custom of the Parisians — which is false. But against this it is argued: it happens that the parish priest does not have the necessary means of support; therefore he can then compel them to adopt the custom of paying that prevails in neighboring places. The response is: he still cannot exact anything. Rather, let him teach children, let him write, let him seek his livelihood by his hands or by his industry, as is stated in Distinction 91, the chapter Clericus victum — just as the Apostle did, as in the chapter Cum apostolus D.91 c.4. And if he does not know how to seek a livelihood by other means, then the people will provide for him and will be compelled to do so.

Against the third conclusion the following argument is made.

The second conclusion entails the contradictory of the third; therefore these two conclusions are in conflict — because if it is permissible for the inferior, it will be permissible for the superior, since otherwise the inferior in jurisdiction would be proportionally greater than the superior. The response is to deny that these conclusions are repugnant to one another. For a poor parish priest who has great labor among his people, even with all his customary dues, sometimes barely collects sixty ducats, and sometimes scarcely thirty or less. In my estimation you will find many who do not collect a hundred ducats — indeed, not even sixty — and you will find some collecting beyond that sum even when all customary dues are counted in their total. Bishops, however, regularly have sufficient revenues. Are two or three thousand ducats not enough for a bishop’s sustenance — even if he were the most profound theologian, with as many eyes in his pastoral care as Argus, and noble besides? What need is there, then, when he has so many revenues for supporting himself and his household, to make so many exactions? Add further: if need be, the bishop can have ecclesiastical men in his service by giving them small amounts, for which he can provide according to place and time — not by reason of service, but by reason of recognized suitability in their service. And where there might be others who are

one having sufficient means according to his common station ought to diminish his temporal and transitory condition rather than give others occasion to act wickedly, because if a bishop having little takes money after the administration of spiritual things under the title of sustenance (especially if he is a good man), wealthy bishops will think this is permitted to them. The arguments of a certain person who holds the opposite view carry no weight: he says that bishops are burdened with the care of the entire diocese — but custom does not prevail against natural equity, as we have said above. Nor is his argument valid that the Pope knows of and tolerates it, and therefore it is lawful. For the antecedent is false, as is evident from the constitutions of Martin V, Eugenius IV, Paul, Sixtus, and many other subsequent pontiffs. Second, the consequence is invalid, as is evident from the many crimes in which both ecclesiastics and laypeople are ensnared.

Gathering together the points made in passing.

We have said that a parish priest may lawfully compel his subjects to observe a praiseworthy custom — but only after the fact, when the custom is fully established by prescription. Before the fact, or at the time of administering the sacrament, he cannot do so, even though he takes payment not by reason of the sacrament but by reason of the custom, because the custom does not yet exist, and there would be an appearance of selling sacraments — and the appearance of evil is to be avoided. He may, however, accept what is freely offered. Nor does the chapter Emendari C.1 q.1 stand in the way, where it is forbidden to place coins in the basin lest the priest appear to be selling baptism — this is on account of the appearance of evil. But in the following chapter it is said that he may accept what is freely offered. Bishops, however, cannot do these things, since they regularly have sufficient revenues. Whence it follows that less pardon should be given to a wealthy bishop who takes such payments than to a poor one. But you say: if a poor priest were to accept something secretly for his sustenance, he would not commit simony; therefore neither does a rich one commit simony. I reply: to one who understands, the consequence has no plausibility. Where there is no custom compelling people to pay, he would commit simony; but not where there is a custom among parish priests — just as a merchant takes profit beyond the principal without usury, whereas if one who is not a merchant were to take similar profit, he would commit usury. That person commits simony who, in the administration of spiritual things, takes a temporal payment without justification, even though he says he takes it for his sustenance. And this concludes the matter of custom as it pertains to both bishops and their inferiors. Regarding notaries and similar officials, one must consider whether they have an assigned sustenance so that they may carry out their office without charge, or not. And accordingly one must judge whether they are simoniacal or not.

Question Five of the Twenty-Fifth Distinction.

It is asked, fifth, whether one who has been simoniacally promoted by a gift from the hand munus a manu acquires a just title to a benefice. The answer is in the negative, as is evident from the extravagant decree of Martin V issued at the Council of Constance, which begins Culte. It states as follows: “With the approval of this sacred council, we declare that those ordained simoniacally are by that very fact ipso iure suspended from the exercise of their orders. Moreover, elections, postulations, confirmations, and any simoniacal provisions whatsoever to churches, monasteries, dignities, parsonages, offices, and benefices of any kind that are hereafter made shall be null by that very fact, and no right shall be acquired by anyone through them.”

Nor shall those promoted, confirmed, or provided make the fruits their own, but they shall be bound to make restitution of them as having been unjustly taken. We decree furthermore that those who give and those who receive shall incur the sentence of excommunication by that very fact, even if they hold the honor of the pontifical or cardinalate dignity. In reality, however, one who has been simoniacally promoted does acquire orders, but does not acquire the right to exercise those orders — that is, he cannot perform those things that pertain to the order without the penalty of mortal sin.

Against this conclusion it is argued.

It is possible for the Roman Pontiff to be simoniacally elected by the cardinals, and yet he acquires a true right to the supreme pontificate. Therefore the conclusion is false. There appears to be no doubt except regarding the minor premise, and so the objection is answered: because if the opposite were granted, it would frequently be uncertain who is the head of the Church, which is unacceptable. The reply is to concede both premises, for he alone is excepted. And this is evident concerning elections in the chapter Licet Licet de vitanda, X 1.6.6, where it is written: “Although concerning the avoidance of discord in the election of the Roman Pontiff, sufficiently clear provisions had previously issued from us, nevertheless, because the Church has often thereafter suffered a grave schism from the audacity of wicked ambition, we too have decreed that something should be added to avoid this evil, with the counsel of our brothers and the approval of the sacred council. We therefore decree that if, perchance, the enemy sowing tares, there cannot be full concord among the cardinals regarding the appointment of a supreme pontiff, and two parts being in agreement, the third part should refuse to concur or should presume to nominate another for itself, that person shall without any exception be held by the universal Church as Roman Pontiff who has been elected and received by the two parts.” Note that it says here “without any exception” — this is of positive human law. The Gloss excepts heresy. But I say that exception is void. For a pope does not fall from the papal dignity on account of heresy, nor is it inconsistent that a heretic be elected, because then there would be uncertainty in the pontificate. Therefore, if he were simoniacal or a homicide, after the election by two thirds he will be pontiff. Panormitanus, in the aforesaid chapter, infers that a layman elected by two parts will be pontiff. His proof is from Petrus, who was the first Pope and a layman. But the proof is invalid. For although Christ promised him the pontificate before the Passion, as is evident from Matthew 16 — and by extension, C.24 q.1 Quodcunque — nevertheless he was not supreme pontiff while Christ was living. Rather, that power was conferred upon him after the Resurrection, as we said in the preceding distinction; and yet he had been made a priest at the Last Supper. Therefore Panormitanus assumes a falsehood in his proof. I think the conclusion is true, however. I do not believe it is required by divine law that a person be a cleric in order to hold the papal dignity. You see that just as the Pope has a right separated from other pontiffs, so he has a different mode of election. For other bishops are elected by the greater part of the chapter, and the agreement of two thirds is not required — a plurality suffices, as is evident. From this, in the said chapter Licet: other bishops are confirmed and consecrated, which is not required in his case. He is not called “lord elect” in the manner of others, but “Roman Pontiff.” But one who gives money to be elected sins gravely: it is a mark of great ambition and gives the worst example to other prelates. We read that some who doubted their election renounced the papacy, as did Leo IV and Honorius II. The cardinals, however, who accept money from him so that they may elect him, are bound to return it, because as a general matter of natural law, a person does not acquire ownership of money through an act which he is bound to perform gratuitously — as when you give money to a robber so that

he will not kill you, or money to a debtor so that he will pay you what he owes: neither the assassin nor the debtor acquires ownership of that money, but is bound to restore it. And the reason is that he is bound to do the opposite. So it is in the case at hand. The cardinals are bound to elect the Roman Pontiff gratuitously, if they are to elect at all, and they are forbidden to accept such a gift — not only by positive human law. Therefore they do not acquire ownership of that money, but are obligated to restore it. You object: a woman receives money for the shameful hire of her body, and she is bound to do the opposite; nevertheless, she does acquire ownership of that money. The reply is: a woman is not bound to communicate gratuitously the dominion of her body to another, because she is in no way bound to communicate the use of her body to another. Rather, although such use is forbidden to her, the acceptance of money is not forbidden to her, nor is she bound to make restitution. Nor can the Pope himself, once he is pontiff, remit that money to them — that is, so that they are safe in conscience however they spend that money. That was ecclesiastical money, as is supposed, of which the pontiff is not the owner but only a faithful steward. But against this it is argued from the statement of Pope Nicholas that is recited in Distinction 79, chapter Si quis pecunia, where it says: “If anyone has been enthroned in the Apostolic See by money or by human favor or by popular or military tumult, without a concordant and canonical election by the cardinals and the other religious clergy, let him be held not as apostolic but as apostate, and let it be lawful for the cardinals and other God-fearing clerics and laypeople to anathematize him and to drive him from the Apostolic See with human assistance.” The Gloss there responds that the text speaks of one who was elected through simony by those who did not have the power of election — not by the cardinals. This is the Orleans gloss. And this is evident from the words of the text just cited. But I say that was the old law, and it is revoked in the chapter Licet. Nor does the law cited at the Council of Constance in the proof of the conclusion revoke this law, because that law in the chapter Licet is reasonable, considering the times in which we live.

Second, it is argued.

If Sortes has a true right to benefice A and is impeded by someone, he can redeem the vexation with money so as to have his benefice. Therefore the conclusion is false. The antecedent is evident from the chapter Dilectus filius, where a provost recovered money by mandate of the supreme pontiff from the Archdeacon of York, who had not kept his promise to cease from vexation. The reply is: simony is not committed here, because a temporal thing is not given for a spiritual thing, but a temporal thing is given for something that has an estimable monetary value. For the cessation of unjust vexation is a temporal thing with an estimable monetary value. Therefore someone may lawfully redeem that unjust vexation, even though the one who unjustly vexes him sins and is bound to restore what he accepted, because the one redeeming the vexation has a just cause for redeeming it, and he does not cooperate in the sin of the other, because he does not consent to the active vexation of the other, nor is he pleased by the reception of money that the other accepts; rather, what pleases him is the cessation of the unjust vexation and the payment of the price for it, which is not evil — as we said in the fifteenth distinction, concerning usury. But when a person has a fully acquired right, whether in spiritual or temporal matters, it is lawful to redeem vexation, according to the saying of the Apostle: “Redeeming the time, because the days are evil” Ephesians 5:16 — whether he has been placed in possession or not, but is unjustly impeded from possession. And this applies when the right is indubitably established as acquired. For by means of money

I do not acquire a new right, but I remove an impediment to holding the right I already have. This is evident from another angle: I can give money to a tyrant so that he ceases from a greater sin, if I cannot entirely dissuade him from sinning — and so, lest he kill me in the forest, I give him money, in the acceptance of which he sins less than he would by killing me. But it is a lesser sin to take a small amount of money than to hold a benefice continually without right. This is evident from the cited chapter Dilectus, where it is held that the giving of money for the preservation of an acquired spiritual right against undue molestation does not constitute simony or turpitude. Otherwise the one vexed could not have sought recovery of the money given, because when turpitude exists on both sides, there is no ground for recovery C.1 q.3 Quantum. But if Sortes is a suitable person who has been elected, whether he can give money to the one confirming him so that the latter will confirm him — when the confirming authority wrongfully denies confirmation to a suitable person who has been elected — is a matter of greater difficulty. There is a colorable argument for the affirmative. For since he is a suitable person who has been elected, he has a right to seek confirmation; the superior is bound to confirm the election unless he has a legitimate cause against the elect. Where he knows for certain that there is no cause for not confirming except that money is not given, it is perhaps not implausible that in the forum of conscience he can give money to remove the vexation. In spiritual matters, however, in order to avoid the taint of simony, it is not lawful to give money for the acquisition of a right. For in that case there is no ground for redeeming unjust vexation. But if the objection to his right is made on legal grounds, the taint of simony in giving money is manifest — as is evident in the chapter Matther and the chapter De hoc. I can, however, give money so that the electors do not elect an unsuitable candidate and so that they elect suitable ones. To this I have an acquired right, and it falls under the second category — but not so that they elect me as a suitable candidate, for I ought not to presume that I alone am suitable, nor that Sortes alone is. In this way, Jacobus did not buy the right of primogeniture that God had actually given him from his brother, but redeemed his vexation in the manner of a purchase — as if money were given to those opposing in fact but not in law. It is safer, however, to abstain from giving money to those opposing in fact and for confirmation, on account of the appearance of evil, and where the right in confirmation is fully acquired and those opposing in fact may perhaps have the appearance of opposing in law. In the same way, if someone has been unjustly excommunicated, he can give money for the purpose of redeeming the vexation, because perhaps he is impeded from electing or being elected, or incurs some other loss. I am speaking of an unjust excommunication that is null. The reason is: such an excommunicated person already has an acquired right to this. In the same way, if I have a small child near death, and no one present will baptize him except a priest who is alone and who will not baptize without payment, and I cannot persuade him otherwise, I shall give money, redeeming my unjust vexation. Whatever he may specify — whether for sustenance or for the sacrament — it suffices for me that I do not give with that intention. In that case only a temporal thing is given for a temporal thing, and I have an acquired right.

Third, it is argued.

Something annexed to a spiritual thing can be exchanged for money. This is evident in the exchange of two benefices, one of which is richer than the other, with money refunded until equality of revenues is reached — as is evident in the chapter Ad questiones, under the title De rerum permutatione. And yet there is simony in this according to what has been said. Therefore. The reply is: the chapter explains itself. Possessions can be exchanged among themselves, and churches among themselves, but these things ought not to be mixed together — namely, a possession with a church, as the text says. If someone exchanges a benefice burdened with debts contracted by reason of the benefice and not of the benefice-holder, the debts

were contracted on behalf of the benefice: he can also agree that he will exchange with another on the condition that the other party pay these debts. The reason is that without such an agreement the other party would be compelled to do so; nothing is brought into the agreement beyond what was tacitly inherent. A benefice is exchanged for a benefice in itself; those debts pass along incidentally.

Fourth, it is argued.

When two persons contend for a benefice, they can settle between themselves, as we see every day: a perpetual pension is assigned to one, and the benefice to the other. And the case is expressly stated in law, in the chapter Nisi, under the title De praebendis, where one person received the benefice and the other a pension of a certain number of pounds annually, and sold his right to the benefice for the price of a certain number of pounds. Therefore something annexed to a spiritual thing is exchanged for a temporal thing. The essence of a settlement is that a non-gratuitous agreement is made in which something is given or retained so that the parties withdraw from the lawsuit. For it is by this feature that it differs from an amicable composition properly so called.

The reply is:

When both have a probable title, they can settle by the authority of prudent men; nor is a settlement and exchange of benefices simoniacal in itself, but on account of the danger of simony and fraud the laws forbid it. Therefore the Pontiff says in the said chapter Nisi that he would hold that composition suspect if it were not for the respectability of those persons — there is nothing to fear. Those who weigh the words of the law and not their meaning are not to be believed when they say that it is not lawful for those exchanging benefices to have discussions with one another, but that one must go to the bishop, informing him that he would do better in another place, making mention of the other’s benefice, and then the bishop will bring both together. This is not necessary: they can speak with one another about this and explain their intention to each other, and say that they are content if it pleases the superior. But on account of the law invalidating the contract, they cannot effectively exchange without the permission of the bishop. For example: if I am disliked and less welcome in this place, but can serve my subjects well elsewhere, and another would be more welcome to my flock — why could I not desire to go to another place? Since I cannot in this mortal state speak in the manner of angels, why should I not make my mind known to another? The advantage of the churches or of the church, or the advancement of the persons without detriment to the church, is a sufficient reason for exchange. If there were no law enacted that an exchange should not take place without the consent of the bishop or bishops (when they are from different dioceses), two prudent men could exchange among themselves, and it would in no way be simony. But on account of the danger of simony or avarice, this is forbidden; and so an exchange made without the authority of the bishop can be tainted with the vice of simony in name, because it is prohibited. I say further: if Sortes has benefice A and simoniacally exchanges it for benefice B of Plato who acts justly, Plato thereafter has a just title to benefice A and Sortes to benefice B. The reason is that they resigned their benefices into the hands of the superior, who conferred these benefices anew. Each is capable of holding the benefice, unless some positive human law prejudices Sortes. Benefice B is not given as the price corresponding to benefice A, but is conferred anew. It is otherwise with fields purchased through usury: the defendant who takes the place of the usurious increment succeeds to the obligation of restitution.

To the form of the argument:

I deny that a pension is something purely temporal. “Benefice” sometimes stands in the nominative for the right of collecting fruits by reason of the divine office, which is commonly called a canonry, to which a person is obligated; and sometimes it stands for the fruits themselves, and then it is something temporal — as in chapter 1, under the title De usuris. So a pension is understood as the right of levying such fruits by reason of divine worship when a person is bound to the office: the thing is virtually a benefice and a temporary apportionment. And the pensioner is obligated to pray for those for whom the other who is in possession

of the whole categorematically. And so a person who holds one spiritual right of uncertain title but greater revenue may exchange it for another spiritual right of lesser importance — it does not matter that it is not called a benefice; names signify by convention. For example, when two persons are in litigation and each has an apparent title: if Sortes holds a small benefice, he may concede it to Plato, the other litigant, on condition that Plato cede his right; and neither party commits a sin. Therefore, if neither of them held a benefice, one takes the title of the benefice and is called curate or rector in Britain, assigning to the other a pension for life or until provision is made for him of a richer living — provided this is done on the counsel of prudent men, all of this is licit. But if one of them has no right at all and knows this, the one who does have the right may redeem the vexation by assigning the other a portion, or by giving money so that he will withdraw, without sin — because he acquires no more right than he had before. This is clear: he gives money so as not to be harassed, while the other party takes it unjustly and is bound to make restitution. Against this: when two persons are litigating with probable claims, it may happen that at the end of the proceedings it is discovered that Plato has no right but had only a sophistical claim. It follows that, although Sortes may remit to Plato the expenses incurred, Plato cannot accept them with a clear conscience. I reply: this does not follow, because even though Plato has less right, he will appeal; and now the right appears to grow in favor of one party, now of the other — and without that certain right, the probable basis for his litigation and proceedings will, for the time being, excuse him. From what has been said you can discern whether one who has an acquired right to a benefice, even though he is in fact being harassed, may exchange that right for another actual benefice — and it is clear that he may. Furthermore, you can discern whether for a probable right one may accept a less certain benefice.

In summary, we say that the Roman Pontiff acquires a true papacy

even if he is elected simoniacally and by corrupt agreement — because there should be no difficulty regarding the episcopate, since it is an order, and also with respect to the jurisdiction inherent in it. And this is reasonable, lest there be confusion and uncertainty in the head of the Church. It is, however, a sign of great ambition and of a man who does not fear God to ascend to the papacy in this manner. From this it is clear that, although such an ascent is forbidden by divine and natural law, the papacy itself is not thereby denied to him. Furthermore, it is clear that a person may redeem a vexation in temporal matters, both for a right already acquired and for one being acquired. In spiritual matters, one may redeem a vexation for a right already acquired — whether or not one is in possession — since such a person buys no right but merely redeems a vexation. Concerning transactions and the exchange of benefices, we have said that if they are carried out on the counsel of prudent men, neither simony nor the appearance of simony is committed. Furthermore, we have said that individuals may confer privately about the exchange of benefices when they see that it would benefit the Church or serve them spiritually, or that it is harmful.

Distinction Twenty-Five, Question Six.

The sixth question is: whether there can be a pact in spiritual matters. The answer is given through two conclusions, of which the first is: A spiritual thing may be contracted for in exchange for another spiritual thing. This is clear from the exchange of churches — as in “I give you the title to my church, and I take the title to your church,” from the preceding question. Second: two persons accustomed to celebrating — Sortes at the eighth hour and Plato at the tenth — may, on account of an impediment, licitly agree that if Plato celebrates at the eighth hour, Sor-

tes will celebrate at the tenth. Moreover, a bishop confers upon someone a parish church on the condition that he resign his first — and the conferral is valid, for it is tacitly implied that by accepting a second parish church the first becomes vacant capitulo De multa, de praebendis. Indeed, a conferral of a benefice is valid in capitulo Significatum, de praebendis even under the condition that the beneficiary should celebrate a daily Mass of the Blessed Virgin. Furthermore, religious fathers promise a certain young man that if he studies well for two or three years, they will receive him into the religious order. And a bishop honorably says to a young man: “If you study well and show yourself to be upright, I will provide you with a benefice.” He may also licitly promise that if the young man changes his dissolute life for a good one, he will give him a benefice.

Second conclusion.

A temporal thing belonging to the Church may licitly be applied with the addition of a spiritual obligation, and conversely a spiritual thing may be promised in exchange for a temporal one — because in the handing over of one’s property, anyone may set whatever condition he wishes lege In traditionibus, ff. de pactis. Even if the transfer is made to a church, there is a text to this effect in capitulo Verum, de conditionibus appositis in desponsatione. In this way many monasteries and many churches have been endowed: receiving temporal goods with the obligation that the religious or priests, both present and future, should pray for the benefactors and their posterity. Just as gold, a profane thing, is given to the church so that a chalice may be made for use in the divine office, so it is with money left for anniversaries and in many other similar cases. Again, we see upright parish priests who have reasonable cause compelling their absence from the church appointing good vicars and agreeing with them on a fixed sum for service in the church. Moreover, a priest may celebrate Mass for six small coins, as established in the second question of this distinction; therefore, this may be made the subject of a condition. But you rightly object: the inference is invalid, because the one who confers a benefice may accept a palfrey after the conferral as a free gift, and yet he may not make this a condition. For this reason, the argument is made differently: Everything that is licit without a condition — and no illicitness or impropriety arises from the condition itself — may be made a condition. But this is the case in the matter at hand, as is clear from what was cited for the first conclusion. Furthermore, I may licitly make a condition of that which is tacitly implied — and when I have someone perform spiritual labor on my behalf, it is tacitly implied that sustenance should be provided to him in part or in full, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 9. Therefore I may make such an agreement: “If you celebrate for me, whenever you are disposed to do so, I will give you food and clothing.” From the Council of Agde it is written, as is found in capitulo Clerici, C.1 q.2: “Let all clerics who faithfully and vigilantly serve the church receive the stipends due to their holy labors according to the merit of their service, by the ordinance of the canons, from the priests.” And since it is licit to receive a stipend for holy labors, and no impropriety appears to be involved in making a pact to that effect, this is licit.

Against these conclusions the argument is raised, especially against the second conclusion.

It is simony to attach a spiritual obligation to a profane thing. I reply by denying that this is simony, as is clear from what was said in the second question. And on this point, the Gloss on capitulo Signatum, de praebendis, provides a safeguard for avoiding simony. It is this: that the obligations of divine services to be celebrated should be attached to the thing itself, and afterward the thing should be transferred unconditionally — then the thing passes with those obligations attached. Innocentius says that a temporal obligation may be attached, but not a spiritual one, except for the redemption of captives C.10 q.1, Hoc ius; C.12 q.1, Aurum. Panormitanus follows Innocentius. This does not hold. If that pious cause can be attached — namely, redeeming captives — then a fortiori there can be attached the cause of redeeming souls from purgatory and promoting the glory of God. That authority is from Ambrosius

in his book De officiis, where he says: “The Church has gold not to hoard it but to spend it and to relieve those in need. What purpose is there in guarding what serves no good? Do we not know how much gold and silver the Assyrians carried off from the temple of the Lord? Is it not better for a priest to melt it down for the nourishment of the poor, if other resources are lacking, than for a sacrilegious enemy to defile and carry it off?” And what follows. Here blessed Ambrosius says that the wealth of the Church should be given not only for the redemption of captives, but also for the nourishment of the poor and for burial — concluding that in these three categories it is lawful to break, melt down, and sell the vessels of the Church, even those that have been consecrated. And he means not only these cases but all similar pious causes — against the more recent prelates of the Church and against certain men of his own time. Now, as I was saying, it is a greater thing to free a soul from purgatory than a body from captivity. Is not the obligation of teaching attached to a prebend? There is an express text in c. penult., de magistris. Nor is the safeguard of the Gloss even necessary. I see no reason why a spiritual and pious condition may not be attached in the giving of a temporal and profane thing. And for the question of simony, it makes no difference whether the spiritual obligation is attached before or at the time of the giving. The same point is evident from the dispute between a certain abbot of ours at Melrose and a certain nobleman of the forest named Alanus, where the Pontiff looked to the intention of Alanus’s father regarding the condition that had been attached.

Against these conclusions the argument is raised again.

From the conclusions and their proofs it follows that if someone gives goods to the Church with a condition attached, then if the Church does not fulfill its promise, the heirs — even by their own authority or that of successors — may revoke those goods. This is an absurd consequence. And that it follows is clear from the proofs for the first conclusion. I reply: a donor may give something to the Church in many ways. In one way, thus: “I give goods to the Church” — even though he intends that the minister live well and spend the surplus on pious uses. In a second way, thus: “I give such-and-such a possession to the Church so that on such-and-such a day each year an anniversary should be celebrated,” adding: “If this is not observed, I and my heirs may revoke the gift.” In a third way: “We may revoke it without the authority of a superior — indeed, by our own authority.” In the first way, the gift is valid and cannot be revoked even if the condition is not observed. In this way churches have been endowed with benefices, for those who endowed a church intended that the revenues be spent for Christ and his ministers. In the second way, the goods may be revoked if the condition is not fulfilled. To this effect there is an express text in c. Verum, de conditionibus appositis in desponsatione, and in other contracts, where the Roman Pontiff says: “Indeed, when any possession is donated to a church under whatever condition, the gift cannot afterward be revoked by the donor, unless perhaps it was conferred under such a condition that upon its cessation the gift ought to be revoked.” And in this way stipends have been granted for the celebration of anniversaries, because this is how common custom regards the matter, unless there is a reasonable impediment. Whence Augustinus says to Casselanus: “Concerning those matters about which divine Scripture has determined nothing certain, the custom of the people of God and the practices of our ancestors are to be regarded as law.” If you say that things once dedicated to churches ought not to be recalled to profane uses, this is true if they were given unconditionally. Concerning the third case, there would be a difficulty. But I hold the position that a person cannot revoke by his own authority but only by the authority of a judge — otherwise it would be sacrilege c. Quicunque militum; c. Nulli, C.12 q.2. And the reason is this: on account of the many wicked persons who are excessively attached to earthly goods, who would fabricate a cause where none exists. If you ask how this arrangement can bind successors to celebrate the anniversary, I reply: the thing passes with its obligation, and a benefice is given on account of the office c. finali, de rescriptis, libro ut — so that on account of the stipend, which is the benefice, they are bound to perform this anniversary office.

For he who receives the benefit ought likewise to bear the burden.

In conclusion, I say that spiritual things are to be exchanged for spiritual things, and a spiritual condition may be added to a profane thing, provided the condition is reasonable — the rationale for which is gathered from the written law and from what follows from it, or from the light of nature and the judgment of prudent men. Certain conditions, however, would be dishonest and contrary to reason — for instance, if a benefice were always to be given to one of one’s kinsmen, since the collator is bound to confer it upon the most suitable person. To attach a condition concerning the celebration of an anniversary each year is in effect the same thing as giving that thing with its attendant obligation to the church and annexing the condition at the time of the donation — which is proved as follows. Either the condition was licit from the beginning, or it was illicit. Not the second, as is well known according to these authorities. If the first: then it can be added at the transfer of the thing just as it could before the transfer. Nor is it necessary to say, “We leave to you such-and-such revenues to be collected each year from such-and-such lands, and we ask you for the love of God to celebrate an anniversary for us each year on such-and-such a day.” I have said that this is not necessary, for that manner of speaking is good, and from the custom of men an obligation could arise from it; but I mean to say that the condition may be attached — and quite distinctly so — as when a Mass is instituted for the feast of Corpus Christi, or when one is to sing the Salve Regina every Saturday before Our Lady, with the condition attached that if they do not fulfill the duty they shall not collect the revenues. For in that case a spur to doing good is given to them, so that the aid of the Christ-bearing Virgin may be implored — just as children are enticed to study or to holy conduct by small gifts. In no different fashion were the nocturnal and diurnal distributions in the church instituted. It is therefore astonishing that there are men who call this into doubt. And it is equally astonishing that others have devised various precautions (as he says) for avoiding simony, when the meaning is the same — as is evident from human custom, and this would be declared so in a court of law. If, however, the heirs of the deceased wished to recover the revenues, or if the church refused to perform the appointed office, people should always understand that the spiritual office is not given for those temporal goods as an ultimate end and as an adequate price. Nor should simple folk be condemned no matter what manner of speaking they employ, since they conform their faith and manner of assent, formally or virtually, to the Church. For if an objection were raised against them that they wrongly judged there to be a purchase or something of the kind, they would say that they thought they were getting the better of the exchange — namely, receiving the spiritual for the temporal — and that they were doing these things for the glory of God and the salvation of their own souls and those of their parents, and that they would wish to be shown how one ought to speak in this matter. Indeed, some people establish numerous obits, assigning revenues to the Friars Minor, who sin by accepting those revenues since it is contrary to their profession. Far be it that those who piously endow revenues should sin, unless they had been instructed on this point — just as the common people who give them money do not sin, because they do not know the friars’ rule and are not bound to know it. It is different for a learned person, who sins because he knowingly cooperates in the sin of those who receive, or does so through vincible ignorance. For what is vincible ignorance for one person is invincible ignorance for another.

Question Seven of the Twenty-Fifth Distinction.

Seventh and last concerning this matter, the question is asked: what is the penalty for simoniacs?

The reply is that although their penalties are manifold, I shall speak only of the graver ones. One penalty is that simoniacs in respect of orders or benefices are excommunicated, and they acquire no right in a benefice. This we stated in the fourth question,

in the proof of the conclusion. And Martin V, in another extravagant issued in the second year of his pontificate at Mantua, which begins Damnabilem, confirms all excommunications, suspensions, deprivations, interdicts, and other censures issued by the supreme pontiffs against simoniacs. He wills that every simoniac, whether secret or manifest, wherever he may have committed simony, of whatever status — even if he holds the dignity of a bishopric or cardinalate, or any other ecclesiastical or temporal dignity — shall incur these penalties by the very fact of the act, reserving to himself the absolution from the said excommunications, suspensions, and penalties except at the point of death. Nor does he will that by virtue of any grant, indult, or any faculty of absolving, whether already granted or to be granted by the Apostolic See, such persons may be absolved, unless the authorization specifically includes the power to absolve from the sin of simony. Eugenius IV willed the same in the extravagant beginning Cum detestabile. So too Paul II in the decree he issued on Holy Thursday, and Sixtus IV. The second penalty concerns restitution, which is more burdensome in the forum of conscience. It is said that the pontiff can dispense from all penalties imposed by canon law — suspension, irregularity, infamy, and excommunication. Let this stand as a first proposition or conclusion, the rationale for which is as follows: there is no purely papal statute that can bind him, for just as an equal has no authority over an equal, so neither does the same person have authority over himself.

Second conclusion.

He cannot dispense so as to make simony committed against the divine law not a sin. Proof: an inferior cannot revoke the law of a superior.

Third proposition.

He can, however, bring it about that an act which would be simoniacal on account of his own prohibition in the case of an inferior is not simoniacal. This follows from the proof of the first proposition. He cannot, however, bring it about that what was a sin in the past was not a sin. Concerning the past, he cannot make the past not to have been past — just as not even God can, as stated in Book 6 of the Ethics of Aristotle.

Fourth proposition.

He can dispense with a pactional simoniac, when money has been given, so that such a person may licitly hold a benefice. Proof: he can give him a new collation of that benefice, and neither natural law nor divine law stands in the way of such a person being capable of holding that benefice; therefore he can confer it upon him. The taint is sufficiently purged when the matter comes into the hands of the lord Digest, De usucapionibus, lex Si fur, and the passage beginning quidam, section si forte; Causa 1, quaestio 1 — that is, just as if I were to hold your horse, obtained by theft, with the horse remaining in my possession, you could transfer ownership of the horse to me, and it would remain mine. Now the pontiff can confer a benefice and can act in advance of ordinary collators, and this is reasonable in the case at hand, because otherwise men would not resign these benefices against their own consciences — although there can be some occasion for purchasing benefices. But concerning the gift of service when there is no pact: if a man is suitable, for whatever purpose he may serve, I do not believe he is bound to restore the benefice. In the same way, if someone acquired a benefice through entreaty or kinship, provided he is suitable, it suffices to repent of the sin, whether or not his principal intention was to obtain the benefice through service or entreaties. This can be shown from the final chapter De simoniis in the Decretals.

But concerning mental simony, among the doctors there is no small difficulty, on account of the final chapter under this rubric — namely, whether a man who has acquired a benefice through mental simony is bound to resign it if the Roman pontiff does not dispense with him. For understanding this, it should be considered that there is one kind of mental simony without any external act, another kind of mental simony with a subsequent external act but without a pact, and another with a subsequent pactional external act. And I understand “pact” here as referring to a gift already given or one promised in expectation. I offer examples. First: I give to a collator a sum of money so that I may have, by real agreement, a benefice, and he accepts on that basis. Concerning this pactional simony, no one calls into doubt that the man is bound to resign the benefice.

to repent, as in c.inquisitionis De accusationibus; and the penalties of excommunication mentioned above have been issued broadly against these persons. Concerning mental simony without an external act, there is no obligation to make restitution — this is certain, for there nothing is given, as was shown in one corollary of the first question. Concerning the second member — that is, when I give money to a prelate so that I may have a benefice at the time it falls vacant, or beforehand, and he knows my intention in giving and accepts with that same intention, yet nothing is said openly between us — there are various positions. Johannes Andreas says that intention alone never gives rise to anything other than mental simony. Panormitanus approves this in c.Tua nos. Against this it is argued: a person acquiring a benefice in this case is bound to restore it, nor does he acquire title to the benefice, as is clear from the authorities cited — for otherwise it would be a disguise for simony, and men would tacitly purchase benefices without any formal pact. And the pontiffs, wishing to remove the stain of simony from among men, speak against this kind most especially, as against a little fox. Moreover, if someone, without the knowledge of the chapter and even of the bishop, committed simony alongside a chapter member, the chapter is bound to resign the benefice — i.q.i. Presentium — therefore a fortiori in our case. And it is clear that the pontiff can dispense with regard to irregularity, infamy, and excommunication. You may say: usurious money must be returned to those who received it on interest, money which the pontiff cannot remit; for simoniacal restitution must be made to the church, which the church can remit if it wishes. Against this: one church cannot remit money belonging to another church. The response given has no force. After this, you may say that usury is prohibited by divine law, whereas simony in respect of a benefice is prohibited by human law alone — but this runs counter to what was said in the second question of this distinction. Johannes Andreas gives some trivial arguments, saying that a man is more strictly bound in respect of a loan than of a benefice; that in simony the mind of both parties can be corrupted, and therefore the condition of the possessor is stronger; whereas in a loan only the lender’s mind is corrupted. The first argument is false: for who is bound to give a benefice to another? In a loan, no such obligation holds, except in a case of necessity. It also happens that in simony only one party’s mind is corrupted, and in usury sometimes both parties’ minds are. Panormitanus, however, in c.fi. departs from his earlier opinion in c.Tua nos, setting out the member under discussion more fully: Sortes gives three hundred ducats to a prelate at the time a prebend is vacant and says nothing; the bishop takes these three hundred and, on account of them, gives the prebend without any pact. This is true simony, and I believe the bishop is bound to restore the money, and the other party acquires no right to the benefice. And it is similar if I were to deposit one thousand ducats so that the bishop would not give a vacant benefice to my brother, believing that by this means the avaricious bishop would give the benefice to my brother, and he in fact does so: then I say that the bishop is bound to restore this money, and my brother acquires no right to the benefice. And in both cases alike, when the effect of mental simony is the motivating cause of obtaining a benefice. There is another kind of mental simony which is not the cause of obtaining a benefice; a benefice or money acquired in such a case need not be restored — as if some suitable person gives a bishop a palfrey with the intention that he grant him a prebend, signifying nothing of this to the bishop: he is already a simoniac in that regard. A year or two later the bishop, remembering both the gift received and the man’s suitability, gives him a benefice for which he is suitable — perhaps the horse he rides on is what prompted the memory. Neither is the bishop bound to restore the grade to him, nor the cleric to restore the prebend, even though mental simony preceded. And this fits differently from what I set out, which suits the present purpose. [Hold that the case in usury and in simony is the same, and what is said of usury applies proportionally here as well. And then, as for the final chapter of this rubric, I say that there the text speaks of a monk, and it was ordained in the council that religious persons admitted for a price, together with those who received them, should be expelled from the monastery and confined in stricter monasteries to perform penance. But those admitted before that council were placed in the same situation as those admitted in